N. N. Kradin

NOMADS of INNER ASIA in TRANSITION



URSS

Н. Н. Крадин

КОЧЕВНИКИ ВНУТРЕННЕЙ АЗИИ В РАЗВИТИИ

НАУКА

РОССИЯ – МИРУ

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NOMADS OF INNER ASIA IN TRANSITION

URSS
MOSCOW

Kradin Nikolay N.

Nomads of Inner Asia in transition.

This book contains some important articles and conferences presentations by Russian archaeologist and anthropologist Nikolay N. Kradin. They are divided into four parts in which the author has made contributions in the field of nomadology. The original conception of the author declares that the pastoral nomads had their specific pathway of socio-cultural evolution. Most of the book is dedicated to questions of the theory of nomadism, anthropology, archaeology, and history in the studying of nomadic life in Inner Asia steppe areas. Chronologically the book comes through the prehistorical and ancient nomads to our-days' Buryats and Tuvinians.

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

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TO MY PARENTS – WITH LOVE

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Author's Preface

Ever and again, each researcher should carry out a revision of attained objectives in order to total all the pluses and to adjust the plans for the future. This book is some result of my studies of nomadism for a quarter of a century. It contains my articles and reports at the conferences on the pastoral nomads written between 2000 and 2013.

Most likely, somebody will write later that my path to the nomadology was logical because I was born in Buryatia and educated in Siberia at Irkutsk State University where a long-standing tradition of investigating the steppe cultures has existed. However, my actual path was somewhat different. At the beginning of my degree course, I took interest in general theory of historical processes. My lecturer and supervisor Pavel Shmygun drew my attention to the subject of the Asiatic mode of production. At that time, it was fashionable. Among a number of progressive intellectuals, the neo-Marxist ideas were popular even in the Brezhnev's period of stagnation. It was dangerous to study the contemporary period and many creative scholars turned to prehistory and anthropology.

As early as the freshman year, I, with impudence inherent usually of laymen, decided to write the big book devoted to the theory of the pre-industrial societies. My supervisor advised me to write a graduate thesis for which I would carry out the comparative analysis of the Oriental, ancient and medieval European, and nomadic societies. I agreed and decided to write first the simplest, as I deemed it, section concerning the pastoral nomads. I became lost in the literature of "terrible" steppe warriors and debates of nomadic feudalism and have remained forever in this domain.

On completion of a course in the University, I embarked upon a professional career in the Institute for History, Archaeology and Ethnography of the Far East Nations, Far-Eastern Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok. I worked under direction of the known Far-Eastern archaeologist, Professor Ernst Shavkunov. He was the first Russian archaeologist engaged in large-scale excavations of the states of Bohai and Jurchen in this territory. As to Mongolian studies, Shavkunov is famous, first of all, for the fact that he together with the known Mongolian archaeologist Perlee discovered the unique historical and juridical monument, manuscript *18 steppe laws*, in the town Kharbukhyn balgaas. I still imagine one day that I should excavate where Shavkunov visited more than 30 years ago.

For the first decade, I was interested, above all things, in theoretical questions of nomadism and ancient nomads. In addition, it was impossible at the time to be engaged in archaeology of Mongolia in Vladivostok and so the Institute had a different specialization. For this reason, the major part of my early works was devoted to the historiography and creation of my own theoretical conception. My graduate thesis (1985) and first book (1987) were devoted to an analysis of discussions about nomadic feudalism in the USSR. In the PhD Thesis (1990), I attempted to prove that, for the nomads, their own path of historical process existed. Since in those times Marxism predominated, this idea was substantiated within the framework of the Marxist historical approach. I put forth an idea of the specific *exopolitarian* (*xenocratic*) mode of production of nomads. This conception was presented in details in my second book *Nomadic Societies* (1992). The book was completed shortly before the collapse of the USSR and, at the time, nobody supposed what global changes our country and the entire world could expect. Nevertheless, I had to face criticism from dogmatic Marxists and a strong counteraction. If I had written such a work some decades before, my destiny would likely have become unenviable.

After August 1991, Russian scholars found themselves in new circumstances in which there was no need to view the world only through the lens of Marxist methodology. The world became more open for us and we acquainted ourselves with other countries, scholarly schools, and articles and books in other languages. Many roads to new knowledge had thus opened before us. That was the very time when I began to realize that it is possible to study and interpret historical processes through various theoretical approaches. However, this is not to say that I discarded my early papers of 1987-1993. In contrast, it seems to me now that these were really modern ideas within the framework of Marxist theory. I assess this from a lively response from Ernst Gellner, who, upon receipt of *Nomadic Societies*, wrote me that this paper, according to him, is evidence of the high potential of creative Marxism.

A few years later, I completed a book on the Xiongnu Empire, the materials for which I began to collect in my student days. One of the first books devoted to nomads and read by me was the book *Xiongnu* by Lew Gumilev. This book charmed me in my students' years. Later on, I again familiarized myself with this great son of two eminent Russian poets. Present-day researchers often, sometimes unduly and blanketly, criticize the works of Gumilev. The sustaining power of a human who went through the GULAGs and persevered as a researcher is worthy of great respect. My own book on the Xiongnu has found its readership as well. It was written specially for the Inter-congress of World Archaeological Congress about the Xiongnu in Ulan-Ude in 1996. Five years later, the book was reprinted in Moscow as a larger edition. This past year, it was translated and published in Mongolia.

In the second half of the 1990s, I engaged in the ethnology of nomadism. Perhaps I am known more for this, as a political anthropologist (my textbook *Political Anthropology* is popular in Russia really and reprinted ten years, 2001–2011), but it is impossible to completely and correctly understand nomadism without field research. As far back as the end of the 1980s, the well-known Russian anthropologist and Professor of Moscow University, Gennady Markov, highly advised me to take part in ethnographical expeditions so as to see objectively the world of nomads. Later on, under the auspices of the eminent nomadologist of the 20th century, Anatoly Khazanov (I consider him my *guru*), I extended the subject matter of my research. Upon his advice, I began to study the transformation processes of pastoralists after the breakup of socialism. At first, for a long period of time, I studied Buryats, and then made several tours of Tuva and, finally, Mongolia has become my subject of research.

Then, at the very beginning of the 21st century, as a result of support from the President of the Mongolian Academy of Sciences, B. Enkhtuvshin, and Corresponding Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Boris Bazarov, I was among the participants of the International UNESCO Expedition in Mongolia from 2001-2002. These were momentous journeys. Only those who have unfortunately been restricted to literary sources for the study of pastoral nomads can understand my feelings when for the first time I passed the Russian-Mongolian frontier. And although I presently visit Mongolia every year, the first two journeys were momentous. In my personal files are the field books of these expeditions. Some day the time will come to publish them. Now I cannot imagine myself or my academic endeavors without ethnography of Mongolian nomads. It gave me a tremendous understanding of nomads, and now perhaps I would write some of my previous conclusions a different way.

Finally, I succeeded, at a later date, to reach a dream of my students years – to engage in the archaeology of nomads within the territories of Mongolia, thanks again to the friendly help of B. Enkhtuvshin. Since 2004, a joint expedition of Mongolian and Russian researchers has conducted archaeological investigations of urbanization processes in the nomadic empires of Mongolia. Ten years of excavations at intriguing sites has accrued, and the full array of books and articles out of this work has yet to be published. I hope that new and interesting discoveries are still yet to come.

During these years, I have deduced that only a complex approach to nomadism – from the integrated perspectives of history, cultural anthropology, and archaeology – will allow us to understand the essence of nomadism and the related historical-cultural phenomena. A focused specialization within only one of these scientific disciplines does not provide a chance to accomplish a broad, complex coverage of the subject of interest. Insofar as I am able, I have tried myself to follow this principle of multi-disciplinary research.

The researcher should try to obtain objective information from several different categories of resources. The written sources of neighboring agrarian civilizations provide for us an *etic* description of steppe nomads. The real researcher, however, must not merely follow such external definitions of provided by city-dwelling narratives. Sedentary people have long depicted nomads as weird creatures and even monsters, centaurs, half-humans and half-horses. This is the traditional joint perspective of *Orientalism* and *Sedentarism*.* Archaeology, anthropology, and even runic inscriptions and folklore show us a more *emic* understanding of pastoral people. But a skilled researcher cannot merely combine these corpuses of information, but instead must know how to incorporate and navigate both the *Scylla* of sedentarist historical narratives and *Charybdis* of ethnic nationalism. This is the only way to maximize a deep and objective understanding of the nature of steppe pastoral nomads.

***

The papers collected in this volume were previously published in the sources or presented at the conferences listed below:

Chapter 1. Nomadism, Evolution, and World-Systems: Pastoral Societies in Theories of Historical Development. *Journal of World-System Research*, 2002, Vol. VIII, No 3, p. 368-388.

Chapter 2. Nomadic Empires in Evolutionary Perspective. *Alternatives of Social Evolution*. Ed. by N.N. Kradin, A.V. Korotayev, D.M. Bondarenko, V. de Munck, and P.K. Wason. Vladivostok: Far Eastern Division of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2000, p. 274-288.

Chapter 3. Ernest Gellner and Debates on Nomadic Feudalism. *Social Evolution and History*, 2003, Vol. 2, No 2, p. 162-176 (revised version).

Chapter 4. Cultural Complexity of Pastoral Nomads. *World Cultures*, 2006, Vol. 15, No 2, p. 171-189.

Chapter 5. The Social Stratification of the Xiongnu Nomadic Empire in Baikal Area. Paper presented at the Second Eurasian archaeology conference "Social orders and social landscapes: Interdisciplinary approaches to Eurasian archaeology". Chicago, USA (May 2005).

Chapter 6. Settled Population in the Xiongnu Empire: Ivolga fortress settlement example. *New Perspectives on Xiongnu Studies in Ancient East Asian Culture*. Seoul: Korean Association of Central Asian Studies & Pykyong National University, 2010, p. 59-90.

Chapter 7. New Approaches and Challenges for the Xiongnu Studies. *Xiongnu and its Eastward Neighbours*. Seoul, 2012, p. 35-51.

Chapter 8. North and South in the Dynamics of Inner Asia: the Movement of Peoples, Empires, and Technologies. *III Northern Archaeological Congress*. Papers. Ed. by A.V. Golovnev. Ekaterinburg and Khanty-Mansiisk: Izdatnaukaservis, 2010, p. 237-266.

Chapter 9. Structure of Society and Power in the Ancient Inner Asian Nomadic Empires: Xiongnu and Xianbei. *Representing Power in Ancient Inner Asia: Legitimacy, Transmission and the Sacred*. Ed. by R.Hamayon, I. Charleux, G.Delaplace, and S.Pearce. Bellingham: Western Washington University Press, 2010, p. 307-341.

Chapter 10. Liao Dynasty as a Nomadic Empire. *The International Conference on "Cultural Diversity of Nomads"*. Ulaanbaatar: International Institute for the Study of Nomadic Civilizations, 2011, p. 25-34.

Chapter 11. The Mongols Empire and Debates of the Nomadic States Origins. Paper presented at the Symposium "New Perspectives to the Studies on the Mongol Empire" (51st International Conference of Eastern Studies). Tokyo, Japan (May 2006).

Chapter 12. Chinggis Khan, World System Analysis and Preindustrial Globalization. *Entelequia. Revista Interdisciplinar*, 2013, No 15, p. 169-188.

Chapter 13. Transformation of Peasant Pastoralism among the Aginsky Buryats, end of XX – Beginning of XXI Centuries. *Proceedings of the International Conference "Dialog between Cultures and Civilizations: Present State and Perspectives of Nomadism in a Globalizing World"*. Ed. by J. Janzen and B. Enkhtuvshin. Ulaanbaatar: Admon Printing Press, 2008, p. 153-158.

Chapter 14. The Transition of Tuvinian Pastoralism in Contemporary Perspective. Paper presented at the International Conference "Pastoral Societies of Central Asia and Siberia: History and Anthropology". Kirgizia, Bushkek (May 2010).

Chapter 15. Between Khans and Presidents. Anthropology of Politics in Post-Soviet Central Asia. *Social Evolution & History*, 2010, Vol. 9, No 1, p. 150-172.

Chapter 16. Post-Soviet Power in Anthropological Perspective. *State, Society, and Transformation*. Ed. by B. A. Mitchneck. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011, p. 50-76.

* *Sedentarism* is deemed here an equivalent of *Orientalism* with respect to pastoral nomads. The term as referenced here was coined by the Kirghiz researcher N. Kadyrmyshev.

Part One

THEORETICAL FOUNDATION

1

NOMADISM, EVOLUTION, AND WORLD-SYSTEMS: PASTORAL SOCIETIES IN THEORIES OF HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT

Introduction

In the modern social sciences and history, there are four groups of theories that variously explain basic principles of origin, further change and, sometimes, collapse of complex human social systems. The first of these groups is the various unilinear theories of development or evolution (Marxism, neoevolutionism, modernization theories etc.). They show how humanity has evolved from local groups of primitive hunters to the modern post-industrial world society. The second ones are theories of civilizations. The proponents of these theories argue that there is no unified world history. Rather there are separate clusters of cultural activity that constitute qualitatively different civilizations. The civilizations, like living organisms, are born, live and die (Spengler 1918; Toynbee 1934 etc.).

The world-systems perspective and multilinear theories of social evolution are intermediate between these poles. The world-system approach (Wallerstein 1974 etc.; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Sanderson 1999 etc.), like unilinear theories of development distinguish three models of society: mini-systems, world-empires and world-economies. But they are considered in space rather than in time. This makes the conceptualization of history more complete. The modern multilinear theories (Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000; Korotayev, Kradin, de Munck, Lynsha 2000 etc.) suppose that there are several possible paths of socio-political transformation. Some of these can lead to complexity, e.g. from a chiefdom to a true state; while others suppose the existence of the supercomplex community without a bureaucracy (e.g. Greek polises); while a third group preserves the tribal system under particular ecological conditions. I propose to call this school *multievolutionism*.

In this paper I will consider the prospects of various methodologies in studying the nomadic societies. I begin with the theories of historical stages.

Social evolution

Social evolution among pastoral nomads has not been well conceptualised. In general essays on cultural evolution nomads are only touched upon indirectly. The emphasis in these books is on the evolution of agrarian cultures and civilizations (Sahlins 1968; Service 1971; Adams 1975; Johnson and Earle

1987; Earle 1997 etc.). Some attention to this problem has been given by Marxist anthropologists (see details on this discussion in: Khazanov 1975; 1984; Markov 1976; Kogan 1980; Halil Ismail 1983; Gellner 1988; Bonte 1990; Kradin 1992; Masanov 1995; etc.). The prolonged debate about the essence of nomadic societies (including the concept of "nomadic feudalism") did not lead to the emergence of a generally accepted theory. But some theories have been discarded, especially the orthodox Marxist scheme of five formations. Other viewpoints (e.g. *pre-class* society of nomads, *early state*, different interpretations of *feudalism* among nomads, conceptions of *nomadic mode of production*) continue to contend up to present (see Kradin 1992).

For years in anthropology there has been a tradition of following Herbert Spencer in his understanding of social evolution as "change from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity, through successive differentiation and integrations" (Carneiro 1973: 90). As H.J.M. Claessen (2000) showed in his brilliant review of neoevolutionism, the current concepts of social evolution are much more flexible. It is apparent that social evolution has no single line of development. Many channels of evolution do not lead to the development of complexity. The obstacles in the way of increasing complexity are vast, and stagnation, decline and even collapse are just as typical of the evolutionary process as any progressive increase in complexity or structural differentiation. One can agree with Claessen's characterization of social evolution as a qualitative reorganization of society from one structural state into another.

Nomadic societies are a good confirmation of these ideas. A cyclical movement among pastoral cultures has predominated over the development of complexity (but this is a feature not only of nomadic societies [see Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Hall 2001]). Nomads have many times united into large political formations and created great empires that have subsequently disintegrated. The *xenocratic* empires of nomads (based on conquest or extraction of surplus from agrarian societies) represent the upper limits of complexity reached by pastoral societies (Barfield 1991; 1992; Hall 1998). Central Asian steppe nomads did not independently evolve beyond this stage of integration. There was an insuperable barrier determined by the rigid ecological conditions of the arid steppe environment.

This view of nomadic societies is shared by the majority of nomadologists of different countries (Lattimore 1940; Bacon 1958; Krader 1963; Khazanov 1975; 1984; Markov 1976; Kradin 1992; Masanov 1995 etc.). Regarding the problem of general evolution, I think that three levels of cultural integration of pastoral nomads are revealed, falling into an order of increasing political complexity as follows:

1. Acephalous segmentary clan and tribal formations;
2. "Secondary" tribe and chiefdom;

3. Nomadic empires and "quasi-imperial" pastoral polities of smaller sizes.

A changeover from one level to another could occur in either direction (Kradin 2000). It is the critical peculiarity of nomadic social evolution that transformation of the political systems did not correlate with other criteria of social complexity. The political system of nomads could easily evolve from the acephalous level to more complicated organizations of power and *vice versa*, but such formal indicators as increase in population density, complex technologies, increase in structural differentiation and functional specialization did not occur.

When transforming from tribal pastoral systems to nomadic empires only a growth in the total population (due to the addition of conquered populations) takes place. The political system becomes more complex and the total number of hierarchical levels increases.

From the viewpoint of anthropological theories of social evolution, the key problem is whether or not the nomads could create their own statehood? How should the nomadic empires be classified in anthropological theories of evolution? These questions are currently discussed by researchers of different countries and, especially, by Marxist anthropologists. It should be noted that for the Marxist theory of historical progress, nomadism has become a stumbling block similar to the "Asiatic mode of production." How could unchanging or cyclical nomadic societies be interpreted within a framework of the common march of the production modes? A unilinear Marxist theory of social progress assumed, primordially, changes from lowest economical forms to the highest ones.

However, the economic "basis" of pastoral societies has remained unchanged: the similarities among the modern Masai and Arabs with the ancient Xiongnu is very great. Thus, nomadism drops out of a unilinear Marxist dialectic of history. On the other hand, if the economic "basis" of society did not change, then the "superstructure" should be unchanged. But the "superstructure" of the pastoral nomads varied greatly. The nomads created giant steppe empires, which later disintegrated to separate Khanates or acephalous lineage societies and all of this cal structure of the nomadic society to confiscate prestigious goods from adjacent societies and international sovereignty.

With respect to internal relations the "state-like" empires of nomads (apart from some quite explainable exceptions) were based on non-forcible (consensual and gift-exchange) relations and they existed at the expense of the external sources without establishment of taxation on the live stockbreeders. All basic economic processes in the stockbreeding society were realized within the limits of individual households. For this reason, there was no need for specialized bureaucratic machinery engaged in the administration-distribution activities.

On the other hand, all social contradictions were solved within the framework of traditional institutions of maintenance of internal political stability. A strong pressure upon nomads could cause a decampment or use of retaliatory violence because each free nomad was a warrior at the same time.

Finally, in the nomadic empires, the main sign of statehood was absent. According to many current theories of the state, the main distinction between statehood and pre-state forms lies in the fact that a chiefdom's ruler has only consensual power i.e., in essence authority, whereas, in the state, the government can apply sanctions with the use of legitimated force (Service 1975:16, 296–307; Claessen and Skalnik 1978:21–22, 630, 639–40 etc.). The power character of the rulers of the steppe empires was mainly consensual and prevented a monopoly of legal organs. The Shan-yu, Khan or Khagan was primarily a redistributor, and his power was provided by personal abilities and ability to obtain prestige goods from the outside and to redistribute them among subjects.

It is beyond question that this political system cannot be considered as a true state. However, this is not to say that the nomadic administration structure was primitive. The complex societies that Gordon Childe called *civilization* could appear without the bureaucratic organization of administration. The extensive investigations by specialists in the field of ancient history show that the Greek polis was not a true state. Statehood, with its intrinsic bureaucracy, appears fairly late – in the epoch of post-Alexandrian Hellenistic states and in the Roman Empire (Staerman 1989; Berent 2000). However, what term should be used to describe the polities of nomads? Considering their non-state features I prefer to characterize the nomadic polities as **supercomplex chiefdoms** (Kradin 1992; 2000; Trepavlov 1995; Skrynnikova 1997; 2000).

The nomadic empires, as supercomplex chiefdoms, provide a real prototype of a particular kind of early state. The population of typical complex chiefdoms is usually estimated in tens of thousands of people (see, for example: Johnson and Earle 1987: 314) and they are typically ethnically homogenous. But the population of a multi-national supercomplex chiefdom of nomads may have hundreds contradicts the principles of a unilinear Marxist theory of historical evolution (Gellner 1988:93–97, 114).

The advocates of the concept of nomadic feudalism and the Engels/Stalin scheme of five modes of production emphasized the difference in economical and cultural development between nomads and agrarian civilizations, thereby overestimating the level of the economic "basis" of pastoralism. In these theoretical schemes, many facts were falsified and fitted to the Procrustean bed of the dogmatic Marxism of the Soviet Union. So, the erroneous division into "early" (pre-feudal and slave-owning societies in ancient Eurasia) and "late" (medieval feudal) nomads has arisen.

Advocates of the concept of the pre-class development of nomads subjected the concept of "nomad feudalism" to criticism (Markov 1976 etc.). As "true" Marxists, they concentrated on the development level of the economic "basis" of pastoralists. If the "basis" of ancient nomads was not a class one, then the "basis" of the later pastoralists must not be based on class either. On the other hand, primitive "superstructure" should be adjusted to primitive "basis". Therefore, nomads in this approach to social evolution have only approached the late primitive (pre-class, pre-feudal etc.) stage.

This development in the discussions of Russian nomadologists was already obvious. For example, analysis of the samples from the *Ethnographic Atlas* of George Murdock (1967) indicates that almost all ethnohistorical known nomads have not approached the state level and nor have they had class stratification (see Korotayev 1991:157, table XI). But the conclusion relative to the pre-state nature of all nomads led to underestimating the development level of the "superstructure" for a number of pastoral societies – the great steppe empires. These empires were also declared pre-state, but were their political organizations really of the same type as that of the Nuer, Hottentots or Kazaks and Kalmyks? At present there are two popular groups of theories explaining the origin and essence of the early state. The *conflict* or *control* theories show the origin of statehood and its internal nature in the context of the relations between exploitation, class struggle, war and interethnic predominance. The *integrative* theories were largely oriented to explaining the phenomenon of the state as a higher stage of economic and public integration (Fried 1967; Service 1975; Claessen and Skalnik 1978; 1981; Cohen and Service 1978; Haas 1982; 1995; Gailey and Patterson 1988; Pavlenko 1989 etc.).

However the majority of nomadic empires cannot be unambiguously interpreted as either chiefdoms or states from the viewpoint of either the conflict or the integrationist approaches. The similarity of the steppe empires to true states clearly manifests itself in relations with the outer world only (military-hierarchy of thousands of people, or more. Some of the nomadic confederacies of Central Asia have had as many as one and half million pastoral nomads. And their territory was several orders greater than areas needed for simple and complex chiefdoms.

Nomads need a great area of land for pastures! From the viewpoint of neighboring agricultural civilizations (developed preindustrial states), such nomadic societies have sometimes been perceived as independent subjects of international political relations and, quite often, as equal in status to the agrarian empires. These chiefdoms had a complex system of titles of chiefs and functionaries, held diplomatic correspondence with neighboring countries, contracted dynastic marriages with agricultural states, neighboring nomadic empires and "quasi-imperial" polities of nomads.

With regard to their settlement systems and urban constructions the nomadic societies had more than temporary camps. Already the Xiongnu began to erect fortified settlements, while the "headquarters" of the empires of the Uighur and the Mongols were true towns. The construction of splendid burial-vaults and funeral temples for representatives of the steppe elite (e.g. the Pazyryk burial mounds at al Altai, the Scythian burial mounds in Northern Black Sea Area, the burials located in Mongolian Noin-Ula, the burial mounds of the Saks time in Kazakhstan, the statues of Turkish and Uighur Khagans in Mongolia etc.) were monumental achievements. In several supercomplex chiefdoms the elite attempted to introduce written records (e.g. Xiongnu and Turks), while there is a temptation to call some of the nomadic empires (especially the Mongolian Ulus of the first decades of thirteenth century) true states.

This is supported by the existence of a system of laws (*Yasa,* the so-called Blue Book – *Koko Defter Bichik*), as well as legal organs of power, written clerical work and efforts to introduce taxation under Ogodei (Kradin 1995b).

Nomadic empires and multilinear evolution

The empire is one of the forms of the state. Specific signs of empires are: (1) the presence of large territories; and (2) the presence of a "metropolis" of the empire and peripheral subsystems dependent on the metropolis (Eisenstadt 1963; Thapar 1981; Kradin 1992; Barfield 2000). The fundamental difference between the nomadic empires was that their "centers" were highly developed only in the military aspect, while they were less developed than the exploited or conquered territories in socio-economic complexity and other attributes of civilization.

They were actually "peripheries" in themselves. In this case, the nomadic empire can be defined as nomadic society organized on the military-hierarchical principle, occupying a quite large space and exploiting the nearby territories, as a rule, by external forms of exploitation (robbery, war and indemnity, extortion of "presents," non-equivalent trade and tribute). One can identify the following attributes of nomadic empires: (1) multistage hierarchical character of the social organization penetrated at all levels by tribal and super-tribal genealogical ties; (2) dualistic organization (into "wings") or triadic organization (into the "wings" and center) as the principle of administrative division of the empire; (3) military-hierarchical character of the social organization of the center of the empire, more often, on the "decimal principle"; (4) coachman service (*yam*) as a specific way of organizing the administrative infrastructure; (5) a specific system of power inheritance (empire as the property of the whole khan clan, the institution of co-government–*"kuriltai"*); and (6) specific character of relations with the agricultural world (Kradin 1992; 1995a; 1996; 2000).

It is necessary to distinguish the classical steppe nomadic empires from (1) the similarly mixed agricultural/ pastoral empires in which the nomadic element played a great role (the Arabian caliphates, the states of Seljuks, Dunai and Volga Bulgaria, the Ottoman Empire) and (2) the "quasi-imperial" nomadic state formations which were smaller than empires (European Huns, Avars, Hungarians, Priazov Bulgaria, Kara-kitans, and the Tatar khanates after the collapse of the Golden Horde).

Nomadic empires were organized in the form of "imperial confederations" (Barfield 1981; 1991; 1992; 2000). The confederations had an autocratic and statelike look from the outside. They were created to bring the surplus products of agrarian peasants to the steppe nomads. Their inner structure was consultative and tribal in form. The stability of steppe empires directly depended on the ability of the imperial confederation to extract silk, agricultural products, handicraft articles and delicate jewels from the settled territories. As these products could not be produced under conditions of a stockbreeding economy, obtaining them by use of force and extortion was the priority task of the ruler of nomadic society.

By becoming the sole intermediary between China and the Steppe, the ruler of a nomadic society endeavored to control the redistribution of plunder obtained from China and, thereby to strengthen his own power. This organized accumulation allowed him to maintain the existence of an empire that could not have existed on the basis of the extensive pastoral economy.

The chiefs of the tribes that made up a steppe empire were incorporated into a military hierarchy of the "hundreds" and "thousands." However, their internal policy was to a certain degree independent of the policy of the center. This peculiarity has been thoroughly analyzed by Thomas Barfield using the example of the Xiongnu Empire (1981, 1991; 1992: 32–84). A certain degree of autonomy of the pastoral tribes was promoted by the following factors: (1) economic independence made them potentially independent of the center; (2) basic sources of power (predatory wars, redistribution of tribute and other external subsidies, external trade) were quite unstable and involved relations outside the steppe world; (3) general armament restricted the possibility of political pressure upon tribes; (4) for the tribal groupings displeased by a policy of a Khan, the opportunity of moving to new places, desertion under the protection of the agricultural civilization or revolt with the aim of overthrowing the disagreeable ruler were feasible alternatives.

A mechanism connecting the "government" of the steppe empire and pastoral tribes was the institution of the gift economy. By manipulating gifts and distributing them among comrades-in-arms and tribal chiefs, the ruler of

the steppe empire strengthened his potential influence and prestige as the "generous khan". Simultaneously, he bound the persons receiving gifts by the "liability" of the return gift. Tribal chiefs receiving gifts might, on the one hand, satisfy their personal appetites and might on the other hand, strengthen their intratribal status by a distribution of gifts to fellow tribesmen or by organizing ceremonial feasts. In addition to receiving a gift from the ruler, the tribal chief felt as if he also received some part of the ruler's supernatural charisma and that contributed additionally to rise of his own prestige. The integration of tribes into the imperial confederation was also achieved by inclusion in the genealogical kindred of different stockbreeding groups, diverse collective arrangements and ceremonies (seasonal meetings of chiefs and festivals, battles, erection of monumental funeral structures etc.).

A certain role in the institutionalization of the power of the rulers of nomadic societies was played by their performance of the functions of a sacred intermediary between the society and Heaven (*Tenggeri*). Subject to the religious conceptions of nomads, a ruler of a steppe society (Shan-yu, Khaghan, Khan) personified the society's center and, in virtue of his divine abilities, performed rituals that were thought to provide prosperity and stability to the society. These functions were deemed to be of colossal importance for the society. Therefore, in the case of natural stress or disease and loss of livestock, an unlucky Khan could weaken or lose his charisma. The unlucky Khan or chief could be replaced in some nomadic societies or even killed. But ideology was never a predominant variable in power among the nomads. The life of the steppe society was filled with real alarms and dangers that required quick action from the leader. The power of rulers of the steppe empires of Central Asia was mainly based on their ability to extract external surplus product (Kradin 1992, 1996).

The most interesting and novel feature of the steppe empires was their dual structure. From outside they appeared to be despotic aggressive state-like societies because they were formed to extract surplus product from outside the steppe.

But from within the nomadic empires remained based on the tribal relations without the establishment of taxation and exploitation of the stockbreeders. The force of power of the steppe society's ruler was, as a rule, based on his ability to redistribute earnings of trade, tribute and raids from neighboring countries. From the viewpoint of multilinear evolution the steppe empires were rather different from other early states as well as from most complex chiefdoms. This observation provides justification for telling the story of the particular independent way of evolution of pastoral nomads.

Nomadic civilization

I refer now to the comparative civilizations approach developed by Sorokin, Toynbee and others. In 1934 Toynbee suggested that pastoral nomads could constitute a special form of solidified civilization. It is beyond question that pastoral nomadism is a special world that stands in opposition to the world of agrarian civilizations. But *nomadic civilization* is a metaphor rather than a scientific definition.

If the culture of nomads is defined as a civilization then why not also the "civilizations" of hunter-gatherers or horticulturalists? In other words, all types of human cultures could be characterized as civilizations.

Can the attributes specific to *pastoral nomadic civilization* be identified? The majority of similar attributes (specific relation to time and space, hospitality custom, developed system of fictive kin relationships, modest needs, unpretentiousness, powers of endurance, militarization of society etc.) can also be found in other types of societies. Perhaps, only the special cult relation to the livestock, main source of subsistence of nomads, distinguishes them from all other societies. In the thinking of Toynbee each civilization is based on a particular psycho-cultural unity and goes through the stages of growth, prosperity and collapse.

Nomadism is something other than civilization. Its prosperity occurred during the very long period from the First millennium BCE to the middle of the Second millennium CE. During this period a number of settled-agricultural civilizations appeared and collapsed. The same fate was met for many nomadic societies during the period of nomadic steppe empires. It is not likely that the nomads thought of themselves as a unified cultural group standing in opposition to other nations and civilizations. Hyksos and Xiongnu, medieval Arabian and Mongolian Kereyid, Nuer from Sudan and reindeer-breeder from Arctic have been assigned not only to different ethnic groups, but belonged to different cultural communities. Of course some pastoral nomadic societies could contribute to the core of an emergent civilization (e.g. Arabians), while others could play the role of "barbarian" periphery of an agrarian civilization (Hyksos before the conquest of Egypt) while others could appear beyond the civilizational process prior to the beginning of modern Western colonialism (e.g. Nuers, Chukchi).

It is more accurate to tell about the separate large nomadic patterns rather than to try to erect a large general category based on the notion of pastoral nomadic civilization. The Russian historian Lev Gumilev (1989) has associated the processes of the origin and development of civilization with particular geographical zones. From this viewpoint, the Arabian Peninsula was such an area where in seventh century CE the Arabian civilization emerged. Inner Asia was also a specific geographical zone. In opinion of a number of authors, the unified steppe civilization has been here in existence beginning with the

Xiongnu time (or even earlier) (Perlee 1978; Urbanaeva 1994 etc.). These scientists identified the following characteristic signs of the civilization under consideration: administrative division into wings, decimal numeration, ideas of power, enthronization ceremonies, love for horse and camel races, a particular world outlook, etc.

It is easy to note that many of these signs are among the attributes of pastoral nomadic empires mentioned above. Nevertheless, of all versions of the civilization approach, only this is worthy of notice as applied to the history of nomadic stockbreeders.

A further popular idea is the theory of the *nomadic mode of production* (Markov 1967; Bonte 1990). This discourse has emerged in Marxist anthropology. The nomadic mode of production is conceived as a technological mode of production rather than a social one. It is thus compared with hunting, fishing, and agriculture rather than with primitive, Asiatic, feudal and other social modes of production. On the basis of one technological mode of production, different social modes of production could exist. The model of the nomadic mode of production is a too generalized pattern. All possible political formations of nomadic societies fall into the framework of this unified model. But African Nuers live in the separate lineages and are only united by very complicated genealogical ties.

The same social organization was probably characteristic of ancient Ukhians roaming from place to place on the Inner Mongolia steppe. Tuaregs, Kalmyks and Kazakhs had a developed inner property and social stratification. They were consolidated in tribal confederations that included several tens of thousands of people. Xiongnu, Turks, and Mongols organized steppe empires that included many hundreds of thousands (even up to million and more) nomads (Barfield 1992; Kradin 1996 etc.). The differences in the complexity of social political system between Nuers and Ukhuans, on the one hand, and Xiongnu and Mongols, on the other, are considerable. For this reason, I reject the use of the notion of a nomadic mode of production.

Russian social science has, in recent decades, devoted a lot of attention to producing a synthesis between the theories of *social stages* and *civilizational approaches*. It is fundamentally impossible to do this completely on the basis of orthodox Marxism. At the same time, another powerful theoretical line has emerged – the world-systems approach. Within this framework the methodological synthesis between the evolutionary approach to history (from the lineage reciprocity mini-systems to the capitalist world-system based on the commodity-money relations) and the perspective of history as a totality of different large regional systems (e.g. world-empires, world-economies) has been successfully combined.

Nomadic societies and world-empire dynamics

In accordance with the world-systems approach, the main unit of development is a great system which includes groups of polities rather than a single country.

In this group, the "center" (core) is identified, which exploits a "periphery". The core has a higher level of technology and production and more complex internal structure and gets maximum profit. The core societies pump out the resources of the periphery, organize financial and trade flows, and arrange the economic space of the system (Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 1984; Ekholm and Friedman 1979; Santley and Alexander 1982; Rowlands, Larsen, and Kristiansen 1987 etc.; Frank, Gills 1994; Hall 1996; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; 2000; Chase-Dunn 1998; Sanderson 1999 etc.).

I. Wallerstein identifies three modes of production: (1) mini-systems based on reciprocation, (2) redistributive world-empires, (3) capitalist world-system (world-economy) based on the commodity and money relations (1984: 160ff).

The world-empires exist to exact tributes and taxes from provinces and captured colonies that are redistributed by the bureaucratic government. The distinctive feature of world-empires is administrative centralization and the predominance of the polity over the economy, according to Wallerstein.

However, such an approach to the evolution of preindustrial systems is incomplete. It is necessary to note two important circumstances. First, in addition to the hierarchical world-empires, there were also peer-polity systems (Frank 1992; Frank, Gills 1994; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997). Ancient Greece and medieval Europe served as examples of the coexistence of multi-polity systems (see Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Andrey Korotayev has shown that the West was no exception. In ancient Arabia, several centers and peripheral systems have coexisted in what he calls a "multipolity" (Korotayev 1995; 1996). Therefore, in the preindustrial period, a division of labor between separate elements of regional systems could be performed on the basis of different models of interaction.

Secondly, it is necessary to clarify how many such models and preindustrial modes of production (I use here this term so as it is understood by Wallerstein) there could, in principle, be? This question was formulated by Andrey Fursov who moved an emphasis from the traditional Marxist problem "how many modes of production have existed in history" to another plane (1989:298). Two models of interaction are known: redistributive "World-empires" and polycentric "World-economies" (Chase-Dunn 1988; Frank, Gills 1994). As to the modes of production, it is more complex. Fursov has created a solid social philosophical theory in which all the main present-day theories were synthesized. In this opinion, living labor manifests itself in two forms– individual and collective.

The more developed is production, the more independent is collective labor. In preindustrial systems, a relationship of collective (C) and individual (I) is fixed in the social organization (*Gemeinwesen*). Only three types of relationship are possible: C > I, C = I, C < I. They correspond to the "Asiatic", "Ancient", and Germanic' forms of *Gemeinwesen* identified by Marx.

I would like to add something to Fursov's classification. His classification lacks an important type: C > C, when one collective exploits another one. The pastoral nomadic empires occupy this place. They were also redistributive societies. But they differed from the agrarian empires and the "Asiatic" mode of production (where a government levied a tribute and taxes on its subjects) On the steppes the pastoral economy of nomads was carried out within the family-related and lineage groups and based on mutual aid and reciprocation.

Redistribution only affected the external sources of the empire's income: plunder, tribute, trading duties and gifts. The nomads, in a given situation, took the part of "class-society" and "state-society", rising as a building over the settled-agrarian foundation. For this, the nomad elite performed the functions of bureaucracy and commanders, while the ordinary pastoralists were the soldiers of expansion and repressions. Such a society might be called **xenocratic** (Kradin 1992; 1993; 1995a; 1996; 2000).

There is some similarity between the **xenocratic** pastoral polity and "African" mode of production of K. Coquery-Vidrovitch (1969) as well "tribute-paying" formation S. Amin (1976:13–19; 1991). They are made similar by a dependence of the government on the external sources of subsistence as well as by the semiperipheral position in the international division of labor. The concept of semiperiphery was introduced by Wallerstein to designate the intermediate zone between the center and periphery. The semiperiphery is exploited by the core but itself exploits a periphery as well as being an important stabilizing element in the world division of labor. I. Wallerstein argues that the three tiered structure is characteristic of many organizations. The intermediate tier provides flexibility and elasticity of the whole system (e.g. centrist parties, middle classes, etc.).

The concept of the semiperiphery was developed mainly to describe processes in the present-day capitalist world-system. In the preindustrial period, some functions of the semiperiphery could be performed by the trading city-states of ancient times and the middle ages (Tyre, Carthage, Venice, Genoa, Malacca). Marcher states that conquered core regions to form larger empires were often also originally located in semiperipheral regions (e.g. Akkad in Mesopotamia, Macedonia, Rome) (Chase-Dunn 1988; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997).

The Central Asian steppe empires of nomads were also the militarist "satellites" of agrarian civilizations as this process was figuratively pictured by Owen Lattimore (1962) – "barbarism is a result of civilization." However, the nomads also performed important intermediary functions between distant core

regions. Similar to seafarers, they provided the connections for flows of goods, finances, technological and cultural information and epidemic diseases between the islands of the settled economy and urban civilization.

However, it would be an error to consider the nomadic empires as representing the semiperiphery. The semiperiphery is often exploited by the core, whereas the nomadic empires were never exploited by agrarian civilizations. Any society of the semiperiphery aspires to technological and production growth.

The mobile mode of life of pastoral nomads did not provide the opportunity to make great accumulations (livestock could be accumulated but the quantities were limited by the productivity of the pastures and this natural "bank" could at any instant go bankrupt due to drought or snowstorm) and their society was based on the gift economy. All plunder was distributed by the rulers of the steppe empires between the tribal chiefs and stockbreeders and consumed during mass festive occasions. The nomadic societies were doomed to remain peripheral.

Only conquest of the core allowed them to become a "center". But for this purpose it was necessary to cease to be a nomad. The Great Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai realized this: "Although you inherited the Chinese Empire on horseback, you cannot rule it from that position." There is a close temporal relationship between the prosperity of the agrarian core state and the power of the nomadic empires. It was most usually the case that the steppe empires arose and were sustained during periods in which the imperial agrarian state was also strong and prosperous. In Inner Asia this correlation is especially clear for here there are many areas of pasture that made possible the formation of a large steppe empire from tribes and chiefdoms. The Han dynasty and Xiongnu Empire arose during the same decade. The Turkish Khaganate arose just as China was united under the power of the dynasties of Sui and, later, T'ang. And, in contrast, the periods of crisis in the fourth, fifth and tenth centuries in China led to political entropy in the steppe areas.

This phenomenon gave ground to the Japanese historian J. Tamura's identification of two long cycles in the history of Northern Eurasia: (1) the cycle of ancient nomadic empires within the arid zone of Inner Asia (second century BCE – ninth century CE): Xiongnu, Xianbei, Jou-jan, Turks, Uighurs; (2) the cycle of the medieval conquest dynasties coming from the forest (Jurchen, parts. The Second Khaganate of the Turks and Uighurs was unable to restore unity in Eurasia. As a result of the next conflict in China and drought on the Mongolian steppes, the peoples of Manchuria – Khitans and Jurchen – began to play the leading part.

The Mongolian storm of the thirteenth century coincided with a new period of moistening in Mongolia and the steppes of Eastern Europe (Ivanov and Vasiljev 1995: 205 table 25) and with a demographic and economic upturn

in all parts of the Old World. This brought the culmination of the history of preindustrial empires. The Mongols merged a chain of international trade into the united complex of land and sea routes. For the first time, all the great regional cores (Europe, Muslim area, India, China, and Golden Horde) proved to be united in the first Eurasian-wide empire (Abu-Lughod 1989; Barfield 1991; Hall 1996; Wilkinson 1996; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997). On the steppe, similar to fantastic mirages, there arose gigantic cities – centers of political power, transit trade, multinational culture and ideology (Karakorum, Sarai-Batu, Sarai-Berke). From this time, political and economical changes in some parts of the world began to play a much greater part in the history of distant other parts of the world.

The existence of the first Eurasian-wide empire did not last long. The plague, the ejection of the Mongols from China and the decline of the Golden Horde became the most important links of the chain of events that conditioned its downfall. Demographers mark the serious crisis in all its main sub-centers in the period of 1350–1450 (Biraben 1979). At the beginning of fifteenth century, the first Eurasia-wide empire disintegrated. Tamerlane's desperate efforts to restore the transcontinental trade met, in the end, with failure. The Ming resumed the traditional policy of opposing the nomads that resulted in the regeneration of an older policy of the Mongols to remotely exploit China (Pokotilov 1976). In the emerging Europe-centered capitalist world-system, the nomads were allotted quite another position. Machine technology, firearms and new sources of energy changed the balance of power to their disadvantage. Since that time, the steppe hinterland has ceased to play an important role in the dynamics of world-system processes.

Conclusion

In closing, one can draw several conclusions. More than two and half centuries ago, Montesquieu in *L'Espirit des lois* worked out the law of "political gravitation". He argued that democracy is a characteristic of small societies; monarchy–of middle-size ones, while the despotic empire is typical of large societies. I think we can apply this law to describe pastoral nomads. If the neighbors of pastoralists were acephalous segmentary societies (as Nuers in Africa and Wuhuans in Manchurians) or steppe (Khitans, Mongols) zones (tenth century – beginning twentieth century): Liao, Chin, Yuan, Ch'ing. The societies of the first cycle interacted with China at a distance whereas the states of the second conquered the agricultural South and established symbiotic state structures with dual management systems and new forms of culture and ideology (1974).

The concept of T. Barfield is more complex. He not only established a synchrony between the growth and decline of the nomadic empires and similar

processes in China, but noted also that the conquest of China was, as a rule, a business of the Manchurian people. The breakdown of centralized power in China and on the steppes released the forest-dwelling tribes in Manchuria from pressure from both of these adjacent powers. Manchuria's people established their state formations and conquered the agricultural areas on the South when both of their neighboring competitors were weak. The Khitan, Jurchen, and Manchu succeeded in conquest. In Barfield's opinion, a cyclical process of synchronous state formation among the peoples of China and Central Asia was repeated three times over a period of two thousand years (Barfield 1991; 1992:13 table 1.1).

The theories of Tamura and Barfield complement each other. The relations among migrations and crises of agrarian empires and the activities of nomads is evident. In this paper, I pointed out already that the formation of early nomadic empires (Scythia, Parthia, Xiongnu etc.) fell within the final period of the axial age when the powerful agrarian empires (Ch'in and Han in China, Persia and Hellenistic states in Asia Minor etc.) were established. The first global demographic crisis of our millennium (third through fifth centuries) occurred at nearly the same time in different parts of Eurasia (Biraben 1979: 13–24). It was not only a coincidence that this was also the epoch of the "great migration of peoples". Contrary to popular opinion the nomads did not at all desire to conquer the agrarian territories. In order to rule an agrarian society, the nomads would necessarily have to give up their nomadism and their horses. This they were ill disposed to do. It was only during periods of crisis and collapse of the settled societies that the steppe nomads were forced to enter into closer relations with the farmers and townspeople. As R.Grousset (1939) has vividly written, "vacuum has sucked in them inside the agrarian society." The Sui and, subsequently, T'ang successes caused a new joining up of all tribes and chiefdoms of Inner Asia in the imperial confederation of Turks. It is possible that a particular effect on this process was exerted by regular periods of a moister climate on the Mongolian steppes (Ivanov and Vasiljev 1995: 205 table 25). The First Khaganate of the Turks became the first true Eurasian-wide empire. It connected, through trade routes, China, Byzantium and the Muslim World. But this unity was fragile. It quickly collapsed into western and eastern Manchuria in the last centuries BCE) then the pastoralists themselves were at the level of tribal formations. In each local regional zone, the political structuration of the nomadic periphery was in direct proportion to the size of the core.

That is the reason why, in order to trade with oases town or to attack them, the nomads of North Africa and the Near East have united into "tribal confederations" of chiefdoms, nomads of the East European steppes living on the margins of the Ancient Rus' established "quasi-imperial" state-like structures, while in Inner Asia the "nomadic empire" became such an important

mode of adaptation. The imperial and "quasi-imperial" organization of the nomads in Eurasia developed after the ending of the "axial age" (Jaspers 1949), from the middle of the first millennium BCE at the time of the mighty agricultural empires (Ch'in in China, Mauryan in India, Hellenistic states in Asia Minor, Roman Empire in Europe).

The nomadic empire is a distinctive *xenocratic* form of mode of production. Inside, it was a supercomplex chiefdom. It was based on the redistribution by the khan (chief) of profits from war, extortion, and international trade. On the outside, it was a militaristic collective exploiter of agrarian states and civilizations. I think it is not only a special mode of production but also a unique path of cultural evolution.

On can agree with Thomas Barfield (2000) who referred to the steppe polities as "shadow empires." A.G. Frank has considered Eurasia as a common space that has long related the West to the East (1992) and a similar approach was developed in the works of the Russian Eurasianists of the 1920s. As the world became a single system the steppe was a "pipe" between the "vessels" that were the agrarian civilizations.

2

Nomadic Empires in Evolutionary Perspective

Introduction

Social evolution among pastoral nomads has not been studied as well as the problems of general evolution. In generalizing essays in cultural evolution, nomads are only touched upon indirectly. The emphasis in these books is on the evolution of agrarian cultures and civilizations (Sahlins 1968; Service 1971; Adams 1975; Johnson and Earle 1987; Earle 1997 etc.). More attention to this problem was given by Marxist anthropologists (see details on this discussion in: Khazanov 1975; Markov 1976; Kogan 1980; Halil Ismail 1983; Gellner 1988; Bonte 1990; Kradin 1992; Masanov 1995 etc.). Because I have already considered the discussions of the Marxist anthropologists concerning nomadic societies specifically, and have proposed my interpretation of this problem (Kradin 1992; 1993; 1995a), I will not dwell on the Marxist approach. Now, my prime interest is in the problem of placing complex pastoral society within a general scheme of a cultural evolution.

For years, in anthropology, there has been a tradition of following G. Spencer in his understanding of social evolution as

> "change from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity, through successive differentiation and integrations" (Carneiro 1973: 90).

As H.J.M. Claessen showed in his brilliant review of neoevolutionism, the current concepts of social evolution are much more flexible. It is apparent that social evolution has no specified line. Many channels of evolution do not cause a growth in complexity. The obstacles in the way of increasing complexity are simply vast, and in addition, stagnation, decline and even destruction are just as typical of the evolutionary process as any progressive increase in complexity or development of structural differentiation. One can agree with Claessen's characterization of social evolution as a qualitative reorganization of society from one structural state into other (Claessen 1990:234).

Nomadic societies are a good confirmation of these ideas. A cyclic movement among pastoral cultures has dominated over development in complexity. Nomads have many times united into political formations and created great empires which have after time disintegrated. The xenocratic empires of nomads represent the limits reached in the increasing complexity of pastoral societies. Nomads did not independently evolve beyond this stage of integration. This was an insuperable barrier determined by the rigid ecological

conditions of arid steppes. Such a view on the essence of nomadic societies is shared by the majority of nomadologists of different countries (Lattimore 1940; Bacon 1958; Krader 1963; Khazanov 1975; 1984; Markov 1976; Kradin 1992; Masanov 1995 etc.).

In another short publication, I stated my conclusions concerning nomadism from the viewpoint of the theory of general evolution. I think that three levels of cultural integration of pastoral nomads are revealed, falling into an order of increasing political complexity as follows: (1) acephalous segmentary clan and tribal formations; (2) "secondary" tribe and chiefdom; (3) nomadic empires and "quasi-imperial" pastoral polities of smaller sizes. A changeover from one level to another could occur in either direction.

It is the critical peculiarity of nomadic social evolution that transformation of the political systems did not correlate with other criteria of social complexity. The political system of nomads could easily evolved from the acephalous level to more complicated organizations of power and vice versa, but such formal indicators as increase in population density, complex technologies, increase in structural differentiation and functional specialization were instead essentially unchanged. When transforming from tribal pastoral systems to nomadic xenocratic empires, only a growth in the total population (due to the addition of conquered populations) takes place. The political system becomes more complex and the total number of hierarchical levels increases.

In this paper, I will again discuss the social evolution of the most complex pastoral societies – nomadic empires – despite the fact that my opponents believe that these empires represent a fortuitous or accidental and short-lived episode in the history of nomadism (Kalinovskaya 1994). I think that this approach is incorrect. There were a great many of these "chance" events, and they played too important a role in the cultural evolution of humanity. This was a specific version of adaptation under the extreme ecological conditions. The results of this adaptation were so specific that attempts to include the nomads in general evolutionary schemes (chiefdom – early state) run into serious problems.

From tribe to nomadic empire

Possibly the most intriguing question in the history of the Great Steppe is: what drove nomads to mass migrations and destructive campaigns against agricultural civilizations? With regard to this, a great many diverse opinions have been proposed. These opinions might be classified as follows: 1) diverse global climatic changes (drying according to A. Toynbee [1934] and G. Grumm-Grzhimailo [1926]; humidification according to L.N. Gumilev [1993: 237–340]); 2) the warlike and greedy nature of nomads; 3) overpopulation of the steppe; 4) growth of productive forces and class struggle, weakening of the agricultural societies in consequence of feudal division (Marxist conceptions);

5) the need to replenish an extensive cattle-breeding economy by means of raids on more stable agricultural societies; 6) unwillingness on the side of the settled peoples to trade with nomads (the cattle breeders had nowhere to sell their surplus products); 7) personal property of rulers of the steppe societies; 8) ethno-integrating impulses (*passionarity* according to L.N. Gumilev [Goumiliov 1975; Gumilev 1989]).

The majority of the factors listed here have a certain rationality of their own. However, the importance of some of them has been overestimated. So, the present paleogeographical data do not conform to a strict correlation between periods of the steppe drying (hunidification with periods of decline) and the prosperity of nomadic empires (Ivanov, Vasilyev 1995 table 24, 25). The "class struggle" thesis concerning nomads has proved to be erroneous (Markov 1976; Khazanov 1984; Kradin 1992). The role of demography is not entirely known because the livestock increased faster than the human population. An increase in livestock has led to destruction of grasses and crisis of the ecosystem. The nomadic life can, naturally, contribute to the development of certain military characteristics. But the farmers outnumbered them many times over, and they also had an ecologically complex economy, reliable fortresses and a more powerful handicraft-metallurgical base.

It seems to me that the following important factors should be taken into account:

(1) Ethnohistorical studies of the present pastoral people of Asia and Africa show that the extensive nomadic economy, low density of population, absence of a settled way of life do not assume the need to develop any legitimated hierarchy. Thus, one can assume that a demand in the state system has not been intrinsically necessary for nomads (Lattimore 1940; Bacon 1958; Krader 1963; Markov 1976; Irons 1979; Khazanov 1984; Fletcher 1986; Barfield 1992; Masanov 1995 etc.).

(2) The degree of centralization among nomads is in direct proportion to the extent of the neighboring agricultural civilization. From the viewpoint of the World-System approach, nomads have always occupied a place of "semi-pheripheryˮ which has consolidated different regional economics into a common space (local civilizations, "world-empires"). In each local regional zone, the political structurization of the nomadic "semi-pheripheryˮ was in direct proportion to the size of the "core". That is the reason why, in order to trade with oases or attack them, the nomads of North Africa and the Near East have united into "tribal confederations" of chiefdoms, nomads of the East-Europe steppes living on the margins of the Ancient Rus" established "quasi-imperial' state-like structures while, in Inner Asia, for example, the "nomadic empire" has become such an important mode of adaptation (Grousset 1939; Lattimore 1940; Barfield 1981, 1992; Khazanov 1981; 1984; Fletcher 1986; Fursov 1988 Kradin 1992; 1996; Golden 1993 etc.).

(3) Thus, the imperial and "quasi-imperial" organization of the nomads in Eurasia first developed after the ending of the "axial age" (Jaspers 1949), from the middle of the First millennium BC at the time of the mighty agricultural empires (Ch'in in China, Maur in India, Hellenistic states in Asia Minor, Roman Empire in Europe) and in those regions first, where there were available large spaces favorable to nomadic pastoralism (regions off the Black Sea, Volga steppes, Khalkha-Mongolia etc.) and, secondly, where the nomads were forced into long and active contact with more highly organized agricultural urban societies (Scythians and old oriental and ancient states, nomads of Inner Asia and China, Hunns and Roman Empire, Arabs, Khazars, Turks and Byzantia etc.)

(4) It is possible to trace a synchronism between the processes of growth and decline in agricultural "world-empires" and in the steppe "semi-pheriphery". The Han Empire and Xiongnu power appeared over one decade. The Turkish Khaganat appeared just at that time when China has been consolidated under the dominion of the Sui and T'ang dynasties. Similarly, the Steppe and China entered into periods of anarchy one after another over a short period of time. When, in China, the sedition and economic crisis started, the system of remote exploitation of nomads ceased to work, and the imperial confederation collapsed into separate tribes until peace and order were reestablished in the south (Barfield 1992).

(5) Besides these general regularities, other more accidental factors (ecology, climate, political situation, personal features of political leaders and even luck) have played a part sufficient to determine the course of historical development in each particular case.

There were four variants of the form of power on the steppe. The first variant represents the classic internal integration of the tribal nomadic ethnos into a centralized empire. As a rule, this process was related to the appearance of a talented political and military figure who succeeded consolidating all the tribes and chiefdoms (=khanates) "living behind felt walls" into a common state (Maotun of Xiongnu, T'an-shih-huai of Xianbei, A-pao-ci of Khitan, Chinggis Khan of Mongols). After the consolidation of the nomads, the ruler must arrange an incoming of surplus product from without to support the unity of the empire. If he had not succeed in this, the empire would have collapsed. As this variant of steppe empire formation is most often associated with the name of Chinggis Khan in can be called *Mongolian*.

The second variant was related to formation, at the periphery of an already developed nomadic empire, of political consolidation with strong centripetal tendencies. In the struggle for sovereignty, this union overthrew its exploiter and occupied its place in the economic and political infrastructure of a region. This variant describes the interrelations between Turks and Jou-Jans, Uighurs and Turks, Jurchens (with some reservations because they are not entirely nomads) and Khitans. We will call this variant *Turkic*.

The third variant was connected with nomadic migration and subsequent submission of the farmers to them. In the literature, the opinion has been formed that this was typical of the origins of nomadic empires. However, conquest of the great agricultural civilizations was in fact more often accomplished by already developed nomadic empires (Khitan, Jurchen, Mongols). The formation of the state T'o-pa Wei was a classic example of this version of nomadic empire formation (or more adequately "semi-nomadic" or even agricultural-stock-breeding). However this model is found most often, on a smaller scale, in the form of the "quasiimperial" formation of nomads (Avarian, Bulgarian and Hungarian powers in Europe, period of disturbance of 4–6 centuries in the North China (the "epoch of 16 states of five barbarian tribes" in Chinese chronicles), Kara-Khitans in East Turkestan). We agree to call this variant *Hunnian*.

Finally, there has been a fourth, quite peaceful variant. It was connected with the formation of nomadic empires from the segments of the greater "world" empires of nomads existing earlier. There were two such empires: the Turkish Khaghanat and the Mongolian Empire. In the former case, the empire divided into the East Turkish and West Turkish Khaghanates (later, the Khazar Khaghanate and other "quasiimperial" formations of nomads originated based on the West Khaghanate). In the Second case, Chinggis Khan's empire had been divided among his heirs into the uluses of Jochi (Golden Horde), uluses of Chaghadai, ulus of Helugu (Il-Khans of Persia), Yuan Empire (Khalkha-Mongolia and China proper). Subsequently, the Golden Horde collapsed into several independent Khanates. This variant may be, for example, called *Khazarian*.

The Structure of Nomadic Empire

The Empire is one of the forms of the state. Specific signs of empires are: 1) the presence of large territories; and 2) the presence of a "metropolis" of the empire and "periphery" subsystems dependent on a "metropolis" (Thapar 1981: 410ff). The fundamental difference between the nomadic empires was that their "centers" were highly developed only in the military respect while they fell behind the exploited or conquered territories in social-economic development etc. and, actually, were "peripheries" and "provinces" in themselves. In this case, the nomadic empire can be defined as nomadic society organized on the military-hierarchical principle, occupying a quite large space and exploiting the nearby territories, as a rule, by external forms of exploitation (robbery, war and indemnity, extortion of "presents", non-equivalent trade, laying under tribute etc.). One can identify the following signs of "nomadic empires": 1) multistage

hierarchical character of the social organization pierced at all levels by tribal and super-tribal genealogical ties; 2) dualistic (into "wings") or triadic (into the "wings" and center) principle of administrative division of the empire; 3) military-hierarchical character of the social organization of the center of the empire, more often, on the "decimal principle"; 4) coachman service (*yam*) as a specific way of organizing the administrative infrastructure; 5) specific system of power inheritance (empire is a property of the whole khan clan, institution of co-government, *"kuriltai"*); 6) specific character of relations with the agricultural world (Kradin 1992; 1995a; 1996).

It is necessary to distinguish the classical nomadic empires from 1) the similar mixed agricultural – pastoral empires in which the nomadic element played a great role in their history (Arabian caliphate, state of seljuks, Dunai and Volga Bulgaria, Osman Empire) and 2) the "quasi-imperial" nomadic state formations which were smaller than empires (European Huns, avars, Hungarians, Priazov Bulgaria, Kara-kitans, Tatar khanates after the Golden Horde collapse). Three models of nomadic empires are identified: 1) nomads and farmers coexisting over a distance. The creation of surplus products by nomads is accomplished through distant exploitation: raids, extortion of "presents" (actually, extortion; non-equivalent trade) etc. (Xiongnu, Hsian-pi, Turks, Uighurs etc.); 2) farmers dependent on nomads; exploitation form – laying under tribute (Golden Horde, Yuan etc.); 3) nomads conquering the agricultural society and moving to its territory. The robberies and laying under tribute are replaced with a regular taxation of farmers and townspeople (Kradin 1992; 1993; 1995).

Nomadic empires were organized in the form of "imperial confederations" (Barfield 1981, 1992). The confederations had an autocratic and state like look from the outside (they were created to withdraw the surplus products outside the steppe) but were consultative and tribal inside. The stability of steppe empires has directly depended on the skill of the supreme power at organizing the production of silk, agricultural products, handicraft articles and delicate jewels of the settled territories. As these products could not be produced under conditions of a cattle-breeding economy, obtaining them by use of force and extortion was the priority task of the ruler of nomadic society. Being a sole intermediary between China and the Steppe, the ruler of a nomadic society had a chance to control the redistribution of plunder obtained from China and, thereby, strengthen his own power. It allowed him to maintain the existence of an empire that could not exist on the basis of the extensive pastoral economy.

The chiefs of the tribes which made up a steppe empire have been incorporated into the military hierarchy of the "hundreds" and "thousands", however their internal policy was to a certain degree independent of the policy of the center. This peculiarity has been thoroughly analyzed by Thomas Barfield using the example of the Xiongnu empire (1981, 1992: 32–84).

A certain autonomy of pastoral tribes has been determined by the following factors: 1) economic independence made them potentially independent of the center; 2) basic sources of power (predatory wars, redistribution of tribe and other external subsidies, external trade) were quite unstable and outside the steppe world; 3) general armament restricted the possibility of political pressure upon tribes; 4) for the tribal groupings displeased by a policy of a Khan, the opportunity of moving to new places, desertion under the protection of the agricultural civilization or revolt with the aim of overthrowing the disagreeable ruler have been provided.

For this reason, political relations between the tribes and management bodies of the steppe empire were not purely autocratic. Supertribal power was kept by virtue of the fact that, on the one hand, membership in the "imperial confederation" provided the tribes with political independence from neighbors and a number of other important advantages and, on the other hand, a ruler of nomadic power and his surroundings guaranteed for the nomadic tribes a certain internal autonomy within the limits of empire.

A mechanism connecting the "government" of the steppe empire and pastoral tribes was the institution of a gift economy. By manipulating gifts and distributing them among comrades-in-arms and tribal chiefs, the ruler of the steppe empire strengthened his potential influence and prestige as the "generous khan". Simultaneously, he has bound the persons receiving gifts by the "liability" of the return gift. Tribal chiefs receiving gifts might, on the one hand, satisfy their personal appetites and might on the other hand, strengthen their intratribal status by a distribution of gifts to fellow tribesmen or by organizing ceremonial feasts. Besides, receiving a gift from the ruler, the tribal chief felt as if he also received some part of the ruler's supernatural charisma which contributed additionally to rise of his own prestige.

One can assume that an integration of tribes into the imperial confederation was performed not only by symbolic exchange of gifts between chiefs of different ranks and the khan. The same purpose was achieved by inclusion in the genealogical kindred of different stock-breeding groups, diverse collective arrangements and ceremonies (seasonal meetings of chiefs and festivals, battues, erection of monumental funeral structures etc.).

A certain role in the institutionalization of the power of the rulers of nomadic societies has been played by their performance of the functions of a sacred intermediary between a socium and Heaven (*Tenggeri*) which would provide patronage and favor on the side of the otherworldly forces. Subject to the religious conceptions of nomads, a ruler of a steppe society (Shan-yu, Khaghan, Khan) has personified a society centre and, in virtue of his divine abilities, performed rituals which should provide prosperity and stability to the society. These functions were of colossal importance for the society. Therefore, in the case of natural stress or disease and loss of livestock, an unlucky Khan

could weaken or lose his charisma. The unlucky Khan or chief could be replaced in some nomadic societies or even killed. But ideology has never been a predominant variable in power among the nomads. The life of the steppe society has been always filled with real alarms and dangers which have required from the leader active participation in their overcoming. As a whole, as noted above, the power of rules of the steppe empires of Eurasia has been largely based on external sources (Kradin 1992, 1996).

Supercomplex chiefdom

Could the nomads create their own statehood? How should the nomadic empires be classified in anthropological theories of political evolution? Can they be considered states or pre-state formations? These questions are currently discussed by researchers of different countries and, especially, by Marxist anthropologists (see details on this debates in: Khazanov 1975; 1984; Kogan 1980; Halil Ismail 1983; Gellner 1988; Bonte 1990; Kradin 1992; Masanov 1995 etc.). It should be noted that for the Marxist theory of historical progress, nomadism has became the same stumbling-block as the "asiatic mode of production". How could unchanged nomadic societies be interpreted within a framework of the common marsh of the production modes? A dialectic theory of social progress assumed, primordially, changes from lowest economical forms to the highest ones. However, the economic "basis" of pastoral societies has remained unchanged: it is the same among the modern Masaai and Arabs as among the ancient Xiongnu. Thus, nomadism drops out of the Marxist dialectics of history. On the other hand, if the economic "basis" of society didn't change, then the "superstructure" should be unchanged. But the "superstructure" of the pastoral nomads didn't remain basis-like persistence. The nomads now have created giant steppe empires, now have disintegrated to separate Khanates or acephalous lineage societies and all of this has contradicted the principles of Marxist theory (Gellner 1988:93–97, 114).

The advocates of nomadic feudalism and the Engels – Stalin scheme of five modes of production "connived" at the difference in economical and cultural development between nomads and agrarian civilizations, thereby overestimating the level of the economic "basis" of pastoralism. In these theoretical schemes , many facts were falsified and fitted to the Procrustean bed of dogmatic Marxism. So, the erroneous division into "early" (pre-feudal and slave-owning societies in ancient Orient and West) and "late" (medieval feudal) nomads has arisen.

Advocates of the concept of the pre-class development of nomads subjected to criticism the "nomad feudalism" (Markov 1976 etc.). As "true" Marxists, they nested up on the development level of the economic "basis" of pastoralists. If the "basis" of ancient nomads was not a class one, then the

"basis" of the later pastoralists must not be class either. On the other hand, primitive "superstructure" should be adjusted to primitive "basis". Therefore, nomads in social evolution have approached at most the late primitive (pre-class, pre-feudal etc.) stage.

This evolution in the discussions of Russian nomadologists was already obvious. For example, analysis of the samples from the "*Atlas of World Cultures*" of G. Murdoc indicates that almost all known ethnohistorical nomads have not approached the state level and class stratification (see Korotayev 1991:157, table XI). But the conclusion relative to the pre-state nature of all nomads led to underestimating the development level of "superstructure" for a number of pastoral societies – steppe empires. These empires were also declared pre-state, but was their political organization really of the same type as that of the Nuers, Gottentots or Kazaks and Kalmyks?

At present there are two popular groups of theories explaining a process of origin and essence of the early state. The *conflict* or *control* theories show the origin of statehood and its internal nature in the context of the relations between exploitation, class struggle, war and interethnic predominance. The *integrative* theories were largely oriented to explaining the phenomenon of the state as a higher stage of economic and public integration (Fried 1967; Service 1975; Claessen and Skalnik 1978; 1981; Cohen and Service 1978; Haas 1982; 1995; Gailey and Patterson 1988; Pavlenko 1989 etc.).

However the majority of nomadic empires can not be unambiguously interpreted as either chiefdoms or states from the viewpoint of either the conflict or the integrationist approaches. A similarity of the steppe empires to the state clearly manifests itself in relations with the outer world only (military-hierarchical structure of the nomadic society to confiscate prestigious product from neighbors as well as to suppress the external pressure; international sovereignty, specific ceremonial in foreign-policy relations).

At the same time, as to internal relations, the "state-like" empires of nomads (except some quite explainable cases) were based on non-forcible (consensual and gift-exchange) relations and they existed at the expense of the external sources without establishment of taxation on the cattle-breeders. Finally, in the nomadic empires, the main sign of statehood was absent. According to many current theories of the state, the main distinction between statehood and pre-state forms lies in the fact that the chiefdom's ruler has only consensual power i.e., in essence authority, whereas, in the state, the government can apply sanctions with the use of legitimated force (Service 1975:16, 296–307; Claessen and Skalnik 1978:21–22, 630, 639–40 etc.). The power character of the rulers of the steppe empires is more consensual and prevented a monopoly of legal organs. Shan-yu, Khan or khagan is primarily a redistributor and its power is provided by personal abilities and know-how to get prestige goods from the outside and to redistribute them among subjects.

For such societies which are more numerous and structurally developed than complex chiefdoms and which are at the same time not states (even "inchoate" *early state*), a term **supercomplex** chiefdom has been proposed (Kradin 1992:152). This term has been accepted by fellow nomadologists (Trepavlov 1995:150; Skrynnikova 1997:49) although, at that time, clear logical criteria allowing us to distinguish between supercomplex and complex chiefdoms had not been defined.

The critical structural difference between complex and supercomplex chiefdoms was stated by Robert Carneiro in the special paper (1992); he further develops these ideas in Chapter 3 in *Alternative of Social Evolution*. True professor Carneiro prefers to call them "compound" and "consolidated" chiefdoms respectively. In his opinion, a difference of simple chiefdoms from compound ones is a pure quantitative in nature. The compound chiefdoms consist of several simple ones and over the subchiefs of districts (i.e. simple chiefdoms), the supreme chief is ruler of the whole polity. However, R. Carneiro pointed out that when compound chiefdoms unite into greater polities, they rarely prove capable of overcoming the separatism of subchiefs, and such structures disintegrate quickly. He traced a mechanism of the struggle against structural division using the example of one of the great Indian chiefdoms inhabited in XVII century on the territory of present-day American state of Virginia. The supreme chief of this polity, Powhatan by name, dealt with the centrifugal aspirations of the chiefs of the segments by replacing them with his supporters who were usually his near relations. This imparted an important structural impulse toward further political integration.

Similar structural principles have been observed by T. Barfield in Xiongnu history (1981:49; 1992:38–39). Xiongnu power has consisted of a multi-ethnic conglomeration of chiefdoms and tribes included in the "imperial confederation". The tribal chiefs and elders have been incorporated into the all-imperial decimal hierarchy. However, their power was to certain degree independent of the centre policy and based on the support on the side of fellow-tribesmen. In relations among the tribal members of the imperial confederation, the Xiongnu Shan-yu has relied upon support of his nearest relations and companions-in-arms bearing titles of "ten thousand commander". They were put at the head of the special supertribal subdivisions integrating the subordinate or allied tribes into "tumens" numbering approximately 5–10 thousand warriors. These persons should be a support for the metropolis' policy in the provinces.

Other nomadic empires in Eurasia were similarly organized. The system of uluses which are often known by the Celtic term *tanistry* (Fletcher 1986), has existed in all the multi-polities of nomads of the Eurasian steppes: Wu-sun (Bichurin 1950b:191), European Huns (Khazanov 1975: 190, 197), Turkish

(Bichurin 1950a:270) and Uighur (Barfield 1992:155) Khaganates, Mongolian Empire (Vladimirtsov 1934:98–110).

Furthermore, in many nomadic empires, there were special functionaries of lower rank engaging in support of the central power in the tribes. In the Xiongnu empire, such persons were named "marquises" *Ku-tu* (Pritsak 1954:196–199; Kradin 1996:77, 114–117). In the Turkish Khaganate, there were functionaries designed to control the tribal chiefs (Bichurin 1950a:283). The Turk have also sent their governor-general (*tutuks*) to control the dependent people (Bichurin 1950b:77; Taskin 1984:136, 156). Chinggis Khan, after the reform of 1206, appointed special noyons to control his relations (Cleaves 1982: §243).

The nomadic empires, as supercomplex chiefdoms, provide a real model prototype of an early state. If the population of complex chiefdoms are as a rule estimated in tens of thousands of people (see, for example: Johnson and Earle 1987: 314) and if they are, as a rule, ethnically homogenous, then the population of a multi-national supercomplex chiefdom makes up many hundreds of thousand and even more people (nomadic empires of the Inner Asia have amounted to 1–1.5 mln pastoral nomads) their territory (nomads, needed a great ar of land for pastures!) was several orders greater than areas needed for simple and complex chiefdoms.

From the viewpoint of neighboring agricultural civilizations (developed preindustrial states), such nomadic societies have been perceived as independent subjects of international political relations and, quite often, as equal in status polities (Chinese called them go). These chiefdoms had a complex system of titles of chiefs and functionaries, held diplomatic correspondence with neighboring countries, contracted dynastic marriages with agricultural states, neighboring nomadic empires and "quasi-imperial" polities of nomads.

The sources of the urban construction (already the Xiongnu began to erect fortified settlements, while the "headquarters" of the empires of Uighur and Mongols were true towns), the construction of splendid burial-vaults and funeral temples for representatives of the steppe elite (Pazyryksky burial mounds al Altai, Scythian burial mounds in Northern Black Sea Area, burial placed in Mongolian Noin-Ula, burial mounds of Saks time in Kazakhstan, statues of Turkish anf Uighur Khagans in Mongolia etc.) are characteristic. In several supercomplex chiefdoms, the elite attempted to introduce clerical work (Xiongnu), in others, the epic history of the people was written down in runes (Turks), while there is a temptation to call some of the *typical* nomadic empires (first of all, Mongolian Ulus of the first decades of XIII century) states. This is, in particular, supported by the mention of the system of laws (*Yasa*) in the *Secret History of Mongols*, legal organs of power, written clerical work and creation of laws (so called *Blue book – Koko Defter Bichik*) and by attempts to introduce a taxation under Ogodei (Kradin 1995b).

T. Skrynnikova has written an excellent book of the power in the Chinggis Khan's empire (1997). In that monograph and, here, in Chapter 26 she considers that the Mongolian empire could not be a state. In a conversation during the International Hunnian Congress in 1996 in Ulan-Ude, she told me that my earlier position concerning a pre-class character of the Mongolian empire (Kradin 1992) seems to her more correct. It may be that my later opinion is untrue. In the future, I intend to make a special study of the evolution of medieval Mongolian society. However, Skrynnikova's and my positions are principally similar. The nomadic empires are distinguished from the settled agrarian states as nomads had no specialized bureaucratic organs and no elite monopoly of the legitimated application of force.

Nomadic Hinterland and World-Empire Dynamics

In accordance with the World-System approach, the main unit of development was a great system which included the groups of polities rather than a single country. In this group, the "centre" (core) is identified which exploits a "periphery". The core has a higher level of technology and production and more complex internal structure and gets maximum profit. The centres pump out the resources of periphery, draw up financial and trading flows, arrange the economic space of the system (Wallerstein 1974; 1980; 1984; Ekholm and Friedman 1979; Santley and Alexander 1982; Rowlands, Larsen, and Kristiansen 1987 etc.).

I. Wallerstein identifies three modes of production: (1) mini-systems based on reciprocation, (2) redistributive World-Empires, (3) capitalist World-System (World-Economy) based on the commodity and money relations (1984: 160ff).

The World-Empires exist to exact tribute and taxes from provinces and captured colonies which are redistributed by the bureaucratic government. The distinctive feature of World-Empires is the administrative centralization, predominance of policy over economy according to Wallerstein, the compulsory component of the world economy's development is a downfall of some World-Empires, shift of the development centres and prosperity of other World-Empires.

However, such an opinion about the evolution of preindustrial systems would be incomplete. It is necessary to note two important circumstances. First, in addition to he hierarchical World-Empires, other peer-polity modes of production. Ancient Greece and medieval Europe served as examples of the coexistence of multi-polar centres of economy and power (see Renfrew and Cherry 1986). Andrey Korotayev has shown that the West was no exception. In ancient Arabia, several centres and peripheral systems have coexisted in what he proposes to call "multipolity" (Korotayev 1995; 1996). Therefore, in the

preindustrial period, a division of labor between separate elements of regional systems could be performed on the basis of different models of interaction.

Secondly, it is necessary to clarify how many such models and preindustrial modes of production (I use here this term so as it is understood by I. Wallerstein) there could, in principle, be? This question was formulated by Andrey Fursov who moved an emphasis from the traditional Marxist problem "how many modes of production have existed in history" to another plane (1989:298).

Two models of interaction are known: redistributive "World-Empires" and polycentric "World-Systems" (Chaze-Down 1988). As to the modes of production, it is more complex. Fursov has created a solid social philosophical theory in which all the main present-day theories were synthesized. In this opinion, living labor manifests itself in two forms – individual and collective. The greater is developed production, the more independent is a collective labor. In preindustrial systems, a relationship of a collective (C) and individual (I) is fixed in the social organization (Gemeinwesen). Only three types of relationship are possible: C>I, C=I, C<I. Is correspond to the "Asiatic", "Ancient", and Germanic' forms of Gemeinwesen identified by Marx.

On this base, Fursov believes that there can be only three modes of production (i.e. models of productions organization): (1) *slave-owning* – when each of the citizens combined in a collective (policy) alienates individually the labor of slaves who have no property (C>I); (2) *feudalism* – when a seignior alienates individually the labor of peasants possessing means of production (I>I); (3) Asiatic mode of production – when a despot and state alienate the labor of the great mass of the population (I>C). It is obvious that it is the "world-empire" (1989:298–317).

A loss by a human of individuality in the case of slaveowning and feudalism has an incomplete nature. A peasant has land and tools and in the slaveowning society a concept of "freedom" and free citizens occurs. In the east, there is no freedom but there is a "general slavery" (a term which was evidently borrowed by Marx from Montesqueien). A. Fursov considers that Gemeinwesen of K. Marx are the stages of the successive liberation of the man's subject qualities from his collective nature. The world-wide historical process is developed in two planes: deadlock Asiatic, where the system dominates the individual and advanced western, where, in each higher social formation, successive emancipation of the subject is realized. With formation of the capitalist World-System, the subjective West subordinates the collectivist East and uses it as a "periphery" (Fursov 1989; 1995).

I would like to change or add a few things to this classification. It is evident that the subject and system flows of Fursov conform to the decentralization World-Systems and tributary World-Empires. However, this classification is short of one link: C>C, when one collective exploits another

one. I think this place should be occupied by the nomadic empires. They were also redistributive societies. But they differed from the agrarian empires with the "Asiatic" mode of production where a government levied a tribute and taxes on its subjects, while the pastoral economy of nomads was carried out within the family-related and lineage groups and based on mutual aid and reciprocation. Redistribution has only affected the external sources of the empire's income: plunder, tribute, trading duties and gifts. The nomads, in a given situation, took the part of "class-society" and "state-society", rising as a building over the settled-agrarian foundation. For this, the nomad elite performed the functions of bureaucracy and commanders, while the ordinary pastoralist made the expansion and repressions. Such a society might be called **xenocratic** (Kradin 1992; 1993; 1995a; 1996).

There is some similarity between the **xenocratic** pastoral polity and "African" mode of production of K. Coquery-Vidrovith (1969) as well "tribute-paying" formation S. Amin (1976:13–19; 1991). They are made similar by a dependence of the government on the external sources of subsistence as well as by the semi-peripheral position in the international division of labor. The concept of semi-periphery was introduced by Wallerstein to designate the intermediate zone between the centre and periphery. The semi-periphery is exploited by the core but itself exploits a periphery as well as being an important stabilizing element in the world division of labor. I. Wallerstein argues that the three-link structure is characteristic of any organization, the transitional link which provides a flexibility and elasticity of the whole system (centrist parties, "middle class", etc.) exists always between polar elements.

The concept of semi-periphery was developed mainly to describe processes in present-day capitalist World-Systems. In the preindustrial period, some functions of the semi-periphery could be performed by trading towns-states of ancient times and the middle ages (Phoenicia, Carthage, Ganza, Venice, Genoa), militarist states "satellites" arising near the highly-developed centre of the region (Accad and Sumer in Mesopotamia, Sparta, Macedonia and Athens, Austrasia and Neistria of Franks Empire) (Chaze-Dunn 1988) as well as nomadic empires of the Eurasiatic steppes. The empires of nomads were also the militarist "satellites" of agrarian civilization as they depended on a supply of products from there as this process was figuratively pictured by O. Lattimore (1962): "barbarism is a result of civilization". However, the nomads have performed important intermediary functions between regional World-Empires. Similar to seafarers, they have provided the connection of the flows of goods, finances, technological and cultural information between the islands of the settled economy and urban civilization.

However, it would be an error to consider the nomadic empires as representing the semi-periphery in all senses. The semi-periphery is exploited by the core whereas the nomadic empires have never been exploited by agrarian

civilizations. Any society of the semi-periphery aspires to technological and production growth. The mobile mode of life of pastoral nomads has not provided the opportunity to make considerable accumulations (cattle could be accumulated but its quantity was limited by the productivity of the pastures and this natural "bank" could at any instant go bankrupt due to drought or snowstorm) and their society was based on the gift economy. All plunder was distributed by the rulers of the steppe empires between the tribal chiefs and cattle-breeders and consumed during mass festive occasions. The nomads were doomed to remain Hinterland. Only conquest of the core allowed them to become a "centre". But for this purpose it was necessary to cease to be a nomad. The Great Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai realized this: "Although you inherited the Chinese Empire on horseback, you cannot rule it from that position".

There is a close relationship between the prosperity of the agrarian World-Empire (as well as World-Economy) and the power of nomadic empires which existed at the expense of extortion of a portion of the resources of the settled town states. In Inner Asia, this correlation is especially clear for here there are many areas of pasture which made possible the formation of a large steppe empire from tribes and chiefdoms. I will once again repeat that the Han dynasty and Xiongnu Empire have appeared for one decade. The Turkish Khaganate arose just as China was united under power of the dynasties of Sui and, later, T'ang etc. And, in contrast, the periods of crisis in IV-V and X centuries in China led to political entropy in the steppe areas.

It gave ground to the Japanese historian J. Tamura to identity two long cycles in the history of North Eurasia: (1) the cycle of ancient nomadic empires within the arid zone of Inner Asia (II century BC – IX century AD): Xiongnu, Xianbei, Jou-jan, Turks, Uighurs; (2) the cycle of the medieval conquest dynasties coming from the forest (Jurchen, Manchurians) or steppe (Khitans, Mongols) zones (X century – beginning XX century): Liao, Chin, Yuan, Ch'ing. The societies of the first cycle have interacted with China at a distance whereas the states of the second conquered the agricultural South and established the symbiotic state structures with the dual management system and original forms of culture and ideology (1974).

The concept of T. Barfield is more complex. He not only established a synchrony between the growth and decline of the nomadic empires and similar processes in China, but noted also that the conquest of China was as a rule a business of the "Manchurian people". The breakdown of centralized power in China and in the steppe released the latter from pressure both on the side of nomads and on the side if Chinese. Manchuria's people realized from the external pressing have established their state formations and conquered the agricultural areas on the South. Especially, Khitan, Jurchen, and Manchurian have succeeded in conquest. In Barfield's opinion, a cyclic structure of political relations between people of China, Central Asia, Mongolia and Far east were

repeated three times for a period of two thousand years (Barfield 1992:13 table 1.1).

Both these theories complement each other. The relation between flights and crises of agrarian World-Empires and the activities of nomads is evident. In this paper, I pointed out already that the formation of early nomadic empires (Scythia, Parthia, Xiongnu etc.) falls within the final period of the axial age' when the powerful agrarian World-Empires (Ch'in and Han in China, Persia and Hellenistic states in Asia Minor etc.) are established. The first global demographic crisis of our millennium (III-V centuries) observed at nearly the same time in different parts of the Old World (Biraben 1979: 13–24) did not by chance coincide with the epoch of the "great migration of peoples". Notwithstanding the ordinary opinion, the nomads did not at all seek to direct the conquest of the agrarian territories. They didn't need this. To rule the agrarian society, the nomads should be "dismounted from the horse". And only during periods of crisis and collapse of the settled societies, were the nomads forced to enter into closer relations with the farmers and townspeople (according to figurative note of R.Grousset (1939) "vacuum has sucked in them inside the agrarian society").

The Sui and, subsequently, T'ang successes caused a new joining up of all tribes and chiefdoms of Inner Asia in the imperial confederation of Turks. It is possible that a particular effect on this process was exerted by regular periods of a moister climate on the Mongolian steppes (Ivanov and Vasiljev 1995: 205 table 25). The First Khaganate of Turks became the first true Eurasiatic empire. It connected, through trade routes, China, Byzantia and the Muslim World. But the unity was fragile. In the short run, the Khaganate collapsed into western and eastern parts. The Second Khaganate of Turks and Uighurs was unable to restore unity in Eurasia. As a result of the next conflict in China and drought in the Mongolian steppes, the peoples of Manchuria – Khitans and Jurchen – began to play the leading part.

The Mongolian storm of the XIII century coincided with a new period of moistening in Mongolia and the steppes of East Europe (Ivanov and Vasiljev 1995: 205 table 25) and with a demographic and economic upturn in all parts of the Old World and became a culmination of the history of preindustrial World-Empires. The Mongols merged a chain of international trade into the united complex of land and sea routes. For the first time, all great regional cores (Europe, Muslim area, India, China, Golden Horde) proved to be united in the first World-System (Abu-Lughod 1989). In the steppe, similar to fantastic mirages, there arose gigantic cities – centres of political power, transit trade, multinational culture and ideology (Karakorum, Sarai-Batu, Sarai-Berke). From this time, political and economical changes in some parts of the world began to play a much greater part in the History of other parts of the world.

The existence of the first World-System did not last long. The plague, the ejection of the Mongols from China and the decline of the Golden Horde became the most important links of the chain of events that conditioned its downfall. Demographers mark the serious crisis in all its main sub-centres in the period of 1350-1450 (Biraben 1979). At the beginning of 15th century, the first World-System disintegrated. Tamerlane's desperate efforts to restore the transcontinental trade met, in the end, with failure. The Ming resumed the traditional policy of opposing the nomads which resulted in the regeneration of an older policy of the Mongols' remote control exploitation of China (Pokotilov 1976). In the new capitalist World-System, the nomads were allotted quite another position. The machine technology, fire-arms and new sources of energy have changed the balance to their disadvantage. Since that time, the steppe Hinterland has ceased to play any noticeable role in the dynamics of the World-System processes.

3

ERNST GELLNER AND DEBATES ON THE NOMADIC FEUDALISM

In 1988, Ernest Gellner published the book *State and Society in Soviet Thought*. It is clear even from the title that the book was devoted to an analysis of the thoughts of Soviet (Russian) anthropologists regarding various theoretical problems. However no review of this book has ever appeared in Soviet anthropological journals. It is believed that in this way Soviet anthropologists ignored any criticism. This is not the case. A review of this book was to have been written. Those who have intended to write it were then young Soviet anthropologists on whom the western ideas including books by Gellner had an efficient influence. It had been planned that each of those willing to participate in the review would present an analysis of those chapters for which s/he had competence. However, as is often the case when many people take part in a project, some did not write their parts and the work was not done.

The following is an expanded version of my portion of the review concerning nomadic societies (my other fragment was devoted to the Asiatic mode of production). Initially a Russian variant of this text was published in the mid-1990s (Kradin 1996). Later, in the course of discussion concerning the importance of Gellner for development of anthropology, an idea was formulated to prepare the paper for a wider group of researchers. Without additional comments however many fine points would be incomprehensible to Anglophone scholars. Therefore, I had to re-orient the Russian version into this present English form.

Discussion of the social and political organization in the nomadic societies in the Soviet anthropology and history has travelled several stages in its development (in detail see: Kogan 1980; Halil Ismail 1983; Erdnieva 1985; Popov 1986; 1986a; 1987; Kradin 1987; 1992; Markov 1989; Vasjutin, Dashkovsky 2009). In 1920-s – early 1930-s, a pluralism of approaches to the stage essence of the nomadism has occurred: some researchers spoke in favor of primitive – tribal nature of nomadic societies while other persisted their statehood nature; there have been also intermediate points of view. Since mid 1930-s with establishing Stalin dictatorship and beginning of mass repressions and genocide against the Soviet people, the theory of the nomadic feudalism became to prevail in the historic literature. However, own revisionists were also within the ranges of orthodox monism who made their ordinal treatments of nomadic feudalism. And if, according to official point of view, the basis of nomad feudalism was an ownership of land, them, in opinion of revisionists such functions were attributed to an ownership of cattle. These disagreements

led to several heated discussion and the most acute one was in 1953–1955 (for details see: Kradin 1987; 1992). After XX Congress of the CPSU only where a small a step was made towards democratic transformations in the country, the ideological press of the communist despotism raised a little over the social sciences. However, this was sufficient that many researches became to seek new approaches and to pvopose non-traditional solutions of scientific problems. So, the second discussion on the Asiatic mode of production began (Sawer 1983; Dunn 1982; Bratkiewicz 1989; Jaksic 1991). At the same time, the points of view have been appeared which persisted in non-feudalic nature of nomadic societies: concepts of pre-feudal and early-class nature of nomadic societies, an opinion of existence of the Asiatic mode of production from nomads and specific nomadic way of evolution.

All of the expressed points of view as well as officially accepted view of feudal nature of nomadic societies were developed in 1970–1980-th years. One of the most consistent critics of the nomadic feudalism theory, professor of the Moscow University Genadiy Markov, has shown on large number of the facts that the social organization of Mongols, Kazakhs and Turkmen was, in principle, similar to that of the earlier nomads and had little in common with feudalism. He has distinguished the *community-nomadic* and *military-nomadic* conditions of nomadism, *military-democratic* social organization of nomadic societies and only temporally, under strengthening of the military organization, in the steppe, the unstable ephemeral political formations, nomadic empires, have been arisen (Markov 1970; 1970a; 1972; 1976; 1978; 1980; 1981; 1989; Kalinovskaja, Markov 1983; Markov, Masanov 1985).

In the review of the Markov monograph, the assumption about the pre-class nature of nomadic societies has been said (Vainstein, Semenov 1977: 165). Later, one of the authors of this review has decoded given thesis.

> "Nomadic societies in fact do not belong to any of known social-economic formations. All of them should be attributed to the society, lain between the primitive communal formation, on the one hand, and class society, on the other In the pre-class societies, in particular, nomadic ones, numerous forms of exploitation other than there classical ways of the oppression of man by other man occurred" (Semenov 1982: 54).

To the opinion of nomadic societies as pre-class formation, Markov was also inclined. This conclusion was also supported by Kalinovskaja (Kalinovskaja, Markov 1987, Kalinovskaja 1989, Markov 1989). The opinion that nomads have approached the only proto-state stage – chiefdoms – in their evolution has been proposed by sinologist Leonid Vasil'ev (1981; 1983: 32) Other scholar, anthropologist Viktor Shnirelman, believes that nomadism thought it is a variety of productive economy, is nevertheless, impasse branch

of evolution and cannot step over the barrier of class formation (1986: 244,336; 1988: 50; 1989: 404).

The stable conservative (pre-class, military-democratic) character of the social structure of nomadism was shown in many papers of late known Russian thinker and scholar Lew Gumilev (1989: 41, 396, 634, 675). However Gumilev avoided the discussion about the modes of production among nomadic societies. He has largely grounded a creation of great steppe empires by ethno-integrating pulses and presence of striking leaders directing the people masses (1989a; 1990).

At the same time in 1970–1980-s the alternative direction in nomadology became to develop which assumes the presence of classes and state from nomads. Some researchers continued on persisting in possibility of passing of slaveholding stage of evolution by nomads (Abramson 1970; Smirnov 1970; Akishev 1986), although the works of researchers of past and present (Nieboer 1910; Semeniuk 1958; Khazanov 1975: 133–148; 1976; Kliashtorny 1985; Kradin 1987: 74–84) have convincingly demonstrated the impossibility of evolution of the slavery relations among nomads.

There were also other viewpoints on the post-primitive nature of nomadic societies. Andreev wrote about specific way of evolution of nomadic societies with the superstructure in form of military democracy (1974: 28–29; 1985: 191). Georgian Member of Academy Melikishvili considered also that the nomads were a specific form of early state. "Nomadic", "oriental", and "highlands" feudalisms are in his opinion, different variants of evolution of early state societies (1972: 64). The member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Kshibekov, argued that the nomads should be considered within the framework of the Marx model of *Gemeinwessen* of Asiatic type but in the absence of developed despotism (1973: 217). An opinion of the presence of the Asiatic mode of production among the nomads has been also said in other works.

One can identify several independent solutions among the advocates of the feudalism existence from nomads. First, it is orthodox understandings of nomadic feudalism. It is based on traditional historical materialism approach to the essence of feudalism formulated even in the *Brief Course of VKP(b) history*. The basis of feudalism, in opinion of this viewpoint advocates, is private ownership of land (Zlatkin 1973; 1982; Potapov 1975; Mannai-Ool 1984; 1986). The ancient nomads are considered by them as tribal or early-slave-holding formations while the nomads of the Middle Ages and our time as feudal societies (Okladnikov et al. 1983). However, main arguments of this direction advocates are outside the scientific knowledge. This is a blind faith in that "offer to reject the existence of feudalism from nomadic peoples, introduce to the outline any new, early unknown stage contradict completely the materialist interpretation, of the history" (Kogan 1980: 121).

Second, there is so called *saun* tendency. Its advocates assume that the cattle was the main factor of production in the nomadic pastoral societies but not land. Hence, giving of animals by rich cattle owners to poor nomads for pasture (*saun*) was the ground of feudal basis in nomadic societies (Tolybekov 1971; Petrov 1981; Poliansky 1982; Dan'shin 1985).

Third tendency is' one going back to concept of nomadis feudalism by Member of the Soviet Academy of Sciences Boris Ya. Vladimirtsov, known mongolist dead in 1931. His advocates are methodologically founded on the existed in the Marxist political economics point of view that ownership relations are only legal expression of real economic relations. For this peason, both ownership of land and ownership of cattle cannot be considered as a basis of feudal mode of production. In the opinion of advocates of this tendency, the feudalism essence is in the power relations and it is necessary to find it in the system of vertical social relations between nomadic aristocracy and ordinary nomads (Munkuev 1970; 1970a; Fedorov-Davydov 1973; 1976: Taskin 1984; Popov 1986; 1987).

Fourth, there is a point of view of Moscow archaeologist Svetlana Pletneva (1981, 1982, 1987) and her followers (Magomedov 1983; Gavriliuk 1989) who consider an evolution of nomadic societies within the framework of there models identified by her from *military democratic*, continuously leading a nomad's life to semi-settled "nomadic towns" with stable feudal state. The main channel of establishing feudal relations, in the opinion of Pletneva, was settling of impoverished pastoralist's at places of winter camps.

Fifth, there is large group of researchers' speaking in favour of existence of undeveloped patriarchal forms of feudalism from nomads but without particular evidences relative to its internal nature (Lashuk 1973;Eremeev 1979; 1981; 1982; Arsymatov 1983, Kyzlasov 1984; Masanov 1984, Kshibekov, 1985).

Intermediate position in the discussion is occupied with the viewpoint concerning the nomadic societies as early states. The researchers developing it base themselves upon the repeatedly said in the literature about nomads assumption that it is necessary to consider nomads as element of the wider macro-system common with farmers. It is also assumed that despite early appeared private ownership of cattle and property differentiation, the development of internal exploitation among the nomads has been impeded by necessity to consolidate the society to carry out successful conquests and to levy a tribute. Therefore, the nomads independently have only approached the early-class stage while their further fate has been determined by character of relations with neighboring farmer civilizations (Pershits 1971; 1973; 1976; 1982; Reisner, Simoniia 1984: 55; Kliashtorny 1986; 1986a; Bromlej 1988: 223, 472, 526).

In the main, this approach in the late Soviet literature was developed by the known nomadologist Anatoly Khazanov, now professor of the University of Wisconsin-Madison, in particular, in his fundamental monographs *Social history of Scythians* and *Nomads and the Outside World* (1973; 1973a; 1975; 1976; 1980; 1981; 1984). He proposed to call this direction in the nomadology the ecological approach (1984: 196). Working in the course of this orientation, some researchers are nevertheless inclined to consider that nomads were able to approach only the pre-class stage in the independent evolution while the formation the state was related to establishing the relations of outer exploitation with farming-urban societies (Godiner 1976; Kiselev 1981: 206; Kradin 1987; 1990; 1991; 1992; 1993; Kubbel' 1988: 152–153; Viktorin 1988; Murzin 1989). The degree of nomadic state are closely related to the exploited settled-farming social systems: the greater the expansion object is the larger nomadic ethnos itself must be respectively (Fursov 1988).

Similar views on nomadism were presented in the typology of early class societies by the interesting Ukrainian political anthropologist Yuri V. Pavlenko. In his opinion, both way of class formation identified by Engels in *Anti-During* were primarily present in the nomadic societies. However, that way predominated numerically in course of which the representatives of the elite monopolize the social post. For this, the nomadic empires were largely based on outer exploitation and nomadism, in principle, although it develops, to larger extent, in accordance with laws of *Germanic* mode of production has not internal resources for independent approaching the early class level and can be attributed to epoch of pre-class societies (1987; 1989; 1991).

Another Ukrainian archaeologist Ekaterina Bunyatyan has approximately by the same way approached the nomadic societies (1984; 1985). She assumes that, from typological point of view, the nomads belong to that from of early class societies where the basis contradiction is realized along the line of direct producers away the managements functions. At the same time, they are "one of side blind alley branches in the progress of development of productive forces" (Bunyatyan 1985a: 41).

The known soviet theorist of pre-capitalist societies Dr.Dr. Vasiliy Ilyshechkin, considering the nomads-cattle-breeders against a background of exploitation relations existed in the Middle Ages and New Time concluded that collective ownership of land has occured among nomads; cattle was their main factor of production and exploitation was re-lazed in a form of "cattle-breeding-lease" and "personal-cattle-breeding" cent. In addition, during conquest of agrarian societies the tax exploitation of subjugated people was practiced. On the whole, Iliushechkin has attributed the nomads to the stage of estate-class (i.e. post-primitive but pre-capitalist, class) societies (1971: 29; 1980: 41, 212, 297–300; 1990: 262–264, 292–293, 316–317, 332, 371, 393).

Holding, on the whole, the opinion of early state in the nomadic societies. The Moscow nomadologist Vadim Trepavlov enters into polemic with views of those researchers who advocate the cyclic nature of nomadism evolution. He attempted to trace the idea of continuity of statehood succession which has passed from ancient nomads to later ones (1987; 1993). Trepavlov attributes the sacred legality of supreme power, system of the power distribution and delegation and existence of specialities of headquarters and nomads' camps ("magistrates") administration to the number of basis features of nomad state (1989; 1993).

The ideas of specific forms of early state among the nomads have been described in the works of Evgeniy I. Kychanov, orientalist from Sankt-Petersburg. Basis orientation of his arguments is towards more ancient genesis of state from nomadic people of the Central Asia and Far East. But specific features of this form of early state din not described in his works (1974; 1986; 1990; 1992; 1997).

Distinctive opinion of the state of nomadic people was proposed by the Siberian archaeologist Anatoly Martynov. He supposed that nomads in their evolution have escaped the "barbarism" stage and created original "steppe civilization" (1986; 1988; 1989; 1989a). In order to ground this thesis he used a diagram of phasic division of the history into *savagery – barbarism – civilization* described in *Ancient Society* by Lewis H. Morgan and *Ursprung* by Fridrich Engels. However, it should be noted that Morgan nor Engels consider the nomads within the framework of civilized stage of evolution.

On the whole, one can conclude that polemics of social systems of nomadic societies in 1970–1980-s can be considered within the framework of specific phase of discussion of the Soviet anthropologists and archaeologist about peculiarities of social-economic relations among the nomads-cattle-breeders (Kradin 1987: 24–29, 125–126). During the ten post-Soviet years, this discussion has largely continued in the literature in the Russian language. In this discussion, all the above viewpoints have figured to some extent or another. However, attempts to substantiate a specific mode of developing the societies of pastoral nomads have attracted the greatest attention. The subject of discussion has been concentrated on the question of what is the base for nomadism's specificity, (1) the internal nature of the stock-breeding being the base of the so-called nomadic mode of production (Andrianov, Markov 1990; Masanov 1991; 1995) or, (2) the peculiarities of the external modes of adaptation of nomads to the agricultural world-empires (Kradin 1990; 1991; 1992). Simultaneously, under the conditions of overcoming of the formational monism, attempts have been undertaken to consider nomadism from the perspective of an evolutionary civilisation approach, which would substantiate the existence of a specific nomadic civilisation in history (Zelezniakov 2000; Enkhtuvshin 2003; Martynov 2003; Orazbaeva 2005; Kulpin 2008 etc.).

Gellner has turned his attention to the problem of nomadic feudalism twice: first in the foreword to the book, *Nomads and the Outside World*, by Anatoly Khazanov and then, more fully in this collection of essays with the title, *State and Society in Soviet Thought*, where he devoted a special chapter to the discussion of the social-economic relations among the nomads (Gellner 1984: ix-xxv, 1988: 92–114).

Gellner does justice to Soviet nomadology. As Russian history has been always related to the steppe world, – he writes, – the Russian and Soviet scholars should be successful in research of nomads. Therefore, to a degree the problem development has been dictated by its urgency for the Soviets. Gellner touches on two aspects of the problem considered in the chapter: a theoretical one concerning the heuristic possibilities of the Marxist method and a properly historiographical one providing assessment of either authors or of their works.

As to the theoretical aspect, Gellner notes that nomadism is for Marxism the same fundamental problem as is the AMP. Neither nomads nor the East (the Orient) fit into the common evolution of humanity from the primitive stage to Communism. The problem arises from the impossibility of interpreting the superficially motionless and cyclically evolving nomads within the framework of progressivist (and I would add, Eurocentrist) theories of the human history which also include Marxism.

Another serious problem is in that it is difficult to represent the socio-political organisation of nomads in terms of the Marxist conceptual system. How can we explain from the Marxist point of view such a paradoxical fact that among the nomads private property in means of production (i.e. livestock) has appeared practically in parallel with the formation of nomadism as an economic-cultural type far in advance of private property in land among the agriculturists whereas, as their socio-economic level is concerned, the nomads are less developed than sedentary people? How accurate is it to assign the nomadic pastoralists to the primitive formation when there has existed private ownership of livestock and of persons allowing to accumulate it in large quantities? Conversely, how can one consider nomads to be primitive even if they had no state bureaucratic apparatus?

Finally, how should nomadism be interpreted within the framework of one of the basic methodological principles of the historical materialism – the law of correspondence between base and superstructure? According to Marxist theory, changes in the base lead inevitably to the respective transformation in the superstructure (in the form of revolutions). The economic basis of nomadism – pastoralism has remained actually unchanged over the course of many centuries. Ancient, mediaeval and even more recent nomads have had a similar herd composition strictly determined by the ecological conditions of habitat, primitive and easily transportable tin ware and analogous household technology. However, pastoral "superstructure" did not demonstrate the

permanency of base. The nomads sometimes created tribal alliances of separate conglomerates of tribes and kindred clans, but also formed the gigantic nomadic empires under the dominion of mighty leaders and then have again disbanded into separate khanates, tribes and even smaller groups.

Because nomadism has dropped out the Marxist dialectics of history, – summarises Ernest Gellner, – Soviet theorists have created a specific theory of nomadic feudalism. Gellner rightly assigns the credit of the founders of the theory of nomadic feudalism to Boris Vladimirtsov (1934) and Sergey Tolstov (1934). The book *On the Question of the Turkish-Mongolian Feudalism* by professor Nikolay Kozmin, who was killed by firing squad in Irkutsk in 1939, remained unknown to Gellner (Kozmin 1934). Gellner writes with respect of Vladimirtsov as a great orientalist and does not count him among the sycophants of the orthodox Marxism.

Gellner rightly notes that most of data interpreted by Vladimirtsov as feudal concern the period of the empire and brings about the quite natural question: how right is it to use the feudal paradigm with respect to the non-imperial nomadic societies? The fact is that Vladimirtsov, as opposed to his imitators, does not practically cite the classics of Marxism, and has not escaped Gellner's attention. True, Gellner is here somewhat inconsistent. By intuition, Gellner treats Vladimirtsov sympathetically. Still he assigns him among the founders of the theory of nomadic feudalism. In fact, Vladimirtsov's direct contribution to the creation of a really Marxist theory of nomadic feudalism was grossly overestimated. Vladimirtsov was a great orientalist of the linguistic orientation. It is not likely that he could know Marxism thoroughly.

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To do this it was necessary not to perfection knowledge of many dialects of the Mongolian language but to study Marx's *Das Kapital* and *Der Ursprung* by Engels. All that is Marxist in the *Social System of the Mongols* is the inclusion of Engels' book in the reference section and an attempt of Vladimirtsov to justify, using the actual data, the presence of a number of feudal institutions in the Mongolian society during the period of the empire. In this case, it is interesting that Vladimirtsov perceives feudalism as a juridical

system. In a number of important positions, he cites Pavlov-Silvansky, the well-known Russian historian of the end of the 19th century. But nowhere does Vladimirtsov writes of feudalism as a specific mode of production that comes after a slave-owning mode.

Why exactly has Vladimirtsov and no one else been considered to be the founder of the theory of nomadic feudalism? I think that the answer to this question can be found by tracing some parallels in the Soviet assessment of the work of the archaeologist Childe and the orientalist Vladimirtsov. Leo Klejn showed in his book *The Phenomenon of Soviet Archaeology* (1993) that, in Childe's lifetime, attitudes towards him were quite watchful, whereas posthumously, his contribution to the development of Marxist archaeology was canonised.

> "It was a common practice in the Soviet Union with respect to the foreign leftist intellectuals. As long as he lives be on the guard: goodness knows what trick was played by him and your warm attestation can very seriously harm you (in the Soviet Union political accusations had always retrospective effect and contagiosity). And a dead Marxist is a good Marxist: his views will always remain Marxist forever" (Klejn 1993: 116).

It is possible that similarly this happened with *Le régime social des Mongols*. The author was a scholar of authority who died suddenly three years before the book appeared. After this, it could be quite painless to attribute any ideas to him. For some scholars, he became an icon and his contribution to the Mongolian mediaeval studies was canonised for a half of century. For others, Vladimirtsov proved to be a convenient target for criticism. Most of critical arrows of the main opponents of the theory of nomadic feudalism – Tolybekov and Markov – were shot not in the direction of Zlatkin and Potapov. They have pointed towards *Le régime social des Mongols* although they have criticised Stalin's understanding of feudalism and not Vladimirtsov's. The attempt by Fedorov-Davydov (1976) to show that there is little in common between Vladimirtsov's understanding of feudal property and that of most Soviet specialists on feudalism has not met with success.

Unlike Vladimirtsov, Tolstov does not evoke any sympathy in Gellner. Tolstov is well-known as a violent introducer of Stalin's straightforward theses. Gellner notes a predominance in Tolstov's works of canon citations from the works of the classics of Marxism over particular historical data. However, this is not the reason for his antipathy. The basis of Gellner's negative opinion was the result of the pressing attempts of Tolstov to justify the relationship of the Marxist theory of class struggle with a necessity to apply it in action. By giving proof of the class, feudal character of nomadic societies, Tolstov provides supportive data to the proposition of a presence in contemporary pastoral societies of the class of kulaks-bloodsuckers, the intensification of class

struggle (according to Stalin's thesis) and, therefore, the necessity of the scientific substantiation of an unleashing of the class genocide against nomads of Central Asia, Siberia and Kazakhstan.

Furthermore, E. Gellner quite adequately interprets the course of further discussion on nomadic feudalism. He shows how a thesis of the feudal nature of nomadic societies has gradually penetrated throughout the Soviet historical science and believes, completely correctly, that a new splash of discussion has been stimulated by the famous Tashkent session in 1954. Gellner identifies Zimanov, Potapov and Tolybekov as the key figures in the discussion. Gellner's sympathies in his analysis of the discussion are evident (unfortunately, one more supporter of Tolybekov, the Kazakh ethnologist Shakhmatov, was dropped from Gellner's field of vision). Shakhmatov was clearly on Tolybekov's side and explained with sympathy his position when Tolybekov was subjected to severe criticism by dogmatists. In Gellner's opinion, Tolybekov's criticism of the semi-official theory of nomadic feudalism is of importance. To the contrary, the viewpoint of Potapov and his supporters (all except Shakhmatov) defending the official scheme is unsympathetic to Gellner. He demonstrates the tentativeness and contradictory character of Potapov's constructions. "His use of argument from survivals is strange", states the British anthropologist in summarising his analysis.

Gellner properly exposes the weak aspects of Tolybekov's position which, on the one hand, criticises the theory of nomadic feudalism but, on the other hand, remains within the framework of feudalism-oriented (patriarchal-feudal) interpretation of the history of the pastoral nomads. Alas, there were objective reasons for this. After a defeat of the first Soviet discussion on the Asiatic mode, the concept of the historical process in the national historical science could only develop within the framework of a unilineal formation paradigm. It is possible that many researchers being educated in the Soviet Union at the time (for example, Tolybekov was born in 1907) did not suspect that multidimensional interpretations of world history could occur. Within the framework of the Soviet Marxism, during Stalin's era, the engine of world history could move only along one line: if not forward then "one step forward, one step back".

Nomads have not fitted into the dialectics of world history. On their historical rails, the red signal has been invariably found. That is the reason why – as Gellner believes – in order to introduce nomads into the course of the historical process, Tolybekov defended the progressiveness of inclusion of the Kazakhs into Tsarist Russia (Gellner 1988: 114). Here, Gellner unites Tolybekov's viewpoint with the position of Sartre who bravely deleted all so-called "pre-historical" peoples from world history, assigning for them merely an exotic position in the historical past within the framework of more developed, "historical", societies. Sartre's position has been sharply and justly criticised by Lévi-Strauss. Gellner was on Lévi-Strauss' side. However, it

should be said in defense of Tolybekov that he has not remained a pure "unilinealist". Tolybekov attempts to lay a parallel track alongside the main one of world history. He provides a strong political-economic background to his viewpoint trying to prove that land is only a subject of labour whereas means of production is the animals pastured by them. In this regard, Tolybekov can be considered as one of those researchers in the USSR who attempted to restore within Soviet Marxism the multilineal interpretations of the historical process.

After Tolybekov, Markov raised the banner of struggle against nomadic feudalism. His concept of the specific "nomadic mode of production" formulated in 1967 in his Doctor of Science thesis was quite multilineal and dangerous for the dogmatic five-member scheme. Unfortunately, Gellner apparently was not familiar with this hypothesis. He only cites the published book by Markov, *Nomads of Asia*, based on the thesis but in which the courageous idea of the nomadic mode of production was already replaced by the concept of pre-class character of nomadic societies.

Also the polemic of Markov with Zlatkin, Lashuk and Fedorov-Davydov has escaped Gellner's attention. For some reason, the British anthropologist does not include the works of these Soviet scholars; not even those which were published in the central Moscow scientific journals.

Nevertheless, despite these gaps, Gellner correctly relates the subsequent progress of Soviet nomadology to the writings of Markov and Khazanov. Gellner notes that, unlike the works by Tolybekov which operate only with data on history of the Kazakhs, Markov and Khazanov argue their positions using representative historical information. Gellner assesses the contributions of both authors largely in the light of their consistent criticism of the theory of nomadic feudalism; in this connection, he writes that both Markov and Khazanov came independently to the same conclusions (Gellner 1988: 109–112).

In many respects, one can agree with the conclusions of Gellner. Markov himself has emphasised the anti-feudal orientation of his investigations (1976, 1998). Nearly all chapters in Markov's book are a critical review of well-known (and interpreted as feudal) facts from principally different angles of vision. "The priority of the well-reasoned dethronement of this theory is due to just him", believes Kalinovskaia (1996: 154). Khazanov (1981: 173, note 3) emphasises, though not so directly, his negative attitude vis-à-vis the feudal interpretation of nomadic societies. One can also trace a certain similarity in the characterisation by both authors of nomadic economy, social structure and political organisation. It is also true that, eventually, both authors to a degree reach Ibn-Khaldun's concept of the cyclical evolution of pastoral societies (Gellner 1988: 113). But at the same time, as far as their conclusions are concerned, Markov and Khazanov disagree with each other. If, from Markov's viewpoint, the nomads could not get over the barrier of class formation (at different times, he called them by different terms – pre-feudal, pre-class or

nomadic mode of production, all involved in the primary formation) then for Khazanov, the nomads, during the course of independent evolution, could reach a level of the early state. And this, one should agree, is a principal difference.

Completing his review of Soviet nomadology, Gellner turns to the second volume of *History of Primitive Society*. Not a Marxist himself, Gellner nevertheless sympathetically cites Shnirelman's conclusions that nomadic pastoralism, though being one of the forms of productive economy, "does not allow society to rise above the level of pre-class or, in rare cases, early class relations" (Shnirelman in Bromley 1986: 244) and even he finds similar thoughts in the works of Childe. The fact that this idea was presented in a official academic volume edited by Academician Bromley and issued by the central scientific publishing house (with a large number of copies printed) serves, in the opinion of the British anthropologist, as an index of change in Soviet nomadology. Gellner makes a slightly optimistic conclusion with respect to the future of Soviet anthropology: "The continuing steady stream of 'feudal' interpretations... seems to be swinging in favour of the rival view" (Gellner 1988: 113).

Alas, if this indeed was the case! Gellner overlooks that the fundamental work on primitive societies cited by him did not reflect views of the majority of researchers. The volume has been prepared by one of the most striking research teams of the 1970–1980s, working in the department of history of primitive society (headed by Avram Pershits) of the then Institute of Ethnography of the USSR Academy of Sciences. I think that if Ernest Gellner would have acquainted himself with the works of a wider circle of nomadologists he would not have been so optimistic. Unfortunately, for many historians and ethnologists in the post-Soviet countries Marxism retains its influence. For about 10 years, I have taught different courses at universities and could see that it was not necessary to cite Marx in order to be a Marxist. The references to works of Marx, Engels and Lenin disappeared. However the same people have remained as chairs and heads of research committees.

Another large group of researchers has simply replaced the term "formation" with the term "civilisation". If earlier they attempted to prove their right for a place in world history by proof of the existence of feudalism among their ancestors, then now they do it through declaring themselves partisans of civilisation. In this case, many people perceive civilisation as a stage in world history (Morgan, Engels) rather than as a specific original cultural system (in the sense of Spengler or Toynbee).

Gellner has valued positively those Soviet anthropologists who have disclaimed nomadic feudalism. At the same time, the specific traits of pastoral nomadic societies cannot be explained on the basis of mere logic of the internal development of nomads. These ideas go back to the famous book *Inner Asian Frontiers of China* by Owen Lattimore (1940) in which he showed that the

specificity of nomadic society cannot be correctly understood without an appeal to the cultural ecology and relations of nomadic pastoralists with their sedentary agrarian neighbours. In more recent times, at first Anatoly Khazanov (1984) and then Thomas Barfield (1981, 1992, 2000) have focused attention on this problem. Khazanov has conclusively shown that the great nomadic societies (he assigns them to the early state stage) were established because of assymetry of relations between the nomads and their outer (settled) environment. Barfield, rejecting the diffusive interpretations of borrowing of the state by nomads from farmers, has shown that the degree of the centralisation of the steppe society was directly related to the level of political integration of the sedentary agrarian society. Subsequently, Peter Golden (1992, 2001), using data on sedentary mediaeval nomads of the East European steppe, developed the ideas of the mediacy of the steppe politogenesis with the agrarian world.

For Marxism such ideas were unacceptable because, according to the theory of formations, the state could emerge only due to internal factors such as growth of productive forces and class struggle. From this viewpoint even early ideas of Khazanov advanced in his book on the evolution of the Scythian society (1975) looked quite revisionist. A tradition of referring to the specifics of nomadic societies on the basis of only, or largely, internal development survives in the Russian research on nomadism until today (Kalinovskaia 1996; Kychanov 1997; Markov 1998). Nevertheless, there are also followers of the Lattimore-Khazanov-Barfield line in the Russian literature (Masanov 1991; Kradin 1992, 2002; Furson 1995; Skrynnikova 1997; Vasiutin 1998; Kradin, Korotayev *et al.* 2000; Kradin, Bondarenko, Barfield 2003 etc.).

The question remains as to whether Ernest Gellner exerted any influence on Russian nomadology. There was no direct impact, of course. However, I do not doubt that his influence on Russian anthropologists would be stronger if his 1988 book had been translated and published in Russia as it was the case with *Nations and Nationalism*. Gellner's book and the work of Valeriy Tishkov, the main constructivist in Russia, have helped greatly to dethrone Bromley's primordialist-Marxist theory of ethnos. Nevertheless, one should not forget that Gellner did much to facilitate the publication of Khazanov's *Nomads and the Outside World*. For a long time Khazanov's name has been influential in the West and the USSR. His ideas were internalised by the nomadologists of my generation. From this perspective Ernest Gellner played an important role in world studies of nomads and also in the emergence of a multilineal tradition in Russian anthropology of nomadic societies.

4

CULTURAL COMPLEXITY OF PASTORAL NOMADS

Introduction

In spite of plenty of general theoretical works in the field of nomadic studies, one cannot say that the interpretation of the pastoral societies in the context of the world history has been thoroughly developed. There are several most influential paradigms of the historical process which include the stage unilineare (modernization theory, neoevolutionism, Marxism) [Gellner 1988; Sanderson 1990; 1999; Green 1992; Bantley 1996; Claessen 2000; Carneiro 2003 etc.] and multilineare theories (Bondarenko, Korotayev 2000; Korotayev et all. 2000), civilization (Toynbee 1948; Weskott 1970; Melko 1995; Sanderson 1995 etc.) and world-system approaches (Wallerstein 1974; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997 etc.).

In the modernization theory, only Gerhard Lenski has included the nomadic societies into his scheme as the side, per se, dead-end variant of social transformation (Lenski 1973: 132). The neoevolutionist anthropologists engaged in the typology of the political systems have also lost sight of nomads in their constructions. In the most competent works, we will not find the chapters considering the place of nomadism in evolution and, all the more, special typologies of the societies of pastoral nomads proper. The Morton Fried's conception includes four levels: egalitarian, ranked, stratified societies, and state (1967). By Elman Service, the number of such levels should be higher: local band, community, chiefdom, archaic state and state-nation (1971; 1975). The latter scheme has been time and again corrected, however, as a rule, the question of the specificity of the social evolution of the societies of pastoral nomads has been not particularly considered. At best, nomads are used as an example of the secondary tribe or chiefdom, the militarized character of their society and establishment of the pastoral state system on the basis of conquest of agrarian civilizations are noted (Johnson, Earle 2000: 139, 263–264, 294–301).

The subject of nomads is rather more around in the works of the world-system approach's supporters (Chase-Dunn 1988; Abu-Lughod 1989; Hall 1991; Chase Dunn and Hall 1997; Chase-Dunn, Hall, Turchin 2003 etc.), however, the standpoint according to which the nomads are considered in these works is beyond the scope of this paper.

As a rule, in the studies of the Western authors specially engaged in problems of the social-cultural evolution of nomads, a lack among the nomads

of intrinsic needs to establish firm forms of the state system, cyclic character of political processes, appearance of perspectives of the stable development only in the case of symbiosis with farmers (Lattimore 1940; Khazanov 1984; Fletcher 1986; Barfield 1989; Golden 1992; 2001 etc.).

The much greater attention to the problem of the nomadism periodization within the framework of the world history has been given in the Marxist and, especially, Soviet literature. However, within the framework of Marxist approach, the researchers have classified nomads by proper modes of production (it appeared from this that the similar to each other steppe empires of Xiongnu, Turks and Mongols were divided into three different groups – slavery, early and mature feudal states) or have disclaimed the state of nomads (see details on this discussion in: Khazanov 1984; Gellner 1988; Kradin 1992; 2002b; 2003, etc; Bondarenko et al. 2003).

However, in the framework of the Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches, the interesting idea of the nomadic mode of production has been advanced which has challenged a correctness of the universalist constructions based on the interpretation of only settled-agricultural societies (Markov 1967; Bonte 1981; 1990; Masanov 1991 etc.). Subsequently, other constructions placing emphasis on the conquest (*xenocratic*) character of nomadic empires (Kradin 1992; 2000) appeared.

Many researchers have also written of the internal typology of nomadic societies. The majority of schemes were based on the extent of inclusion of nomadic society into the sedentarization and acculturation processes of the settled-agricultural civilizations (Wttfogel, Feng 1949; Tamura 1974; Pletneva 1982; Khazanov 1984; Kradin 1992; 2000; Barfield 2000 etc.). As for the complexity of pastoral societies, the nomadologists identify usually the decentralized and centralized states (Markov 1976; Konig 1981).

I believe that the complexity degree of pastoral nomads had more levels of taxonomy. Among the nomadic societies, three groups could be identified:

(1) acephalous segmentary clan and tribal formations;

(2) secondary tribe and chiefdom;

(3) nomadic empires and "quasi-imperial" pastoral polities of smaller sizes.

A change-over from one level to the other could take place both in one direction and in opposite one. The limit of increasing the evolutional complexity is nomadic empires. This was an insuperable barrier determined by the ecological conditions of arid zones of the Old World. Here, the significant peculiarity of the nomadism evolution is a non-conformity of the political system transformation with other criteria of the complexity growth. The political system of nomads could easily evolved from the acephalous level to more complicated organizations of power and vice versa but formal indicators as increase in population density, complex technologies, increase in structural differentiation and functional specialization were instead essentially

unchanged. When transforming from tribal pastoral systems to nomadic empires, only a growth in the total population (due to the addition of conquered people) takes place. The political system becomes more complex and the total number of hierarchical levels increases.

As to the complication line, any evolution could be related to either conquest by nomads of farmers and migration to their territory or development among the pastoralists sedentarization processes under marginal natural conditions or processes of industrialization in the modern history. There were no other variants in the history.

Methodology

Nomads could be classified, for example, by the economy type subdividing them into the Eurasian horse-breeders, Afro-Asian camel-breeders, East-African pastoralists, northern reindeer-breeders and mountain yak- or llama-breeders (Khazanov 1984; Barfield 1993). One could classify nomads by the extent of mobility and large quantity of most various schemes was created on the basis of this criterion (Masanov 1995 etc.).

At the same time, we can consider nomads using a degree of complexity of their society and social-political organization. However, how can be revealed that the society under consideration is more complex then the other and what criteria should be a basis of the similar classification, all the more, that the same polities (for example, Xiongnu empire or Chinggis Khan's empire) have been considered by some researchers as the existing states while they were only pre-state formations for other scientists. Possibly, the cross-cultural methodology was less subjective. Just the supporters of this methodology have had to compare various cultures of our planet and to determine criteria of such comparisons. These investigations have taken the form of a number of the known publications for this subject (Carneiro 1973a; Murdock, Provost 1973 etc.) and famous Atlas by George Murdock (1967), HRAF, and Atlas of Cultural Evolution (Peregrine 2003).

The methodology of the authors of the above works is based on the single-line interpretation of evolution the main criterion of which is a growth of the organizational complexity. According to these concepts going back to the ideas of the classic evolutionism of Herbert Spenser, the cultural evolution should be determined as follows:

> change from a relatively indefinite, incoherent homogeneity to a relatively definite, coherent heterogeneity, through successive differentiation and integrations (Carneiro 1973b: 90).

However, it is generally agreed that the evolution is not one-line. Many of the evolution channels do not lead to the growth of complexity, the barriers on

the path to increasing the complexity are simply huge and, finally, the stagnation, decay and even downfall are so common phenomena for the evolution process as the forward growth in complexity and development of the structural differentiation. The main criterion of evolution is the qualitative transformation of the society from one structural state to the other (Claessen 2000).

It is difficult not to agree with the above. Indeed, the one-line evolutionism has its heuristic limits. However, this is not to say that other methodological approaches are free of disadvantages. Moreover, some ways are suitable to explain and interpret some questions while it is more desirable to use other methodologies to solve other problems. Because this paper is aimed to determine the level of the stage complexity of the pastoral nomads' societies in comparison with other societies, it is worthwhile to use such methodology that allowed to compare the societies of different chronological periods, economic-cultural types and regions using the same criteria.

To realize the aim made, we will use one of the above0mentioned works written by George Murdock in co-authorship with Caterina Provost (1973). In this paper, the authors aim at determining a criterion of the complex society. They have chosen ten of the most significant from their point of view criteria of the cultural complexity: (1) writing and records, (2) fixity of residence, (3) agriculture, (4) urbanization, (5) technological specialization, (6) land transport, (7) money, (8) density of population, (9) political integration, (10) social stratification. Each of the variables has been evaluated using the five-score scale from 0 to 4 (see details Murdock, Provost 1973).

The authors have coded information for 186 societies of all regions of the world. According to their idea, total sum of scores should demonstrate the society complexity. It is clear that the obtained digits are relative. One cannot evaluate the society complexity only on the basis of a simple arithmetic summation. The authors themselves acknowledge this, paying attention to a quite fanny fact by which the Russian culture was estimated by them at 38 of 40 maximum scores while the ancient Babylon and Rome at 39 scores. One score was taken away from Babylonians and Romans because they have not used the mechanical transportation facilities whereas the Russian were short of two scores due to a low population density (ibid.: 388).

But Murdock and Provost have not pursued the objective to establish a rating of the human cultures and civilizations. They attempted to show only general tendencies in the social evolution. Here, they have realized the positive result. The societies of hunters-gatherers are at the very bottom of Table 3 "The sample societies in Rank Order of Overall Cultural complexity" (for example, Tiwi – 2, Kong Bushmen – 2, Hadza – 0). The segmental societies have slightly higher quantity of scores (Masai, Gilyak – 9, Yanomamo – 8). The sum of scores for chiefdoms is still more (Tonga – 20, Trobrianders – 16). The topmost

position is occupied by the states and empires (Chinese, Japanese – 40, Babylonians, Romans – 39, Turks, Russians, Koreans – 38 etc.).

All of this is, on the whole, quite logical. Practically, all the technologically and culturally complex societies are in the upper part of a "list" of Murdock and Provost. The typological series in which the societies are located is of importance rather than the particular position of each of them. With these general principles in mind, Murdock and Provost have divided all of societies into four groups of complexity (1973: 391):

1. low complexity – 0–9 scores;
2. lower middle complexity – 10–19 scores;
3. upper middle complexity – 20–29 scores;
4. high complexity – 30–40 scores.

It is interesting that, earlier, independently and using different method of computation, the similar study was carried out by Robert Carneiro (1973a: 846, 853). Looking through both lists where we are dealing with the same examples, one can make sure that the number of coincidences is more than could be expected (Murdock, Provost 1973: 390). It is obvious that it confirms a correctness of the methods of authors of both publications. Consider now how do fall the societies of pastoral nomads into this pattern.

Sources

In the base of Murdock and Provost, 7 societies of pastorals and nomads are presented among 186 societies. They are given in Table 4.1. The first column represents the ordinal number of a society in the general list, third one – region (A – Africa, M –Mediterranean region, E – East Europe).

Table 4.1. Complexity level of pastoral nomads

No		Reg.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
034	Masai	A	0	0	0	2	3	1	1	1	1	0	9
041	Ahaggaren Tuareg	C	3	0	2	0	3	1	1	0	3	3	16
046	Rwala Bedouin	C	4	0	0	0	3	1	2	0	2	1	13
058	Basseri	E	3	0	2	1	3	1	0	1	3	1	15
065	Kazak	E	3	1	0	3	3	1	2	1	3	3	23
066	Khalkha Mongols	E	4	1	1	0	3	3	2	1	4	3	23
121	Reindeer Chukchee	E	0	1	0	0	3	2	0	0	1	1	8

(by Murdock, Provost 1973).

Let us comment this Table 4.1. In accordance with the Murdock and Provost scale, two societies (Masai, Chukchee) are assigned to the level of lowest complexity, three societies (Basseri, Bedouin, Tuareg) to the level of lower middle complexity and two societies (Kazakh and Mongols) to the level of upper middle complexity. In accordance with classifications widespread in the anthropology, first two societies fall in to the so called acephalous, segmental societies. Three next societies correspond to the chiefdoms or stratified societies. Two last ones have more complex nature. All of this corresponds approximately to the above typology of nomadic societies (Kradin 1996) with the one proviso: instead classical nomadic empires, the nomadic societies of modern period were presented in the Murdock and Provost's Table which were subjected to the influence of the more developed agrarian civilizations. How do the most powerful nomadic societies – nomadic empires – fall into this pattern?

To answer this question, a new Table was constructed in which information of eight nomadic empires of Eurasia from Xiongnu to the medieval Mongols was included. When constructing the able, I have rested upon both my own studies of some empires of nomads (Kradin 1992; 1996; 2002a etc.) and investigations of colleagues (Wittfogel, Feng 1949; Fedorov-Davydov 1973; Egorov 1985; Fletcher 1986; Barfield 1989; Golden 1992; 2001; Trepavlov 1993; Kychanov 1997; Skrynnikova 1997; Klayshtorny, Sultanov 2000).

Table 4.2. Complexity level of nomadic empires

No		Reg.	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Total
187	Xiongnu	E	1	0	1	0	4	3	1	1	4	2	16
189	Xianbei	E	2	0	1	0	4	3	1	1	4	1	16
190	Jou-jan	E	3	0	1	0	4	3	1	1	4	2	18
191	Turks	E	4	0	0	0	4	3	1	1	4	2	18
192	Uighurs	E	4	0	1	0	4	3	1	1	4	2	19
193	Kitan (Liao)	E	4	3	3	3	4	3	4	3	4	4	34
194	Mongol 1206	E	3	0	1	0	4	3	1	0	4	2	17
195	Golden Horde	E	3	2	2	0	4	3	4	1	4	4	24

Because many items in this Table could be interpreted in different ways, it is necessary to provide the appropriate explanations. As to the first indication (Writing & Records), I tried to evaluate an extent of developing records within the society under study regardless of the fact if the diplomatic correspondence with Chins has carried out. As applied to the Xiongnu, I believe that, un spite of attempts to introduce the Chinese written language in the time of Lao-shang Shan-yu (Taskin 1968: 45), it has not be widespread in the society. This demonstrates the well known fact of substitution of the Shan-yu seal by the Chinese envoys of the Emperor Wang Mang. In the closest circle of Shan-yu,

nobody has been found who was able to read an inscription on the seal. The separate hieroglyphs on the ceramic vessels found in Ivolga fortes settlement suggest, more likely, the ethnic membership of the residents of this settlement rather than a development of written language among the nomads Xiongnu (Kradin 2002a: 80–86).

The Xiongnu knew the mnemonic means (1 score). This could be demonstrated by reference to Ssu-ma-Ch'en information. By his data, the Xiongnu elite has traditionally met in Tailin to count up and check people and cattle (Taskin 1968: 40). To a large degree, this resembles the description of appropriate customs of Jou-jan:

> "There has been no written language for records, therefore, commanders and chiefs have approximately counted up the number of warriors using sheep's droppings to do this but, later on, the Jou-jan have well learnt to make records with the help of notches on a wood" (Taskin 1984: 269).

The notches themselves could be interpreted as unwritten records (2 scores). Their use was characteristic not only of the Jou-jan but, by analogy with Wu-huan of Xianbei(Taskin 1984: 63, 327) although some representatives of elite of the Xianbei society knew the Chinese language and ideographic writing (for example, Ke-pi-neng). Among the Jou-jan, the number of persons knowing the Chinese language was much more (ibid.: 269, 289). Therefore, the Jou-jan society, as the Golden Horde, where with taking Islam the Arabic written language has been adopted should be assigned to the societies using the written language of other people (3 scores). Turks, Uighurs and Kitans had their own written languages (4 scores).

In the XII century, Mongols had no written documents. Heu have used so called by the Chinese chroniclers marks or notches (Munkuev 1975: 52–53). Since 1204, Mongols have used the Uighur written language. In 124 chapter of "Yuan shih", the biography of Uighur Ta-ta-tung-a working for the Naiman khan Ta-yang. After defeat of the Naimans, he was taken prisoner by Mongols and began working. He was entrusted to teach the Chingghis Khan's offsprings and some khans to read and to write. True, it is not clear whether they have taught the Uighur language or have written in their native language with the Uighur letters (Munkuev 1975: 125–128). Only later on, in 1220s, after going over to the Mongols of large quantity of the Chin's functionaries, the Chinese hieroglyphic written language (ibid.: 52–53) became to us. Thus, a degree of written language development among Mongols by 1206 is needed to be evaluated at 3 scores.

Many nomadic empires under consideration were, to one or other extent, acquainted with the settled way of life. On the Mongolia territory, the sites and unfortified settlements of Xiongnu were known (Hayashi 1984). The Xianbei leader T'ang-shih-huai has resettled to the Lao-haho river shores about 1000

families of Wo-jen people in order to they have engaged in fishery (Taskin 1984: 80). Early in the VI century, the Jou-jan have built the town of Mumoch'eng (ibid.: 290). The Uighurs have also engaged in the construction of fortresses and have erected in the centre of modern Mongolia their capital – town of Ordu-Balyk (Har Balgas). The extent of urbanization of the Kitans (Jagchid 1981; Ivliev 1983) and residents of the Golden Horde (Egorov 1985; Fedorov-Davydov 1994) has been much higher.

For this reason, as for the second indication (Fixity of Residence), I tried to be founded on the mode of life of the most population of the society under study. Taking into account small number of the settled population, Xiongnu, Xianbei, Jou-jan, Turks, Uighurs and Mongols were assigned to the societies with monadic system of settlements (0 scores). About only of Kitans has led the nomadic and semi-nomadic life (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 58). The elite and government have also moved periodically to five capital towns. For this reason, the degree of the settled mode of life in Liao has been estimated as settled but inconstant (3 scores). More than 100 sites were known in the Golden Horde but it seems that a share of urban population was there, on the whole, low. However, taking into account the specificity of ecology of the East-European steppes assuming the semi-nomadic character of economy, one can evaluate the degree of settled mode of life in the Joche Ulus at 2 scores.

The determination of the degree of agriculture development (third indication) presented no special problems. Here, I started from the assumption that a presence of the settled settlements supposes an exercise of agriculture or truck farming (1 score). The similar settlements of Turks are unknown (0 scores). About ¾ people of Kitans have been engaged in the intense agriculture, however, almost one million of people has had only embryos of agriculture (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 58). For this reason, the degree of agriculture development in Liao was evaluated at 3 scores. In the Golden Horde, a meaning of agriculture was evidently more than 10% but, nevertheless, the leading part in the rural economy has been played by the cattle-breeding (2 scores).

Filling out of a column of the forth indication (Urbanization) proved to be relatively complex. This was related to the fact that, in a number of societies, different types of social organization occurred – small in number communities of nomads and considerable in size communities of farmers and townsmen. Here, I had to be guided by the fact what of the form of social organization was most widespread in the society under consideration. Because of the pastoral nomads of Eurasia, the community of small size (less than 100 people) is characteristic (Bacon 1958; Krader 1963; Khazanov 1984; Cribb 1991; Barfield 1993 etc.), all of the societies under study, except Kitans, were assigned to the simplest form (0 scores). The empire Liao has consisted of Chinese to the extent of about 2/3. The urbanization degree was there evaluated at 3 scores.

Considering the fifth indication (Technological Specialization), it is necessary to base on both archaeological data and the written sources. The archaeological materials (except Jou-jan, the sites of which are not found so far) confirm that of all the above societies, a presence of metallurgy, weaving, pottery is characteristic. Describing the Ukhuans – contemporaries of Xiongnu and Xianbei – the Chinese chronicler notes that they have had metallurgy, weaving, pottery:

> "The adults know how to make bows, arrows, saddles, bridles, to forge arm from iron and metals, are able to embroider on leather, to make patterned embroideries, to weave woolen cloths" (Taskin 1984: 327).

The similar characteristics could be also found with respect to the medieval Turks, Mongols and even nomads of modern time (Kradin 1992: 49–50). For this reason, the level of handicraft development should be evaluated at 4 scores.

It is quite another matter, how much were these technologies developed as compares with the settled-agrarian civilizations. In many societies of pastoral nomads, the handicraft has not become a specialized economical subsystem. Quite often, the nomads have captured the most qualified part of craftspeople at the time of raids to the neighboring countries or in the course of conquests. The experience of the cross-cultural comparison of the level of the handicraft activity development in the nomadic societies and agrarian-urban civilizations of the East shows that nomads were inferior on this indication to their settled neighbors (Alaev 1982: 27).

Filling up of the column for the sixth indication (Land Transport) presented no special problems. Of all selected societies, the use of both animals and wheeled traffic is characteristic (3 scores).

Only Liao and Golden Horde have had their own money (seventh indication). Of other nomadic empires, the use, first of all, of home livestock as an instrument of exchange is characteristic.

As for the eighth indication (Density of population), it is necessary to be founded on that population of nomadic empires of Xiongnu, Xianbei, Jou-jan, Turks was approximately identical (within 0.8–1.5 millions people [see Kradin 2002a: 71–79]) and, at the same time, comparable with the population of Mongolia at new time – slightly more than 1 people per sq. American mile (1 score). Judging from § 202 of Secret History of Mongols, Chinggis Khan had 95 commanders of one thousand horsemen and ten thousands guardsmen. Because each adult man (about 20% of population) was a soldier, then, even taking into account so called forest Mongols not included in the lists of thousands, total number of Mongols at a time considered was not more than 500–6000 thousands people (i.e. less than one man per one sq. mile [0 scores]). The Liao population was 3.8 millions people (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 58). A dividing of this value by the approximate area of the country gives, as a result,

about 7 people per one sq. mile (3 scores). The Golden Horde population density was slightly more than 1 people per sq. mile (Ivanov, Vasilyev 1995: 57–60).

When calculating the number of levels of the political integration, it is needed to be guided by the fact of availability in the nomadic empires of the decimal system. In this case, it makes no difference whether the local ail = ten soldiers or clan = a hundred soldiers is used as the lowest level of hierarchy, the total number of the hierarchy levels is characteristic of the most complex societies – three and more levels of hierarchy is characteristic of the state subdivided into regions and districts – 4 scores.

When filling up the column for the last indication (Social Stratification), it is necessary to take into account that of all the nomadic empires included in the sample, a division into elite and ordinary nomads is characteristic. In particular, it is pronounced in the appropriate social terminology: *beg* (elite) and *kara budun* (black people) among Turks, *khans*, *noyons* (aristocracy) and *kharachu* (commoners) among Mongols etc. At the same time, there has been no caste division in the societies under consideration and the slavery among the nomads of Eurasian steppes has had undeveloped character (Nieboer 1910; Khazanov 1984; Kradin 1992 etc.). Therefore, the most nomadic empires were evaluated at 2 scores (two strata's but slavery and castes are not developed). The determination of the social stratification development level in the Golden Horde presented some difficulties as it has included a considerable percentage of the urban population in addition to pastoral nomads but was also evaluated at 2 scores. This is related to the fact that, first, the special literature does not provide examples of existence of more than two levels of social stratification (Fedorov-Davydov 1973; Egorov 1985 etc.) and, secondly, in spite of the wide spreading of slavery, it had no hereditary character (Poluboyarinova 1978: 36–37). As in the Xianbei power, a man of the common people (Tan-shih-huai, Ke-pi-neng) could become a ruler, the degree of development of social stratification in this society was estimated at 1 score. Only in Liao empire, there has been multi-level social structure (Wittfogel, Feng 1949) having more than three strata different from each other (4 scores).

Discussion

Three following questions are considered as most important for discussion: (1) internal typology of nomadic societies by the complexity extent; (2) nomadic empires and state origin in steppes areas (3) difference of nomads from settled societies.

First of all, it should be remembered that Murdock and Provost mechanically divided the sample of 186 societies into four groups of complexity by the number of scores with a step of 10 units. However, in reality, a division into the

complexity levels with quite other frameworks is beginning to emerge. The simplest societies in the Murdock and Provost sample are local groups of hunters-gatherers. Second in complexity segmental societies have about 10 scores including those, from among pastoral societies, of Chukchi-reindeer-breeders (8 scores) and Masai (9 scores). The chiefdoms are between 15 and 20 scores with some deviations in the both directions (for example, a simple chiefdom of Trobrianders – 16 scores, more complex ones (Tikopia, Samoa) – 18 scores, Tonga – 20 scores). This group includes the majority of examples of nomadic societies discussed in the paper: Basseri (15 scores), Tuaregs, Xiongnu and Xianbei (16 scores), Mongols (17 scores), Jou-jan and Turks (18 scores), Uighurs (19 scores) and Kazkhs (20 scores). The Bedouins have slightly lesser sum (13 scores). The Khalka Mongols of modern history have gotten 22 scores while the Golden Horde 24 scores. The most complex society has been Liao dynasty (34 scores).

Thus, one can say of several levels of the cultural complexity of pastoral nomads included in the sample: (1) segmental acephal societies of stock-breeders (Chukchi, Masai) – less than 10 scores; (2) secondary tribal formations (Bedouins) – 13 scores; (3) chiefdoms and nomadic empires and traditional societies of nomads of modern history (Basseri, Tuaregs, Xiongnu, Xianbei, Mongols, Jou-jan, Turks, Uighurs, Kazakhs, Khalkha-Mongols) –from 13 to 22 scores; (4) nomadic empires of the tributary and transitional types with different sectors of the settled-urban economy (Golden Horde, Liao) – 24 and 34 scores respectively.

In principle, it is in conformity with the majority of classifications. More difficult is the question of the fact how should be the level of the political complexity of societies assigned to the second group (from 13 to 22 score determined. Even Tuaregs (16 scores) are assigned by some authors (Pershits 1976) to the early class societies while other researches (Johnson, Earle 2000) determine Basseri as chiefdoms (15 scores). As for the nomadic empires and nomads of modern history, here, a spectrum of opinions is still wider. The discussion of many years concerning the specificity of the social relations of nomads, as indicated above, never came to drawing-up of positions acceptable for the majority of scientists.

However, the settled-agrarian societies located in the Murdock – Provost classification nearly at the same level of complexity are interpreted by scientists in different ways. If, as for Samoa (18 scores – more than for Xiongnu and the same as for Mongols in 1206 – by the way the tribal confederation of Hurons had the same amount of scores !!), the majority of authors agree that it is a chiefdom (Bargatzky 1988; van Backel 1991) then, with respect to Tonga, some researchers believe that it is a classic chiefdom (Kirch 1984) while the others consider that it is already early state (Claessen 1991). The opinions are also different with respect to Ashanti (24 scores): in opinions of some authors,

it is a "segmentary" state (Sautholl 1953) while the others think that it is pre-state formation (Popov 1990). In the same group of complexity, Ifugao (21 scores) fall who had three-level social stratification but the stable centralized political institutions were not established.

Nevertheless, from the analysis of Table 3 (Murdock, Provost 1973: 389) follows that, on the basis of total number of scores, the most nomadic empires should be, more likely, assigned to the chiefdoms or societies being in the course of transition to the state system rather than to the established early states. Slightly larger number of scores (26) is characteristic of those societies which had more complex, multi-polity structure and, quite often, were determined as empires – Songhai (Kubbel 1974) and Inka (Johnson, Earle 2000; Earle 2002 etc.).

It is interesting that Dmitri Bondarenko and Andrey Korotayev came to analogous conclusions when they carried out the cross-cultural study of a model of the early state. They used the collected data of 21 early-state societies systematized by Claessen by 51 signs (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 533–596) to construct the computer data base and analyzed it using the factor analysis. One of the tasks of authors was a check, on the basis of empirical material, of the H. Claessen and P. Skalnik typology who have divided the early-state societies into inchoate, typical and transitional. As a result of ranking of the societies used in the Henri J.M. Claessen and Peter Skalnik sample, two nomadic empires (Scythians and Mongols) presented in the sample proved to be on the verge between the inchoate and typical states (Bondarenko, Korotayev 2003: 112).

At the same time, the interesting picture was found. Among so called inchoate early states, such societies as Vikings, Hawaiians, Tahitiians and Ankols which are usually assigned to chiefdoms rather than to early states were found. However, it is not accidental if it is analyzed what features are allotted for the inchoate early state. According to Claessen and Skalnik, it is characteristic of the latter: 1) predominance of clan relations; 2) officials lived at the expense of a share of redistribution gathered by them; 3) there was no legal codification; 4) there were no special judicial authorities; 5) re-distribution, tribute and requisitions were not strictly determined; 6) poor development of administrative machinery (1978: 22, 641).

At the same time, these signs are characteristic of the chiefdom rather than of the state. Only with a transition to the more complex level of typical early state, the signs of the state system proper – special officials, judicial machinery, written code of laws etc. appear (ibid.). For this reason, I believe that it would be more properly to identify typical early state, transitional early state, traditional (or, by Claessen, mature) pre-industrial state. Moreover, as Claessen does not take into account differences in the degree of the chiefdoms' complexity in his typology, one can assume that so called inchoate early states, by Claessen, are, in essence, so called complex and supercomplex chiefdoms.

Thus, the conclusions of Bondarenko and Korotayev paper confirm the fact that it would be not quite properly to assign the nomadic empires of Scythians and Mongols to the classic early states. Actually, the latter are between the chiefdoms and early states. Possibly, the fact that the Xiongnu power which had also the signs of both pre-state society and early state but, to a larger degree, has corresponded to the super-complex chiefdom (Kradin 2002) has found itself actually side by side with the Chinggis Khan empire of 1206 (17 and 16 scores respectively) on the scale of the cultural complexity, according to Murdock and Provost.

The last of problems considered in this paper could be characterized as a revealing the most typical features of the cultural complexity of nomadic societies differentiating them from other regions and cultural areas. Toward this end, Table from the paper of Murdock and Provost with inclusion into it additionally of data of 7 nomadic societies from their sample as well as my data of 8 Eurasian nomadic empires was used.

I has not become to summarize this data together because the F. Galton's principle was broken in my sample – all these societies have existed on the same territory and one could not theoretically disclaim the possibilities of cultural diffusion although I am not a follower of the idea of a presence of succession between the ancient and later nomads of the Central and Inner Asia. Nevertheless, the tendencies characteristic of the sample of 7 nomadic pastoralists (furthermore, NP) correlate with tendencies observed in the sample of 8 nomadic empires (furthermore, NE). This allows to assume that the case in point should be the universal features of the evolution of nomadic societies rather that a succession regardless of their habitats and degree of cultural complexity.

Table 4.3. Average index of cultural complexity of regions

		A	C	E	I	N	S	NP	NE
1	Write	0.2	3.3	2.0	1.0	1.2	0.7	2.4	3.0
2	Residence	3.1	3.4	2.7	3.6	1.9	2.0	0.4	0.6
3	Agriculture	2.8	3.0	2.6	2.8	1.3	2.3	0.7	1.3
4	Urbanization	1.6	2.2	1.6	1.5	1.5	1.1	0.9	0.4
5	Technology	2.7	3.2	2.7	1.2	1.0	1.8	3.0	4.0
6	Transport	0.1	1.6	1.5	0.5	0.8	0.3	1.4	3.0
7	Money	1.5	2.4	1.9	1.8	1.2	0.4	1.1	1.8
8	Population	2.3	2.6	2.2	2.6	0.9	0.9	0.6	1.1
9	Polit. Integration	2.1	2.5	2.4	1.8	1.2	1.4	2.4	4.0
10	Stratification	1.5	2.7	2.0	1.3	0.8	0.6	1.7	2.1

(according to Murdock, Provost 1973) with addition of the last columns.
Legend: A – Africa, C – Mediterranean region, E – East Eurasia, I – Insular pacific, N – North America, S – South America, NP – nomadic pastorals, NE – nomadic empires.

The results obtained are quite interesting. The first feature lies in the relatively high level of the record system and written language development among nomads. On the whole, it is second only the Mediterranean region. When the conclusions of some investigations according to which such indication as the written language is not always related to the already existing state system (Staerman 1989; Berent 2000; Korotayev et al. 2000 etc.) are considered, one could assume that the stateless society should be not always primitive and, therefore, the civilization presumes not necessarily a presence of the state system. From this point of view, it is time to refuse the stable stereotypes determined since the classic evolutionism and generalized by W.G. Childe according to which the origin of civilization should always be accompanied with an appearance of written language, urbanization, developed social stratification and state. The nomadic societies provide an illustrative example of necessary to correct the generally accepted ideas.

The second conclusion is a quite evident. As for the degree of development of the settled life, urbanization, agrarian sector of economy, population and population density, the nomads were, to a great degree, inferior to their settled neighbors. However, they have compensated this by the quite high level of technology (second place to the Mediterranean region), relatively high level of economy marketability (trade was always one of the most significant and prestigious kinds of nomads' activity), development of the transport infrastructure based not only on the use of the large quantity of animals but also on the advantages of the flat spaces with minimum quantity of obstacles.

However, it should be meant in mind that the general cultural potential of the society is not always in conformity with its military potential. The Eurasian nomads not only often watched closely the technological progress in the military science and were quite often inventors of innovations in this field but also were distinguished by the economic and political organization more adapted to the military mode of life. In contrast to their settled neighbors, they could painlessly detach the large quantity of men for campaigns. The tribal organization has facilitated the task of political mobilization. A presence of large quantity of the saddle animals has made the army of nomads mobile and invulnerable while the concentration within the limited space and in the shortest possible time of a great number of manpower has created for nomads significant tactic advantages.

The third peculiarity lies in the fact that the nomadic pastoralists (NP) had a quite high index of political centralization (2.4). This index is equal to that of people of the East Eurasia and slightly lower than the index of the Mediterranean region people. At the moment, I can not say whether it is caused by any significant reasons or it is a result of a limitedness of the sample of data. On the other hand, a quite high level of political centralization of nomads (2.4 scores – somewhere between the simple and complex chiefdoms) suggests that

the great part of nomads having such saddle-animals as horse and/or camel were characterized by the sufficiently complex form of social-political organization.

And the last conclusion. The index of political integration of both nomadic pastoralists and nomadic empires was one order of magnitude higher than the index of social stratification (2.4 and 1.7; 4.0 and 2.1 respectively). This give all grounds to assume that, on the whole, processes of polygenesis in the nomadic societies have passed slightly ahead of development of social stratification. Possibly, this was caused by the absence of the stable sources of accumulation and storage of considerable productive resources in the nomadic societies, peculiarities of ecology, thereupon, one could be deprived of the whole of livestock right away.

Conclusion

The results of the cross-cultural study of 15 societies of nomads show that among the nomads and pastoralists, approximately three-four levels of cultural (and political) complexity can be identified. The simple societies are segmental *acephalos* ones having no government systems. The next stage is the secondary tribes, confederations of tribes, simple chiefdoms. Even more developed structure is characteristic of the complex and super-complex societies. The last societies are presented on a substantial scale by the nomadic empires as well as quasi-imperial polities of somewhat lesser size (like Tatar khanates after the collapse of Golden Horde), independent and semi-dependent khanates of nomads in Modern time (Kazakhs, Kalmyks etc.). Those nomadic empires (tributary and transitional in my typology [Kradin 1992; 2000]) which included the agrarian population are most complex.

The average cultural complexity of typical nomadic empires is approximately at the same level as that of so called complex chiefdoms of the settled-agrarian societies or, at the most, polities being on the threshold of the state system establishment. From my point of view, it would be more correct to call the similar societies of nomads as the supercomplex chiefdoms (Kradin 1992; 2002). Of the latter, the high degree of centralization, development of social stratification, embryos of urbanistic and even monumental construction and, sometimes, written language. These chiefdoms have had the complicated system of naming of chiefs and functionaries. The rulers were in diplomatic correspondence with the neighboring countries, entered into the dynastic marriages with the kings of the agrarian states and khans of other nomadic empires. From viewpoint of the neighboring settled-urban civilizations, such nomadic societies were perceived as the independent objects of the international political relations.

Could be the super-complex chiefdoms established by the settled agrarian nations? It is known that the populations of complex chiefdoms are estimated, as a rule, in tens of thousands people (see, for example: Johnson, Earle 2000: 246). However, the population of the super-complex chiefdom amounts many hundreds of thousands people and even more (nomadic empires of Inner Asia – up to 1–1.5 millions people). Territory of the super-complex nomadic chiefdoms was much more than areas of simple and complex chiefdoms of farmers (of nomads, such population density is characteristic that is typical for pre-hierarchical types of society and chiefdoms of farmers). At the same time, on the territory comparable in sizes with any nomadic empire, several times larger number of farmers who could not manage without the state could reside.

A government by so great space in the society of nomads has been facilitated by the specificity of the steppe landscapes and availability of the saddle animals. On the other hand, a general armament of nomads caused in particular by their dispersion, their mobility, economic autarchy, militant way of life in the course of long historical period as well as a number of other factors have prevented from establishing control over the pastoral tribes and individual nomads on the side of the top levels of the power of nomadic societies. All of this gives the grounds to assume that the super-complex chiefdom, even if it were not characteristic of only nomads form of political organization, it has been just this society which has received the widest spreading.

Part Two

ARCHAEOLOGICAL RETROSPECTIVE

5

THE SOCIAL STRATIFICATION OF THE XIONGNU NOMADIC EMPIRE IN BAIKAL AREA

Introduction

The Xiongnu history is one of the most interesting pages of the history of the Eurasia steppe's people in the ancient epoch. On the boundary between III and II centuries BC the Xiongnu have established the first steppe empire which has consolidated many peoples of the Inner Asia. Over a period of 250 years, a dramatic confrontation between Xiongnu and southern neighbour – Chinese dynasty Han. At the end of the first century AD, the Xiongnu era in the Inner Asia was over but from this point a new stage of their history – the Huns invasion to the West and their devastating conquests in the Old World begins.

Basic sources on the Xiongnu history are data of which was made into basic languages (Lidai 1958; Bichurin 1950/1851; Groot 1921; Watson 1961; Taskin 1968, 1973), as well as materials of archaeological excavations on the territories of Mongolia, Russia and China (Dorzsuren 1961; Unehara 1960; Rudenko 1969; Konovalov 1976; 2008; Davydova 1995; 1996; Minyaev 1998; Desroches 2003; Turbat 2004; Wright, Honeychurch, Amartuvshin 2009 etc.). At present, there are several great papers (Egami 1948; Bernschtam 1951; Gumilev 1960; Ma Chanshou 1962; Davydova 1985; Suhbaatar 1980; Di Cosmo 2002; Kradin 2002a; Krol 2005 etc.), in which different aspects of the history and culture of the Xiongnu society are elucidated. However, many questions remain as before unsolved and debatable. This paper will consider some of these problems.

Tribal confederation of Xiongnu was the first nomadic empire at the Central Asia. At appeared at the boundary of III-II centuries BC. The main reason of its appearing was the necessity to resist active extension and acculturation from the South. Military and political talents of Mao-tun, who was the empire founder, played a great role.

Social structure

The Nomadic Empire of Xiongnu was a tribal one. It was tribal confederation in the area if internal relations, and also was a conqueror xenocratic nomadic statehood polity to the other peoples (Kradin 2000; 2002; 2008). Every pastoral nomad (chief, follower, ordinary pastoralist) was included into social structures or, on the other words, into genealogical status

inequality among tribes and clans. At the same time this nomad was a warriors and occupied his place in the decimal classification (foreman, commander of a hundred or thousand men, etc.).

Based on analysis of the writings of the ancient Chinese chroniclers, it is known that the social structure of the Xiongnu had many hierarchical levels. The highest level of the social pyramid was occupied by the Shan-yu and his relatives (Luan-ti clan). The representatives of other noble clans, tribal chiefs and service nobility have ranked next. And further, the most mass social group of the society – economically independent ordinary pastoral nomads – has been placed. At the bottom of the social pyramid, different categories not processing rights have been: impoverished nomads, semi-vassal settled people, captives-tributaries being engaged in agriculture and handicraft and, possibly, slaves (Kradin 2002a, English summary).

The archaeological data supplement to a great extent an information of writes annals. During a period of the Xiongnu growth, a social stratification has further increased. The higher a status of individual the greater are expenses for erection of the funeral structure and the more splendid are things lowered in a grave. In the Noin Uul and Gol Mod (Mongolia), Ilmovaya pad and Tsaram (Southern Buryatia) the monumental "royals" and chiefs mound graves of the Xiongnu elite are located for building of which considerable efforts were required (Rudenko 1969; Konovalov 1976; 2008; Desroches 2003; Minyaev and Sakharovskaya 2006; 2007; Polosmak, Bogdanov, Tsevendorzh Erdere-Ochir 2008 etc.). The burials of ordinary nomads were much simpler and more poor in this. These are generally rounded or quadrangular stone little mounds burial of 5–10 m in diameter. A depth of the grave hole was generally 2–3 m. At the bottom of a hole, a wooden coffin (more rarely a coffin within a framework) has stood. The burial place has been accompanied by individual goods of households, arms, harness, implements, adornments and funeral food (Dorzsuren 1961; Konovalov 1976; Tsevendorz 1985; Turbat 2004 etc.). The pit graves of settled people living on the territory of Ivolga fortress settlement were even simpler and more poor (Davydova 1995; 1996).

Sources and methods

At present, on the Baikal area region territory, more than 90 archaeological sites of Xiongnu were found. Among them, there are 3 fortress settlements, 3 elite and 30 ordinary cemeteries, more than 50 sites (Lbova, Khamzina 1999). All of them are on the Buryat Republic territory, within the great steppe tract related to the Selenga river valley and wedged itself in the forest-steppe and taiga zones of the Baikal Siberia. It is an isolated ecological region. One can assume that this territory was not only of great economic importance and a zone

of potential agriculture and trade contacts with the cultures of hunters of the Baikal area taiga and Baikal fishers but it was also the independent administrative-political subdivision in the Xiongnu Empire structure. This assumption makes a consideration of the Xiongnu archaeological of the South-West Baikal area as a united integral spatial system urgent.

To solve the set problem, data of four best studied cemeteries of 33 known mortuary complexes of the Xiongnu in the Byryatia territory were selected: Ilmovaya Pad' (60 burials were excavated), Cheremukhovaya Pad' (20 burials were excavated), Dyrestuisky Kultuk or Dyrestui (130 burials were identified) and Ivolga one (216 burials were excavated). This selection was solely governed by the quantitative criteria because small samples are unrepresentative for statistic methods.

As the methodology for studying of the social stratification using archaeological sources, one can take an assumption according to which the power strength is defined by the control scale over the energy sources (productive resources, spoils, commodity turnover etc.), energy accumulators (warehouses, for nomads – herds of cattle, treasure houses etc.) and control over the redistribution of the energetic flows (Adams 1975; Masson 1976; Earle 1997; Smith 2003; Kradin, Tishkin, Kharinsky 2005 etc.). Consequently, the higher was an individual status, the more splendid was a stock lowered together with him to the grave. However, very many so called elite burials of early civilizations and cultures were pillaged. For this reason, one can agree with those researchers who believe that such criterion as the amount of power inputs for construction of the burial structures correlate, as a rule, with the rank of the deceased, volume of this power in this life-time and can be used to reconstruct the social structure of the archaic society.

The research procedure assumes a necessity to perform a number of consecutive operations:

1. Identification of the mortuary ritual peculiarities, preparation of a list of signs, entering information into the computer data base (for this purpose, the specialized program STATISTICA 5.0 for WINDOWS).
2. Identification of factors significant for age division of set.
3. Division of the set into adult and children burials.
4. Identification of factors significant for sex division of the array of adult burials.
5. Division of the set into the male and female burials.
6. Examination of differences in the mortuary ritual within the homogeneous of uncertain burials.
7. Identification of strong factors relating those of other intragroup clusters with different categories of the grave goods.
8. Interpretation of the results obtained.

To identify the signs significant for those or other sex-age and social groups the *factor* analysis was used. For isolation of social groups within the homogeneous sex-age sets, the *cluster* analysis was applied.

Burials database description

From the general wealth of burials, the anthropologically determined individual man's, woman's and children's burials were set off (33% in Ivolga, 67% in Dyrestui, 65% in Cheremukhovaya Pad' and 58% in Ilmovaya Pad' accordingly of total number of buried people). Collective burials were not analyzed here. It is a task for future studies. Then, a visual investigation of the constructive peculiarities of the funeral ceremony (sizes, depth, orientation of burials etc.) was carried out with the purpose of a revealing of differences between adult and children's as well as between man's and woman's burials. So, in Ilmovaya Pad, a study of differences in the construction of funeral structures showed that the area of constructions placed on woman's burials is a slightly more than that of children's burials and, in turn, area of a stonework over the man's burials is much more than that of woman's ones. The length and width of all sex-age classes of burials were not much different from each other (if the dimensions of graves of the elite mounds), however, the depth of children's graves was slightly smaller than that for graves of adults. The orientation of skeletons in the man's burials has differed in a slightly larger variety. In addition to traditional variants of positions of the deceased with a head to N, NNO and other deviations from the northern orientation, the opposite positions of the deceased people were found (SSW). Moreover, a burial in sitting position was revealed only in man's graves. On the whole, the visual differences in the constructive peculiarities were not sharply defined.

After that, the factor analysis of features of the accompanying goods was carried out inside each of three above sex-age classes to identify appropriate factor loadings. The analysis was performed using the principal-component method. As a result, the factor matrix which revealed a degree of the factor loading of different factors was obtained. This enabled to reveal what categories of the accompanying implements were characteristic of one or another of the sex-age classes of burials. Further, using the same principal-component method, the factor analysis of already all features was carried out (dimensions of the funeral structures, orientation of the deceased people etc. were compared with the accompanying implements) which allowed to specify visual observations relative to those or other peculiarities of the funeral ceremony as well as enabled to examine an accuracy of the first factor analysis conclusions.

As a result, it has been possible to find out what features were characteristic of the man's, woman's and children's burials accordingly. So, for instance, it was determined that a number of features is found in all sex-age classes of burials in the Ivolga burial ground (buttons, bone arrows, open-work pendants, harness, beads, rings). Such features as a knife and ceramics were often found in the burials of cemetery. At the same time, there are particular differences. So, in the children's burials, the ritual and bronze vessels were found but a presence of weapon and ritual food is practically not characteristic of them. The woman's burials contained more adornments (glass beads, pendants, shells) than man's ones. The ritual sacrifice of a pig was, to a greater extent, characteristic of the woman's burials. On the contrary, in the man's burials, the weapon objects (e.g. daggers) not characteristic of the woman's burials are more often found. On the whole, there are the specific nuances for each of the sex-age classes and this allows, in a number of cases, to determine sex and, partly, age of buried people.

The following stage of study was a procedure of the sex-age interpretation of those single burials for which it has been not possible to interpret sex and age of the diseased. Toward this end, the results of the factor analysis carried out were used. This sampling relative to the total sex-age classes of buried people amounted additionally 37% in Ivolga cemetery, 8% in Dyrestui one, 15% in Cheremukhovaya and 28% in Ilmovaya. However, a number of single burials were never interpreted. In all, along with the collective burials, it amounts 30% in Ivolga cemetery, 26% in Dyrestui one, 20% in Cheremukhovsky Pad' (in view of little total sample) and 13% in Ilmovaya Pad. In the Ivolga and Dyrestui cemeteries, too much number of indeterminate burials is present. It is necessary to continue the study of these sex-age classes.

After that, each sex-age class of man's, woman's and children's burials was investigated using the cluster analysis (Ward's method). Degree of proximity between clusters was analyzed. As a rule, it is a key but most difficult part in an investigation of the social structure of the archaic society with the use of archaeological data. At that, I have carried out the cluster analysis twice: at first, only for indicators of constructive peculiarities of the funeral ceremonial rites (categories I-III) and, further, for all five categories of indicators of ceremonial rites of burials. The results obtained were compared and proved to be nearly identical. Such a difficult procedure was caused by the fact that most of burials of culture were robbed and correlation of indicators of the accompanying ceremonial rites (category IV) was very low. Then, I compared different groups of clusters and considered indicators of ceremonial rites as the qualitative indices. The results of cluster interpretation for all aggregates of all four burial grounds are presented in the following section.

Male ranks

An investigation of the funeral monuments of the Baikal area Xiongnu confirms a thesis of the multilayer social hierarchy in the Xiongnu empire traced in different sex-age and rank groups of the society. The male burials are subdivided into several widely differed ranks. The cemeteries form the scale of rank. The topmost story is occupied by three mound (No 10, 40, 54) of cluster 2 in the Ilmovaya Pad' complex which belong to so called elite or king's mounds. Then, the burials of subclusters 1A and 1B of Ilmovaya follow. There are some differences between them. Burials of subcluster 1A are, possibly, slightly richer.

By the proximity of the funeral ceremony and quantity of the accompanying goods, they are succeeded by the burials of Cheremukhovaya Pad' and Dyrestui. Most likely, we should say about the population of the Xiongnu society enjoying full rights. In the latter burial ground, three groups of approximately the same social rank can be identified.

In the Ivolga burial ground, four social ranks were recognized. The lowest rank is the burials of the cluster 1 without goods. Three other groups are accompanied by different categories of implements. The second subgroup (subcluster 2AB) differs additionally from the first one (subcluster 2AA) by the presence of a belt while the third subgroup (subcluster 2B) differs from the second one by the presence of a harness.

Table 5.1. Male Xiongnu burials in the Baikal area

Burial Ground	Cluster	Burial goods
Ivolga Cemetery	1	None
	2AA	Standart
	2AB	Same +belt
	2B	Same + horse harness
Dyrestuisky Kultuk	1B	Diverse
	1A	More diverse
	2	Same + Ornaments
Cheremukhovaya Pad'	1	*No differentiation relevant*
	2	
Ilmovaya Pad'	1B	Diverse
	1A	Even more diverse + mirrors + golden ornament
	2	Elite burial mounds (No 10, 40, 54)

It would be suggestive to attach these strata to the particular social groups known from the Chinese annals. However, this would be too much untimely. It is necessary to remember that archaeology deals with only fragmentary remains of the formerly existing culture and that we have at hand only small sample of the facts and our knowledge of the past can be essentially corrected with each new field season. Most likely, the particular clusters of burials could be more determinately connected with the particular social groups of the Xiongnu society only in the case of considerable enlargement of the source base.

At the same time, when interpreting the results of statistical analysis of the complexes of the man's burials, one should take account of the earlier advanced assumption that the nomadic cattle-breeding population of the South-western Baikal area represented the independent administrative-territorial unit of the imperial hierarchy headed by the chief of a ten thousand (Kradin 1999). On this basis, one can assume that the elite mounds in the cemeteries of Ilmovaya Pad, Orgoiton, Tsaram, Khukhunder were erected in memory of the highest regional chiefs and their nearest relations.

Why were they – emissaries of the gold clan Luan-ti or members of other noble clans (Hu-yan, Lan Hsü-pu and Quilin)? It is not likely to receive the correct answer to this question. It is impossible to disclaim a probability that a part of these cemeteries could belong to any groups of elite fighting for the power at a period of the civil war (60-36 BC) or was remained by the rules of any group of the northern Xiongnu already after the collapse of the steppe empire. The following is evident – in the course of two and more centuries, the power was passed from hand to hand which reflects a presence on the territory under consideration of several different clan (tribal) cemeteries.

The elite mounds were sharply opposed to the burials of nomads having a lower status. It is appropriate at this point to tell about differences in the funeral ceremony and diversity of the accompanying goods between the cemeteries on the whole as well as about differences between individual social groups (subclusters of burials). The differences between cemeteries could be caused by the different statuses of tribal and clan collectives erecting these funeral complexes, intraethnic (intertribal) specificity and chronological differences of different stages of the Xiongnu history.

On the whole, a quantity of a labor put in the burial grounds of Ilmovaya and Cheremukhovaya Pads, Dyrestuiske Kultuk is more than the costs for burials of Ivolga ground cemetery. This gives the grounds to assume that the status of nomadic pastoralists was evidently higher than that of inhabitants of the settled agricultural settlements.

A differentiation of the individual subclusters within cemeteries reflects the differences between different social ranks of the Xiongnu society. Here, based on the differences in the accompanying goods, the "richest" burials are prominent (cluster 2, Ilmovaya Pad). It is much more difficult to decide to representatives of what social ranks of the Xiongnu society (elders, common nomads, slaves etc.), the burials of one or other cluster (subcluster) belong. However, this is not to say that the similar interpretation will be impossible in future. In particular, it is hardly probable that we are seriously mistaken if we connect the poorest burials of cluster 1 in Ivolga cemetery with population having a slavish or semi-slavish status.

Female ranks

The investigation of groups of woman's burials shows a presence of a hierarchy among the weaker sex representatives. It should be also pointed out that the weapon objects are found nearly in a half of the revealed clusters (subclusters) of woman's burials. This confirms the well known from the written and archaeological sources fact of the active participation of women in the military life of inhabitants of steppe (Bunyatyan 1985: 71; Polosmak 2001: 276–277; Linduff, Rubinson 2008 etc.). However, the fact that the weapon objects were found in woman's burials of the settled people more often than in those of nomadic population (in 3 of 5 clusters of Ivolga cemetery) can not be explained.

Table 5.2. Female Xiongnu burials in the Baikal area

Burial Ground	Cluster	Burial goods
Ivolga Cemetery	1B	None
	1AA	Ceramics
	1AB	Standard +ceramics
	2A	More diverse grave goods (+harness, coin, adornment)
	2B	Even more diverse, remains of funerary repast
Dyrestuisky Kultuk	1B	Diverse, remains of funerary repast
	2	Diverse, remains of funerary repast + cow bones, weapons
	1A	Even more diverse ornaments, remains of funerary repast + cow bones
Cheremukhovaya Pad'	1	More diverse
	2	Diverse
Ilmovaya Pad'	1B	Scarce
	2	Diverse
	1A	Even more diverse + mirrors + golden ornaments)

In the burials of the most noble cemetery of Ilmovaya Pad, three social ranks are identified: the "richest" burials fall into a subcluster 1A; more poor burials belong to a cluster 2; burials of women with the lowest status fall into a subcluster 1B.

In contrast to man's burials, in woman's ones of Cheremukhovaya Pad, two social layers were identified: slightly "richer" burials of a cluster 2 and slightly "poorer" graves of a cluster 1.

The analysis of graves of the Dyrestui revealed a presence of three social subgroups. Group 1B is accompanied by the common for ordinary graves goods. It is poorer than groups 1A and 2. However, there are some differences between the last groups. A weapon was found in a cluster 2 while a cluster 1A differs by a great deal and diversity of adornments.

Much more complicated hierarchy is observed in female graves of the Ivolga burial ground. Here, five ranks were identified. The first group of burials (1B) has no implements, in the second one (1AA), only ceramics was found, in the third group (1AB) the accompanying implements appear, the implements in the fourth one (2A) become more diverse (here, a belt, coins, various adornments are observed) and, in the fifth group (2B), these indicators become mass and funeral feast is more diverse.

Statuses in Childhood

As in the case of the graves of adults, in the children's graves, the distinct difference is stated between little mound (Ilmovaya Pad, Dyrestui) and pit ground (Ivolga burial ground) funeral complexes. The social differentiation is best traced in Ivolga cemetery where the class of the children's graves is divided into three groups: graves without goods (subcluster 2AAB), graves with ceramics (subcluster 2AAA), graves with various accompanying implements (subcluster 2AB). The burials of baby in vessels of cluster 1 which are conditionally denoted as "infantile" ones should be separately considered.

Table 5.3. Immature Xiongnu burials in the Baikal area

Burial Ground	Cluster	Burial goods
Ivolga	1	*burials of baby in vessels*
	2AAB	None
	2AAA	Ceramic
	2AB	Standard +ceramic
Dyrestuisky Kultuk	1	Standard (girls ?)
	2	Standard (boys ?)
Ilmovaya Pad'		*differentiation don't find*

When comparing different clusters of children's burials in different cemeteries, it emerges that, as for a diversity of the accompanying implements, they can be combined into two groups: 1) burials without goods and "poor" burials in Ivolga burial ground (cluster 1, subclusters 2AAA, 2AAB, 2B); 2) burials in Dyrestui and Ilmovaya Pad' to which a subcluster 2AB of Ivolga burial ground is adjoined. As a whole, this gives grounds to trace a particular differentiation among the children's burials, identification of "rich" and "poor" burials.

Conclusion

The richest burials were concentrated in the Ilmovaya pad cemetery. Here, three ranks are identified in the burials of both men and women. The men's burials of Cheremukhovaya pad and Derestuisky Kultuk are combined into

several different groups which, possibly, reflect a nature of their activities during life-time. In the female burials of Cheremukhovaya pad, two groups were revealed. A differentiation was not found among the female burials of Derestuisky Kultuk. Four hierarchical ranks for men and five ones for women were identified in Ivolga cemetery. The certain differentiation of children burials into "rich" and "poor" ones can be traced (most pronounced differences were found for Ivolga cemetery were 3–4 groups were identified). However, it should be borne in mind a part of children burials including not poorest ones was related to sacrifices.

However, it is essential to bear in mind that, in this case, the variety of the funeral goods can not always serve as a reflection of a status. Even if it is granted that a number of the children's burials can be bound with the sacrifices which were for a long time known among the Xiongnu from the chronicles (Lidai 1958:17; Bichurin 1950a:50; Taskin 1968:40) then the wealth of goods should be, more likely, considered as the indicator of the high social status of the men buried.

It is clear that all of the stated conclusions and assumptions do not pretend to be final. At present, there are very little materials for examination and interpretation (only four burial grounds), the questions of the chronology of the Xiongnu sites remain practically not worked out. However, we would like to hope that the obtained results help in the further investigation of different problems of the Xiongnu archaeology. At the same time, it is essential to bear in mind that a reconstruction of the social structure from archaeological data demonstrates existing tendencies only, however, the particular ratio of social groups of different ranks depends on the available sampling. It should be remembered that Baikal area was the northern frontier advanced post of the Xiongnu Empire. Here, one or several peripheric tribal groups or chiefdoms belonging to the imperial confederation. This fact should be taken into account in the case of extrapolation of conclusions made by us to the Xiongnu society as a whole.

On the Mongolia territory proper, there are much more magnificent funeral complexes of the Xiongnu elite belonging to representatives of the Gold Clan Luan-ti rather than provincial chiefs. It is definitely clear that the somewhat different functional part was also played by the Xiongnu forts on the Mongolia territory (otherwise, in what manner, the absence of a tile in the Buryat forts can be explained). One can suppose also that in studies of the array of the Xiongnu burials of Mongolia, somewhat different number of social groups will be found and the ratio between them will be also different. However, a consideration of all of these questions as well as a problem of chronology and local variants of the Xiongnu culture are, undoubtedly, the aim of other studies for realization of which, it is necessary to systematize preliminary all of the available information concerning the Xiongnu burials excavated on the territories of Russia, Mongolia and China.

6

SETTLED POPULATION IN THE XIONGNU EMPIRE: IVOLGA FORTRESS SETTLEMENT EXAMPLE

Introduction

In the Chinese chronicles, the Xiongnu are generally described as cattlemen randomly moving in search of food within unbounded spaces of the cold northern desert. In this characteristic, a neglectful attitude to the wild and non-virtuous barbarians is discernible. However, if the texts of chronicles concerning the Xiongnu are perused one can find out a certain number of mentions about the construction by the people of the Xiongnu power of the settlements with walls and agriculture (Lidai 1958: 191, 204, 208; Bichurin 1950: 76, 78, 83-84; Taskin 1968: 91; 1973: 22-24, 30, 103). This is confirmed by the archaeological data. At present, about 20 fortresses and settlements of the Xiongnu period are known (Sosnovsky 1934; Kiselev 1957; 1958; Doržsüren 1961; Perlee 1957; 1974; Davydova 1985; 1995; Hayashi 1984; Danilov 2004; Ramseyer, Pousaz, Törbat 2009 etc.).

What place was occupied by the settlement sites in the structure of the Xiongnu imperial confederation? This question is still an open question. The opinions of specialists differ. Some of them believe that Xiongnu nomads were also engaged in agriculture (Sosnovsky 1934; Doržsüren 1961; Perlee 1957; Konovalov 1985; Di Cosmo 2002; Wright, Honeychurch, Amartuvshin 2009 etc.). In opinions of other authors, the settlement were mainly settled by immigrants or captives from the settled-agricultural societies (Bernshtam 1951; Ma Chanshou 1962; Rudenko 1969; Davydova 1978; 1995; Hayashi 1984; 2004; Kradin 2002a etc.).

The functional status of the Xiongnu ancient settlements should be still clarified. In particular, they could not perform the important defensive part. Their dimensions were not great and they were incapable to restrain large armies. In addition, the Xiongnu themselves maintain scepticism with respect to possibility of the passive defense in siege (Lidai 1958: 204; Taskin 1973: 23-24). The nomads have put major emphasis on the mobility of tribal troops and households. They have seen in this one of the basic reasons of their military invulnerability. One more interesting moment noted by specialists: in the Xiongnu sites in Buryatia (Davydova 1985; 1995; Danilov, Zhavoronkova 1995; Danilov 1998), in contrast to those on the Mongolia territory (Kiselev 1957; Perlee 1957; Danilov 2009), a tiling which is an indicator of constructing the buildings with administrative or religious functions was not found.

The present-day data of the Xiongnu archaeology allow to interpret in a new way some aspects of this subject. Among the most examined settlements of Xiongnu is Ivolga ancient settlement. It is situated within about 7 km to the south of Ulan-Ude town. The lands of the North Mongolia and South Buryatia were favorable for agriculture. The average annual precipitation in this geographical zone can reach 400 millimeters in the best years (Murzaev 1952: 256) which in combination with the river network is the most important prerequisite for the agriculture development (Masanov 1995: 41).

The settlement represents an irregular rectangle with the sides of approximately 200 x 300 m. On three sides, it was protected by the fortification works (4 walls and 3 ditches between them) while, on the fourth side, the settlement has bordered with Selenga River. The settlement was discovered in 1926 by V.V. Popov. The site was investigated by different authors but the most contribution to its study was made by A.V. Davydova. During 12 field seasons (in 1949-1974), about 1/10 of the total area of the site were uncovered, more than 50 dwellings, many utility and other structures were dug as well as a burial ground (216 burial places) synchronous with the site was examined. The materials of these excavations were practically completely published (Davydova 1968; 1985; 1995; 1996). Introduction of these materials into the scientific circulation allows to solve not only specific archaeological problems (classification, typology, chronology etc.) but also to reconstruct the economy, structure of society and ideology.

Population of settled sites

The population of Ivolga was polyethnic. This was confirmed by the analysis of the domestic animals herd, the structural design of the houses, certain categories of the artifacts, the anthropological examination of the people buried in the Ivolga burial grounds, and the specific features of the funeral ritual. The domination in the osteological materials of the fortress settlement's of bones of such animals as a dog (29%) and a pig (15 %) (Garutt, Yurjev 1959: 81–82; Davydova 1995: 47), in combination with the widely used in the "*kang*" construction tradition implicitly pointed to the possibility that at least some part of the settlement's population came from the Far East. It is known that dog meat was a traditional delicacy of the Chinese peoples, Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, whereas pork since the deep antiquity was one of the favored meals of the "oriental foreigners" (Larichev 1973: 112; Krjukov et al. 1983: 155). At the same time it was indicative that in the osteological collections from Ilmova Pad' there were only 6% of the dog bones, and the pig bones were not mentioned at all (Konovalov 1976: 209). The population of the Ivolga fortress settlement practiced fishing a lot (Davydova 1995: 48–49; 1996: 14, 81–82).

It is interesting that Xiongnu have generally consumed large quantity of fish (Brosseder, Marsadolov 2010) which is non-typical for traditional nomads, for example, Mongols and Buryats. However, Xianbei have also eaten fish. Not long before his death, the founder of the Xianbei steppe confederation Tanshihuai being anxious about a lack of resources has resettled from somewhere "east" (maybe, it is territory of the Korean Peninsula, present-day Heilongjiang or even Russian Primorye) more than a thousand families of Wozhen people to the Wuhouqin (today's Liaohehe in Manchuria). He forced them to be occupied with fishing in order to "make up a deficiency in food" (Taskin 1984: 80).

The tradition of *kang* construction (Korean *ondol)* was evidently not of local origin and was registered in the Baikal Asia only during the Xiongnu period (Davydova 1985: 21). As evidenced by the recent research the earliest structures of this type were found in the north of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in the regions of China along the Korean border, and only later the *kang* tradition spread across the neighboring territories of Manchuria, the Far East of Russia and the Korean Peninsula. Its appearance in Buryatia was, most likely, the consequence of the tradition's import to the colder territory of the Baikal Asia by some groups of the "oriental foreigners" or the Chinese speaking bearers of this construction tradition from the south-east.

In addition to agriculture part of the fortress settlement's population practiced artisanship. The specialization of the inhabitants could be deducted from the concentration of different types of the finds in individual houses. Thus in house No 25 a large number of bone finished goods and blanks were found, in house No 32 – iron tools and metal casting moulds, and in house No 41 – lots of ceramics and ceramic rejects, whereas house No 49 had a concentration of armor plates and other arms items (Davydova 1985: 20, 75–80).

The agricultural tools technology was definitely related to China. A spade found in the Ivolga fortress settlement (Davydova 1985: 99, Fig. VIII, *26*; 1995, Table 132, *9*, 186, *51*) and the celts (Davydova 1995: 32, Table 186, *22–23*) were similar to the Han spades and celts (Krjukov et al. 1983: 152; Davydova 1995: 32–33, 44, 52), the Xiongnu plough tips (Davydova 1985: 99, Fig. VIII, *23*, *25*; 1995, Table 31, *1*) were very similar to the Old Chinese ones (Krjukov et al. 1983: 150), and the half-moon knives (Davydova 1995, Table 24, *5*, 31, *3*, 61, *5*, 95, *7*, 149, *25*, 154, *17*, 186, *40–44*) were similar to the traditional Chinese sickles.

The sources of the Xiongnu artisans' pottery tradition apparently also went back to the agricultural world (Dyakova, Konovalov 1988; Khudyakov 1989: 149–150; Davydova 1995: 27–28; Filippova, Amogolonov 2001 etc.). Of all types of vessels of a particular interest were the items with the holes in the bottom (Davydova 1995: Table 20, *4*, 26, *8–9*, 43, *11–12*, 58, *10–11*, 143, *19*,

169, *8*, 175, *7*, 177, *20–21, 35*). They were used for a very common in the Han China method of cooking steamed rice and other cereals (Krjukov et al. 1983: 202–203).

In addition the archeologists found in the settlement a number of items with the inscriptions in Chinese characters. These items included, for instance, a whetstone (Davydova 1995: Table 15, *15*), the inscriptions on the three sides of which have been interpreted by a Chinese archeologist Xia Nai (Davydova 1995: 37) as *sui* (number of years), *chóu* (enemy, rival, hate, avenge; this character was used as a family name) and *dang* (a party, administrative unit of 500 households; this character could also be used as a family name). There was a very interesting inscription on the bottom of a vessel from house 21 (Davydova 1995, Table 38, *7*, 179, *3*), which according to the interpretation of the aforementioned Professor Xia Nai (Davydova 1995: 28) was a representation of the Xiongnu period character *Yīng*, translated by him as "deserved". No less interesting were the imprint found on the bottom of a vessel from house 50 (Davydova 1995, Table 179, *1*), which resembled character *Zhǔ* (master, ruler), an imprint of the character *Wang* on another vessel's bottom, an imprint on the bottom of a vessel from house 13, similar to the character *tu* (picture) and the scratched inscription on the inner side of another vessel's collar resembling the character *jǐng* (a well) (Davydova 1995, Table 29, *1*, 179, *6, 9*). Some imprints on ceramics were illegible (Davydova 1995, Table 134, *4*, 179, *2, 5, 7*), however they could quite possibly be the artisans' stamps.

Since even the elite groups of the Xiongnu society were not particularly knowledgeable in the Chinese writing (it would be enough to mention the well known episode with the substitution of a Chanyu stamp by the order of Wang Mang), the common nomads could hardly be more literate than their leaders. Thus we may presume that the inscriptions on items from the Ivolga were made not by the Xiongnu, but by the people of the sedentary-agricultural origin and, most likely, by the immigrants or the prisoners of war from China.

A.V. Davydova believed that the funeral ritual of the Ivolga burial place population differed from the Xiongnu one and was, in general, poorer (1985: 22, 35). This in her opinion was an evidence of: (1) interethnic stratification, (2) social differences between the immigrants and the prisoners of war, (3) first generation captives and the descendant of the captured and relocated agricultural population. Indirect indication of this was provided by the variety and dimensions of the neighboring to the burial site Ivolga fortress settlement structures, as well as the tools found in those objects (Davydova 1985: 20).

These assumptions have been confirmed by the physical-anthropological examination of the bodies from the Ivolga burial grounds and the funeral ritual studies. According to I. I. Gokhman the population of the fortress settlement belonged to three different anthropological groups: (1) the Xiongnu (according to A. V. Davydova, the non-nomadic part); (2) the aboriginal (probably belonging to the "Plate Grave Culture" population's descendants); (3) the Chinese consisting of defectors and prisoners of war (Gokhman 1960; see also: Davydova 1985: 22, 85–86; 1996: 26–30). Analysis of the social structure on the basis of the funeral ritual indicated the existence of approximately four-five groups of the fortress setlement's population with various statuses (Kradin, Danilov, Konovalov 2004).

Agriculture in Xiongnu settlements

In order to examine the paleoeconomy of the Xiongnu settlements, the site catchment analysis was used. (Roper 1979; Findlow, Ericson 1980 etc.). The first aim was to determine the number of the Ivolga fortress settlement people. One can answer this question if the number of houses and their sizes are known. Given the minimal norm of room space for one person (in the range 1.8–3.6 sq. m) generally accepted in demographical archaeology (Cook, Heizer 1968: 92; Masson 1976: 112-113), it is possible to assess the number of people who lived in the excavation area at Ivolga. The total of 55 dwellings has been excavated. The following subgroups have been established with respect to the dwelling size:

- less than 10 sq. m – four houses, each could be populated by not more than two persons;
- less than 20 sq. m – 13 houses for not less than 4 persons in each;
- less than 30 sq. m – 24 houses for 6–7 persons in each;
- more than 30 sq. m – 13 houses, 6–8 persons in each.
- one house (dwelling 9) occupied an area of more than 100 sq. m and apparently served as a administrative center.

Proceeding from these data, the total population of the study area can be estimated as not more than 300 persons. Some houses were possibly populated by high-ranked citizens, with the lower density of population per 1 sq. m of the house, thus making the entire population of the area as 250–300 persons. The excavation area occupied about 1/10 of the total settlement territory, thus allowing us to estimate the total simultaneous population of Ivolga in the range of 2.500–3.000 persons. On the basis of correlation of these estimations to the available information on the economic activity of the population, we will assess the position of Ivolga in the economic structure of the Xiongnu nomadic empire.

Intermontane depressions in the basins of the Selenga and its tributaries belong to the dry climatic agricultural zone. Despite a certain moisture deficiency, wheat, oat, barley, buckwheat, millet and vegetables were cultivated in the area. The agricultural cycle began with thawing at the frozen rivers. Ploughing and corn sowing were usually carried out during the first decade of

May (by Gregorian calendar), corn ripens by late August – early September (RSHA, F. 560, Inv. 27, Fail 84: 184). Archaeological findings including ploughs, hoes, sickles, grinding stones, etc., provide evidence that the Ivolga population was engaged in agriculture (Davydova 1995).

The question arises what areas were used as arable lands. It is generally assumed in archaeology that the sedentary population actively exploits those lands for agricultural purposes, which are located within an hour of walk from the settlement (approximately 5 km) (Roper 1979). The lands not suitable for agricultural purposes (woods, swamps, water sources, etc.) are excluded. In our case, the lands on the right bank of the Selenga should also be excluded from she arable lands, because it is considered that tilling lands on the opposite bank of the river is not efficient. In our determination of the pasture and possible arable lands in the vicinity to Ivolga we have used the map "The Republic of Buryatia" (scale 1 : 200.000), issued in 1994 under the project "General geographical maps of the Russian Federation". According to our estimations, arable and pastoral land resources form a semi-circle of 34.5 sq. km.

For correlation, I used also site-catchment analysis for the settled sites of Xiongnu confederation in Buryatia. The settlement Dureny is located on Chikoy River. Arable and pastoral land resources form a semi-circle of 33.5 sq. km. The settlement Yenkhor is on the Dzhida River. According to our estimations, arable and pastoral land resources form a semi-circle of 32 sq. km. Therefore, the agriculture resources of the Ivolga fortress are approximately comparable with those in the Dureny and Yenkhor settlements.

Official archive records suggest that the average yield in the western Trans-Baikal region gave a fifth and a half (RSHA, F. 560, Inv. 27, Fail 84: 184). N.V. Kriukov, a renown expert in agriculture of Eastern Siberia, wrote that "the average yield of buckwheat and wheat equaled 50 – 60 *poods* (one Russian *pood* equivalent to .38 kilograms) from an acre, a yield of 80–90 poods was considered a good one" (I 8%: 74). Judging from the data cited in his work on the amount of planted and harvested corn for six years (Ibid.: 77), the average yield gave a fourth – a sixth. It is noteworthy that Chinese peasant in Manchuria gathered around 85 poods of corn from a desyatina (one desyatina is equivalent to 2.7 acres) (Yashnov 1926: 112). However, it is hardly possible thai in western Trans-Baikal, peasants gathered more than the average Han yield giving a one and a half – a fourth (Kulpin 1990: 209), the amounts of which were gathered in the areas southwards from the territory under discussion. Hence, we believe would not be a great error if we take 50 poods, or 734 kg/ha as the average yield. Proceeding from the cited data, the maximal amount of corn (given all the arable land is used for crop growing and no places are used as pasturing lands) gathered from the territory of 34.5 sq. km equals 2,532,110 kg. Some portion of grain (let's take one forth, which equals 633 tons) was kept as seed-stock, another portion of total yield was used as

provision. According to Kulpin's detailed calculation of nutrition norms of the Ancient China population across various historical periods (1990: 131–132, 208 211), a total of 300 kg per person can be taken as an average statistical norm ensuring a simple economic and demographic reproduction of agricultural population. Hence, in order to secure the provision for a settlement of about 3 thousand persons, it is necessary to have 1,500 tons of grain. The remaining part is 1,000 Ions, This amount of com can be captured (or exchanged) as provision for nomads-pastoralists.

The question is whether our estimations can be regarded as reliable. Apparently, not all the spare lands were used as corn fields. Some portion of the fields were used for vegetable growing, another part was used as pasture lands for cattle which was used in land ploughing as well as served as a source of meat, milk and natural fertilizer. It cannot be excluded that some fields stayed fallow, though it is more probable that the Ivolga population practiced the bed technique of crop growing typical of the peoples of the Far East.

Our estimations of the productivity of arable lands should be correlated with the real physical abilities of people. It is generally assumed that a man driving a team of animals is able to plough 1 ha approximately during four and a half working days; two days were used for harrowing; sowing took about a quarter of a day; cropping look about eight days and a half; thrashing took additional four days and a half (Bibikov 1965: 53-57; Masson 1976: 105–107; Malinova, Malina 1988: 54-59; Milov 1998: 190-113; etc.). Judging from these data, we can assume that adull male population of Ivolga (approximately 600 persons) were able to plough, harrow and sow an area of 1,800 ha in the course of three full weeks in May. In total, they could gather about 1,321 tons of corn. Cropping would take nearly 13 days in late August – early September, given the entire adult population (600 x 2 = 1200) took part. Another week would be spent on thrashing.

Of the total yield we subtract 900 tons as the provision for the fort population and about 300 Ions as seed-stock. The remaining extra supply would make not more that 100 tons. However, we did not take into account the amount of grain used as additional feeding of cattle during the lactation and ploughing period, as well as the additional feeding of youngsters and pigs representing popular domestic animals of the Ivolga population.

The above estimates show the minimal amount of labor necessary for the local population to secure their economic and demographic reproduction on the basis of agricultural economy. In order to provide nomadic people with agricultural products, additional labor inputs were necessary. According to the simplest calculations mentioned above, a total amount of surplus product from the area of active economic exploitation can in theory reach 1,000 tons of grain. It would take 77 instead of 44 working days to gather such a crop by the adult Ivolga population (whether such a period of agricultural activity is possible

under the environmental conditions of the southwestern Trans-Baikal is another question). Given the amount of grain used as additional food supply (for instance, during winter-time), it would be enough for more than 13 thousand nomads. At that time, according to the estimations of the productivity of pasture lands, from 16 to 36 thousand nomads could live in the steppe zone of Buryatia (Kradin 1999). Hence, it can be assumed that the Ivolga population was able to partially serve the needs of the majority of the local nomadic population in agricultural products. If the Ivolga population used distant lands as arable fields situated at more than 5 km from the fort or used isolated arable fields and worked for 100 days at the fields, the tolal yield of surplus product would theoretically be even greater.

Animal husbandry, hunting and fishing

The animal husbandry has also played the important part in the economic life of the settlement. The local population has bred pigs, small (sheep and goats) and great cattle (Garrut, Yuryev 1959: 81-82; Davydova 1985: 71; 1995: 47). A percentage of bones of domestic animals reached 92.5%.

A ratio of individuals of most commonly encountered animals (sheep, bull, pig) is 16:13:11 (Garrut, Yuryev 1959: 80). If these data are converted into the weight proportions using data of the average weights of animals then the ratio will be looked as 1:6:2. Therefore, a domestic bull (Bos taurus) and pig (Sus scropha) were most commonly encountered among the settlement residents. A bull was basic draught force in households. It is possible that the pigs were for natives a basic source of meat.

The daily length of driving the domestic animals is not great. The settled residents should return the flock home for the night. The flock of sheep should not be typically driven more than 5–6 km from the settlement while a herd of cattle should be pastured for maximum distance of 3 km from home. The pigs pastured in general near a house. So, Davydova associates the "small" settlement located within 100 m to the south of the main one with the corral (1985: 27; 1995: 23).

Knowing the volume of fodder consumed by animals and area of pasture resources around the Ivolga settlement, one can calculate the approximate number of animals which could be bred by local people. Let us take data of pastoralism on this territory in the 19 century as a basis. Here, for pasture of one head of cattle, about 2 dessiatinas were required, for a horse – 2 dessiatinas, for five head of sheep, from 2.6(6) to 4 dessiatinas of pastures (Kradin 2002a: 92). If it is granted that, for example, one-third fraction of a zone of the active economic use (11 km^2) around the settlement was used as pasture then, it is simple to calculate maximum possible number of pastured cattle heads – about 500 animals. Nearly the same number of bulls was required for the local

population – approximately one animal per family. Some more 75 "conditional" heads of cattle (or 150 heads in case of stalled keeping of cattle for a period of 6 months) could be fed by straw collected from remained 23.5 km^2 (about 1200 kg/ha [Bibikov 1965: 53-54]).

A pig breeding was very beneficial for the settlement people. One can use a comparison with a pig breeding among Chinese in Manchuria at the turn of 19-20 centuries. The native breed of pigs provides 5 poods of meat per head. The pigs are able for crossbreeding beginning from 6-months age and are distinguished by high fertility (12–14 piglets) (Yashnov 1926: 130). It is simple to calculate that if each family had one sow then it was able to produce the sufficient amount of meat for additional nourishment of local people.

In addition to grass and straw, the acorns, root crops, kitchen wastes etc. are needed for pigs. The landscape of the Ivolga settlement is such that there are no forests near settlement. We do not know what the local people did in this situation. One thing is certain that people found any way out of this situation because the osteological materials confirm a quite high degree of the pig-breeding development. In general, the pigs may live in steppe. I myself have observed it during the field investigations in 2009-2010.

It is very important to know how many head of cattle were needed to the settlement residents for nourishment and their economical activity. The total number of livestock should be not less than 500–600 head (approximately, one bull per family). As for the amount of ate meat, one can use the Yashnov's data of a ration of the Chinese population in Manchuria. There, about 0.61 poods (9.76 kg) of meat products fell on one statistically average resident (1926: 399, 403, 418–419). Therefore, not less than 29 tons of meat were needed for the settlement with three-thousand population. This is about one thousand sheep if one head provides 25–30 kg of meat (Kriukov 1896: 97). It is unlikely that local residents had such number of the small cattle. But they could exchange a part of animals for grain, jigulines and metallurgic products of craftsmen.

Judging from the composition of the faunal collection, hunting was less important. Remains of wild animals form only 7.5% and they are mostly represented by bones of roedeer, deer, steppe antelope, and fox, as well as less numerous bones of elk, bear, badger, hare, and ferret (Garrut, Yuriev 1959: 81-82; Davydova 1985: 74-75; 1995: 49-50). Davydova believes that Ivolga inhabitants hunted mainly with bow and arrow (1995: 49). Hunt for fur-bearing animals is probably evidenced by blunt arrow-heads present in the artifact collection (Ibid.: Table 126, *3*, 168, *15*).

The resources of the Ivolga surroundings allowed people to use hunting as an important supplementary source of protein food, especially during cold seasons. The best hunting territory for inhabitants of permanent settlements is considered an area within two-hours walk (approximately 10 km, i.e. 157 sq. km (Poper 1979; Binford 1980 etc.). Total resource territories for hunting in

other Xiongnu settlements were approximately comparable: Bayan-Under fortress (155 sq. km), Dureny (138 sq. km), Enkhor (187 sq. km), Sharagol (188 sq. km). If a probable area of arable lands in Ivolga (34.5 sq. km), is taken away, then the potential hunting territory of Ivolga population would be 122.5 sq. km. Biomass of wild animals in Eurasian steppes constitutes from 3 to 10 kg/ha (Ivanov, Vasiliev 1995: 32). Hence, the maximum biomass of mammals living in the territory under consideration could be approximately 122.500 kg per sq. km. Let us assume that a hunter could subtract not more than 30% from this mass not to disturb the ecological balance. So for a community of approximately 3,000 individuals such amount of meat could be an important component of diet in autumn and winter (36,750 kg : 3,000 individuals : 100 days – 0.123 kg per day).

Inhabitants of Ivolga also caught fish. The Selenga River freezes in late October – early November and breaks up in late April – early May. So the period of active fishing lasts from May to the end of summer (Kriukov 1896: 197-205). After winter fish served as an important supplement to the diet of Ivolga residents. In this area, the main objects of fishing are rudds, pikes, burbots, perch, ides, and such delicious fishes as sturgeons, graylings, and taimens. Baikal omuls can also be encountered in the Selenga. Bones of fishes representing most of these species have been found at the site (Davydova 1985: 73-74; 1995: 48 49).

Table 6.1. Fishing in the Ivolga area

Fish	Month												Size (*puds*)
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	
Pike						x	X	X					5
Lenok						X							6
Perch				X					X				6
Omul								x	x				15
Roach				x	X	X	X	X					45
Burbot				x	X	X	X	X					15
Sturgeon					x	X	X	x					6
Ide				x	X	X	X	X					18
Grayling				x	X	X	X	X					9
Taimen					x	X	X	X					30

Sources: Kriukov 1896:197–205 ((X – all month, x – 15 days).

Fishing, however, could not be regarded as a principal subsistence activity of the Ivolga population. According to the statistics of the 19th century (Kriukov 1896: 197-205), up to 155 poods (2,480 kg) offish could be caught in this sector of the river. Per capita consumption of fish, thus, was small. High-protein fish, though, could partially compensate for deficiency of meat.

Social structure of Ivolga population

The social structure of the settlement population can be reconstructed with the use of data acquired in the course of the Ivolga cemetery excavations. The funeral ceremony can serve as a quite reliable source of the social differentiation in the society under study. At present, the technique of similar studies is quite well developed in the archaeology and in archaeology of nomads (Binfrod 1971; Tainter 1978; Masson 1976; Chapman, Kinnes, Randsborg 1981; O'Shea 1984; Bunjatian 1985; Gening et al. 1990; Wason 1994; Kradin et al. 2005; Matveeva 2007; Vasjutin, Dashkovsky 2009 etc.

The study procedure assumes a necessity to perform a number of consecutive operations: (1) Identification of the mortuary ritual peculiarities, preparation of a list of signs, entering information into the computer data base; (2) Identification of factors significant for age division of set; (3) Division of the set into adult and children burials; (4) Identification of factors significant for sex division of the array of adult burials; (5) Division of the set into the male and female burials; (6) Examination of differences in the mortuary ritual within the homogeneous of uncertain burials; (7) Identification of strong factors relating those of other intragroup clusters with different categories of the grave goods; (8) Interpretation of the results obtained (Kradin et al. 2004; Kradin et al. 2005). For examination of the Ivolga cemetery burials, the computer program STATICTICA 5.0 for WINDOWS was used. The detailed results of these studied were published (Kradin 2002a; Kradin et al. 2004). By this reason, it makes sense to present only general results of the studied carried out.

Table 6.2. Burials in the Ivolga cemetery

Burial Ground	Cluster	Burial goods
Male	1	None
	2AA	Standart
	2AB	Same +belt
	2B	Same + horse harness
Female	1B	None
	1AA	Ceramics
	1AB	Standard +ceramics
	2A	More diverse grave goods (+harness, coin, adornment)
	2B	Even more diverse, remains of funerary repast
Immature	1	*burials of baby in vessels*
	2AAB	None
	2AAA	Ceramic
	2AB	Standard +ceramic

The examination of the complex of male graves in the Ivolga cemetery shows that one can identify here four social ranks. The lowest of them includes

graves of cluster 1 without implements. The other three groups are accompanied with different categories of implements. The second subgroup (subcluster 2AB) differs from the first one (subcluster 2AA) additionally in presence of belt while the third one (subcluster 2B) differs from the second subgroup in presence of horse harness.

A slightly more complex hierarchy is traced in the female graves of the Ivolga cemetery. Here, five ranks were revealed. The first group of graves (1B) contains no implements, in the second group (1AA), only ceramic was found, in the third one (1AB), the accompanying inventory appears, in the fourth group (2A), the inventory becomes more diverse (in addition, a belt, coins and various jewelleries are found while, in the fifth one (2B), these signs become mass and the funeral feasts become more diverse.

The complex of children graves is separated into three groups: graves without inventory (subcluster 2AAB), graves with ceramic (subcluster 2AAA), graves with diverse accompanying inventory (subcluster 2AB). The burials in the vessels in the cluster 1 which are conditionally designated as "infantile" should be separately considered.

However, the social inequality becomes apparent not only in differences of the obsequial rites but also in the amount of efforts needed for construction of residential structures and provision in them of the necessary facilities. In is interesting to make sure to what extent the results of investigating the social composition of the Ivolga cemetery are comparable with identification of stratification from data of analysis of the residential structures of the Ivolga settlement. For these purposes, the cluster analysis was used (Kradin 2002a: 255-260).

In order to examine the houses by the method of cluster analysis, the cluster 55x55 matrix of houses was preliminarily compiled. For analysis, only signs of the house construction were selected. As a result of examination, the graves were divided into two clusters. The cluster 1 included 54 houses while cluster 2 consisted of the greatest house No. 9 (Table 6.3). This house differed from all others. It was located on a platform, had large dimensions (13x11.5 m) and its walls were made of sun-dried brick. A.V. Davydona assumed that the ruler of this settlement resided in it (1985: 19-20; 1995: 17-18).

The subcluster 1AA includes houses 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 11–13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 24, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 45, 49, 51, II, III. Of the houses of this group, areas of 18–24 sq. m are typical and such constructive feature as a door opening is absent.

Into the composition of the cluster 1AB, the houses 5, 10, 15, 26, 31–33, 44, 48 enter. In this case, the houses have door openings but areas of houses in this cluster are lesser. They are subdivided into two groups: 7-10 and 12-16 sq. m.

Into the cluster 1BA, the houses 7, 28, 30, 34, 39, 47, I entered. These are greatest in area houses (from 35 to 47 sq. m). For the lesser half of houses from this group, the door opening is uncharacteristic.

The subcluster 1BB included houses 8, 14, 18, 21–23, 25, 27, 29, 36, 41, 46, 46A, 50. The average areas of houses vary from 26 to 30 sq. m. About 2/3 of houses in this group, such sign as a door opening was absent.

The greatest house No. 9 (maybe, a residence of local administrator) is identified as a separate cluster 2.

Table 6.3. Results of Cluster analysis of Ivolga Dwellings



After division of the residential complexes into groups, it was decided to check by means of the cluster analysis with what found artifacts, the houses of one or other subcluster correlate. Of all of subclusters, the household things, adornments, agricultural and handicraft implements, arms, finds which can be related to fishing and hunting are characteristic. All of this gives ground to conclude that occupants of all four groups of houses did housework in an equal degree.

At the same time, there are particular differences in the distribution of the accompanying inventory things between these clusters. So, the most poor are characteristic of the cluster 1AB in contrast to all remaining groups. To the

fullest extent, the clusters of houses differ in the number of ceramic vessels. A large number of vessels was found in the houses of the cluster 1BB rather than in largest houses of the cluster 1BA. On the contrary, an average number of vessels in the largest houses of cluster 1BA is comparable with that in houses of the third in size cluster 1AA (areas are 18-24 sq. m). At the same time, ceramics is on the whole absent in a half of the smallest in size and poorest in inventory houses of cluster 1AB while where it is found, its amount is much less than that in the houses of other groups.

In this connection, the conclusion comes to mind that houses of cluster 1AB belonged to persons of the lowest-rank group of the settlement population. Most probably, they did not families. The following in status are clusters 1AA and 2BB of houses. Between their occupants, there is a certain difference in the property and, possibly, social position. The greatest houses of cluster 1BA rank slightly below in the inventory diversity and number of ceramic vessels than cluster 1BB, however, in this case, differences can be explained, for example, by specificity of the spatial distribution of material (high density – more probable concentration of the human activity signs on the floors of houses) or by the fact that the occupants of the cluster 1BA houses were, to a smaller extent, involved in the process of food production and handicraft than other groups.

Conclusion

How the relationships between nomads and residents of permanent settlements should be assessed: as a stable system of dominance of nomads and the exploitation of agriculturists or as a trading-exchange partnership of two economic and cultural groups of the society? Nomads obviously possessed a higher social status in the Xiongnu nomadic empire. This is evidenced even by visual observations: graves of nomads at Dyrestuisky Kultuk and Chercmukhovaya Pad are richer and larger than graves in the Ivolga cemetery. This fact is suggestive of possible exploitation of settlements' residents by nomads (no state formation is required for interethnic exploitation of agriculturists by nomads). At the same time, it should be borne in mind that in the in the lower social strata of the Han Empire there existed the idea of easy living of immigrants in the nomadic milieu. The only problem was how to escape Chinese frontier guards (Lidai 1958: 230). Relationships between the nomads and the sedentary agriculturalists in the Xiongnu state were apparently rather diverse. The villagers could have been captive slaves or semi-vassals, who had to pay a tribute to the nomads in the form of agricultural and handicraft products, or even agriculturalists who maintained friendly economic and trade links with the nomadic population of the steppe empire under the military and political dominance of the nomads.

Ivolga Dwellings hierarchy, and stratification male, female and Immature burials of Ivolga cemetery shows that 4–5 social ranks can be identified. On the one hand, the graves of the lowest groups of society without inventory are revealed. At the other pole of the society, the well-to-do residents are. Their graves are accompanied with diverse inventory, arms, abundant funeral food. It is entirely possible that they belonged to persons related to the nomadism. Between these extreme ranks, several social groups (in the male graves, up to three, in the female ones, from two to four while in the children graves one group) are noted. All of them are representatives of the settled-agricultural part of the Xiongnu empire. Their social position was lower the status of nomads. However, this is no to say that they did not play a particular part of no small importance in the economic structure of the nomadic empire.

7

NEW APPROACHES AND CHALLENGES FOR THE XIONGNU STUDIES

The history of the Xiongnu attracts unfailing interest. This is related to the fact that there is image of Xiongnu as menacing conquerors. They have established the first in the Inner Asia nomadic empire. Later on, the cruel Huns, who are genetically associated with Xiongnu, came to Europe from the East. The histories of many European countries – Hungary, Italy, Germany and France – are associated with them. Finally, in the first quarter of the XX century, the Russian researches have revealed in Mongolia unique burial mounds which disclosed other aspects of the ancient nomadic aristocracy life. The results of these excavations were exhibited at the shows in museums all over the world. All of this made the interest to studying of the Xiongnu constant.

Over the 100-year history of the Xiongnu study (it is reckoned from the end of the XIX century when the physician Yulian Talko-Gryntsevich began first excavations of the Xiongnu burials on the territory of South Buryatia, Russia Empire), many advances were made. The Soviet scholars have investigated the unique Xiongnu sites on the Buryatia territory (Konovalov 1976; Davydova 1985; 1995; 1996; Minyaev 1998; Davydova, Minyaev 2003 etc.). In the USSR, the resumtive books on history and Xiongnu were published (Bernstam 1951; Gumilev 1960; Rudenko 1969 etc.). Of great importance were the investigations of the Japanese scholars who, at a period of the North China occupation, have carried out there the archaeological and ethnographic investigations (Egami 1948). A weighty contribution to the archaeology and history of Xiongnu was also made by the Mongolian researchers (Dorzhsuren 1961; Perlee 1961; Sukhbaatar 1980 etc.). The Chinese scientists have prepared the resumptive books on Xiongnu history based on examination of ancient records (Ma Changshou 1962). In addition, they have actively studied the archaeological sites of the northern territories. The Western scholars summarized the results of the studies of Xiongnu (Di Cosmo 2002). Thus, by the end of the XX century, great archaeological data base was stored and resumptive books in various languages were written.

Only over the last 15 years, four major international conferences were held. In 1996, the World Archaeological Inter-Congress "Nomadism: past and present in the global context and historical perspective. Hun phenomenon" was conducted in Ulan-Ude. The results of Xiongnu investigations at that point in time were generalized by the author in the special article (Kradin 1998). In

2008, the International Conference on the Xiongnu archaeology was organized in Ulanbaatar by the Bonn University and Silk Road Foundation. In 2010, the International Conference "New Perspectives on Xiongnu Studies in Ancient East Asian Culture" was organized in Seoul. Finally, in 2011, the International Conference "The Xiongnu Empire and study of the Old Mongolian history" devoted to 2220th anniversary of the Xiongnu Empire formation was arranged in Ulan Bator. By that time, a big colored album of the unique archaeological finds "Treasures of the Xiongnu" was published in Mongolian and English.

Turn of the XXI century was marked by revolution in investigation of the Xiongnu. It was related to two widely different circumstances. The first reason consisted in change of the political situation. The iron curtain has wrecked and Mongolia became open country. It was fast integrated into the context of the world communications and the scientific ties and contacts with the researches of other countries were formed. The intense study of the Mongolian archaeological antiquities has started. The second reason was in a change in contents of the archaeological science. If, in the XIX-XX centuries, archaeology was considered as a part of history or anthropology then, as a result of large-scale scientific revolution, archaeology became rapidly to turn into the natural science in the last decades of the past century. New methods of dating, different chemical and physical techniques of analyzing the artifacts, bones of animals, eco facts, methods of pathology of the human remains, genetic data, GIS information etc. allowed to achieve entirely new results which were inaccessible when using the classical methods of work of archeologist.

The burial mounds of the Xiongnu aristocracy became the most prominent breakthroughs at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries. The international Mongolian-French expedition under the direction of J.-P. Desroches carried out the excavations of the burial ground Gol Mod in the Central Mongolia for a long period of time. The interesting results were obtained and they were on display at different exhibitions. The detail materials of excavations were published (Desroches 2003; Desroches, Andre 2007). Nearby, the another elite burial ground Gol Mod – 2 is located (Miller et al. 2006; Erdenebaatar et al. 2011). The Mongolian-Russian expedition under the direction of Natalia Polosmak continued to investigate the burial ground Noyon Uul. The excavations increased a large variety of Noyon Uul riches. Apart from the large elite burial mound, several small burial mounds were also studied (Polosmak et al. 2008a; 2008b; 2011; Korolyuk, Polosmak 2010; Chikisheva et al. 2009). The abundant burial mounds of grand people were also excavated in the Tsaram fold, near the Russian-Mongolian frontier (Minyaev, Sakharovskaia 2006; 2007). In addition, the survey results were also published for the burial mound located in the Ilmovaya pad (South Buryatia) that was excavated as early as 1970-1975 (Konovalov 2008). The international expedition of

archaeologists from Mongolia and South Korea has studied the burial ground Duurlig Nars in the East Mongolia (Yun Hyeung-Won, Chang Eun-Jeong 2011). Not unfrequently, the accompanying graves (so called satellites graves) are located near the elite burial mounds. Their investigation yields the interesting results.

Unfortunately, as for publication of results of investigating the simple burial grounds, we have a completely different situation. By now, the results were published only for small percentage of excavated large burial mounds of the Xiongnu. Three of them – burial grounds of Ilmovaya pad, Dyrestui and Ivolga – are located on the Russia territory (Konovalov 1976; Davydova 1996; Minyaev 1998). In addition, the investigations of Daodunzi burial ground in China (Ningxia... 1988) and Burkhan Tolgoi burial ground in Mongolia (Төрбат, Амартүвшин, Эрдэнэбат 2003) were also published. The large summary concerning the excavations of ordinary graves on the Mongolia territory where information of 174 graves was systematized should be also noted (Төрбат 2004).

One more problem is one of identification of some or other sites with the Xiongnu culture within the boundary territories. The Russian archaeologists note a presence of the Xiongnu burials far beyond Mongolia: in Tuva (Leus 2011), Khakassia (Savinov 2009), Altai (Tishkin 2011) and East Baikal area (Kovychev 2006). There are sites synchronous with the Xiongnu ones on the territory to the west of Baikal (Kharinsky, Korostelev 2011).

The study of the Xiongnu sites on the China territory from Liaoning and Inner Mongolia to Xinjiang was performed in another way. As Nicola Di Cosmo writes, many Xiongnu burials in China were initially identified under the influence of written sources. If the Xiongnu people should migrate through this territory in old time, it means that these are the Xiongnu archaeological sites (2011: 39). However, there were some grounds for such conclusions. Here, bronze belt decorations made as the zoomorphic ornament are of frequent occurrence and general set of artefacts differs clearly from one attributed to the culture of the ancient Chine. With the course of time, the Chinese researchers took great efforts to define more precisely and revise the early interpretations. They came to the conclusions that many sites which were recognized as early Xiongnu ones (for example, Aluchaideng or Xigoupan) should be attributed to the earlier period (Wu'en 2007, 2008; Pan Ling 2011).

Unfortunately, the examination of the Xiongnu settlements and sites has received little attention up to now. However, there are the positive trends in this matter. Two books devoted to the urbanization in Mongolia were published (Danilov 2004; Tkachev 2009). In the book by Danilov, data of the Xiongnu sites in Mongolia were also systematized. The excavations of the Boroo site within Selenga aimag were performed (Ramseyer et al. 2009) which allowed to find the dwellings with heating systems and materials similar to finds from

Dureny and Ivolga sites. A part of large building beaten in tiles was excavated at the Terelzhiin Dorvolzhin fortress settlement in the Central aimag (Danilov, Simukhin, Tsydenova 2011). Small excavations were made at the Ivolga fortress (Dashibalov et al. 2011) and Mangasyn Khuree site in the Gobi (Amartuvshin et al. 2011). However, the most sensational results were provided by expedition under the direction of Alexey Kovalev at the Baian Bulag settlement in just south of Mongolia. The researches have stumbled on the signs of mass slaughter arranged by the Xiongnu who killed defenders of the small near-border town in the Han Empire (Kovalev et al. 2011).

At present, a number of substantial questions were directed to the Xiongnu archaeology. The first and most important question is a chronology of the Xiongnu sites. At the first stages of the Xiongnu archaeology development, the researchers did not pay attention to this problem. The interpretations of early investigations were generally related to one or another event of the political history. A period of data accumulation was necessary. Now, this stage was over and it is time to proceed with the integration of information. The problem of the Xiongnu chronology was considered to the fullest extent in the monograph by Pan Ling and subsequent works (Pan Ling 2007; 2011). She brings out clearly that a division into the "Sudzha" and "Dyrestui" chronological stages and the attempt made by Minyaev (1998: 74–75) to attribute the Ivolga fortress to the time after 123 B.C.E. are erroneous. Going through the different categories of the archaeological materials, Pan Ling writes that the Daodunzi burial ground is the oldest cemetery of the Xiongnu culture on the China territory. It is synchronous with the Ivolga fortress and cemetery from East Bailkal region. All of these sites are attributed to approximately II-I centuries B.C.E. and assigned by the author to the epoch of the Western (early) Han. Other sites in East Baikal area are considered to be simultaneous with Ivolga one but they could exist prior to the early stage of Eastern (late) Han. The Budonzhou burial ground (China) belongs to the synchronous sites.

It should be noted that all excavated terrace (i.e. elite) burial mounds in Mongolia and East Baikal area (Noyon Uul, Gol-Mod, Durlig Nars, Tsaram and Ilmovaya pad) and also many discovered burial grounds of ordinary people belong to this date. During this period, the funeral ceremony is standardized. Synchronously with this, the social differentiation in the funeral ceremony is recorded. The last stage in the Xiongnu culture coinciding with the years of the Eastern Han dynasty rule in China is related by Pan Ling to such sites on the China territory as Xigoupan and Lijiataozhi. She associates them with the southern Xiongnu and notes a great influence of China (Pan Ling 2011).

However, with introduction of the radiocarbon method, the questions are difficult to intelligibly answer at present arose. The study of dating of so called terraced burial grounds shows that all of them belong to the narrow chronological period – not earlier than middle of the I millennium B.C.E. and

not later than I century C.E. At that, no date attributed to the Xiongnu Empire creation time was established. At the same time, a number of graves interpreted as the Xiongnu ones belong to much later period (Brosseder 2009; Brosseder et al 2011; Brosseder, Miller 2011; Brosseder, Marsadolov 2011).

Very much new data in the Xiongnu archaeology were obtained as a result of using the geoinformation systems (GIS). This technique assumes the total survey of large territories and thorough recording of all finds using JPS. In all appearance, first large-scale investigations were started within the framework of the joint Mongolian-Japanese expedition "Gurvan gol" for search of the Genghis Khan grave in 1990–1993 in the course of which the vast territories in the Khentey mountains were thoroughly investigated. The grave of the founder of Mongolian Empire was not found. However, discovery of a large number of new archaeological sites including the Xiongnu ones became one of the results of this expedition (see, for example: Kato et al. 1992). In succeeding years, the large-scale surveys related to the Xiongnu archaeology, were carried out in different regions of Mongolia: valley of the Egiin Gol river connecting Höbsugul and Selenga (Honeychurch, Amartuvshin 2003; 2005; 2007b; Honeychurch et al. 2007; Wright et al. 2009), Baga-Gazaryn-Chuluu mountains in Dundgovi aimag (Wrigth et al. 2007), valley of the Khanuin-gol River being a tributary of Selenga River (Houle, Broderick 2011), West Mongolia, in Khovd (Miller 2011), Arkhangai aimag (Holotova Szinek 2011a) as well as historical center of Mongolia – valley of Orkhon River (Bemmann et al. 2011; Bemmann 2011).

The local studies open also new perspectives. A mapping of the archaeological sites near the Khanuin-Gol River valley (East Höbsugul area), beginning in the Bronze Age, showed that the majority of sites is grouped within two discrete zones: "summer" sites are in the immediate vicinity of the river while "winter" ones within the elevated zones of foothills, over a distance from the river. A distance between them is about 5 km. The paradox lies in the fact that this scheme coincides completely with the modern routes of migrations (Houle 2009; Houle, Broderick 2011) and correlates with traditional types of nomadism on this territory (Simukov 2007: 272–273, 501, 718 etc.). At that, the environmental conditions of the Xiongnu period comply approximately with modern ones. According to calculations for the faunal remains collected at sites in the Hanuin-gol River valley, they contain 54% of small cattle bones, 25% of horse bones and 16% of great cattle bones (Houle, Broderick 2011: 145). This data corresponds approximately to the traditional composition of the herds of nomads in the Eurasian steppes (Kradin 2002a: 71). The quantity of bones of wild animals is inconsiderable. In a pair of cases, bones of marmot (Marmota sp.) were found.

Traditionally important question for the archaeology of the Xiongnu is a structure of the society. It is known from data of written sources that the

hierarchy among the Xiongnu included many levels (Kradin 2002a). The physical anthropologists have also recorded an inequality in consumption of food (Erdene 2011) which, most likely, is a reflection of the social inequality. Examination of the funeral burials in East Baikal region confirms the conclusion of the complex social hierarchy. It has been possible to trace the hierarchy for different ethnocultural groups and to reveal the intragroup inequality. In different burial grounds, several groups of statuses of men and women are identified. The gender and age inequality is also traced (Kradin, Danilov, Konovalov 2004). The gender inequality among the Xiongnu is also traced in other papers (Brosseder 2007; Linduff 2008; Jianhua 2011). An occurrence of gender inequality in nutrition is confirmed by widespread occurrence of the abscess and periodontal disease among women (Erdene 2011).

The study of social differentiation provides for us a slice of the "vertical" structure of the society. The "horizontal" structure (family-kindred, communal relations) can be studied on the basis of social planigraphy. In Jang Jianhua opinion, two different models of burial distribution can be identified in the Xiongnu burial grounds. In some burial grounds (Ivolga, Maoqinggou), the men were buried by the side of women which suggests, in her opinion, a significance in the social relations of small (nuclear) family. In other burial grounds (Dyrestui, Daodunzi), the richer burials of gender groups are identified according to planigraphy (Jianhua 2011). As far as this distribution is true and why has it happened it should be clarified. In addition to the traditional analysis of social differentiation, the perspectives in studying the kindred relations open (Honeychurch, Amartuvshin 2007a).

A number of new perspectives in the study of the social structure can be provided when investigating the seasonal camps. As a rule, only fragmented ceramics is here found but, if the problem was properly set up, it can be a source of significant information. There exists a technique based on an assumption that inequality can be reflected in sizes, shapes and decoration of ware. The higher rank households arrange more often than other ones the prestigious ceremonies related to feasts and re-distribution. Houle and Broderick have found out that the ceramics of two of 14 sites differs markedly in sizes and ornamentation from the total sample. At sites, the wastes of metallurgic production were found which suggests a home character of metallurgy. In this case, both sites are located opposite one another, one site is closer to the river while the other in the foothills. There are good grounds to assume that the same groups (households?) have migrated along the same routes. Because no other artefacts which could be related to the prestigious things were not here found, the authors believe that there are grounds to suggest a not large scale of social differences in the society under study (Houle, Broderick 2011: 148-150).

One of the most disputable questions is an ethnic structure of the Xiongnu. Some researchers see the beginnings of the Xiongnu archaeological culture in population leaving so called slab burials on the territory of Mongolia and East Baikal area (Dorzhsuren_1961; Sukhbaatar 1980; Batsaikhan 2002; Turbat 2004). In opinion of other authors, the sources of the Xiongnu archaeological culture are in so called cultures of "Ordoss bronzes" formed from approximately XIII century B.C.E. (Wu 1990; Minyaev 1991; Psarras 1995; Konovalov 1996; 2011; Kovalev 2002; Keyser-Tracqui et al. 2003; Varenov 2004 etc.). The third group connects the Xiongnu sites with the "Scythian-Siberian" ones (Polosmak 1990; Zadneprovsky 1991; Shulga 2011).

The natural-scientific discoveries open new aspects of the problem under consideration. The craniological characteristics show a large heterogeneity of the morphologic anthropological features. The results of the comparative craniofacial analysis suggest that mixing of the Caucasoid and Mongoloid races began on the Mongolia territory as early as the neolithic age and lasted until the Mongolian invasions. At that, the results of bone analysis show a closeness of DNA of the Xiongnu and modern Mongols (Tumen 2004; 2010).

The researchers emphasize that the available genetic materials for the Bronze Age and the Early Iron Age of Mongolia are insufficient for performing of the statistic analysis. Some scientists are prone to regard that the Xiongnu came to the Mongolia territory from the West rather than from the East (Kim et al. 2010). Other authors, agreeing with the fact that the number of contacts in westerly direction is more than that in easterly one, are prone to connect the origin of the Xiongnu with the indigenous people of Mongolian steppes, in all appearance, beams of the slab burials culture. In this case, the relation with the prehistoric people residing on the territory of modern China is denied (Lee, Linhu 2011).

The results of the last linguistic reconstructions show that, on the territory between Ordos and Syano-Altai at the end of the I millennium B.C.E. – in the early centuries of the I millenium C.E., the arch-Turkic language went around. However, the Hsiung-nu vocabulary "recorded by Chinese belonged, in most cases, to the 'upper' functional style of the language of appropriate social formations that, probably, has not become the foregoer of the Turkic languages but, as it is typical of such functional styles, dissipated together with the society in which is functioned" (Dybo 2007: 199, 201).

In either case, it should be remembered that the Xiongnu were polyethnic and polylingual nomadic empire. According to the written sources, the Xiongnu aristocracy included the Chinese counsellors and military commanders (most familiar of them is warlord Li Ling). The racial and ethnic tolerance is confirmed by the newest archaeological and genetic data (Kim et al. 2010). If, according to data of the physical anthropology, the Xiongnu of the Central and West Mongolia are close to the cultures of the Turkic circle then the Xiongnu

of the East Mongolia bear many similarities to the Xiongnu of East Baikal area and Xienpi (Tumen 2011: 370).

Many recent works contain the specific data concerning the real contacts between Asia and Europe. Most recently, the antique silver plate with images of goddess Artemis and satyr was found in the elite burial mound of the Noyon Uul burial ground (Polosmak 2011) while, in the course of excavations of the burial ground Gol-Mod 2, the elegant cup made of Roman glass was discovered (Erdenebaatar et al. 2011). In the last years, the geneticists made the unique discoveries when investigating the archaeological sites of the Roman Empire on the west of Eurasia and the Xiongnu steppe superpower on the east. In the township of Vagnari in Italy, a poor burial was excavated. Person buried there has descended up from the East Asia on the maternal side (Prowse et al. 2010). At the other end of continent, in the East Mongolia, the rich military grave was found in the elite burial ground Duurlig Nars where the Caucasoid soldier was buried (Kim et al. 2010). Maybe, it were one of the Crassus legionaries? Why not?

Globalization, mass migrations of people at the present day attract again attention to the large-scale movements of the ancients. In the last years, a problem of the Great Transmigration of the Huns to Europe became again the matter of lively discussion (Vovin 2000; de la Vaissiere 2005). Unfortunately, in spite of many published papers on this topic, there are no resumptive investigations which would be devoted to comparison of the archaeological sites and artefacts of the Xiongnu and Huns. Generally, the fine traffic diagrams of the iron boiler types from the East to the West are used as argumentation. This question was considered with maximum consistency in the works by Bokovenko and Zasetskaia. The boilers on a map stretch into several lines directed from the East to the West. In the authors' opinion, it is an evidence of migration of nomads (Zasetskaia, Bokovenko 1994). This idea found the followers among the Hungarian researchers (Erdy 1995; 2009).

However, it is the everlasting headache of the Eurasian archaeology: what moved – people or artefacts? (Frachetti 2011). It is difficult not to agree with an opinion that the widespread distribution of similar in shape (but unequal!) boilers in the steppe cultures can be otherwise interpreted. Rhetorical question – "Why then should the rider-nomad warriors of the Xiongnu need such a particularly long period of time"? (Brosseder 2011: 415) – is not confirmed by the historical and ethnographic parallels. All known migrations from the East to the West were fast. Nonetheless, there are many followers of the Xiongnu migration to the West among the arcjaeologists. In recent years, a wide picture of migration of the Xiongnu to Ural and then to Europe was constructed by Sergey Botalov (2009). In Kazakhstan, Alexandr Podushkin discovered the arysskaya culture in which the stage with the Xiongnu influence is identified

(2008). The Russian archaeologists study actively the Hun sites in Caucasus (Gmyrya 1993; 1995).

At the same time, there is no special archaeological work that would show a real similarity between the archaeological sites of the Xiongnu and Huns. If this were so simple, this was done long ago. The punctual analysis of distribution through the Eurasia territory of the ornate belt plates indicates that they have more or less certain local tie and their widespread occurrence since the Common Era can be explained by the establishment of the Silk Road (Brosseder 2011). A distribution of other things waits just yet its examination.

The Xiongnu archaeology came into new millennium with great triumphs. However, new interesting results were already obtained over the first decade of the millennium. There is good reason to face the future with hope and optimism.

8

NORTH AND SOUTH IN THE DYNAMICS OF INNER ASIA: THE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE, EMPIRES AND TECHNOLOGIES

Historical research knows two different approaches to the historical process interpretation: the linear theories of stages (Marxism, modernization theories, neoevolutionism, multilinear interpretations) and the cyclical conceptions of civilizations. Their synthesis gave birth to the world-system analysis. The person who stood at the roots of this paradigm was a French historian Fernand Braudel. He wrote a lot about trade communications connecting different regions and cultures into a single macroeconomic environment. Later on these ideas have been further developed by Immanuel Wallerstein (1974; 1890; 1984 etc.), Andre Gunder Frank, Abu-Lughod, David Wilkinson and other researchers. According to the world-system analysis theory all countries, peoples and cultures are connected into a single system. This system has its own center, semi-periphery, and periphery. The system is based on the inequivalent division of labor and the exploitation of the periphery by the center. The system is mobile and subject to cyclical fluctuations (Wallerstein 1974; 1984).

One of the key questions is the question about the time of world-system origin. According to Wallerstein the emergence of the true world-system may be discerned beginning from the 17th century with the beginning of a large scale commodity exchange. However numerous archeologists' and anthropologists' studies demonstrated that for the pre-industrial societies exchange of prestige goods played a more significant role and, in parallel, it was also an important factor of building up of the political power. Some time later Janet Abu-Lughod published a book *Before European Hegemony* (Abu-Lughod 1989). In this book she demonstrated that the first world-system originated in the 13th century, when the Mongols established a chain of strong trade communications between the Old World civilizations creating a single trade network. Later on these ideas have been developed by The world-system ties are made up of the four networks: the bulk goods networks (BNG), the prestige goods networks (PGN), the political and military networks (PMN), the information networks (IN). The widest of them in coverage are the information and the prestige goods networks (Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997: 41–56). However Andre Gunder Frank and It emerged initially in the Middle East and later expanded. In the process of expansion its center shifted as well (Wilkinson 1987; Frank, Gills 1994).

The information exchange networks played the most important role in these processes. This is clearly demonstrated by the quick spread of the most important discoveries around the world: e.g. chariots, ferrous metallurgy, horse-riding, world religions, military technologies, etc. (McNeill 1963; 1982; Nefedov 2008). Evidently, whoever was the first to discover or obtain the important technologies and strategies gained a geopolitical advantage. Consequently, this aproach called for a radical review of the notion of the world-system "core" and the center-periphery relations. While Wallerstein described these relations mostly in the terms of destructive exploitation of the colonies by the capitalist countries, which, as was successfully demonstrated by Eric Wolf (Wolf 1982), was rather an exaggerated description; in the opinion of Andrey Korotayev the world-system core was

> "that World-System zone, which had the highest ratio of the internally generated (and subsequently widely spread to other zones) and borrowed from the other zones innovations, and which was to a far greater extent the innovations donor, rather than the innovations recipient" (Korotayev et al. 2005: 104).

From this position the role of the nomads in the world history acquired an entirely new meaning. Whereas in the classical works on the philosophy of history they were given the role of destroyers of civilizations (at best the "orderlies of history"), in the context of the world-system processes it were they, who for a long period of time acted as the re-translators of information between the sedentary civilizations. The domestication of horses and the spread of the wheel transport facilitated the acceleration of the distribution of information and prestige goods consumption. Despite the fact that the nomads themselves did not change significantly with time, they assisted in the development of trade contacts, the spread of religions and geographic knowledge, development of the information networks and technological exchanges between various civilizations (McNeil 1963). The nomads also played an important role in the geopolitical dynamics of rises and declines of the Old World civilizations.

The bi-polar structure of the Eastern Asia world-empires

A most important feature of the world-systems is the cyclical nature of their life pattern. In principle any system goes through periods of growth and crises, and many systems die because of various reasons. An explanation of this rhythm can be found in ecology, since the ecologists have known of the existence of the animal population cycles for a relatively long time already. The studies of the decline of ancient civilizations began to draw closer attention (Tainter 1999), and the recent global crisis stimulated the study of various types of crises in historical retrospect (Grinin, Korotayev 2010).

In the history of Eastern Eurasia beginning from the Xiongnu period a bi-polar picture of the world developed with the Chinese dynasties in the South and the nomadic empires in the North. At the same time there were several rise and fall cycles of the Chinese dynasties and the steppe empires – the Han and the Xiongnu, the T'ang and the Turks/Uyghur's. In this bi-polar picture of the world the peoples of Manchuria were given the role of an odd player. It was only in the periods of the leading actors' crises, when freed from the pressure of both the nomads and the Chinese they managed to establish their own states and capture the agricultural lands in the south (Barfield 1992; Kradin 2002a). This opposition was of a cumulative nature. Whenever the strength of one of the actors began to grow an opposite party always took actions aimed at striking a geopolitical and military parity (Turchin 2009).

There are several versions of describing the nature of these cycles, however at present the most adequate description of these processes is offered by the Goldstone-Nefedov-Turchin structural-demographic model. This model takes into account several significant variables including the volume of agrarian resources, the number of producers, the size of the elite, the size of the taxes levied on the producers. Growth of population led to the increase of the burden on the resources and the growth of prices. At the same time there was an increase in size of the state apparatus elite (according to the "first Parkinson's law" – for the Confucian China this was particularly relevant). The producers were no longer capable to pay the excessive taxes, which led to a crisis and eventually the fall of the dynasty (Goldstone 1991; Turchin 2003; Nefedov 2008; Turchin, Nefedov 2008 et al.).

Fully supporting their interpretation I would like to mention also the importance of the notorious land allocation system in the history of the Chinese dynasties. Its introduction was driven by the desire of the state to collect maximum taxes from the farmers, thus it organized large scale campaigns involving redistribution of land from the wealthy citizen in favor of all people capable of cultivating the land. In time some of the farmers got wealthier, while others broke. However the elite was always capable of finding means to evade taxes, while the poorer farmers were unable to do so. At the same time the government needs for the elite's and the state's expenditure kept growing. Increased pressure on the population inevitably led to the economic crisis, famine, political unrest and uprisings. After the establishment of a new dynasty the ruling elite often started their reign with another "land allocation system" reform (Vasiljev 1993).

It would seem that the easiest way to explain the relationship between the Chinese cycles and the northern nomads' activity would be through the effect of the natural and climatic factors. The Chinese researchers performed detailed studies involving systematizing the historical chronicles' data on the natural catastrophes, migrations and the nomads' raids, as well as the changes of the

conventional border between the steppe and China from 100 BC to the beginning of the 18th century (Fang, Liu 1992). A careful analysis of the tables compiled by the Chinese authors indicated the existence of clear correlation between the drop of the average annual temperatures by one degree, the increased occurrence of floods, sand storms, etc. on the one hand, and the increase of migrations and the nomads' raids on the other. However, it is not quite clear what was it exactly, that triggered the increase of the military activity of the nomads. This could have been caused both by the deterioration of the conditions of life of the cattle herders themselves, and the decreased availability of the artisans' and the farmers' products because of the crisis in China. These factors could also act simultaneously.

Still another set of circumstances, also overlooked by the authors of the aforementioned study, seems to be of greater importance. The stepping-up of the military activity of the nomads did not in itself cause the creation of the large nomads' empires. On the contrary, during the cooling periods the nomads moved closer to the territory of China and created in its northern territories either small buffer states in the 4th–5th centuries or the large medieval empires (T'opa Wei, Liao, Jin) with the mixed arable-livestock economy. It may possibly be assumed that the Middle Age Manchu "splash" into the south was caused by the fact that beginning from the 10th century the core of the Chinese world-system was gradually shifting to the Southern China. Since this resulted in the shift south of the goods flows as well, the Central Asian nomads and their Manchu neighbors (the Khitans, the Jurchens) were forced to set up states in the North China territory.

The time of existence of the typical Middle Age nomadic empires (the Turks and the Uyghur) coincided excatly with the general warming period (between 550 and 1100). It is quite possible that the data about the ancient natural catastrophes were insufficiently complete, however, it is still possible to assume that the periods of existence of the Xiongnu and the Xianbei empires were also unrelated to the large scale climatic stresses. At the same time the origin of the Mongol Power coincided, according to these authors as well, with the sharp cooling period. However, in general, the large scale changes of the average annual temperatures did not have a significant effect on the dynamics of the nomadic empires or the pre-industrial macroeconomic trends. Apparently it was a result of a more subtle cause and effect relationship between various factors. For this reason it appears that for the purposes of interpretation of the specific political events it would be more justified to take into account in addition to the known large scale climatic changes also the local cataclysms, i.e. droughts, floods, epizooties, earthquakes, etc. However if we compare the synchronicity of the rise and decline rhythms of the Chinese dynasties and the northern imperial confederations (with the exception of the Mongol Empire) not by the years, but by the whole cycles, we will see that both would

approximately fall within the same chronological cycle. The closest correlation can be seen on the example of relationship between the Xiongnu and the Han dynasty. Both polities emerged and died at approximately the same time. This correlation is best demonstrated by the example of the confrontation between the steppe Xiongnu empire and the Han dynasty (for more detail see: Kradin 2002a).

Unfortunately Thomas Barfield did not take into account in his concept such an important internal factor as the dynamics of the size of the elite of the steppe confederation. It was Ibn Khaldun who was the first to note already in the 14th century that the dynasties created by the nomads did not live longer than three or four generations, and from generation to generation they were losing their capacity to the group consolidation (*asabiyah*).

In the process of research work for the book about the imperial confederation of Xiongnu the author managed to obtain some empirical confirmation of the overproduction of elite in the Xiongnu society. These data matched the three clear cycles: 209-126 BC, 126–60 BC, and 30 BC-48 AD respectively. The transition between the first and the second cycles ended with a relatively peaceful change of the succession to the throne system from one brother to another. The second cycle ended with a thirty-year long civil war. And the last, the third cycle, led to a final break up into the Northern and the Southern confederations of Xiongnu. These cycles almost exactly matched the structural and demographic cycles of the Han dynasty (Kradin 1996).

Logically this mechanism should have functioned approximately as follows. Since in the imperial nomads' confederations the polygamous marriage was quite common among the elite, the reproduction of the upper strata should have followed the geometric progression. Let us assume that some ruler of a steppe society had at least five sons by five wives. At this rate of reproduction he should have had 25 grandchildren and 125 great grandchildren! At the same time while every child could inherit approximately 20% of the aggregate resource of the polity, the share of each grandchild reduced already to 0.8 %.

This pattern has lately received a solid theoretical confirmation. P. Turchin has developed a smart mathematical model taking into account such factors as the high rate of elite reproduction, the state revenue, and the weakening asabiyah (Turchin 2003: 38–40; 132–136, 212). A. V. Korotayev has further developed and expanded these ideas having applied them to the history of the Middle Age Egypt.

It is important to note that during the Han dynasty period the Chinese cycle almost completely coincided with the Xiongnu elite cycles. However in the later periods because of the different lengths of the structural and demographic cycles in China and the cycles of the steppe confederations' elite size growth their tacts were often asynchronous. Thus the crisis and the demise

of the Second Turkic and the Uyghur Kaganates fell upon the period of stability in the T'ang empire. However all cycles of the Mongolian steppe empires fitted the chronological framework of 45–85 years, which corresponded to a three-five generations cycle (Table 8.1).

Table 8.1. Dynasty cycles of the Inner Asia steppe empires

	Cycle years	Cycle length	Number of the Khans	Number of generations
Xiongnu empire	209–126	83	3	3
	126–60	66	12	4.5
	30 BC-48 AD	84	8	3
Rouran Kaganate	414–492	78	6	5
	492–552	60	4	4
First Turkic Kaganate	552–630	78	12	5
Second Turkic Kaganate	682–740	58	6	3
Uighur Kaganate	742–795	53	7	5
	795–839	44	5	4
Genghis Khan Empire	1206–1260	46	4	3

The greatest number of facts regarding the size of families of the elite was received from the sources on the history of the Mongolian Khanates. In particular, it is known that Genghis Khan had about 500 wives and concubines (Rashid-ad-Din 1952: 68). His half-brother's Belgutei Jautu's son had 100 sons, for which he was nicknamed a "centurion" (Rashid-ad-Din 1952: 57, 59). Kublai Khagan had 22 sons by 4 wives and also 25 sons by his concubines (Book of Marco Polo 1956: 104–105). One can only imagine what huge progeny it was – the heirs of the Shaker of the Universe! Already during the Juvaini time the so-called golden *urug* (i.e. clan) of Genghis Khan included about 20,000 people (Juvaini 1997: 594). At the 1311 kurultai 1,400 Genghisid with the Khan titles were present (Vernadsky 1997: 139).

The Genghis Khan Empire did not follow the full Ibn Khaldun cycle as it was so huge that its resources were sufficient for all descendants of the founder of the empire. After the death of Mongke Khagan (1259 AD) the empire was eventually split into several parts because of the lack of the mechanisms of control over such a huge territory. Already in the times of Ogedei it would have taken more than one month to cross the Genghisid lands from the west to the east. Upon the death of a Khagan the integrity of the empire was always threatened, a long period of regency followed when the power was seized by one of the close relatives. The period of regency lasted until the Kurultai elected a new ruler of the steppe empire. The Mongol Empire was so big that it took long months and years before it would be possible to get together a sufficient "quorum" of the relatives to have a legitimate power for this kind of

decisions. Various groups proposed their own candidates, however quite often the position of the regents gave them certain advantages (today this would have been called the "administrative resource").

However after the break up of the empire all the Ulus rulers faced a problem of finding ample resources for satisfying the needs of the representatives of the reigning elite. Thus in China the Mongols were expelled into the steppe after only one cycle. As B. Ya. Vladimirtsev wrote:

> "Eventually there was no more land to be given as an apanage. The Genghiskhanids became so numerous, that there were not enough *otoks* and *aimaks* for the apanages to all of them. By the end of the 17th century in various places of the Mongolian world there appeared quite small-landed *Noyans*, and later the younger members of the feudal families already did not receive any true *albatu* apanage, and were left with only 'household servants' and the ordinary property of the nomads, mainly, cattle. Because of this a significant number of the Genghiskhanids were reduced to exactly the same position as the representatives of the upper class *albatu*, i.e. *tabunang*, etc." (1934: 175).

The solution to the Ibn Khaldun problem was possibly found only in the Ottoman Empire. The mechanism of succession was institutionalized there to such an extent that the range of the natural pretendents was reduced to one candidate. The fate of others was a silk cord or some other, less humane, variant of removing themselves from the list of candidates. This somewhat extended the length of the secular cycles of the Ottoman Empire up to 200–300 years (Turchin, Hall 2003: 54).

Anthropology of movement: North and South

The cultural influence can be translated by various means: via the movement of material objects, distribution of the texts and verbal information, contacts between the bearers of different cultures, etc. This is the subject of the anthropology of movement (Golovnev 2009). In this paper I wanted to draw attention to the role of such an important factor as the forced relocation of significant groups of people over great distances. From the ethical point of view the war, mass murders and deportations do not and may not have any historical justification. However in a long-term perspective, however paradoxical it may seem, these events stimulated an intensive intercultural exchange, the creation of cultural innovation and styles.

According to the written sources it is well known that the nomads during the time of existence of the steppe empires had many times attacked China and captured and forcefully relocated a lot of the agricultural population. The first of the nomadic empires was the Xiongnu empire (209 BC – 48 AD) (Kradin 2002a). It is known from the Chinese chronicles that the Xiongnu had rural

settlements and cities the population of which were mostly farmers (Taskin 1968: 91; 1973: 22–24, 30, 103). There is also corresponding archeological evidence of this fact. Today there are almost twenty known fortress settlements with the cultural layer belonging to the Xiongnu period (Kiselev 1957, 1958; Hayashi 1984; Danilov 2004 et al.). One of the best studied sites of the sedentary Xiongnu was the Ivolga fortress settlement located in the territory of today's Buryatia near Ulan-Ude. Practically all materials from the settlement's and the synchronous to it burial site's excavations have been published (Davydova 1985; 1995; 1996).

The population of Ivolga was polyethnic. This was confirmed by the analysis of the domestic animals herd, the structural design of the houses, certain categories of the artifacts, the anthropological examination of the people buried in the Ivolga burial grounds, and the specific features of the funeral ritual. The domination in the osteological materials of the fortress settlement's of bones of such animals as a dog (29%) and a pig (15 %) (Garutt, Yurjev 1959: 81–82; Davydova 1995: 47), in combination with the widely used in the *kang* construction tradition implicitly pointed to the possibility that at least some part of the settlement's population came from the Far East. It is known that dog meat was a traditional delicacy of the Chinese peoples, Manchuria and the Korean Peninsula, whereas pork since the deep antiquity was one of the favored meals of the "oriental foreigners" (Larichev 1973: 112; Krjukov et al. 1983: 155). At the same time it was indicative that in the osteological collections from Ilmova Pad' there were only 6% of the dog bones, and the pig bones were not mentioned at all (Konovalov 1976: 209). The population of the Ivolga fortress settlement practiced fishing a lot (Davydova 1995: 48–49; 1996: 14, 81–82).

The tradition of *kang* construction (Korean *ondol)* was evidently not of local origin and was registered in the Baikal Asia only during the Xiongnu period (Davydova 1985: 21). As evidenced by the recent research the earliest structures of this type were found in the north of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and in the regions of China along the Korean border, and only later the *kang* tradition spread across the neighboring territories of Manchuria, the Far East of Russia and the Korean Peninsula (Brodyansky 1985; Onuki 1996). Its appearance in Buryatia was, most likely, the consequence of the tradition's import to the colder territory of the Baikal Asia by some groups of the "oriental foreigners" or the Chinese speaking bearers of this construction tradition from the south-east.

In addition to agriculture part of the fortress settlement's population practiced artisanship. The specialization of the inhabitants could be deducted from the concentration of different types of the finds in individual houses. Thus in house No 25 a large number of bone finished goods and blanks were found, in house No 32 – iron tools and metal casting moulds, and in house No 41 – lots of ceramics and ceramic rejects, whereas house No 49 had a concentration of armor plates and other arms items (Davydova 1985: 20, 75–80).

The agricultural tools technology was definitely related to China. A spade found in the Ivolga fortress settlement (Davydova 1985: 99, Fig. VIII, *26*; 1995, Table 132, *9*, 186, *51*) and the celts (Davydova 1995: 32, Table 186, *22–23*) were similar to the Han spades and celts (Krjukov et al. 1983: 152; Davydova 1995: 32–33, 44, 52), the Xiongnu plough tips (Davydova 1985: 99, Fig. VIII, *23*, *25*; 1995, Table 31, *1*) were very similar to the Old Chinese ones (Krjukov et al. 1983: 150), and the half-moon knives (Davydova 1995, Table 24, *5*, 31, *3*, 61, *5*, 95, *7*, 149, *25*, 154, *17*, 186, *40–44*) were similar to the traditional Chinese sickles.

The sources of the Xiongnu artisans' pottery tradition apparently also went back to the agricultural world (Dyakova, Konovalov 1988; Khudyakov 1989: 149–150; Davydova 1995: 27–28; Filippova, Amogolonov 2001 et al.). Of all types of vessels of a particular interest were the items with the holes in the bottom (Davydova 1995, Table 20, *4*, 26, *8–9*, 43, *11–12*, 58, *10–11*, 143, *19*, 169, *8*, 175, *7*, 177, *20–21, 35*). They were used for a very common in the Han China method of cooking steamed rice and other cereals (Krjukov et al. 1983: 202–203).

In addition the archeologists found in the settlement a number of items with the inscriptions in Chinese characters. These items included, for instance, a whetstone (Davydova 1995: Table 15, *15*), the inscriptions on the three sides of which have been interpreted by a Chinese archeologist Xia Nai (Davydova 1995: 37) as *sui* (number of years), *chóu* (enemy, rival, hate, avenge; this character was used as a family name) and *dang* (a party, administrative unit of 500 households; this character could also be used as a family name). There was a very interesting inscription on the bottom of a vessel from house 21 (Davydova 1995, Table 38, *7*, 179, *3*), which according to the interpretation of the aforementioned Professor Xia Nai (Davydova 1995: 28) was a representation of the Xiongnu period character *Yīng*, translated by him as "deserved". No less interesting were the imprint found on the bottom of a vessel from house 50 (Davydova 1995, Table 179, *1*), which resembled character *Zhǔ* (master, ruler), an imprint of the character *Wang* on another vessel's bottom, an imprint on the bottom of a vessel from house 13, similar to the character *tu* (picture) and the scratched inscription on the inner side of another vessel's collar resembling the character *jǐng* (a well) (Davydova 1995, Table 29, *1*, 179, *6, 9*). Some imprints on ceramics were illegible (Davydova 1995, Table 134, *4*, 179, *2, 5, 7*), however they could quite possibly be the artisans' stamps.

Since even the upper classes of the Xiongnu society were not particularly knowledgeable in the Chinese writing (it would be enough to mention the well known episode with the substitution of a Chanyu stamp by the order of Wang Mang), the common nomads could hardly be more literate than their leaders. Thus we may presume that the inscriptions on items from the Ivolga were made not by the Xiongnu, but by the people of the sedentary-agricultural origin and, most likely, by the immigrants or the prisoners of war from China.

Antonina V. Davydova believed that the funeral ritual of the Ivolga burial place population differed from the Xiongnu one and was, in general, poorer (Davydova 1985: 22, 35). This in her opinion was an evidence of: (1) interethnic stratification, (2) social differences between the immigrants and the prisoners of war, (3) first generation captives and the descendant of the captured and relocated agricultural population. Indirect indication of this was provided by the variety and dimensions of the neighboring to the burial site Ivolga fortress settlement structures, as well as the tools found in those objects (Davydova 1985: 20).

These assumptions have been confirmed by the physical and the anthropological examination of the bodies from the Ivolga burial grounds and the funeral ritual studies. According to physical anthropologist Gokhman the population of the fortress settlement belonged to three different anthropological groups: (1) the Xiongnu (according to Davydova, the non-nomadic part); (2) the aboriginal (probably belonging to the Plate Grave Culture population's descendants); (3) the Chinese consisting of defectors and prisoners of war (Gokhman 1960; see also: Davydova 1985: 22, 85–86; 1996: 26–30). Analysis of the social structure on the basis of the funeral ritual indicated the existence of approximately four-five groups of the fortress setlement's population with various statuses (Kradin, Danilov, Konovalov 2004)

In the Chinese chronicles there was no information about a city that existed in the north outskirts of the Xiongnu empire. However, there was information about the reason for establishing sedentary settlements during the Xianbei Empire period (130-180 AD). It is known that the founder of the Xianbei Empire Tian-Shih-huai was concerned about the lack of food. For this reason he ordered to relocate from the "east" into the Laohahe region about 1,000 families of the Wojen people who were skilled fishermen, forcing them to catch fish for the nomads in order to compensate for the food deficit (Taskin 1984: 80, 331). In addition to the captive artisans and farmers the Syanbi also had plenty of immigrants from China. It was a result of their contribution that the initial smuggling of the metal arms from China (Taskin 1984: 78) was in the 3rd century replaced with own production of metal weapons and armor (Taskin 1984: 324).

Anthropology of deportations: East and West

The Liao Empire of the Khitan (907-1125) opened a new stage in the relationship between China and the neighboring people. Their rise was preconditioned by the crisis and fall of the T'ang dynasty and the desolation of the steppe caused by the defeat of the Uighur Kaganate by the Yenisei Kyrgyz. The Khitans first brought under their power several small states which were formed on the remains of the T'ang Empire. Later on they conquered a large part of the northern China. For the first time in history almost the whole territory of Northern China was under the power of the so-called eastern "barbarians". In that multinational state the Khitan nomads (the "core – metropolis") made up only a fifth of the population (750 thousand people). In addition to them the empire embraced the agricultural Chinese – over one half of the population (2,400 thousand people), the Bohai (450 thousand people), the non-Khitan (the so-called "barbarian") cattle-breeding and hunter (200 thousand people) tribes. The total number of the Empire's population was 3,800 thousand people (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 58).

The annexation of a growing number of significant agricultural territories to the empire required creation of a more sophisticated mechanism of government. The Khitans built large cities with gorgeous temples and palaces to house the imperial court and the emperor's officials. There were about fifty known Khitan towns (Ivliev 1983). In the territory of Mongolia in the Kerulen and the Tola valleys 20 Khitan towns have been discovered (Ochir et al. 2005). Their purpose was mainly the restriction of the local nomads and, apparently, establishing direct contacts between the Liao and the Xi Xia and the Central Asian states bypassing the Song.

Beginning from 2004 the Russian scholars together with the Mongolian colleagues have been engaged in stationary research of the Khitan archeological sites in Mongolia. These studies have been performed with the support of the RFH grants (NoNo 02-01-00176a, 06-01-91915e/G, 06-01-91915e/G, 07-01-92002a/G, 07-01-92071e/G, 08-01-00265a, 08-01-92072e/G, 09-01-00042e/G, 10-01-18137e/G), as well as with the financial support of the Fundamental Research Program of the Presidium of RAS "Historical and Cultural Heritage and Spiritual Values of Russia" (No 09-I-П25-03).

The study of the Chintolgoi balgas town performed in 2004–2008 provided information about the social and economic organization of the Liao Empire (Kradin et al., 2005; Ochir et al. 2008). The site is located in the central Mongolia, approximately 200 km west of Ulan Bator. The town represented an almost regular polygon with the sides 1.2 km x 0.6 km oriented almost by the cardinal points. The town was surrounded with two ramparts. The main rampart had 35 towers, 5 gates with the inverted-L shaped zahab. The town was divided by the inner rampart into the northern (administrative, elite) and the southern

(residential) parts. The traces of three streets of the Khitan period have been found.

In the central part of the 2004-2005 excavation area, in its most elevated part there were the remains of a clay square shaped building. In the western part of the excavation there were several domestic needs pits filled with the burnt remains, ashes, animal and fish bones, scales and charred grains. To the north and the north-west of this building in the upper horizon the remains of the heating structures (the so-called *kang*) have been found, which were typical for the Bohai and the Jurchen archeological cultures. Apart from the *kang* in the process of excavations numerous other categories of artifacts have been found, which had analogues in the Bohai culture. First of all these were the so-called "chips" – small disks from 1cm to 7 cm in diameter made from the walls of earthenware, glazed and porcelain vessels, fragments of tiles and stone. This kind of "chips" has often been found in the Bohai sites of the Primorye Region. Another important feature was the presence of the typical Bohai horizontal band handles. Alongside with these the Chintolgoi balgas pottery also had examples of another variant of the horizontal handles – the lip-shaped ones. These handles in the shape of the horizontal slightly downward slanted lips with the wavy, cockscomb-like edge were attached to the vessel's body. This type of handles was also found in the best researched Bohai site of the Primorye Region – the Kraskino town. In the group of bone artifacts found in the course of the excavations of the Chintolgoi balgas town of a particular interest was a carved antler die with the drilled on the sides numbers from 1 to 6 in the form of pit-points. A similar in size and workmanship die was found in 2007 in the Bohai Abrikosovsky settlement in the Ussuriisk district of the Primorye Region.

This gave reason to believe that the population of the town included some Bohai, whom the Khitan started deporting from their native lands soon after the conquest of the Bohai state in 926. As a result of detailed study of the history of the Khitan state *Liao Shi* Alexandr Ivliev managed to find in Chapter 37 some data according to which at the time of building of the Khitan borderline fortresses in the Tola basin, 700 families of the Bohai, the Jurchens and the Han were relocated to Zhengzhou (i.e. to the territory of the Chintolgoi balgas town) and the subordinate to the latter cities Fanchzhou and Wéizhōu in order to produce sufficient food supplies for the soldiers (Kradin, Ivliev 2008). Two *tumen* (20,000 of Khitan soldiers) were sent to this territory for military service. The garrisons' and the border fortress-cities' population practiced farming in order to produce food for their own consumption. Apparently in the end of the 1120-s the Khitans managed to gain significant successes in subduing Shiwei and Yutjueli tribes, since in the future periods there was an abrupt decrease in the number of the frontier conflicts with the Mongolian steppe nomads.

In the process of the 2004-2005 studies in the north-west corner of the excavated area the remains of a surface house with a *kang* were found. The three-channel *kang* was oriented along the line North-South. There was a hearth in its southern part. On the eastern side from the *kang* there was an aggregation of bone dice. On the northern side outside of the house there were three large vessels buried into the ground. A little bit further north we registered a brick wall running along the west-east line . Most probably it separated the house (and/or a quarter) from the street.

In 2006-2008 the studies concentrated in another excavation plot with the total area of 180 sq. m. located west of the section of first two years of excavations. Here we found the remains of two more houses of the upper construction horizon with the inverted-L shaped *kang* in each of them. The boundary between the houses was determined by the tiles setting at the floor level. The foundations of the southern walls of both houses were strengthened with large stones. In addition on this side we registered several large flat stones which served as bases for the pillar structures. This gave reason to believe that the city development followed a compact quarterly pattern. The residential districts consisted of quarters which were apparently bisected by streets and side lanes. Inside the quarters the houses were placed rather densely.

The last years of Zhengzhou city existence were related to the personality of Yelü Dashi (Pikov 1989; Biran 2005). After the establishment of the Jurchen Jin Empire (1115-1234) and the defeat of the Liao state the remaining Khitan got together under his leadership in the territory of Zhengzhou and the neighboring cities. He cherished the plans of restoration of the Liao empire from there, however when it became clear that it would not have been possible, Yelü Dashi made a sacrificial offering of a white horse and led the exodus of his people to the West where he established a nomadic Kara-Khitan Xi Liao Empire.

The largest scale period of migrations and deportation of the peoples was related to the period of the Genghis Khan Empire creation and the Mongolian conquests of the 13th century. The Mongols closed the chain of international trade into a single system of the land and sea routes. For the first time in history all major regional cores (Europe, the Islamic World, India, China, the Golden Horde) were brought together forming the single chain (Abu-Lughod 1989). From that time the boundaries of the Oicumene expanded significantly, political and economic changes in one part of the world began to play a much greater role in the history of other regions of the world (Kradin, Skrynnikova 2006).

The beginning of the active military expansion required the transfer of the headquarters from Eastern Mongolia on the banks of the Kerulen to a new place. According to the existing sources already in 1220 a decision was made to move the headquarters to the Orkhon Valley. However the real construction of

Karakorum (*Kharkhorin* in Mongolian) started in 1235 when the Khan's palace and the city walls were erected and the construction of palaces and houses for the Mongol elite began. The location of the future capital was primarily chosen because of the geopolitical advantages. From there it was a lot easier to control both China and the trade routes via Gānsù, as well as organize military campaigns into Jungaria and the neighboring Turkestan. It is possible that this was also related to a particular sacral attractiveness of these territories based on the fact that this was a historical center of the earlier steppe empires.

An important role in the creation of the capital was played by the need of concentration in one place of the artisans from the conquered countries. The Mongols quite soon felt the deficit of trained specialists in various trades, however, they understood even sooner that a qualified specialist was as important a resource as the cattle or the material goods. During the first decades of the existence of the empire they organized a large scale mobilization of human resources. Only after the conquest of Khoresm 100 thousand artisans were captured and moved to Mongolia (Rashid-ad-Din 1952: 217) – a fantastic number, which was clearly exaggerated. However the scale of deportations was nonetheless impressive. Apparently one of the most important functions of the city was provision for the Mongolian army of metal arms and transportation. For these purposes vast numbers of artisans were relocated to Orkhon from the conquered countries.

The second wave of the forced deportation of the artisans was related to the military campaigns against the Jin state, as a result of which many artful craftsmen and artisan were brought to Karakorum, where they decorated the interiors of the palace and produced all kinds of implements and ornaments for it (Rashid-ad-Din 1960: 40). Many of the artisan were sent to Central Asia. The third large scale wave occurred already in 1255–1259, when Hulegu invaded Iran and annexed its territory to the empire. Many of the captives escaped, sometimes up to 80%. However after the introduction of cruel rules under which anyone who gave shelter to the runaways was subject to a death-penalty people were afraid to offer refuge and all roads were piled with dead bodies of escaped captives who died from cold and hunger (Munkuev 1965: 77). The severity of the punishment restrained the mass escapes. In due time the captives began to feel more comfortable in the new territories. If they were hard working and talented their status gradually increased and they could even make a good career at the local court. At the same time it is important to note that the use of human resources of the conquered peoples was extremely irrational. According to *Yuán Shi*:

> "In those days the goods made by the artisans were wasted and eight-nine tenths of the government goods were pocketed by private individuals" (Munkuev 1965: 195).

Anyway, by means of the forced relocation of the large mass of the people, or through involving into the process of a vast number of adventurers, profiteers and gentlemen of fortune the Mongols set up the conditions for an unprecedented intercultural exchange and integration of cultures, religions and civilizations. The Chinese technicians and engineers accompanied the Mongol armies invading the Islamic countries. Significant groups of the population from the territory of Jin Empire were moved to Merv and Tabriz for practicing artisanship and agriculture. Following the Hulegu orders the Buddhist temples were built in the territory of Khurasan, Armenia and Azerbaijan. The remains of one such temple in the vicinity of Merv has been studied with the archeological excavations. The structure combined the local and the Far Eastern building traditions. There were Chinese quarters in many Central Asian cities (Allsen 2001).

This created opportunities for the expansion of the growing number of connections, the formation of the new fashions and tastes. However we should not forget that the Mongols did not pursue a purpose of creating a network of the global information communications. They were obsesses with the idea of conquering the world and hence many outcomes of their contacts with other cultures and civilizations proved to be unintentional. The transit of "high technologies" was rather a consequence of the political will of the Mongol Empire rulers than a predetermined result of the internal development of economy and trade. As a result the vast and stable networks of cultural and technological contacts between the artisans, engineers, artists and other representatives of intellectual labor of different nations and states were established. All this formed a basis for the fruitful technological and cultural exchange, facilitated implementation of new opportunities and unique discoveries, which were destined to have a revolutionary effect on the world in several hundred years (Kradin, Skrynnikova 2006).

A vivid manifestation of a mixture of cultures and peoples was Karakorum – the capital city of the Mongol Empire. The capital was divided into several areas. One zone housed the homesteads of the aristocracy and the Khagan's Palace, another was the territory of the Jurchen and the Chinese artisans, the third was occupied by the Muslim merchants. The city had at least four markets, churches and temples of various confessions. All languages were spoken in Karakorum. According to the European travelers one could meet there the Jurchen and the Chinese, the inhabitants of the Central Asia, the Alans, the Armenians, the Hungarians, the Greeks, the Georgians, the Germans, the Russians, and the French (bearing in mind the conventionality of those names for that time) (Book of Marco Polo 1956: 156; Plano Carpini 1957: 41, 58, 77; Rubruc, 1957: 137, 138, 139, 143, 144, 161).

The population of Karakorum was united into several religious communities (Rashid-ad-Din 1960: 164). The archeological materials and

museum collections confirm this information. It is possible to trace the similarity of the end discs of the tiles on the Jurchen sites of Primorye Region (Shavkunov 1990: 225) and the Middle Age archeological sites of Mongolia (Kiselev 1965: 93, 101, 320). The typical Jurchen *kangs* have been found in many archeological objects of the Mongol period: in Karakorum, Khirkhira town in the East Baikal region, Den Terek town in Tuva (Kiselev 1965, Fig. 20–22, 29, 33, 41, 74–75, 103–104; Artemjev, 2005 9). The sculptured dragon head and the phoenix bird decorations found in the Den Terek town in Tuva (Kiselev 1965: 94–95) were almost identical to the Primorye Region's finds (Shavkunov 1990: 226). Detailed description of the porcelain and slipware from Karakorum made by Evtyukhova definitely pointed to its Jin and Song origin, particularly of such brands as *Jun Yao* and *Cizhou* (Kiselev 1965: 216–258). Some ornaments on the vessels had a certain likeness to the V-shaped ornament of the Old Russian ceramics from Old Ryasan (Kiselev 1957: 99–100). The Jurchen materials have been found even further away – in the Caucasus (Narozhny 2007).

In addition to the capital there were other urban culture sites of the Mongol Empire. The first of them – Khirkhira town – is located in the south of the East Baikal region. The site consists of several groups of homestead complexes stretching for almost two kilometers along the west-east line and approximately 700 m north to south. The largest citadel (110–100 m) was located in the western part and was surrounded with a rampart and a moat. Inside it was a palace type building (15 x 30 m) and several other structures. It was presumed that the main building was a one tier structure with a tiled roof (Kiselev 1965: 23–58). The homesteads were located around the citadel. Some of them were detached houses, while others were combined into a complicated system of quarters, streets and side lanes. Several other large complexes were located west of the main citadel.

It is believed that the Khirkhira town was the headquarters of Yesungke, the son of Khasar, a full brother of Genghis Khan. A reason for this assumption was an inscription found not far from the famous stone stela ("Genghis Stone") from the Hermitage collections:

> "When, after the conquest of the Sartaul (Khiva) people, Genghis Khan returned and assembled the noyans of all the Mongol ulus in the place called Bukha-Sujihai, Yesungke received an apanage of 335 Khondogor soldiers." This inscription was dated as 1225 (Banzarov 1997: 113).

Of a particular importance was the find of the remains of the stack flue structures – a kang with three smoke ducts. This tradition was quite common among the Far East peoples – the Koreans, the Manchu, during the Middle Ages it was also known among the Bohai and the Jurchens. Apparently the latter brought it to the Mongols. In addition various categories of artifacts found

in the towns also gave evidence of the existence of ties with China, as well as the Western and Eastern Europe (Artemjev 2005: 8–10, Fig. 2, 3, *20–23*, Fig. 5, *9–10*).

Nine kilometers north-east from the town, in the creek valley Alestuy there was an independent homestead. It consisted of a 1.5 m high filled-up platform with dimensions 20 x 30 m extended along the north-south line. The platform was surrounded with a low rectangular bank (0.3-0.5 m) with dimensions 70 x 70 m. The bank was oriented almost by the cardinal points. We have conventionally marked it as the main yard. Another 70 x 35 m rectangular banked area was annexed to the northern bank. In 2009 we studied the northern part of the homestead and the neighboring territory of the yard up to the bank. The total excavation area was 200 sq. m. The northern part of the yard between the stone bank and the building as well as the northern section of the platform, have been excavated. The platform's elevation over the day surface was approximately 80 cm. It was made from dense grey-colored clay. We have registered numerous finds of tiles, bricks, and their fragments, as well as other categories of artifacts on the platform's surface.

The cultural layer proved to be very rich. Among the finds there were a large number of iron nails of various sizes, fragments of different iron and bronze goods, a flat arrowhead, a stone smoother, a fragment of a plowshare, bits of slag, fragments of a crucible, an iron lock, wheel hub liners, the rim and pieces of the walls of iron cauldrons, birch bark fragments with holes, two dice made from tiles and some items made from rectangular tiles with holes. We also found three whole bricks and over 50 archeologically restorable fragments. The most common material was the roof tiles. It was represented with whole fragments and pieces of the upper and lower base and eaves tiles with and without ornamentation. Typologically the tiles from the Alestuy homestead were compatible to the tiles from the Khirkhira town and had many features in common with the Jurchen tiles of the Primorye Region.

Another world renowned monument of the same period – the Kondui palace – is located approximately 50 km north of the Khirkhira town. The monument got its name from the river Kondui. It was also studied by S. V. Kiselev (1965: 323-369). The palace building was located on a two meter high cross-shaped clay platform. The floor of the platform was paved with bricks. Access to the platform was provided by five brick ramps – two and two on the east and the west sides, and the main access on the south side. There was no ramp on the north side. This type of planigraphy represented a combination of the space organization principles practiced by the Chines (and indirectly the Jurchen) architects, and the space organization traditions of the Mongolian nomads (exit from the yurt to the south, and the northern side – the *khoimor* – the most honorary, prohibited).

Inside the building there were 37 stone bases, which served as foundations for wooden pillars. Apparently the building consisted of several parts – the entrance hall, the through passages, the audience room, the living quarters or the auxiliary halls. The roof of the palace was covered with green slipware tiles and decorated with the dragon figures. Walls of the palace were also decorated with the pictures of animals and fantastic creatures. To the north, west and east from the main palace there were other buildings. On the layout diagram made by Sergey V. Kiselev they were represented as low rectangular shaped mounds. The main gates were located in the southern side. There was no other construction south of the palace. One kilometer to north-west there were, probably, the houses of the people who provided routine services to the local elite. At a distance of 3 km east of the palace there were the remains of the tile kilns. In the same area there were mounds which could be correlated with the artisan-potters houses (Kiselev 1965: 327–328).

The consequences of the creation of the Mongol Empire could with good reason be called the Middle Age globalization (Kradin 2009). However this globalization proved to be shortlived. The plague that spread quickly across the Old World owing to the developed system of trade communications (McNeil 1976), as well as the expulsion of Mongols from China, and the decline of the Golden Horde became the most significant links in the chain of events that led to its fall (Kradin, Skrynnikova 2006). As soon as the balance of power changed the Mongols were expelled back into the steppe, the need to build palaces and large sedentary-agricultural settlements also disappeared. In the year of the Kulikovo battle the Ming armies destroyed and burned Karakorum which was never fully restored after this tragedy. The same fate befell also the rich palaces erected by the Yuan elite in the East Baikal steppe. They burned down in the fires of the internal conflicts between the Genghis Khan heirs. All memory of them was lost and it was only at the turn of the 18^{th}-19^{th} centuries that the remains of the Kondui palace were rediscovered and used for the construction of a Russian Orthodox Nativity of the Blessed Virgin Church in Kondui village (Kradin N.P. 2002).

Part Three

HISTORICAL DYNAMICS

9

STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY AND POWER IN THE ANCIENT INNER ASIAN NOMADIC EMPIRES: XIONGNU AND XIANBEI

Introduction

The history of the Xiongnu and Xianbei is one of the most interesting chapters in the history of the ancient Eurasian steppe peoples. At the turn of the third and second centuries BC, the Xiongnu established the first steppe empire, by federating several Inner Asian societies. Over a period of 250 years, a dramatic confrontation took place between the Xiongnu and their southern neighbor – the Chinese Han dynasty. At the end of the first century AD, the Xiongnu era in Inner Asia was over. The next hundred years saw domination by the Xianbei of the Inner Asian steppes.

The history of the Xiongnu is known to us through several records: the *Shi ji* [Records of the Grand Historian], chapter 110; the *Han shu* [History of the Han Dynasty], chapter 94A; the *Hou Han shu* [History of the Later Han Dynasty, hereafter *HHS*], chapter 79;* as well as by archaeological findings in the territories of Mongolia, Russia and China (Dorzsuren 1961; Umehara 1960; Rudenko 1969; Konovalov 1976; Davydova 1995; 1996 etc.) At present, several studies (Egami 1948; Bernstam 1951; Gumilev 1960; Ma Changshou 1962; Davydova 1985; Sühbaatar 1980; Di Cosmo 2002) tackle different aspects of the history and culture of the Xiongnu society. Still, many questions remain unsolved and debatable. This paper will consider some of these problems.

The main sources on Xianbei history are three Chinese chronicles: the *Hou Han shu,* chapter 90; the *Wei shu* [History of the Wei Dynasty, hereafter *WS],* chapter 30; and the *Sanguo zhi* [Chronicles of the Three Kingdoms]. These texts have been translated into Russian (Bichurin 1950 [1851]: 149–159; Taskin 1984: 70–86) and others European (Schreiber 1947; Mullie 1969) languages. For a long time, archaeological sites of Xianbei were not known. It is only recently that cemeteries of Xianbei culture have been excavated in China and the Eastern Baikal area (Su Bai 1977; Gan Chigeng and Sun Suzeng 1982; Mi Wenping 1994; Yu Suhua 2002; Yaremcuk 2004; 2005 etc.).

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* These sources (cited here by Lidai 1958) have been translated into European languages (Bichurin 1950 [1851]; Groot 1921; Watson 1961;Taskin 1968, 1973).

The Structure of Xiongnu Society and Power

A *shanyu* was at the head of the Xiongnu empire. In official documents produced at the height of Xiongnu power, the *shanyu* was described as "born from heaven and earth, raised by the sun and moon, great *shanyu* of the Xiongnu" (Lidai 1958: 30). The *shanyu* used raids to obtain the political support of the tribes that were the constituent members of the imperial confederation. Furthermore, using the threats of raids, he extorted from the Han empire gifts (to be distributed among relatives, tribal chieftains and armed forces), and the right for all of his subjects to trade with the Chinese in border areas. In internal affairs, on the other hand, the *shanyu* had much less authority. The majority of political decisions at the local level were made by tribal chiefs.

Thomas Barfield assumes that Han politicians may have relied on simple human avidity, hoping that dizzy with the quantity and diversity of the rare wonders they had given him the *shanyu* would store them up in his treasury or squander them in extravagant behavior. The Chinese officials probably did not, however, fully understand the principles of the steppe ruler's power. The status of the ruler of a nomadic empire depended, on the one hand, on providing his subjects with gifts and material wealth and, on the other hand, on the military capacity to make raids and extort gifts, which he would then redistribute to his followers. The necessity to support the stability of the military-political structure rather than personal avidity was the reason for the *shanyu* ceaseless demands to Han to increase its bestowals. The gravest, insult that could be made to a steppe ruler was the accusation of stinginess. Spoils of war, gifts from the Han emperors and international trade were the main sources of political power in the steppe. And the gifts that then flowed through the ruler's hands not only did not weaken but, on the contrary, strengthened his power and influence in the imperial confederation (Barfield 1989/1992: 36–60).

In the eyes of Chinese historians, the Xiongnu empire was seen as an expansionistic state with autocratic power. In fact, however, it was a quite fragile mechanism. Even during periods of highest prosperity of the Xiongnu polity (under Mode/Maodun and his first successor), the military-hierarchical system only co-existed with and overlay the complicated genealogical hierarchy of tribes; it never fully transformed them. In theory, the *shanyu* could demand explicit obedience from his subjects and issue any command he wished. But his political might was really quite limited. First, the power of the Xiongnu empire remained supratribal, because (a) membership in the confederation provided tribes with political independence from neighbors and a number of other significant advantages, and (b) the *shanyu* and his close circle of relatives guaranteed for the tribes a particular inner autonomy within the empire. Secondly, the actual power of the tribal chiefs and elders was autonomous from the policy of the centre. When a tribe became dissatisfied by

the policy of the center, the whole tribe or a part of it fled to the south seeking China's help.

The *shanyu* had numerous relatives who belonged to his own clan, the Luandi: brothers and nephews, wives, sons and daughters etc. Besides the relatives of the *shanyu,* other noble clans (Huyan, Lan, Xubu and Qiulin) belonged to the highest Xiongnu aristocracy. The next level in the Xiongnu hierarchy was occupied by tribal chiefs and elders. In the annals, they are mentioned, as a rule, as *subordinate kings*, *chief commandants*, *household administrators*, or *qiuqu* officials (Lidai 1958: 17; see also Groot 1921: 55; Watson 1961: 163–164; Taskin 1968:40). Some of the "chiefs of a thousand" were probably tribal chiefs. The "chiefs of a hundred" and "heads of ten" were, most likely, lower-ranking clan leaders. Economic, judicial, cultural, fiscal and military functions were considered to be the responsibilities of chiefs and elders. The chiefs of non-Xiongnu tribes that were members of the imperial confederation were on a slightly lower rank in the hierarchical ladder. In addition, the Xiongnu also had a stratum of service nobility – advisers (who were immigrants from China) – and bodyguards.

Most of the population of the Xiongnu empire were, of course, ordinary pastoral nomads. On the base of some indirect data, one can assume that many important features of economy, social organization and way of life were essentially little different from the features of the nomads of the Mongolian steppes of more recent times (Egami 1956; 1963; Kradin 2002a: 160–165).

In the written sources, there is no information concerning the different categories of indigents or semi-free populations who were engaged in pastoralism within the Xiongnu society. It is also unknown whether there were slaves. The apparent lack of development of slavery in the Xiongnu society can be explained by some cross-cultural anthropological studies that clearly demonstrate that slavery has never become widespread in any pastoral society (For details see Nieboer 1910: 261–293; Khazanov 1975: 133–148; 1984: 160–161; Kradin 1992: 100–111). Those researchers are most likely right, who believe that the overwhelming majority of prisoners of war in the Xiongnu society were engaged in agricultural and handicraft in special established settlements (Gumilev 1960: 147; Davydova 1975: 145; Rudenko 1969; Khazanov 1975: 143–144). However, as to their social-economic and legal position, the majority of these persons (many free deserters) were not enslaved. Their social status probably varied from conditional vassalage to some kind of serfdom. The Ivolginsk fortress (below Ivolga), near the city Ulan-Ude in Buryatia, was a classic settlement of such type (Davydova 1968; 1985; 1995; 1996; Hayashi 1984).

The archaeological data supplement, to a great extent, the information found in chronicles. The higher an individual's status, the greater the expenses for construction of tomb and the splendid implements buried with the dead

therein. Monumental structures defined this sacred space, which symbolized the divine nature of earthly power: these are burial mounds with a *dromos,* i.e. a path to the other world.

According to archaeological data, even before the formation of the nomadic empire, social stratification had existed in Xiongnu society, and other pastoral polities of this period. At the bottom of the society were the ordinary burial places of ordinary nomads. At the top were the graves of the members of the tribal ruling elite, in which have been found a great quantity of adornments for chariots, finely made arms and armor, jewelry and plates with gold images of animals, rods, pommels of banners etc. (for example: Tian Guangjin, Guo Suxin 1980; 1980a).

Social stratification increased even more during periods when the Xiongnu were at the height of their power (after 209 BC). The monumental burial grounds of Xiongnu lords located in Noyon-Uul, Borbulag, Gol Mod etc. (in Mongolia), as well as those at Il'movaya Pad', Tsaraam and Orgontoi (in southern Buryatia), required considerable efforts for their construction. So, for example, the best known of the Xiongnu burial mounds in Noyon-Uul, investigated in 1924–1925 by the Kozlov expedition, represents a structure with a rectangular terrace of 14x16 m. in area and more than 1.5 m. in height. The grave pit goes down by steep ledges to the depth of 9 m. On the south side, the pit has flatter slopes, which are fringed by stone blocks. At the bottom, there is a coffin coated with varnish and paint, lying within two chests. The inner surface of the chests was draped with refined wool carpets and silk cloths. The deceased was accompanied with rich funeral implements (Umehara 1960; Rudenko 1969). Some very interesting results were also excavated in other mounds in Noyon-Uul some years ago, and also in Gol Mod in the Mongol territory, and in Tsaraam in Buryatia (Desroches 2003; Miniaev, Sakharovskaia 2006, 2007; Polosmak et al. 2008a; 2008b; 2011 etc.).

The graves of ordinary nomads are much simpler and poorer in implements. These are usually roundish or quadrangular stone mounds of 5–10 m. in diameter. The depth of the grave pit is generally not more than 3 m. At the bottom of the pit, there is a wooden coffin (more rarely, a coffin within a chest). The burial place is accompanied with separate pieces of armament, harness, implements, adornments and funeral food (Dorzsuren 1961; Konovalov 1976; Tsevendorzh 1985; Turbat 2004). But if we compare the burial sites of common nomads with the graves of the settled population who resided on the Ivolga territory, the latter appear to be even simpler and poorer (Davydova 1995).

How strict was this social pyramid? Was it possible for an individual to overcome the hierarchical stages and to raise his administrative and social status? According to social anthropological studies of Eurasian peoples, the so called patrilineal descent system is characteristic of pastoral nomads (Bacon

1958; Krader 1963; Markov 1976; Khazanov 1984; Masanov 1995). Applied to the problem of vertical mobility, this implies that; 1) status and power, as a rule, are transferred within one descent group in accordance with the seniority principle; 2) no individual can live beyond the framework of a clan-tribal group; and 3) the social status of a particular individual quite often depends on the status of his descent group among other similar groups. Hence, the opportunities of vertical mobility are restricted by the place in the social genealogy of one or another clan subdivision. In such context, the most realistic ways to increase personal status – within limits – is devotion to the ruler and personal military valor.

Archaeological Data

More detailed information about the social structure can be collected from the analysis of burials. Burial rites can be a reliable source of evidence concerning social differentiation in a given society. One should, however, assess the buried persons' sex and age before evaluating their social rank. One reason is that the social status of males and females may have been unequal, and that, if so, this must have been reflected by the burial rite. The second reason is that in such archaic society, rise in social status was only possible after the initiation rite had been performed (Bunyatian 1985; Kradin, Tishkin, Kharinsky 2005).

The analysis of burials includes several successive operations:

1. listing the features of the funerary rite, and feeding the database information (the software used was STATISTICS 5.0);
2. revealing factors correlated with age in the skeletal sample under analysis;
3. separating adult skeletons from those of immature individuals;
4. revealing factors relevant to sex differentiation of adult burials;
5. separating the burials of males from those of females;
6. analyzing differences in the funerary rite within groups homogeneous with regard to age and sex, and attributing indeterminate burials;
7. revealing significant factors linking clusters within sex and age groups with various categories of burial goods;
8. interpreting findings.

To reveal features correlated with sex, age and social status, *factor* analysis was used with a view to discovering latent factors. To discover social groups within homogeneous sex and age cohorts, *cluster* analysis was used, and the number of clusters was estimated *a posteriori.*

The skeletal series selected for the analysis come from the burial grounds that had been subjected to the most detailed archaeological analysis: Ilmovaya Pad', Ceremuhovaya Pad', Dyrestuisky Kul'tuk, and Ivolga cemetery (the total number of graves was 426).

The analysis of Xiongnu burials in the Trans-Baikal region revealed a complex social hierarchy within various sex, age, and ethno-cultural groups (for more information see Kradin, Danilov, Konovalov 2004).

Male burials fall into several groups differing sharply in terms of social rank (Table 9.1); these can be arranged into a hierarchy. The top-ranking group comprises burials in three mounds (10, 40, and 54) at Ilmovaya Pad'. They can be considered elite or even royal burials (cluster 2). The second highest group is composed of burials in the same group of mounds, accompanied by a variety of funerary goods (subclusters 1A and 1B), which display certain differences (burials in the former subcluster appear to be somewhat richer). Next to them in terms of funerary rite and the amount of burial goods are burials at Ceremuhovaya Pad' and Dyrestuisky Kul'tuk. Within the latter burial ground, three groups that were nearly equal in social rank can be separated. Those people were apparently Xiongnu freemen.

Ground burials excavated at Ivolga fall into four social categories. The lowest one includes burials without accompanying goods (cluster 1). The remaining three groups are marked by the presence of burial goods. The second one (subcluster 2AB) differs from the first one (2AA) by the presence of a belt, and the third one (2B) differs from it by the presence of a horse harness.

Table 9.1. Male Xiongnu burials in the Trans-Baikal region

Burial Ground	Cluster	Burial goods
Ivolga	1	None
	2AA	Standard
	2AB	Same + belt
	2B	Same + horse harness
Dyrestuisky Kultuk	1B	Diverse
	1A	More diverse
	2	Same + ornaments
Ceremuhovaya Pad'	1	No differentiation revealed
	2	Same
Il'movaya Pad'	1B	Diverse
	1A	Even more diverse + mirrors + golden ornaments
	2	Elite burial mounds (10, 40, 54)

Generally, differences between the subclusters can be expected to reflect those between social groups of the Xiongnu society. It is therefore tempting to relate these clusters to specific social groups known from the chronicles. This, however, would be premature. One must keep in mind that archaeology deals with fragmentary remains of an extinct culture. Also, our samples are quite small, and every new fieldwork season can introduce substantial corrections to our knowledge of the past. Evidently, relating clusters of burials to specific groups of the Xiongnu society would only be possible after the database has been substantially enlarged.

Another fact relevant for interpreting the results of the statistical analysis of male burials is that the nomadic herdsmen of the western Trans-Baikal region apparently constituted an independent administrative and territorial part of the Xiongnu hierarchy, headed by a top-ranking military chief. If so, then the elite burials at Il'movaya Pad', Orgontoi, Tsaraam, and Huhumder could have been those of top regional chiefs and their closest kin.

At any rate, the elite burial mounds contrast sharply with graves of lower ranking nomads. The funerary rite and the funerary goods vary both between the burial grounds and between separate groups (subclusters) of graves within particular burial grounds. Differences between groups of mounds may be explained either by the social status of tribes or clans with which they were associated or by ethnic (tribal) factors or, if they date from different periods, by the evolution of Xiongnu society.

The amount of labor invested in the construction of mounds at Il'movaya Pad', Ceremuhovaya Pad' and Dyrestuisky Kul'tuk is generally larger than that involved in making ground burials such as those for the settled populations at Ivolga. Apparently, the status of the nomads was markedly higher than that of the sedentary villagers who practiced agriculture (Khazanov 1975: 85–86; Bunyatian 1985: 71; Polosmak 1997: 42).

Female burials, too, reveal a certain hierarchy (Table 9.2). Nearly half of the clusters or subclusters contain weapons. This confirms the previously known evidence of written and archaeological sources to the effect that nomadic women actively participated in warfare.[16]

Female burials of the highest-ranking burial ground, Il'movaya Pad', fall into three groups differing in social status: subcluster 1A (rich burials), cluster 2 (intermediate ones), and subcluster 1 B (burials of the lowest-ranking women). In Ceremuhovaya Pad' burials of women, unlike those of men, fall into two groups differing in status.

Women's graves at Dyrestuisky Kul'tuk can be subdivided into three groups. The first one (subcluster 1B) is characterized by standard burial goods typical of common burials. Two other clusters, 1A and 2, while both showing higher status than 1B, reveal certain differences: the distinctive feature of subcluster 1A is a larger number and greater variety of ornaments, whereas burials in cluster 2 contain weapons.

A much more complex hierarchy is revealed by female burials at Ivolga, where five groups of burials differing in status have been established. Graves of

the first group (1B) contained no goods whatever, and those of the second group (1AA) contained only pottery, while those of the third group (1AB) are characterized by other funerary items as well (Table 9.2). Female Xiongnu burials in the Trans-Baikal region of the fourth group (2A) show a greater diversity of articles such as a belt, coins, ornaments of various types; in the fifth group (2B) such articles occur on a mass scale, and remains of a funerary repast were found.

Table 9.2. Female Xiongnu burials in the Trans-Baikal region

Burial ground	Cluster	Burial goods
Ivolga	1B	None
	1AA	Ceramics
	1AB	Standard + ceramics
	2A	More diverse (horse harness, coins, ornaments)
	2B	Even more diverse, remains of funerary repast
Dyrestuisky Kultuk	1B	Diverse, remains of funerary repast
	2	Diverse, remains of funerary repast + cow bones, weapons
	1A	Cow bones
Ceremuhovaya Pad'	2	More diverse
	1	Diverse
Il'movaya Pad'	1B	Scarce
	2	Diverse
	1A	Even more diverse + mirrors + golden ornaments

Children's graves, too, show marked differences depending on whether they were found in groups of mounds (Il'movaya Pad', Dyrestuisky Kul'tuk) or in ground burials (Ivolga). Social stratification is the most evident at Ivolga, where three groups of children's burials were established; those without burial goods (subcluster 2AAB), those with ceramics (subcluster 2AAA), and those containing various articles (subcluster 2AB). Burials in vessels (cluster 1) must be regarded as a special case (they have tentatively been described as burials of infants).

The comparison of clusters reveals that children's burials fall into two groups in terms of the variety of burial goods: (1) those without any goods and "poor" ones (cluster 1 and subclusters 2AAA, 2AAB, and 2B of Ivolga); (2) burials at Dyrestuisky Kul'tuk and Il'movaya Pad', as well as those in cluster 2AB at Ivolga. Overall, this provides a basis for separating "rich" and "poor" burials of children.

Table 9.3. Burials of Xiongnu Children in the Trans-Baikal region

Burial ground	Cluster	Burial goods
Ivolga	1	Burials in a vessel
	2AAB	None
	2AAA	Ceramics
	2AB	Standard + ceramics
Dyrestuisky Kuituk	1	Standard (girls?) Standard
	2	(boys?)
Il'movaya Pad'		No differentiation revealed

The comparison of these findings with the evidence of written sources demonstrates a complex stratified nature of Xiongnu society. According to narratives, at the top of the social pyramid was the *shanyu* with his closest relatives – members of the *Luandi* clan. The next highest level was occupied by members of other aristocratic clans, tribal chiefs, and non-aristocratic elite. Below them was the most numerous social stratum: herdsmen, common members of the nomadic society. The bottom of the hierarchy was represented by rightless persons such as disfranchised nomads, tribute-paying captives, or members of semi-vassal sedentary populations such as farmers or craftsmen (Kradin 2002a etc.).

Another important fact is that the Trans-Baikal region was the northernmost outpost of the Xiongnu Empire. People inhabiting it belonged to one or several peripheral tribal groups that, in administrative and military terms, were distinct parts of the imperial confederation. In Mongolia, far richer graves of the Xiongnu elite are known, apparently associated with members of the Golden Clan *(Luandi)* rather than with provincial chiefs. Clearly, Xiongnu settlements in Mongolia, too, had a somewhat different function. The difference is evidenced by several features, one being the absence of tiles on Buryatian sites. It is quite possible that analysis of Xiongnu burials in Mongolia would reveal a somewhat different number of social strata, whose proportions, too, would differ. All these aspects, however, as well as the chronology and local variants of the Xiongnu culture, will be addressed in future studies that will be based on all the available information concerning the excavated Xiongnu burials in Russia, Mongolia, and China.

Evolution of the Xiongnu Political System

The eminent Chinese historian Sima Qian has given a detailed description of the administrative system of the Xiongnu empire (Lidai 1958: 17; see also Groot 1921: 55; Watson 1961: 163–164; Taskin 1968:40). The empire under Mode/Maodun was divided into three parts: centre, left and right wings. The wings, in turn, were divided into sub-wings. Theoretically, at least, supreme power was held in the hands of the *shanyu,* while he was concurrently also directly in charge of the central tribes of the metropolis of the steppe empire. Twenty-four of the highest officials were in charge of large tribal associations, while at the same time, as holders of the military rank of "chief of a ten thousand" were subordinate to the *shanyu.* The *shanyu's* elder brother – successor to the throne – was in charge of the left wing. The nearest relatives of the steppe empire's ruler were his co-ruler, leader and co-ruler of the right wing. Only they had the highest titles of "kings" *(wang* in Chinese). These kings and six of the most noble of the "chiefs of a ten thousand" were considered as "strong" and were in command of not less than ten thousand riders. The rest of the "chiefs of a ten thousand" actually commanded less than ten thousand cavalrymen (Lidai 1958: 17; Watson 1961: 163–164).

At the lowest level of the administrative hierarchy were the local tribal chiefs and elders. Although they were officially subordinate to the 24 deputies from the centre, the dependence of tribal leaders was limited. The *shanyu's* headquarters was far away and local chiefs enjoyed support from related tribal groups. Thus, the influence of the imperial deputies on local authorities was relatively limited and they were forced to take into account the interests of the tribes subordinate to them. The total number of these tribal groups within the Xiongnu imperial confederation is unknown.

The use made by Chinese historians of military terms – such as "chiefs of a ten thousand," "chiefs of a thousand," "chiefs of a ten hundred" – as well as of traditional terms – such as "kings" *(wang),* "princes" of different ranks, "chief commandants," "household administrators," officials etc. – gives grounds to propose that the military and civil hierarchies existed in parallel. Each of these two systems had different functions. The system of non-decimal ranks was used during wars when a great quantity of warriors from different parts of the steppe joined to form one or several armies (Barfield 1992: 38).

At the local level, the power of the *shanyu,* of the highest commanders and of the tribal chiefs operated in a strict but simple and traditional way. On the whole, according to the Chinese chronicles' descriptions of Xiongnu laws, punishment was "simple and easily realizable" (*Shiji* 110), consisting mainly of stick strokes, exile and the death penalty. It provided an opportunity quickly to resolve conflict at different levels of the hierarchical pyramid and to maintain the stability of the political system as a whole. It is no mere chance that for the Chinese, accustomed from childhood to an unwieldy and clumsy bureaucratic machine, the management system of the Xiongnu confederation seemed extremely simple: "the management of the whole state is similar to that of one's body" (Lidai 1958: 17).

The well-organized system of ranks developed under Mode/Maodun could not be maintained in later times. This is related to the fact that, owing to the traditional – for the nomadic aristocracy – practice of polygamy, the reproduction of the elite in the nomadic empires occurred in almost geometric series. It is clear that, as a rule, the senior wife's sons benefited from the succession of status and major property, while all other heirs received only a quite high status. This did not, however, exclude these secondary heirs from taking a place in the official hierarchy. Furthermore, privilege was often accorded favorites or children born of young beloved wives. As for the *shanyu's* numerous near and distant relatives, the blue "royal" blood flowed in their veins and all of the members of the *Luandi* kin, without exception, had the right to lay claim to a place under the sun in the Xiongnu social hierarchy.

Several periods of active introduction of new titles can be identified (Kradin 2002a: 216–224). The reason for this became clear in the period from approximately 100-50 BC, with the appearance of an excessive surplus of members of the Xiongnu elite. Though new titles began to be added at this time, all the members of noble clans still could not obtain a place in the political hierarchy corresponding to their birth, leading to an intense competition for possession of status and respective material benefits. In the end, this resulted in a temporary collapse of Xiongnu power into several factions hostile to each other, leading to the civil war of 58-36 BC.

This was followed, in the last third of the first century BC, by a second mass introduction of new titles and posts. The new combination of political forces formed after the civil war gradually rigidified, resulting in a strong hierarchy. The state's new foreign policy now required a correction of the administrative system; some old titles proved somewhat compromised, having previously been held by enemies or traitors. It was now necessary firmly to establish a new principle for the inheritance of power, to develop principles for making political decisions, and to introduce new posts and appropriate splendid titles. In the end, however, the increasing number of the nomadic elite's representatives resulted in a resumption of struggles for limited resources. In AD 48, the steppe empire collapsed into northern and southern confederations; the third and last large-scale appearance of new titles came in this time of the division of Xiongnu power into groupings at odds with each other.

The Chinese historian Fan Ye, author of the *Hou Han shu,* gave the same detailed description of the Xiongnu political system in the first century AD as his eminent predecessor Sima Qian had centuries before (Lidai 1958: 680; Taskin 1973: 73). This provides a unique opportunity to observe the dynamics of the Xiongnu political institutions throughout 250 years. The most

considerable differences between the power of the Mode/Maodun epoch and Xiongnu society before it collapsed are as follows:

1. There has been a transition, from the triadic military-administrative division to dual tribal division into wings.
2. Sima Qian wrote clearly about the development of the military-administrative structure with "chiefs of a ten thousand." Fan Ye does not mention a decimal system; instead military rank of "chiefs of a ten thousand" are enumerated as civil titles of "king" *(wang)*.
3. According to Fan Ye, the whole first ten of "strong" "chiefs of a ten thousand" had, from the viewpoint of the Chinese chronicles, a more independent position from the *shanyu* headquarters.
4. The order of succession to the throne had changed. While the *shanyu*'s throne had ordinarily passed from father to son (with a few extraordinary exceptions), the order from uncle to nephew had now become predominant.
5. The Xiongnu polity came to adopt a prevailing principle of joint government according to which the ruler of the nomadic empire had a co-ruler, who controlled one of the polity's wings. The capacity of become a junior co-ruler was held by birth; but a co-ruler's successors could not pretend to the *shanyu*'s throne.

These changes demonstrate a gradual weakening of the autocratic power of the center, and development of more diffused authority and federative relations, as demonstrated by, among other things, the transition from triadic administrative-territorial division to a dual one. The military-hierarchical relations were pressed back and the genealogical hierarchy between senior and junior by rank tribes was pushed into the foreground.

The Social and Political Organization of the Xianbei

Unfortunately, there is little information in the Chinese chronicles about the Xianbei family, marriage, social organization or political systems. It is only known that, among the Xianbei, there was a custom to hold marriages at the traditional national spring festival *(HHS* 90.8a). We can, however, compare the Xianbei with the Wuhuan, their contemporaneous neighbors. The Chinese chronicles attribute the Wuhuan and the Xianbei to a common cultural sphere – that of the proto-Mongolian Donghu – and inform us that the Xianbei customs and language were similar to those of the Wuhuan (Taskin 1984: 7, 329). Therefore, based on our knowledge of the Wuhuan, one can assume that the Xianbei had the following forms of social organization:

1. Lowest levels: Family (most likely, nuclear or restricted family) and kinship groups related by real blood relationship, ownership of livestock and commonness of economic interests. The Chinese chroniclers used the term *luo* (household) to describe this level of the nomads social organization.
2. Medium levels: Lineages and clans (Chinese *yiluo)*. These levels were based on remote real as well as fictitious kinship, periodic economic relations, cultural, political and ideological networks.
3. Highest levels: *Bu* (group of nomadic households according to Chinese historians), the "tribe" in anthropological terms. The tribes of nomads were mainly based on political, economic, cultural, ideological and other non-economic relations and were veiled in the form of fictitious genealogical kinship.

The use of the definition *tribe* in anthropology is subject to many discussions.* After Fried's book (1975), the term tribe was excluded from the series of mandatory forms of cultural integration (band – community – chiefdom – early state – national state). Actually, tribes only appeared as a response to external influences from more developed societies. However, to interpret the social organization of pastoral nomads, the notions of community and chiefdom are useless. It would hold for both ancient Xianbei and later medieval Mongols. *Uruq, irgen, oboq,* are something more than community but can not be interpreted as chiefdom. For this reason, I think that, to describe the Xianbei community (it would hold for all nomads), it is expedient to use the notion of tribe as structurally opposed to that of chiefdom. A tribe is an aggregate of second level segments, a sum *of yiluo.* A chiefdom could also be a sum of *yiluo.* However, while a tribe has no hierarchical organization of power, a chiefdom is a stratified community with a political hierarchy. In other words, the relationship between the notions of tribe and chiefdom as applied to pastoral nomads is similar to that between the *communal-nomadic* and military-nomadic aggregative situations of nomadic societies (Markov 1978; König 1981). It is also necessary to recognize the tribe as an *akephalos* structure that has no fixed boundaries and general tribal government, as stated for the Nuer by Evans-Pritchard (1940). Ernest Gellner identified for Near Eastern nomads these two phenomena as *primitive* and *marginal* tribalism (1969: 2–3).

The main functions of the Xianbei *bu* (i.e. tribes or chiefdoms, as the case may be) and their authorities were as follows:

1. Establishment of boundaries between the territories of tribes. This can be confirmed by reference to the sources. In the *Sanguo zhi,* it is reported that, in the 220s, the Xianbei chiefs Kebineng, Mixia, and Suli concluded a frontier agreement between tribal territories, in which "there was a separating boundary for each of them" (Taskin 1984: 325–326).

* The new post-modernist critic of tribe concept see in the studies by David Sneath (2007; 2009; my attitude to this: Kradin, Skrynnikova 2009).

2. Defense against external dangers (other Xianbei tribes, other nomadic peoples, Chinese armies) and, on the other hand, organization of raids on neighbors. The sources abound with reports of attacks on the border areas of China (I will return to this point below). There is a lot of data about internal conflicts between Xianbei tribes, such as seizure of livestock and other plunder (*baranta*). Suffice it to mention the conditions of Tanshihuai's rising: Tanshihuai (fl. late second century), the first great leader of the Xianbei, gained authority over his fellow tribesmen in taking by force the livestock of the leader of the neighboring nomadic society Tanshihuai's grand-parents' herds (Taskin 1984: 330).

3. Resolution of internal conflicts concerning border violations, stealing and theft of livestock etc., between separate tribal segments structurally opposed to each other.

4. Possibly, the organization of some tribal festivals and carrying out of cults and rituals for the tribe as a whole. Xianbei assemblies are mentioned in the chronicles (*HHS* 90.8a). Taskin (1984: 24) likens them, quite rightly, to Mongolian *quriltai;* hence, one can assume that similar traditions were also maintained at the lower tribal level.

5. Episodic economic activity in the form of battues. Although there are no mentions of Xianbei battues in the sources, this form of hunting was widespread among many nomadic peoples of the Eurasian steppes and, in particular, among the Shiwei and Khitan, who were ethnically related to the Xianbei.

The demography of the tribes was unequal. Thus, we have mentions of *bu* with five thousand people, several tens of thousands of people, five thousand "households" (about 25 thousand people), ten thousand soldiers and ten thousand tents (up to fifty thousand people); the largest had some twenty thousand "households" (some one hundred thousand people).

The chiefs of *bu*, tribes or simple chiefdoms, fulfilled the following functions:

1. Military: organization of the battle-worthy portion of the population for raiding, and to repulse neighboring tribes' raids (see, for example: Taskin 1984: 76, 80, 325). It is not accidental that "boldest" occupied the first place among the important qualities ascribed to the most outstanding Xianbei chiefs, such as Tanshihuai or Kebineng (fl. early third century) (Taskin 1984: 75, 324, 330). One can remember that the rise of Tanshihuai began after he had dispersed the robbers attacking his nomadic camp.

2. Redistributive: distribution of the booty taken during raids (mainly, on China) (Taskin 1984: 80, 324–325). In the sources, there is no information about the redistribution of internal resources.

3. Judicial: resolution of disputes concerning the territories where nomads live, stealing of livestock, violation of customs, mutilation, murders etc. When Tanshihuai came to power he laid out Maw rules for disposition of cases between innocent and guilty and nobody dared to break them (Taskin 1984: 75, 330). The same duties are also mentioned with respect to his son, Helian (Taskin 1984: 80). One of the reasons give for Kebineng's election as a chief was his equitable investigation of lawsuits (Taskin 1984: 324). However, it is unlikely that these actions were based on written law.

4. Foreign trade: control of the foreign trade with China and other peoples and countries (Taskin 1984: 325–326).

It is possible that the chief should also perform other functions. At the same time, the most important affairs were most likely examined at the great assembly of chiefs, to which a number of sources give passing mention (Taskin 1984: 70, 85, 329).

As a rule, the rulers well-being depended on the prosperity of their nomad subjects. This idea, repeatedly emphasized by researchers of the steppe world, is well confirmed by written and ethnographic sources. The chroniclers connect the successful character of the Tanshihuai and Kebineng regimes with the fact that they were fair and lavish rulers (Taskin 1984: 75, 324):

> "All of the riches seized in the course of raids were fairly divided by Kebineng: he decided all right away and took nothing for his own; therefore, the people served him with all their forces and the elders of other nomadic groups had respect for him and were afraid of him" (Taskin 1984: 325).

The political failures of Helian, son of Tanshihuai, on the other hand, are explained by his excessive greed and unfairness with respect to his subjects: the sources report that because of Helian's greed and debauchery, as well as unfair judgments on emerging disputes, half of his people arose in rebellion against him (Taskin 1984: 80).

As to the inheritance of power, one can say only a few words. First, it is not clear whether the titles of chieftains were handed down by the time when Tanshihuai came to power, or the chiefs were elected at the general meeting. Tanshihuai himself was elected chief of his *bu* for his personal services. He was a courageous warrior and resolved justly the conflicts between herders. However, he became the leader of a confederation of tribes and chieftainships because other chiefs had submitted to his force (*HHS* 90.14a). In this case, we have two different ways of gaining power: elections and usurpation (or for some, both at the same time). But afterwards, the position of the confederation's main leader started to be handed down. Helian, son of Tanshihuai, too, became a leader of confederation. Here, we see a transfer of power from father to son. Following this, however, it was Helian's younger brother, Buduhen, who received the chief's title, because Helian's son was too young. It is known from *Hou Han shu* (*HHS* 90.8a) that the Xianbei held a "great meeting" *(da hui)* in spring. Later on, this notion designated a *quriltai* of Mongols in the Chinese

sources. It is possible that these meetings were similar to those held by the Xiongnu at the end of the spring (the Xiongnu chiefs met three times a year: at the beginning of the year, in spring and in September). We can assume that the legitimation of the confederation's leader was realized at a great meeting.

The main difference between the Xianbei and the Xiongnu is the existence of a high vertical mobility among the Xianbei. Among the Xiongnu, the top positions were mainly taken up by representatives of the *Luandi* ruling family. Tanshihuai, on the other hand, was the illegitimate son of an ordinary warrior recruited into the Xiongnu army. According to Chinese historical sources, Kebineng had his origin in an "insignificant" family of the Xianbei. Nevertheless, in spite of this, both became charismatic leaders.

The Xianbei confederation consisted of different peoples. As early as AD 91, no less than one hundred thousand Xiongnu tents joined the Xianbei confederation (*HHS* 90.9b; Lidai1958: 694; Taskin 1973: 84 note 26). Very likely, other peoples were also included in the tribal confederation, forming primarily the right (western) wing.

The greater part of the ethnically Xianbei tribes was concentrated in the central and eastern areas of the steppe empire. This can be confirmed by the fact that the regions of eastern Mongolia and eastern Baikal (of the "left wing") were areas of traditional residence of the Xianbei. It is precisely there that archaeological sites of their culture have been found. A part of the right wing separated off from the confederation, but only the names of the chiefs listed among the left wing are mentioned in the sources. It is interesting that, later on, the eastern wing was governed by the Yuwen family (clan), which was of Xiongnu origin (WS 103.22a; Taskin 1984: 45, 51–52).

At the time of Tanshihuai, the strength of the Xianbei army reached one hundred thousand horsemen (Taskin 1984: 78). If one considers that all men were potentially warriors, and that the adult male population should amount to about 1/5 of the total population, one can assume that the total population was about half a million. On the basis of the number of tribes, Taskin has come to similar conclusions about the Xianbei population (1984: 44–45). The total number of *bu* was more than fifty. Each of them counted approximately ten thousand people and, therefore, two thousand fighting men.

After the death of Tanshihuai in AD 181, the Xianbei confederation rapidly decayed. A generation later, however, according to Chinese sources, Kebineng managed to restore the military potential of the Xianbei. The strength of his army once again reached one hundred thousand horsemen (Taskin 1984: 325). However, we should remember that the right wing did not belong to his confederation. Furthermore, the author of the *Sanguo zhi,* Chen Shou, wrote that Kebineng's military might could not be compared with Tanshihuai (Taskin 1984: 325). Therefore, one can also assume that the figure "one hundred thousand" is a rough notation tor "very many." It is unlikely that the Chinese

could have a precise information about the number of nomads who permanently traveled "in search of grass and water" through pastures. In any event, the military power of the Xianbei was inferior to that of the Xiongnu nomadic empire, which had had three hundred thousand soldiers, i.e. three times "very many."

The Xianbei had a triadic administrative system a center and two wings. As we have seen above, such a system had been characteristic of the early Xiongnu. It was also found among the Scythians, among the Tuoba, at some periods of the Second Turk Khaganate, in the early Mongol empire, and among the Kalmyks. There are several viewpoints with respect to dual and triadic organizations (Herodotus, IV.7; Bichurin 1950 [1851]: 169; Schorkowitz, 1992: 56–58; Trepavlov 1993: 138). Possibly, the primary factor was the ruler's wish to increase his personal power, the triadic system fostering this better than the dual one. As we have seen, the most powerful of the lords of the Xianbei confederation, Tanshihuai, divided his power into three parts, and after doing so established a headquarters *(ting)* similar to that of the Xiongnu *shanyu.* This was located on the shore of the Chochu River at 300 and more *li.*(i.e. more than 120 kilometers, if the *li* is equivalent to 400 meters) to the north of Gaoli, i.e. the early Korean state Koguryo (*HHS* 90.14a). If the Chinese author is not mistaken, then the headquarters should be located on the Manchuria territory. In connection with this, there are two questions to which I have no answer. The first one is how to rule over such a great territory, which is said to have extended more than 14,000 *li* (over 5000 km) from east to west and more than 7,000 *li* (almost 3000 km) north to south (*HHS* 90.14a-14b)? In the absence of developed means of communication, it seems practically impossible to rule over such a large country. The second question is: what part of the empire did Tanshihuai control himself when, to follow the chronicles, his headquarters was located in the left wing territory? The region of the left wing, it will be remembered, would later come under control of the Yuwen, who were of Xiongnu origin. These questions should be examined in more detail. If Tanshihuai liked a locality near the Chochu River in the Tanhan mountains (Shiratori [1935: 51–52] believes this to be the Baishan mountain near the border between China and Korea), then it could be one of his seasonal headquarters. Being a nomad, he traveled several times a year.

In addition to nomads, the power of the Xianbei lords extended also over settled populations. If pastoral nomads themselves disdained sedentarization, they solved the problem of shortage of agricultural products by seizing people from settled states (Taskin 1984: 76, 80, 324), resettling them on lands they controlled and forcing them to cultivate the land. They may have also forced them to bring tribute. Craftsmen were also captured, and we can assume that both farmers and craftsmen inhabited such settlements. Cases of Chinese immigrants to the Xianbei are also known. It is thanks to these that, at the time

of Kebineng, the Xianbei rejected smuggled iron weapons from China (Taskin 1984: 78), and instead began to produce their own metal arms (Taskin 1984: 324).

Nevertheless, all this gives the impression that settlements of farmers established by nomads were few. Interestingly, the Chinese chronicles record how anxious Tanshihuai was about the nomadic population growth. In order to extend the resource base, he ordered the resettling of about 1000 families of *woren* fishermen (Han according to another source) in an area near the Wuhoujin River (today's Laohahe River) so as to supply fish for nomads (Taskin 1984: 80, 331). This is all the more interesting, since it is traditionally assumed that nomads do not eat fish. But this may result from an influence of religion. Prior to the introduction of Buddhism, the situation was somewhat different. Five years ago, I started to study the Khitan town of Chintolgoi in Mongolia, where I found traces of Bohai peoples who were also resettled in central Mongolia to provide nomads with foodstuffs. We found many bones of pigs and scales of different species offish (Kradin et al. 2005).

Some Conclusions

How were the nomads able to establish the steppe imperial confederations? And were these "empires" states? These are key questions of the political anthropology of pastoral nomads.

There are two different approaches to explain the reasons for formation of the nomadic empires. In this connection, the standpoint of Owen Lattimore and his followers according to which nomadism depends on the natural environment and adjacent agricultural-urban communities enjoys wide popularity (Lattimore 1940; Khazanov 1984; Barfield 1992; Kradin 1992). The nomads are in need of agricultural and handicraft products and, in order to get them, attack their settled neighbors or exchange deficient products through trade. The second approach holds that nomads had independent economies and that the formation of steppe polities is the result of autonomous evolution of pastoral tribes and peoples (Markov 1976; Krader 1978; Di Cosmo 2002.).

Perhaps one of the most charming conceptions concerning the periodization of the Inner Asia steppe comes from Thomas Barfield's pen. In his opinion, one can establish a synchronism in development and decay of nomadic empires and similar cycles in China. Such a cyclic structure of political ties between the peoples of China, Inner Asia and other East Asian polities have, in Barfield's opinion, been three times repeated over a period of two thousands years: from the Xiongnu to the Rouran, from the Turks to the fall of the Yuan dynasty, and from the Ming to the revolution of 1911, which has interrupted this circular evolution (Barfield 1992: 8–16).

Nicola Di Cosmo believes that, based on the limited nature of nomad economies, the conception of the origin of steppe empires was at first erroneous, because the nomads were acquainted with agriculture (Di Cosmo 1999: 12 note 38). The conceptions of both Barfield and Di Cosmo supplement each other. Barfield showed well a correlation between the growth and collapse of the Chinese dynasties and early empires of nomads. One can dispute the specific years when the Han dynasty and Xiongnu power have appeared and Barfield has been rightly criticized with respect to historical details. Nevertheless, when a schedule of the demographic cycle of the China dynasties is compared with the life of steppe empires, they nearly coincide. However, this model is inapplicable to Mongolian history, as the formation of Chinggis Khan's empire coincided with the crisis years of the Jurchen state system rather than its rise. Having united all the Mongols in 1206, Chinggis Khan just four years later began to wage war against the Jin dynasty. Di Cosmo's conception of the origin of the steppe empire, developed out of study of the Xiongnu, is more heuristic for the interpretation of the history of medieval Mongols (Di Cosmo 1999: 15–26; 2002: 167–186).

The prerequisite for the establishment of steppe empire has, instead, been a structural crisis within the nomad community. The crisis is paramount, as the anonymous creator of the §254 of *Secret History* describes it (Rachewiltz 2004: 183):

> "The starry sky was turning upon itself. The many people were in turmoil: They did not enter their beds *to rest,* but fought against each other. The crusty earth was turning and turning, the entire nation was in turmoil. They did not lie on their coverlets *to rest,* but attacked each other."

The first step to overcome such a crisis is militarization. And a consequence of such militarization is establishment of a military-hierarchical structure within the steppe community. Having been proclaimed khan, Chinggis Khan formally organized his guard units (*keshig*), introducing the decimal system. Such militarization ran parallel with appearance of a charismatic leader and his sacral legitimation as ruler. All of this resulted in concentration of power in his person; expansion, organization and acquisition of incomes then laid down the conditions for establishment of a state. The Xiongnu and the Xianbei fit classically into the first and most widespread model, characterized by the rise of a talented leader able to consolidate all tribes into a united steppe confederation. Such talented political and military leaders were Mode/Maodun and Tanshihuai, who would come to represent the road to power in folklore. The Xiongnu and Xianbei tribal confederations are *typical* nomadic empires (Kradin 1992: 166–178; 2003: 78–80). They looked like autocratic states from the outside but were consultative and tribal inside. The stability of steppe empires depended directly on the skill of the supreme power at organizing the

extraction from settled territories of silk, agricultural products, handicrafts and luxury items, and then redistribution of such goods to his following.

One can identify the following features as signs of ancient nomadic empires: 1) multistage hierarchical character of the organization of society crossed at all levels by tribal and super-tribal genealogical ties; 2) a dualistic (two wings) or triadic (center and wings) principle of administrative division of the empire; and 3) military-hierarchical character of social organization. These features are characteristic also of other ancient empires of Eurasia: those of the Scythians and the Huns.

These two Inner Asian empires differed in the following respects: 1) the Xiongnu applied the decimal principle; 2) for the Xiongnu, the empire was the property of the whole imperial clan, as seen in the Xiongnu institution of co-government, while the Xianbei valued only personal charismatic leadership; and 3) as to relations with China, the Xianbei pursued a strategy of raids and plundering, while in the distance frontier strategy of the Xiongnu we see an alternation of raids, tribute and trade.

10
LIAO DYNASTY AS A NOMADIC EMPIRE

Introduction

The Empire is one of the forms of the state. Specific signs of empires are: 1) the presence of large territories; and 2) the presence of a metropolis of the empire and periphery subsystems dependent on a metropolis (Thapar 1981; Burbank, Cooper 2010). The fundamental difference between the nomadic empires was that their centers were highly developed only in the military respect while they fell behind the exploited or conquered territories in social-economic development etc. and, actually, were peripheries and provinces in themselves. In this case, the nomadic empire can be defined as nomadic society organized on the military-hierarchical principle, occupying a quite large space and exploiting the nearby territories, as a rule, by external forms of exploitation (robbery, war and indemnity, extortion of presents, non-equivalent trade, laying under tribute etc.). One can identify the following signs of nomadic empires: 1) multistage hierarchical character of the social organization pierced at all levels by tribal and super-tribal genealogical ties; 2) dualistic (into wings) or triadic (into the wings and center) principle of administrative division of the empire; 3) military-hierarchical character of the social organization of the center of the empire, more often, on the decimal principle; 4) coachman service (*yam*) as a specific way of organizing the administrative infrastructure; 5) specific system of power inheritance (empire is a property of the whole khan clan, institution of co-government, *kuriltai*); 6) specific character of relations with the agricultural world (Kradin 1992; 2000; 2002).

It is necessary to distinguish the classical nomadic empires from 1) the similar mixed agricultural – pastoral empires in which the nomadic element played a great role in their history (Arabian caliphate, state of seljuks, Dunai and Volga Bulgaria, Osman Empire) and 2) the quasi-imperial nomadic state formations which were smaller than empires (European Huns, avars, Hungarians, Priazov Bulgaria, Kara-kitans, Tatar khanates after the Golden Horde collapse). Three models of nomadic empires are identified: 1) **typical** – nomads and farmers coexisting over a *distance*. The creation of surplus products by nomads is accomplished through distant exploitation: raids, extortion of presents (actually, extortion; non-equivalent trade) etc. (Hsiung-nu, Hsian-pi, Turks, Uighurs etc.); 2) **tributal** – farmers dependent on nomads; exploitation form – laying under *tribute* (Golden Horde, Yuan etc.); 3) **conquest** – nomads *conquering* the agricultural society and moving to its territory. The robberies and laying under tribute are replaced with a regular taxation of farmers and townspeople (Kradin 1992; 2000; 2011).

The *tributal* nomadic empires were the intermediate typological forms between *typical* and *transitional* nomadic empires. They differed from the *typical* empires by: (1) more regular character of exploitation (instead of episodic robberies, extorted gifts etc.; there is regular tribute); (2) and, hence, urbanisation and partial sedentarization in steppe; (3) possibly, transformation of metropolis from chiefdom into the early statehood society; (4) forming the bureaucratic machinery to rule the occupied agricultural societies. These empires also differed from the *conquest* ones by (1) closer symbiosis of economical, social and cultural relations between conquerors and occupied peoples in the *conquest* nomadic empires; (2) in the *tributal* empires ordinary pastoralists mainly supported the ruling authority while in the *conquest* empires the pastoral elite undertook measures for political isolation of nomads-soldiers; (3) for *conquest* empires the regular taxation of farmers rather than levy of tribute was characteristic.

Imperial families

The Liao Empire of the Khitan (907-1125) opened a new stage in the relationship between mediaeval China and the neighboring people. Their rise was preconditioned by the crisis and fall of the T'ang dynasty and the desolation of the steppe caused by the defeat of the Uighur Kaganate by the Yenisei Kyrgyz. The Khitans first brought under their power several small states which were formed on the remains of the T'ang Empire. Later on they conquered a large part of the northern China. For the first time in history almost the whole territory of Northern China was under the power of the so-called eastern "barbarians". In that multinational state the Khitan nomads (core – metropolis of nomadic empire) made up only a fifth of the population (750 thousand people). In addition to them the empire embraced the agricultural Chinese – over one half of the population (2,400 thousand people), the Bohai (450 thousand people), the non-Khitan (the so-called "barbarian") hunter and nomadic (200 thousand people) tribes. The total number of the Empire's population was 3,800 thousand people (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 58).

The highest levels of the empire's social pyramid were occupied by the imperial clan of Yeh-lü and clan of the empress Hsiao. The representatives of these clans were the first-rate proprietors in the country and held a major portion of the most important military and civil posts in the empire administration. Since the rule of the empire founder Apao-chi, the clan has been subdivided into two parts: Five or North Divisions and Six or South Divisions. These parts were governed by grand princes (*wang*). The family of the Kitans' emperor was related to five divisions. The direct descendants of Apao-chi gave belonged to so called Horizontal Tents (*hêng chang*) while the

descendants of two his uncles and brothers were known as Three Patriarchal Household (*san fu fang*). Jointly, they have formed four leading lineages (LS 73: 6b; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 191–192).

The emperor has considered as the sole ruler and the highest instance in the name of which the most important and crucial decisions were made and redistribution was exercised. The government herds have included approximately one million head of animals under supervision of the special control authorities (LS 24: 7a; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 131). There has been a complex, minutely worked out court ceremonial that is thoroughly described by the Chinese chronicles (LS 49: 1b-4a; 53: 14b-15a; Taskin 1979: 523). The emperor was protected by the guard. The emperors have led an active life moving from one capital to another and from one palace to the other (LS 32, 3b-4a; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 484). There were five capitals in the empire. The Supreme Capital of empire was located not far away from Shira Muren River in the neighborhood of the present city of Boro Khoton, Inner Mongolia. The Central Capital was situated near the Shira Muren River inflow point to Liao River. These are zones of residence of Kitans and other pastoral nomads of empire. The East Capital was near city of Liao-yang in the area of settlement of Bohai peoples. Two last capital cities were situated within the area of the Chinese people residence. The West Capital is the modern city of Ta-T'ung in Shansi province while the South one is the modern city of Peking (Steinhadrt 1997).

Out of question, the periodic journeys of emperor Lao are a tribute to traditions of the nomadism. The ruler of the steppe empire should behave exactly so. Besides that a regular movement allowed the emperor to personally control the numerous staff of officials in situ. It is no coincidence that he was always escorted by a large retinue. Here, one can find the direct analogies to the collection of tribute institution (*gafol*). It is believed that, in the early states potentially capable to the collapse and segmentation, such a control method was one of the most real means to overcome a separatism of local elite (Kobischanov 1987).

The clan of Hsiao or, in other words, clan of the empress had the Uighur origin and was divided into several higher and lower lineages. This clan was traditional common-law partner of Yeh-lü clan (LS 71: 1b; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 237). In Chapter 23 of the *Qidan Guozhi*, it is recorded: "According to laws of barbarians, a kin of rulers could effect marriages only with a kin of empress, irrespective of whether high or lower rank is occupied by representatives of these clans. The families of two tribes to which a clan of rules and clan of empress belong could not effect marriages with representatives of other trines without permission of the ruler of Kitans. This situation is not applied to marriages between remaining tribes" (Taskin 1979: 310).

According to decree of 1019, the possibilities of marriage for the higher levels of nomadic aristocracy were additionally restricted. The representatives of four most noble lineages of Yeh-lü have no right to get married to representatives of lower lineages. In 1029, two leading lineages of Hsiao clan and lineages of Five and Six Divisions of Yeh-lü were declared "noble lineages of nation". At the same time, four leading lineages of Yeh-lü clan do not mention. In opinion of Wittfogel and Feng Chiasheng (1949: 191), it, possibly, is explained by the fact that the official status of these lineages was much higher than that of ordinary titled nomadic aristocracy.

From tribute to tax

Initially, the Kitan's empire Liao has represented the classic tributary nomadic empire. In all nomadic empires, the ruler power resource has depended, on the one hand, on possibility to provide his homagers with gifts and material welfare and, on the other hand, on the might of military state to conduct the military campaigns and to extort presnets from his neighbors (Kradin 1996). Therefore, Yeh-lü Apao-chi has drawn his attention to the riches of the eastern and southern neighbors after the throne accroachment in 907. Bohai was the first state that has fallen. Thereafter, a green light was given on the east and the Kitans have turned their eyes on the North China.

The tribute and gifts extorted from the Chinese states have earned huge profits. From China, silk and monetary subsidies were mainly extorted. So, for example, the Song dynasty has agreed to pay to Liao every year 100 thousand silver coins and 200 thousand bolts of silk after signing of treaty of peace in 1004. After new military campaign in 1042, the payments were increased to 200 thousand silver coins and 300 thousand bolts of silk (LS 9: 3a, 11: 4a, 13: 5a-b, 14: 5b-6a; Taskin 1979: 63, 69, 148; Franke 1990: 408–409 etc.). Over a long period of time, these incomes have formed the basis of the gift economy budget of the empire. From barbarian people, a tribute has been levied in the form of horses, furs, hunting falcons, pearls, fish etc. (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 93, 100, 120, 127; Taskin 1979: 294–299). The tribute was collected with enviable regularity. So, for example, the tribute was levied 69 times from Jurchen, 43 times from T'eh-li and 18 times from Wu Kuo (Five Nations) from beginning of 10 century through beginning of 12 century (Vorobyev 1975).

The conquests and annexation of great agricultural territories required to establish the complex management mechanism. The traditional pre-state management institutions of the Kitan's "eight tribes" confederation were not adapted to management of the economy of the agricultural civilization with many cities. The conquerors could solve this problem by two ways: (1) simplification of the conquered society in such a way that it corresponded to the less developed economic and political institutions of conquerors. In other words, it is a destruction of cities, agricultural population, transformation of ploughed fields into pastures for cattle; (2) complication of their own authorities – settling of the imperial court in cities or establishing the complex of capitals (five capitals system in Lao empire) between which one would circulate with control-auditing purposes, creation of the officialdom, introduction of written language and office work upon the Chinese model.

Apao-chi and his successors have chosen the second variant. The formation of the administrative machine rudiments goes back to the initial years of empire existence when Apao-chi began to use the Chinese on service. The Chinese have taught him the written office work and assisted to create the system of officials' posts (Taskin 1979: 311). In 947, the original dual system of administration subdivided into the North and South parts was established (LS 45: 1a-b; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 434 ff.).

Nomadic heartland

The North part was considered to be higher than the South one by rank though, as for the administrative machine size and bureaucracy qualification, it ranks below the latter. The heartland of nomadic empire was headed by the Prime Minister of the Northern Administration (LS 1: 10b; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 472) who, as a rule, has been appointed from the representatives of Yeh-lü and Hsiao clans. His competence included the most important affairs of state such as, for example, army control, supervision of the state sector of stock-raising business, participation in working out of the most important political decisions.

As a whole, we can tell about the existence of the developed class inequality, quite heterogeneous multi-level interlayer of the nomadic aristocracy, chiefs and leaders of various ranks among Kitans. The Kitan's aristocracy has possessed a sizeable wealth because permanent wars and levy of tribute have provided an inflow of large quantity of valuables from abroad to metropolitan country while the highest-ranking officials had even their numerous armed forces. This social layer was a backbone of dynasty and its representatives have occupied a major part of military and civil posts in the North administration of empire as well as the greatest number of key positions in the South administration.

The presence of the certain class boundary between the Kitan's grand people (Chinese *ji*) and ordinary nomads (Chinese *shujen*) is confirmed, particularly, the fact that, if the representative of the aristocratic social group has made legal wrongs, he could be transferred to the commoners (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 193). The aristocrats of different ranks were charged small taxes and were freed from public works. In case of commission of crime, the Kitan

aristocrats were punished by milder penalties than other categories of subjects. In case that they were inflicted to penal confinement, their living conditions were fairly good and, in any event, they were freed from servile labor.

However, in spite of a quite hard affixment of the nomad status to the position of his clan-family group in the general genealogical hierarchy, the opportunities have always existed to raise his status by means of military glory, personal services, loyalty or by way of incorporation in one or another aristocratic clan. There was also a position of *sheli* which could be held by "rich Kitans wishing to wind a kerchief round their heads". In order to hold this position, they have paid 10 head of livestock and camels, 100 head of horses (LS 116: 5b).

Initially, the position of ordinary Kitan's pastoralists was, most probably, quite acceptable. They have formed the basis of the Kitan's army and a necessity to hold in subjection more than 80% of the empire population has forced the top of nomads to limit an oppression of their fellow tribesmen. In accordance with the hierarchical principle of the steppe society organization, the nomads were divided into subdivisions by the decimal principle (Taskin 1979: 511–513). In this case, only a part of nomads has taken part in acts of war while the remaining warriors have always stayed put as the basis of a tribe (ibid: 426). The tribes being autonomous and independent formations before the Apao-chi accession to the throne have become main administrative units for a period of empire. Their duties included the following functions:

First, it is military function. The tribal home guard has formed a part of the military organization side by side with the professional army divisions of emperor and a number of eminent aristocrats and armed forces of vassal people. It is not accidental that in *Laio shi* it is mentioned that a banner is a distinctive attribute of a tribe (LS 49: 1b-2a).

Second, the tribes were basic administrative-political units in the northern part of the country. Each tribe had its own particular territory for leading a nomad's life. Each tribe had its own control organization being headed by a traditional chief (*ilichin*). A title of the tribal chief was transmitted hereditably. In the course of sinification a pressure on the nomadic tribes has occurred. Traditional territories of a leading of nomad's life became to limit and reduce by the imperial government. Sometimes, the tribes were transferred from their traditional pastures to new lands.

Third, the tribes were transformed into the fiscal and tax paying units of empire. As the steppe metropolitan country and conquered settled-agricultural territories interact, the social stratification among nomads became stronger. If, during acts of war, poor and ordinary nomads as well as noble nomads and semi-nomads had a right to a part of spoils then, now when the conquered ploughmen were charged fixed taxes, only aristocracy and its surroundings have enriched themselves.

Of the *tributary* and *conquest* nomadic empires, a gradual formation and development of taxation of not only conquered ploughmen but also nomads from among of conquerors is characteristic. The narrative sources allow us to identify several ways which were used to exploit ordinary nomads. They have to take part in military campaigns and battues, to pay capitation taxes for adults, taxes on livestock, to provide the army with horses, to serve the grain transportation and to deliver mail. As the tribes were forced out of the best pasture territories, the nomads have come to ruin and changed into workers in the state pastoral sector (Shimada 1952: 301–302).

The oppression of nomads has caused an evasion from payment of tributes, flight from battues, demand to abolish taxes and unfair legislative acts. With the lapse of time, the disturbing nomads have become a burden to the imperial government and the latter has begun to gradually make the attempts of transmigration of the agricultural population from the south to the marginal zones traditionally occupied by nomads. The peasants were granted the preferential conditions for life and work. The nomads have partly settled and transmigrate partly to margins of empire and, according to plan of initiators of this policy it should strengthen the country borders. These actions were aimed at consolidation of the financial system of dynasty because it is much more profitable for the state to levy taxes from ploughmen than to attempt without success to restrain the proud but poor nomads (Shimada 1952: 301–314). In all probability, this tendency had not time to become widespread. Until the empire has maintained the multiethnic character, the ordinary nomads have formed the basis of war machine by the use of which the elite held in subjection the agricultural population of the country. Therefore, the social status of ordinary nomads has remained higher than that for the conquered people.

Settled population

The South administration has structurally copied the bureaucratic system of T'ang empire and consisted of Chinese officials. However, all senior positions were occupied by Kitans. Up to 1114, Chinese had no right to take part in discussion of the most important affairs of state (Taskin 1979: 178). According to *Qidan Guozhi*, (chapter 19), up to the above time, only eight Chinese were appointed to the superior positions in the empire. Only the crushing defeats from Jurchen have forced the Kitans to trust the Chinese bureaucrats. Nevertheless, the post of the South prime minister being at the head of all Chinese part of the administrative staff machinery was always occupied by Kitans (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 450).

In contrast to other medieval societies, the Chinese civilization has distinguished by the high vertical mobility. It was related to the existence in China of the system of tests of positions. This system was adopted by Kitans

and, since 988, introduced in Liao. According to the rules established, the examinations were conducted in the volosts, regions and administration of Stationary Office every three years. Those who passed examinations in volosts were called *hsiang-chien*, in the region – *fu-chieh* and in the administration of Stationary Office – *chiti* (LS 12: 4a; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 454–455, 491).

Besides the official channels of the status rising, there has been a possibility to reach a higher position at the expense of personal devotion. In case of traditional supremacy, it is one of the most frequent channels of social mobility. According to *Qidan Guozhi*, (chapter 8) "All of persons enjoying the emperor's favor have received the higher positions omitting several steps and without observance of usual rules of the step-up" (Taskin 1979: 150). The cases were noted when some persons of the servants have become councilors and even princes. In 981, the emperor, great amateur of music, has appointed general-governors more than 30 musicians (ibid: 119).

The social status and position of the Chinese officialdom reflects boldly the essence of the multinational empire established by Kitans. The expansion of state at the expense of annexed agricultural regions required an additional involvement of services of the Chinese bureaucrats. It stands to reason, the power of Chinese aristocrats and bureaucracy servicing the Liao court was strongly restrained by the power of elite of nomads-conquerors who, transferring the numerous routine administrative affairs to Chinese, have kept the right to make the most crucial decisions as well as the reins of political and military government.

The status and incomes as well as private wealth pf Chinese bureaucrats were much higher than those of ordinary Chinese and, sometimes, representatives of the top of Kitans to say nothing of ordinary nomads. It is known that the Chinese bureaucrats were freed from general public obligations in which the population of the nomadic metropolitan country has been even involved in the veiled form (soldiery).

The position of Chinese peasants-commoners was, most likely, somewhat more straitened due to ethnic oppression. The sources list the numerous forms of tributes and obligations which were imposed on the settled-agricultural population of empire: land tax, trading tax, hut tax, tax on agricultural implements etc. In addition, Chinese were gotten involved in irrigational operations, construction of cities, palaces, administrative buildings, temples, roads, banks and other fortification works (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 312–313).

There were cases when the Chinese commoners were resettled to the north for engaging in farming, handicraft and trade business (Shimada 1952: 301). Chinese have reconstituted on new place the traditional social organization. At that, among the nomads-conquerors, their exploitation could be made more intensively though, de jure, the status of migrants has remained identical to that of peasant on the south. In other cases, on the contrary, the position of migrants

could be seriously improved because the government has granted to migrants additional privileges. "Thus an intricate system of personal and collective bondage, of half and full freedom arose – a system that was extremely complex in the northern tribal regions and relatively simple in the old Chinese provinces of the south." (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 194).

The Chinese peasantry was stratified and divided, according to the narrative sources, into three groups. The top group has included the richest commoners and village administration which have used in their farms the labor of impoverished neighbors. It is doubtful that the members of families of the middle group could allow themselves to use the wage labor but, nevertheless, they have run the independent housekeeping. Those who were below this group and among the low-income peasantry, have, with great difficulties, provided themselves with necessary and applied for work to the first group. In case of distresses, they were potential pretended for selling for debts into bondage or forced to take to flight or to be on the road (LS 15: 5a, 25: 1b-2a, 59; 2b-3a, 103; 4a; Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 194).

The free Chinese craftsmen and merchants have occupied more privileged position as compared with peasants. They have formed the basic part of population in the southern cities as well as in new northern cities turning then into true Chinese cities with numerous shops and populous markets. Such a position is explained by the metropolitan country interest in the development its own handicraft and domestic economic market. By especially high economic position and considerable possessions, a category of *yunwei* (usury) was distinguished (LS 59: 3b-4a). However, their position was characterized by one peculiarity: the law has prohibited them to engage in political activity (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 195). This state of affairs was typical of the Oriental societies. Here, the power has dominated the private property.

All non-free population of the empire of Liao could be divided into two groups (see details in Kychanov 1986). The first group (*puch'ü*) has included people belonging to individuals. Most often, into the category of *puch'ü*, the former slaves or their descendants transferred to the individual ownership of the Kitan's aristocrats, high officials or Chinese officials have fallen. They were forced to cultivate the land, to construct buildings and cities and they were sent to serve in the frontier troops in place of their masters. The second group of non-free population has belonged to the state. In it, several different categories are identified. *Gonghuy*, *gunfehu*, *zhuanhu* are categories of people attributed to the imperial palaces, headquarters (*ordo*) of Kitans (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 55, 234, 512). Though the craftsmen belonging to the Empire were not free, treatment of them was quite good. It is possible, they were craftsmen of semi-free type.

On the lowest rung of the social structure of the Kitan's society, the slaves were. One can identify the following sources of slavery among Kitans (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 196–197; Kychanov 1986): 1) outer sources – prisoners of war from enemy troops defeating by Kitans turned individually into slaves (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 196, 231, 576, 583) as well as residents of conquered territories or territories on which the raids were conducted; 2) internal sources – selling and self-selling for debts into bondage and turning into slaves of persons committing grave (most often, antistate) crimes. The scope of using the servile labor among Kitans was limited by housekeeping in case of private individuals and by service of the imperial tombs, palaces, administrative buildings and cloisters. The slaves could be also attributed to *ordo* of nomads and they could be used in construction works or even for service in army.

Conclusion

The Kitan's dynasty of Liao gives the best fit to the parameters of the second, tributary, of the identified models of nomadic empire. With the establishment of Liao dynasty, a dual system of management has formed in which the North administration has occupied a higher position as well as controlled nomads and other northern people (metropolitan country). The South administration has copied the bureaucratic system of China and controlled the settled-agricultural territories. As the steppe "barbarism" has transformed in to the urban civilization, the representatives of the elite of conquerors have put on clothes of defeated party, adopted its etiquette and written language or created its own one. The Kitans have erected large cities in which the pompous palaces and temples were constructed and the imperial court and officials were lodged. With the empire territory expansion due to inclusion of new agricultural areas of the North China, a process of sinicizing of the Kitan's aristocracy has developed at a good bat. It has more and more lost the contact with the steppe traditions. The *tributary* nomadic empire of Kitans has gradually transformed into the *conquest* model and it is possible, from here, the straight track to the transformation into the complex agricultural-nomadic state has followed.

To what extent were these tendencies objective? The answer to this question can be only provided if the history of Kitans will be considered in the wider geopolitical context. One of the first versions belongs to Karl A. Wittfogel. He has developed in the course of joint work with Feng Chia Cheng on the fundamental book of the Liao dynasty (Wittfogel, Feng 1949). Wittfogel has considered the two-thousand-year history of China from the viewpoint of acculturation theory as a result of interaction between the settled indigenous Chinese populations and different conquest dynasties. He considered that the result of such interaction has been in formation of some new cultural form which has been expressed, particularly among Kitans, in creation of their own

written language and establishment of the political management system different from the Chinese one.

Comparing the agricultural and pastoral societies, Wittfogel noted that, in case of nomadic mode of life, the possibilities for the despotism establishment are very small. The instability of the steppe economy has contributed to diffusion and separatism. The strong power has been only established after the subjection or conquest of irrigate lands but also, in such case, the military setbacks or natural disasters could quickly weaken the pastoral despotism of the leader of nomads (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 4, 24–25; Wittfogel 1957: 204–207).

In his opinion, one can identify three models of such interaction: (1) in the course of nomadic dynasties of Liao (907–1125) and Yuan (1206–1368), the scales of the cultural mutual penetration between nomads and ploughmen were restricted. Such a model can be called culturally resistant; (2) on the contrary, in the course of the Jurchen dynasty Chin (1115–1234), a situation favorable for the cultural symbiosis has appeared. Wittfogel has defined it as culturally yielding; (3) Manchurian dynasty Ch'ing (1644–1911) has represented some transitional form (Wittfogel, Feng 1949: 24–25).

Unfortunately, in this fundamental book, the role of the nomadic empires proper (Xiongnu, Turks, Uighurs) was ignored. Wittfogel did not include in his classification the empires of nomads which have exploited China distantly. Later on, this drawback was corrected in the concept of Japanese historian Jitsuzo Tamura (1974). In contrast to Wittfogel, Tamura has included in his scheme not only the *conquest* dynasties but also the earlier polities of nomads (Xiongnu, Turks, Uighurs) which have distantly interacted with China. At the same time, he denoted the important differences between the Liao and Yuan. In the time of Mongols, the situation was more complicated. In addition to Mongols, a large group of *semuren* – Turk- and Iranian-speaking people of the Central Asia extraction, has been structurally opposed to the northern and southern Chinese.

Tamura has revealed two long cycles in the North Eurasia history: (1) cycle of ancient nomadic empires within the arid zones of the Inner Asia (II century BC – IX century AD): Xiongnu, Xianbei and Rouran, Turks, Uighurs; (2) cycle of the medieval aggressive dynasties originated from taiga (Jurchen, Manchu) or steppe (Kitans, Mongols) zones (X – beginning of XX century): Liao, Chin, Yuan, Ch'ing. The societies of the first cycle have distantly interacted with China while the states of the second one have conquered the agricultural South and established the symbiotic state structures with the dual management system and original forms of culture and ideology.

The concept of Nicola Di Cosmo (1999) heaved some differences. He developed approaches of earliest historians and selected four types of the nomadic polities in Inner Asia periodization: *tribute* empires (209 B.C.–A.D.

551), *trade-tribute* empires (551–907), *dual-administration* empires (907–1259), and *direct-taxation* empires (1260–1796).

But why have the *typical* nomadic empires dominated and, then, the *tributary* and *conquest* empires come in the stead of them? In part, the answer this question is contained in the Thomas Barfield theory who has found that the conquest of China was, as a rule, Manchurian people doing. The collapse of the centralized power in both China and Steppe has freed the latter from pressure of both nomads and Chinese. Freed from the outer pressing, people of Manchuria have established their own state formations and seized the agricultural areas on the south. The Kitans and Jurchen were especially successful in conquests who managed to subdue practically the whole North China and, later on, Manchu conquering the whole Celestial Empire (Barfield 1992). It is necessary to find out whether the similar geopolitical alignment of forces was inevitable or there were the historical alternatives.

11

THE MONGOLS EMPIRE AND DEBATES OF THE NOMADIC STATES ORIGINS

A problem of the cultural complexity of Mongols in the Chinggis Khan times is one of the most debatable questions in Mongolian and nomadic studies. At present, there are two opposite viewpoints with respect to the complexity level of the Medieval Mongols society. Some authors consider the Chinggis Khan Empire as stateless. Other researchers believe that Mongols have established the state (in opinion of some of them as early the *Qamuq Mongol Uls* times while the others think that it has occurred even in the Chinggis Khan times). Part of the second viewpoint supporters defines this state as feudal one, other part writes about the early or archaic state while the thirds transfer the question to the other level – instead of the state and feudalism they talk about civilization. All of this tells about an ambiguity of the questions examined and suggests that the more thorough comprehension of the Medieval Mongolian society depends on the wider context – discussion about the nature of nomadic societies as well as the theory of the chiefdom and state in the anthropology (details about these debates in English see: Gellner 1988; Bold 2001; Kradin 2002; 2003 etc.).

The reason that this discussion is far from the resolution lies, in many respects, in the fact that the researchers speak in different methodological languages and understand a term *state* in different ways. In such a situation, the scientific debate ceases to be scientific. It changes into a dispute about the words, because, instead of the problem discussion in the framework of the general system of definitions, everyone tells about his own. It resembles a dispute of two physicians about the right diagnosis. The Dr. Celsius declares that a patient will die when his temperature will reach 42 degrees whereas the Dr. Fahrenheit asserts that a patient has already frozen to death at 40 degrees.

In our case, the problem is related to the different comprehensions of a term of the state. In the political science, the classic signs of the state are territory, population, government, sovereignty (Best, Rai, Walsh 1986: 121–123 etc.). Many specialists in Mongolian studies believe that the Mongolian Empire of Chinggis Khan is possessed of all of these signs. Bira writes that the Mongolian society of 1206 conforms to all signs of the state. The population, territories, government and sovereignty are there (Bira 2001: 358). I agree to him. In fact, if such an approach is used, the Mongolian empire is the state. However, the political science and jurisprudence study the modern political institutions. The early power systems are a subject of investigation for

historians, archaeologists and anthropologists. There is a special discipline – political anthropology. It studies the power in the archaic societies and the state origin.

From the standpoint of the political anthropology, three of four above-listed signs are inapplicable to the archaic states. A tradition of their identification is based on the conception of the sovereignty appearing in Europe in the Modernity. However, if you look to the past, you can see that the population, territory and sovereignty are features of any independent society including the prehistorical societies. Any group of hunters-gatherers is the *population*. Any community resides on some *territory*, controls it and defends from strangers. Any chiefdom is considered as the subject of investigation as only independent political unit (otherwise, it is a district of the complex chiefdom rather than the chiefdom).

The only one sign of the above-listed ones – availability of the government institutions – can serve as the true sign of the state. *The British encyclopedia* (Vol. 9, 1976: 533) defines the state as "political organization of the society, or the body politic: more narrowly, the term refers to the institutions of government. The term came to prominence in the 16th century, largely as a result of its employment by Machivelli in The Prince. The text article covers the concept and distinctive features of the state as it emerged from 15th century on…". This sign is in all definitions of the state.

Persons fulfilling the administrative duties are everywhere – in the tribe of Iroquoises, Greek city polity, African chiefdom. Therefore, these persons should be divided into: 1) general functionaries whose activity can cover several kinds of affairs; 2) special functionaries fulfilling the duties only in some one control field; 3) informal persons whose professions is not directly related to the administration, however, they, by virtue of their status or other reasons, can exert influence upon the decision-making (relatives, courtiers, priests etc.) (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 576). As the general functionaries and informal can exist not only in the early states but, for example, in the chiefdoms, only categories of the **special functionaries** can serve as the statehood criterion. It may be, it is the only universal criterion of the state society. With the utmost brevity, the fact of the matter was expressed by Karl Wittfogel (1957: 239): the state is the government of professionals.

In addition, we can call the administration (government) organization as the state if it consists of **large quantity** of men. The state is no individuals concerned with the management (administrative) activity but the management personnel, i.e. a totality of appropriate organizations and institutions. These institutions have the internal structure and consist of the certain number of employees receiving the remuneration for performance of specific duties. The structure can include the specialized subdivisions or departments (ministries, offices etc.) or, in principle, not be institutialized and be at court, headquarters

("staff" in the Max Weber conception) of the ruler. It should be also taken into account that authorities of the heterarchical societies differed from those of the territorial states which should establish the multilevel bureaucratic hierarchies (Trigger 2003: 219–220).

Had Chinggis Khan assistants in the administration? Yes, of course. The administrative functions were, to a certain extent, imposed on *kesikten's*. *Kesik* was at one time squad, servants, couriers and also peculiar "forge of cadres" for the future imperial administration. It is not accidental that in the list of persons awarded to thousand commanders titles in 1206, 28 names of those who were *nökörs* or *kesikten's* after the first inauguration or their relatives are mentioned (Hsiao Ch'i-ch'ing 1978: 35–36). Already in the Chinggis Khan times, *jarčyči* are mentioned. Literally, this term implies a man who affixes a seal on behalf of the khagan (*daru* – Mong. *press*) (Allsen 1987: 46). They were general functionaries-governors in the territories conquered, did justice, collected taxes. In the headquarters, *bič'eči* – literate persons who kept the books and engaged in clerical work appear also although many orders of the first emperors were only verbal.

Many researchers believe that the Mongolian army can be considered as one of the state institutions. Mongols in epoch of Chinggis Khan had no professional army and presented the people-army. It did not escape the acute Juvaini attention. "It is an army after the fashion of a peasantry, being liable to all manner of contributions and rendering without complaint whatever is enjoined upon it, whether *qupchup*, occasional taxes, the maintenance of travellers or the upon the post stations with the provision of mounts and food therefor. It is also a peasantry in the guise of an army, all of them, great and small, noble and base, in time of battle becoming swordsmen, archers and lancers and advancing in whatever manner the occasion requires" (Juvaini 1997: 30).

Sometimes, the researchers consider also that the decimal system of the army presented the state institution. The contemporaries of the Mongolian empire have well understood that the disciplined army has nothing to do with the bureaucratic state. "When [they] alarm [at once even] several hundred troops [they] have not almost any documents. From the captain of thousand soldiers, commander of hundred soldiers, and junior commanding officer of ten men, [all of them] realize the [command] by way of transfer of [verbal] orders", – wrote the author of the work *Men-ta pei-lu* Zhao hong (Men-ta pei-lu 1975: 67).

On this basis, it follows that in the Chinggis Khan Empire, there were no large groups of the specialized functionaries. In the Chapter 85 of *Yuan shih* devoted to the description of the officialdom, the following was spoken: "The Yuan Tai-tsu [Chinggis Khan – N.K.] Chinggis Khan has risen from the northern lands and he has consolidated (under his power) his people. The tribes

were in the wildness, there was no the system of cities and suburbs. The customs of the country were ingenuous and generous, there was no complexity of numerous matters of official concern, the ten thousand commanders have controlled the troops, the administrative cases and punishments have been managed by the functionaries determining the punishments. Not more than 1–2 relatives of the emperor and most influential subjects were used for these posts. When the Great Chinese plain was acquired, Tai zu has, for the first time, set up ten *lu* ('roads')* and taxation department, has chosen the Confucian dignitaries to use them (in this department). Jurchens being subordinate were rewarded in accordance with their previous posts: if they were *xingsheng* or *yuanshuai* they have been designated to the posts of *xingsheng* or *yuanshuai*. Initially, the permanent laws were not established" (YS ch. 85).

It follows from this lengthy quotation that, at a period of Chinggis Khan government, there was no management personnel. Such personnel is beginning to be organized only at a period of Ugedei-khagan government. The formation of the bureaucratic machine in the Mongolian ulus was related to the person of Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai. In 1231, Ugedei was delighted with the Ch'u-ts'ai skill to make a list of loot and to store it. After that, he has appointed Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai the chairman of the state secretariat. This authority had no the clear organizational structure before Khubilai. However, it was the true institution where the most significant decisions and decrees were prepared for distribution of them in the provinces, tokens, seals and other attributes of the imperial power. According to Ch'u-ts'ai advice, the taxation system for the conquered Chinese territory was established which replaced the institution of the feeding of Mongolian chiefs from the territories designated for them. Ch'u-ts'ai began to actively form the State machinery from amongst former Confucian bureaucrats on the China territory.

The completion of the bureaucratic machinery creation falls on the years of government of the fifth Mongolian khagan – Khubilai. According to the calculations, the total number of rank functionaries in the Yuan times in China was 22490 people including 506 in the capital, 2089 court officials and 19895 in provinces. 6791 persons of them were *semuren* and 15738 Chinese. Taking into account the fact that the number of Mongols should be not less than that of *semuren*, total quantity of functionaries in the Yuan times should be not less than 33-34 thousands persons (Borovkova 1971: 8).

Thus, one can say that the developed form of the state of Mongols appears only under Khubilai when the Mongolian Empire is transformed into the Yuan dynasty. Claessen calls such state the *mature* state (1984), Earle – *agrarian* state (Johnson, Earle 2000), Gellner – *traditional* state (1983).

* Details of this term see in: Schurmann 1956: 57-58 note 7.

Such an approach to the state suggests a revision of our conceptions of many ancient and medieval societies. At once, several researchers reached the similar conclusions. Elena Staerman (1989) used the ideas of political anthropologists and come to the logical conclusion that the ancient Roman polis was stateless. In the classical polis, the executive power machinery was insignificant. There were no Office of Public Prosecutor and police. There were no taxes and personnel for their collection. Only, under August, the process of the state formation (administrative machine, praetorian guards, cohorts of guard, professional army) was completed. Subsequently, the similar ideas of the Greek polis were offered by the Gellner's post-graduate Moshe Berent (Berent 1994; 2000; 2006). And then, the similar thoughts have led a number of researchers to the conclusion of the bilinearity of the social evolution (Berezkin 1995; Ehrenreich, Crumley, Levy 1995; Blanton et al. 1996; Marcus, Feinman 1998; Bondarenko, Korotayev 2000; Haas 2001; Bondarenko 2006 etc.).

However, there is one more important moment. When it is recognized that a polis is not state, it is necessary to draw a conclusion that the creation of *civilization* is possible without the state. I believe that the social evolution of the complex societies of pastoral nomads is one more alternative to the state (see also: Kradin, Bondarenko, Barfield 2003). The cross-cultural studies of the cattle-breeders show that the extensive pastoral economy, low population density and lack of settled mode of life do not suppose the institualized hierarchy. All the developed class societies of the standard sample of 186 societies have surely the permanent settled mode of life (Murdock, Provost 1973). The pure nomadic societies can not create the developed three-level class structure. To create the developed class society, the agricultural economy is necessary as the base of economy which should, as a rule, be the high farming. The correlation between the developed political hierarchy and agriculture is also quite high. Only two of 58 complex chiefdoms and states have a weakly developed agriculture (less than 10%) – Mongols and Kazakhs (Kradin 2006: 102–105, table 4–7).

These examples confirm that the nomadic societies can create the highly developed political hierarchy without agriculture development. It has predetermined dual nature of the steppe empires. From the outside, they looked as the despotic aggressive states as they were created to receive the external resources. However, on the inside, the nomadic empires remained based on the tribal relations without the taxation and cattle-breeders exploitation establishing. The power strength of the steppe society ruler was based on his ability to organize the military campaigns and re-distribute incomes from trade, tribute and raids to the neighboring countries.

However, if the Chinggis Khan empire is not developed state, can be it considered as the early or archaic state. The theory of the *early state* was developed in the mid-1970s and come as the answer to the dogmatic Marxist

interpretations of the pre-capitalist societies. It is very important theory and it, in particular, exerted great effect on the Russian political anthropology and on me in person. In the theory of the early state, there are common features with the conception of the *pre-feudal society* of the Soviet medievalist Neusykhin according to which, yet before the feudalism origin in Europe, the hierarchical political structures have existed which were the classical feudalism. Somewhat later, Petr Skalnik was led to the same conclusions assuming that many political structures of the pre-colonial Africa were not feudal and would be more properly called as the early state. Later on, these ideas were developed by him in the doctoral thesis which could not be defended in the socialist country. The author himself had to leave his country for a long period.

Just in the emigration years, the creative alliance between P. Skalnik and H.J.M. Claessen was formed and two first volumes devoted to the early state (1978; 1981). In these books, especially, in the first one, the authors consider the early state as the centralized socio-political organization for regulation of the social relations in the complex stratified society divide into, at least, two basic strata or appearing social classes, rulers and subordinates the relations between which are characterized be the political domination of the former and tribute duties of the latter; the legality of these relations is sanctified by common ideology of exchange of service (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 640). According to the maturity, the authors identified three types of early states – *inchoate*, *typical* and *transitional* (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). The early states should be transformed into the *mature* states in which the developed bureaucratic machine and private property occur.

It is interesting that many societies which were described in works of Claessen and Skalnik as the inchoate early states (1978: 593) while in the Elman Service's book of the state origin they were only interpreted as the chiefdoms (Service 1975: 150 ff.; see also Earle 1997). This was due to the fact that the chiefdoms in the first book devoted to the early state were presented as very unstable and tending to decay structures (one can even say that these are tribes rather than chiefdoms). According to contemporary views of Petr Skalnik (2004: 79), the theory of early state was a product of combination of a number of ideas of the structural functionalism, neoevolutionism and Marxist conceptions of the Asiatic mode of production and early-class society. Initially, the creators of the theory were in the dark about the chiefdom conception and gave no attention to it in the first book. Only in the second edition, the question of the differences between the chiefdom and early state was considered (Claessen, Skalnik 1981: 491). Nevertheless, in this work the chiefdoms and "early state" were also considered as very unstable and subjected to the fission political systems (these are tribes rather than chiefdoms) although, in reality, it is well known that the chiefdoms could be very great and stable. In other words, where other researchers have found chiefdoms, H.J.M. Claessen anf his followers have seen already early forms of the state.

To make certain of that, it is enough to look at the signs of the *inchoate* early state: 1) predomination of the clannish relations; 2) officials lived at the expense of the share of the redistribution collected by them; 3) there is no legitimate legal codification; 4) there are no special judicial authorities; 5) redistribution, tribute and requisitions were not strictly specified; 6) poor development of the management personnel (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). The cross-cultural analysis shows that only in so called *typical* early state, the signs of the state organization – special functionaries, judicial manpower, written code of laws etc. – appear (Bondarenko, Korotayev 2003). Is it really state if in it there is no main criterion of the State system – specialized management personnel. Thus, the conception of the early state substitutes in partial that of chiefdom and a number of societies which belong to the inchoate early states could be entirely characterized as the chiefdoms.

When the signs of the *transitional* early state are analyzed one can also see that it is already existing agrarian or traditional state. Here, the kindred relations are only of importance at the highest levels of hierarchy. The functionaries earn a salary. There is the judicial machinery, written law, taxes and numerous functionaries (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). Therefore, I propose to exclude the inchoate and transitional states from the typology of early states. In addition, it should be recognized that the *inchoate* early states would be more properly called as chiefdoms.

Can be the Chinggis Khan empire considered as the typical early state? Of the *typical* early state, a conservation of the clan-lineage relations is characteristic but with some development of extraclannish relations among the rulers (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). In this regard, it should be noted that, in contrast to the majority of nomadic empires, the territorial division could be best traced among Mongols for a period of the Chinggis Khan power establishment (1206). In § 202 of *Secret History*, the detailed list of 95 captains of a who were granted with thousand is presented. Among them, his near relations are absent. These are mainly the khan brothers-in-arms related to him in person. However, with time, after the power founder's death, the old clannish relations have prevailed at the highest management levels. This can be traced on the basis of investigating the long genealogical lists presented in the *Jami' al-Tawarikh* of Rashid ad-Din. At the same time, people related to the ruler in person have remained in the management personnel.

The other sign of the early state concerns to the method of income acquisition by the administrative elite. Here, the subsistence source includes both feeding at the expense of the controlled population and salary from the center (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). As for this point, it should be noted that there are no data about the availability of regular payments to functionaries

in the Chinggis Khan's times. Later on, during the reign of Ugedei, the functionaries on the China territory have not also earned a salary. They have lived at the expense of the population subordinate to them. A salary was only introduced under Khubilai. However it was not sufficiently great that the functionaries ceased to fleece the population and to extort bribes (Munkuev 1965: 117).

One of the most important signs of the early state is an appearance of the written code of laws (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). The original of the *Yasa* is not known. There are only different retellings of historians. This information was subjected to the convincing criticism (Ayalon 1971). Paul Ratchnevsky believes that, under Chinggis Khan, so called Yasa presented a totality of records of different khan's aphorisms and orders on different occasions. These aphorisms can not be considered as a legal instrument of the systematic character (1983: 164–165). Igor de Rachewiltz believes that *Yasa* has existed as the verbal and, later on, written code of prohibitions and rules in which, the alterations were prohibited. As a consequence, *Yasa* could become the basis of the juridical code (literally "body of fundamental law"). However, *Yasa* was not the well-worked-out juridical code. After the Mongolian empire division, the significance of Yasa has decreased (1993: 102–104). The most surprising thing is in the fact that the *Yasa* text was inaccessible for the majority of people. The only some Chinggis Khan descendants had an access to it. In this case, one can tell about the embryonic forms of the law. *Yasa* can not be considered as the integrated code of laws like different early-medieval *Truths* – *Visigoth*, *Salic*, *Russian* etc.

The next sign of the early state is a presence of the special judicial manpower which heart the majority of juristic acts (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). The presence of persons who heart the disputes and conflicts is known already prior to 1206. Such functions, for example, were imposed as a duty on Belgütei (Kozin 1941: § 154; Rachewiltz 2004: 771). In 203 paragraph of the *Secret History* the fact is discussed that in 1206 Chinggis Khan has entrusted to Shigi Qutuqu to engage in court examinations (Rachewiltz 2004: 135–135 § 203). The members of armed band should assist him (Kozin 1941: § 234). And although *jarĉyĉi*, had, possibly, much wider duties than simply judicial ones, this sign counts in favor of the Chinggis Khan recognition as early state.

One more sign of the early state is taxes (Claessen, Skalnik 1978: 22, 641). In the Chinggis Khan times, the nomads have not paid taxes. In the *Secret History*, the verb *qubciri* – "gather" and its derivatives were used to denote reciprocation and redistribution. However, in paragraph 279 this term was used in the sense of a tax. These were the words of Udegei said, very likely, in the *khuriltai* of 1229, about the necessity to levy one sheep per a hundred head of animals. From this point on, one can tell about an appearance of taxes among nomads. In the Chinggis Khan times, farmers have not paid taxes to Mongols.

The major form of income was the booty. Only, after Chinggis death, the taxes were established in 1231 at the suggestion of Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai.

The most difficult question is how many functionaries should be to form the state machine. According to the Claessen clarification, "this apparatus can be limited to a few functionaries only" – personal letter to Kradin of 23.03.2006. I can not consent to this point of view as, in this case, the distinction between the chiefdom and early state is eliminated. I can not now offer some solutions of this problem. However, I'd like to remind the final words of the very first Chapter of the chronicle *Yuan shih* where a regret is expressed that, under Chinggis Khan, there were no special functionaries who could write down in detail all of his acts and, therefore, many things sank into oblivion. The Chinese medieval annalists have intuitively understood that there was no the developed bureaucracy in the Chinggis Khan empire. The above first lines of the Chapter 85 of this historical work devoted to the officialdom description are heard al the more frank. It was said there that, under Chinggis Khan, the customs were simple and warm, there were no knotty affairs and services and all the administration was reduced to only military leaders and judges. Among such persons, the number of khan relatives, closest friends and captains of thousands was insignificant.

Thus, of six signs of the early state, only two of them (out-of-clannish administration and judges) can be found in the Chinggis Khan empire. In this society, the major signs of the early-state society – taxes, written law and bureaucratic machine – are absent. What name of such society will be right? In the imperial confederations of nomads, there was the multilevel hierarchy, even two parallel forms of hierarchy – social, in the terms of kindred, and military. The first form of the political hierarchy is chiefdom (Carneiro 1981). Therefore, I proposed a term *supercomplex chiefdom* (Kradin 1992; 2000).

The supercomplex chiefdom as a nomadic empire is already a real prototype of the state. If the number of the complex chiefdoms is, as a rule, measured by tens of thousands people then the number of the supercomplex chiefdom reaches many hundreds of thousands and even more (as applied to the nomadic empires of the Central Asia, within 1-1.5 millions people). These chiefdoms have had the compound titles of chiefs and general functionaries, have been in the diplomatic correspondence with the neighboring countries, have entered into the dynastic marriages with the agricultural states and neighboring nomadic empires. From the viewpoint of neighbors, such the nomadic societies were perceived as the independent subjects of the international political relations.

As the territory of the Mongolian empire increases at the expense of new and new conquers, the need has arisen to develop new territory. Here. The nomads could two opposite models: (1) destruction of cities, agricultural population and transformation of the fields into the pastures for the livestock;

(2) complication of their own authorities – sedenterization of the ruling elite in the cities, creation of the bureaucratic machine, introduction of the written language and record keeping in accordance with the Chinese rules. In this connection, the differences should be reminded which have arisen within the Mongolian elite between the supporters of the militarist and pacifist parties. Because it is impossible to rule over the conquered territories using the traditional institutions of the nomadic society, the principal modernization of the authorities was necessary. In the aphoristic form, the thought of the inapplicability of the nomadic power institutions to government of the agricultural state is reflected by the famous phrase of Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai said to Ugedei about that the nomads can conquer the Chinese empire but it is impossible to rule over it being on horseback (Munkuev 1965: 19).

In the course of time, the Mongolian elite chose just this way. It can be said with confidence that in the Ugedei Khagan times, the state system was finally formed (four of six signs of Claessen are found). As a result, the gigantic transcontinental empire gas appeared which was formed by many people and states of the Old World. In this state, the nomads-Mongols have held the predominant political position but, at that, have amounted only insignificant percentage of the population in the economic sector and were of minor importance in the economic sector. It is important to keep in mind that this was very specific world, strange in many respects and unusual for representatives of the settled-agricultural states. It can be understood and conceived only in that case when we try to look it by eyes of the fellow tribesman-inhabitant of steppe – warrior and cattle-breeder. The representatives of the settled-urban civilizations had somewhat different view on a nature of this world of nomads. We should bear it in mind. However, it does not minimize the originality of the political systems of the Mongolian nomads and their contribution to the world history.

12

CHINGGIS KHAN, WORLD SYSTEM ANALYSIS AND PREINDUSTRIAL GLOBALIZATION

Introduction

One of the popular methodological approaches of the recent decades is the world-system analysis one. Its creator is the French historian Fernand Braudel. In his works, the idea of world-economy was advanced which connected different regions and cultures into the common social space by the trade flows. Later on, these ideas were developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. The main subject of his study is the capitalist world-system appearing in Europe in the XVI-XVII centuries. It is just global system covering all the countries and nations. However, in 1989, Janet Abu-Lughod has published the book *Before European Hegemony* (1989) in which the conquests of Mongols are considered as the most important factor of the formation of the first properly global world-system of the XIII century which gave later a chance to compare in the significance these processes with the "big band" in the universal history (Ashed 1993: 53). This system has consisted of five independent cores: 1) West Europe; 2) Muslim world; 3) Indian Ocean zone; 4) China and Great Steppe united by Mongols. This has contributed to the establishment of the stable trade contacts between Europe and China. The significance of this work is in that Abu-Lughod was first who substantiated the unity of the world before the capitalism hegemon epoch. Other scholars developed ideas about globalization as evolutionary process (Modelski, Devezas, Thompson 2007) and role of nomads, espicially Mongols for the pre-inductrial world-systems (Hall 1991; 2005; Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997; Turchin 2009 etc.).

According to Wallerstein, one can tell about the world-system formation when the large-scale exchange of mass goods begins. However, in a series of investigations of archaeologists and anthropologists it was shown that the exchange of prestige commodities played more significant part and was an important factor of the political power strengthening for the pre-industrial societies (Webb 1975; Ekholm 1977; Peregrine 2000 etc.). Later on, these ideas were developed Chase-Dunn and Hall. In their opinion, the world-system methodology can be applied to the systems of any order – from the global system of the present to the mini-systems of hunters-gatherers. The world-system relations are formed by four networks: bulk goods networks (BGN), prestige goods networks (PGN), political and military networks (PMN),

information networks (IN). The networks of information and prestige goods are widest ones (Chase-Dunn, Hall 1997: 41–56; 2000; Hall 2000; Chase-Dunn, Hall, Turchin 2007 etc.). However, Andre Gunder Frank and David Wilkinson believe that there is only world-system. At first, it has arisen in the Middle East. As the system has enlarged, its center has changed (Wilkinson 1987; 1995; Gills, Frank, 1992; Frank, Gills 1994 etc.).

The most important property of the world-systems is cyclic, pulsatory character of their vital functions. Any system goes through the periods of growth and crises, many systems disappear for different reasons. The explanation of the similar rhythm can be found in ecology because, in this field, the existence of the animal population cycles was revealed long ago. However, the scientists have not arrived at the common conclusion of the reasons of similar cycles. Even for many decades, the question is discussed if there is the stable correlation between the solar activity, climate variations and number of animals. Some authors believe that the similar rule can be observed in nature while the others protest again this point of view (Turchin, Hall 2003; Hall, Turchin 2007).

Even in the first half of the XX century, the synchronism of the growths-decays of empires and urbanizations between the West Europe and Chine in the anciquity (Teggart 1939). Even in the time, it has become clear that this was caused by the availability of the particular connections between different parts of the world as well as specificity of ecology, resources and social structure of the society. Andre Gunder Frank has attempted to connect the similar rhythms with the macroeconomic trends of Kondratyev. In his opinion, the trend for the pre-industrial epoch was longer – from 200 to 500 years. Frank and Gills have identified four large cycles: pre-classic (1700 – 100/50 B.C.), classic (100/50 B.C. – 200-500 A.D.), medieval (200-500 – 1450/1500) and modern (from the XVI century). Within each of cycles, the Kondratyev's phases of growth (A) and recession (B) were identified. So, for example, two independent subcycles were revealed within the framework of the medieval cycle: A-phase (500-750/800) – prosperity of Byzantium, Arabian World, China (Sui and T'ang), Turks khaganates; B-phase (750/800 – 1000/1050) – decay of Carolings, Abbasids, T'ang, downfall of Uighur khaganate; A-phase (1000/1050 – 1250/1300) – conquests of Mongols and formation of the pre-modern world-system according to Abu-Lughod; B-phase (1250/1300 – 1450/1500) – regress of Afro-Eurasia related to epidemics (Gills, Frank, 1992; Frank, Gills 1994; more detailed situation see in Chase-Dunn, Ch., T. Hal., et al. 2010).

The networks of information exchange have played the most significant part in these processes. In the history of mankind, a series of the strange coincidences were revealed which are difficult to be explained by only the synchronism of historical processes: the use of chariots in the military

operations as a result of which a nomadism has become a significant factor of historical processes, iron revolution and expansion of the ferrous metallurgy from the Atlantic to the Pacific, axial age and intellectual revolution (McNeil 2000; Korotayev 2005: 84–86). As a consequence, it is necessary to revise fundamentally a concept of the core of the world-system and center-periphery relations. If Wallerstein has connected these relations largely with the relations of exploitation of periphery by countries of the core of capitalist world-system then, in opinion of Korotayev, a core is that part of the world-system which creates and distributes different technologic and other innovations (Korotayev 2005).

From this standpoint, a role of nomads in the world history shows up in principle in a different way. If in classical works on the history philosophy they played the role of the annihilators of civilizations then, in the context of the world-system processes, just they were translators of information between the settled civilizations over a long period of time. A domestication of horses, expansion of the wheeled traffic contributed to the acceleration of the transfer rates of information and prestige goods. In spite of the fact that the nomads themselves have changed not much strongly with time, they contributed to development of trade contacts, expansion of religions and geographic knowledge, development of the information networks and technological exchanges between different civilizations.

International trade and creation of mediaeval world-system

Tomas Allsen has absolutely rightly noticed that the part of nomads in this exchange is usually reduced to that of ordinary intermediaries. Meanwhile, the nomads themselves were quite often initiators of some adoptions. The cultural exchange between the Moslem Middle Asia and Confucian Far East became possible due to the fact that the ruling elite of the steppe empire wanted to do so rather than owing to establishment of the stable and safe routes after the creation of the Mongolian power. In the course of more than the century, the nomads were major initiators, patrons and translators of the cultural and technological exchange between civilizations of the Old World (Allsen 2001: 210–211; see also Kaplonski 2000: 255).

The trade routes were the most important component of this world-system of the XIII century. Abu-Lughod argues that the principal contribution of Mongols in the world history in that century lies in the fact that they have formed the environment favorable for development of the cultural and trade exchanges. For a time, this has broken a barrier between countries and civilizations and cleared the way for powerful flows of goods and ideas (Abu-Lughod 1989: 154). The safety has become the very-first condition of the development of international trade. The conditions for the free movement of

trade caravans were created and a network of caravancerais and stations was little by little formed. Juvaini reports that after 1206, the piece and order were established on the Mongolia territory as a result of which, the roads became safe and this resulted in activation of the trade activity (Juvaini 1997: 77).

The other important catalyst of the trade development is the improvements in the financial field – forming of the bill system and development of the system of crediting, appearance of the paper money in China (Seaman 1991: 5–6). As early as 1236, by the presentation of Yeh-lü Ch'u-ts-ai the paper money were issued to the amount of 10 thousands of silver bars (YS 146: 7a; Munkuev 1965: 194).

In conditions of quick drive on stage-coaches, the way from the Golden Horde to the capital of the Yuan Empire has taken more than 200 days (Kychanov 2002: 32). In case of a slower pace, the journey from the Black Sea to Khanbalyk has required not less than 300 days (Abu-Lughod 1989: 183). The brothers Polo have taken about three and half years for the trip with goods from Mongolia to Mediterranean (Marco Polo 2001: 8, 11). However, the information has much faster propagated in the steppe. Despite the fact that Mongols had no telegraph, the great khan knew long before that brothers Polo moved towards him and he sent the attendants 40 days prior to their arrival (ibid: 11).

Undoubtedly, the trade became much more profitable business in the Mongolian epoch than earlier. Ugedei paid to merchants and second-hand dealers for their goods double prices. According to Juvaini data, many people earned large capitals at this period and reached a significant prosperity (Juvaini 1997: 132). In an attempt to excel the glory of his father in generosity, Güyüg has paid for the goods from the merchants several times over the prices offered by the merchants themselves (Juvaini 1997: 259–260). The ordinary trade duty was slightly more than 3 % (Di Cosmo 2005: 396, 407, 415). The trade duties for goods from India and other countries could reach 10% (Marco Polo 2001: 207–208).

Even the Pope, realizing all advantages of the transit trade through the Golden Horde, has granted to merchants the complete license. On the Black Sea coast, the Genoese settlements have springed up like mushrooms. In the XIII, the Genoese have sailed not only in the Black Sea but also in the Caspian Sea. The Italians have exported from their colonies furs, leathers, horses, wax, incense, grain, salt, wine, some luxury goods. The Mongolian khans have used them as their envoys to the Pope. The important role in the development of the Volga steppe way was played by the revelation by the Palaiologos in 1261 of the Black Sea Straits as well as political integration of the north-eastern coast of the Black Sea into the Golden Horde.

After Möngke death, the roads were rather dangerous for a time as the Mongolian world has been divided into two political fractions. One could easily

be taken prisoner (Marko Polo 2001: 4, 36). However, after the distemper was finished, the situation became stabilize. Even, despite the fact that Khibilai has transferred the capital to Khanbalyk, the significance of Karakorum as the important center of trade communications has remained. This is particularly confirmed by the burial ground with the Moslem graves of the time excavated not far from the northern part of city as well as by finds of the Golden Horde silver coins of 1340s (Voitov 1990: 133, 140, 146).

In fact, before 1370s, trade with the East through the Golden Horde possessions was absolutely safe. In the famous Catalan atlas of 1375, near the Caravanserai, the caravan of merchants making its way to the East was depicted. The illustration is accompanied with the inscription: "This caravan leaved the caravanserai to move to China". The people of experience have recommended to take for the trip only flour, salted fish and interpreter (woman if possible). Everything else, especially meat, could be found on the journey largo manum.

Money, prestige goods and international network

The trade development has stimulated the development of commodity-money relations. Little by little, a stamping of coins became to develop in different centers of the Empire. In the time of Möngke, the centers of coin stamping were reestablished in Bukhara, Otrar, Kharat, Mosul and other large centers. In the years of his ruling, the quantity of coins issued was much more than that during the reign of his predecessors. The mints have actively functioned in the Golden Horne capital and Khorezm, in the Caucasus (Ponomaryev 2002). This resulted in that, with time, a monetization has been realized – the natural duties were replaced by the money tax (Allsen 1987: 171–186).

As the volumes of the international trade have increased, the serious problem has arisen – how to convert one kind of currency into the other, especially if the coins in the western Eurasia were stamped from the precious metals and, in China, there were the copper and even paper money. This question was even more significant in the connection with that the commodity turnover development was impeded by the necessity for person to have with itself large amounts of money to do trade operations. Little by little, this resulted in the establishment of the credit system. It allowed for the merchants to receive money for execution of financial operations in the strange city and even abroad using the paper obligations and to pay ready money after home-coming. Without doubt, the similar system proposed a certain risk which should be minimized through the establishment of the network of the family-kindred commercial enterprises, partnerships and corporations of different types. In such system, the responsibility was placed on not only a particular person but

also on the wile group to which he belonged. This situation was one more stimulating condition of developing the international trade in the XIII-XIV centuries (Abu-Lughod 1989: 15–16).

With time, the problem of the currency circulation unification was acute in the empire. Allsen (1987: 180–182) believes that a role of the universal currency has been played by the *silver bar* (Mong. *süke*, Chinese – *ting*, Persian – *balīsh*, Uigur – *yastug*, Russ. – *slitok*). The fact that a similar practice has occurred in the Mongolian Empire of the day is known from Rubruck's notes who called a bar falsely as *iaskot* (*iaskot*, erroneously of *yastug*) and reported that it weighed ten marks (Rockhill 1900: 156). Juvaini reports that a *balysh* constitutes 50 gold or silver *miskals* or about 75 *dinars* of Rukn ad-Din (Juvaini 1997: 23). From this standpoint, a bar could be really used as universal currency which was in the ratio with all monetary systems used in the centre of empire. However, the question how much were the silver reserves of the nomadic empire – is not simple. In the XIII century, the end of so called silver shortage caused by the exhaustion of the silver extraction sources took place which resulted in the activation of gold coins stamping (Ponomaryev 2002: 9). It should be also remembered that the great part of resources of the palace storerooms was distributed as presents. Thus, one can assume that the so called *bar* or *balysh* was the virtual unified measure of estimation of money and financial settlements rather than a real medium of exchange of local currency in the international trade operations.

A significant place in the world-system relations of the XIII century was occupied by the exchange of prestige goods. As already noted by Rubruck in Chapter about Clothing (Rockhill 1990; see also Juvaini 1997: 22), the prestige goods have come in the headquarters of Mongolian Khagans in an endless stream. The formation of the Mongolian Empire has stimulated the development of the textile manufacture in the West Asia and coming of fabrics in Mongolia and China. Allsen believes that this was caused by the ancient traditions of cosmology and symbols of high status of the steppe people. The symbols are designed for a marking of the highest and lowest groups, reflection in the cultural-ritual form of the real political relations and structures (Bourdeieu 1977). There are many various symbols of the power. However, an accumulation of tangible assets among the nomads was, to a great extent, limited by the mobile mode of life which assumes, on the one hand, the striking but, on the other hand, quite light and transportable markers of the high status. For a long time, this role in the cultural world of nomads was played by horses, richly decorated belt, weapon, brocade robe and head-dress (Allsen 1997: 102–104; Dode 2005).

The silk cloths have performed not only important hygienic function but also symbolized the status of their owner in the society. They presented the prestige good and these goods were important resource of the political power in

the society of nomads. "If through your favour, O Cinggis Qa'an, I were to obtain But a ring from your golden belt, But a thread from your crimson coat, I will become your fifth son and will serve you", – with such request, the ruler (*idu'ut*) of Turphan Uigurs approaches to Chighis-Khan (Rachewiltz 2004: § 238). The rich people wear the gold and silk clothes, trim them with plumes, sable and fox furs, – the Venetian traveler told (Marco Polo 2001: 79).

Hartlends and Hinterlands

The rulers of the Mongolian empire have required from their vassal possessions to demonstrate different ways of loyalty: 1) personal coming in the Khagan headquarters; 2) sending of sons or cadets to the court as hostages; 3) carrying out of a census; 4) mobilization of recruits; 5) collection and dispatch of taxes and tribute; 6) reception of *darguchi* (baskaks); 7) in some cases, arrangement and maintenance of coachmen's service (Allsen 1987: 114).

At that, Mongols behaved in different ways in each of the conquered uluses (Halperin 1983). They were also perceived by the conquered people differently. In China, they have blended with the classical scheme of the change of dynasties due to violation made by the preceding Emperor of the Heavens Mandate. As a result, the Mongolian Ulus has regenerated in to the Yuan dynasty. However, if the Kitans and Jurchens (especially, latter) have firmly moved on the way of Sinicizing then Mongols have remained bigger barbarians than their predecessors. The Emperor's family has adopted the Chinese ceremonial but the ethnic confrontation between conquerors, other people and Chinese has kept. In all, for a period more than hundred years of the political domination, they have not dissolved among the local population (Dardess 1963; Langlois 1981; Endicott-West 1989; Farquard 1990; Franke 1994 etc.).

Ilkhans have chosen a way of direct identification with the local power structure. In Iran and Central Asia, there were good deserts and pastures adjoining to oases of rural and urban life (Boyle 1968; Morgan 1988). Islam has corresponded to the militant image of nomads to a greater extent than Christianity and Buddhism (Fletcher 1986). As a result, Mongols have occupied a niche of the preceding Turkic-Arabian local ruling elite and have been perceived by the Islamic philosophy through the prism of the cyclic paradigm of origin and downfall of the nomadic State system (for example, in the Ibn Khaldoun's conception).

The contrary was the case in Russia. In the neighborhood with the Russian principalities, the great territories suitable for exercise of nomadic cattle-breeding were located. This allowed for the Golden Horde khans to control the inland situation in Russia not resorting to a quartering of large garrisons in the conquered country. As the basic geopolitical interests of Jochids were concentrated on so called Northern Silk Road (Khorezm, Volga region, Black

Sea region), the policy of indirect control of the Russian principalities through the institution of tags was convenient for them. In the Orthodox concept of the universe, there were not grounds of the subordination of the Slavonians to Mongols-unbelievers. The fact of the military defeat was recognized but the conquest and inclusion of the Russian principalities in the Mongolian Empire was disclaimed (Halperin 1985: 65–74). By implication, the reflection of this can be found even in the modern Russian school's and university's textbooks where the fact of the Russia subordination to the Golden Horde is recognized but the Russian principalities are shown on maps as the sovereign formations rather than a part of the Horde. From here, there is a morbid stir about the polemics of the Tatar-Mongolian yoke (Halperin 2004).

With time, on a map of the medieval world-system, new economic centers are formed which concentrate around them the flows of tangible and prestige things, power resources, large masses of people. In the course of time, like Karakorum, the headquarters of the Chinghisids were transformed into the real cities. To provide the needs of nobility, the jewelers, masters of manufacture of luxurious fabrics and elegant clothes, builders of palaces and other great structures concentrate in the neighborhood with the places of the elite residence.

Ibn Batuta describes the Golden Horde capital as the heavily populated city with the wide streets and palaces, aristocratic country estates, craftsmen blocks, noisy bazaars and churches of different religions. One day, he decided to travel through the whole Sarai city; leaving early in the morning, he reached other end of the city only at noon. Having dinner and praying he returned home only by the sunset. "The Sarai city, – he states, – is one of the most beautiful cities achieving the extraordinary size on the even ground overcrowded with people, with the good-looking bazaars and wide streets ... and it is a continuous line of houses where there are no empty places and gardens " (Tizenhausen 1884: 306). One can envision what were sizes of this medieval megapolis. Even though we can assume that Ibn Batuta has leisurely (at speed of about 3 km/hour) moved for a period of four hours (from 8 a.m. to the noon), the city diameter should be not less than 12 km!

In 1260, Khubilai Khagan has transferred the capital from Karakorum in Kaipin (Shandu) and then, in 1264, in Yanjin (Beijing). In 1271, he has constructed new city with huge palace. The city was called Khanbalyk (Ta-tu, Hangbalgasun, Yeke niyslel – Great capital). With the sincere delight, the Venetian Marco Polo (2001: 12–113, 128–129) not accustomed to such great luxury describes Khanbalyk. There are many houses and people in this city. In the outskirts, the number of residents is more than that in the city. There, the merchants from other cities and countries live also. They carry here the precious stones, pearls and other expensive goods. All good and expensive things from China and other regions are transported by ships. All of them are

destined for the Emperor and his wives and grandees who live here. Each day, more than a thousand of carts with silk arrive here; the broadcloths with gold and silk fabrics are weaved here (in detail see Liu 1992).

With the same colorfulness, the Venetian traveler portrays the capital of the khan Hülegü, city of Tebriz (Tauris). Here, very expensive, gold and silk fabrics are manufactured. The city is situated at the good place; here, the goods are delivered from many countries. Here, the European merchants come to buy the foreign commodities. The merchants earn a high profit. The merchants are of different countries and religions – Christians, Moslems and representatives of other religions (Marco Polo 2001: 31–32). All of this can be considered as an encouragement of the loyalty of numerous foreigners residing in the empire capital and assistance in the conservation of their ethnic identity. Possibly, it has sometimes produced an effect of the snowball: one group which has already adjusted to the new place has stimulated the arrival of new migrants from the native land (Allsen 2001: 196).

The similar examples show clearly how the campaigns of Mongolian khans changed the medieval world. Without question, main importance of the Mongolian empire for the world history laid in the fact that Mongols have enclosed a chain of the international trade into the common complex of the land and marine ways. For the first time, all large regional components of the medieval world-system (Europe, Islam, India, China and Golden Horde) proved to be so integrated into the common macroeconomic space (Abu-Lughod 1989; 1990) that it resulted in the global information, technological and cultural exchange between the civilizations of the Old World. The force of relations proved to be so great that, even after the proscription of Mongols from China and devastation by Tamerlane of the Golden Horde capital, the system of international trade has decreased but has not vanished entirely. This is evident, at least, from one of transactions concluded in the Serai city in 1438 by the Central Asiatic merchant who has purchased goods to the amount of 45900 dinars. Of the goods listed in the financial documents, the silk and satin were called Chinese, linen – European while broadcloth – Russian goods. Percentage of profitability from trade was, in our opinion, fantastic: broadcloth – 66%, silk and linen – 300%, satin – 433% (Kramarovsky 2001: 15).

Role of Mongols in History

Evaluating a role of the Chinghis Khan empire and his successors in the world history, it is necessary to state that the Mongolian conquests have brought the death and destruction to many people and civilizations. No any justifications could be for an evil and violence. At the same time, it would be erroneous to overestimate an extent and nature of destructions made by Mongols. Even in the first half of the past century, the archaeological studies

have established that the devastation of Urgench by Tamerlane in 1388 has posed even more catastrophic consequences than the capture of the city by Chighiss-Khan in 1231 (Yakubovsky 1930: 20). The Juvaini's evidence about the conquest of the Central Asia by Chinghis Khan can be considered to be a quite objective: "The tide of calamity was surging up from the Tartar army, but he had not yet soothed his breast with vengeance nor caused a river of blood to flow, as had been inscribed by the pen of Destiny in the roll of Fate. When, therefore, he took Bokhara and Samarqand, he contented himself with slaughtering and looting once only, and did not go to the extreme of a general massacre. As for the adjoining territories that were subject to these towns or bordered on them, since for the most part they tendered submission, the hand of molestation was to some extent withheld from them. And afterwards, the Mongols pacified the survivors and proceeded with work of reconstruction, so that at the present time, i.e. in 658/1259–60, the prosperity and well-being of these districts have in some cases attained their original level and in others have closely approached it. It is otherwise with Khorasan and Iraq, which countries are afflicted with a hectic fever and a chronic ague: every town and every village has been several times subjected to pillage and massacre and has suffered this confusion for years, so that even though there be generation and increase until the Resurrection the population will not attain to a tenth part of what it was before" (Juvaini 1997: 96–97).

The Russian principalities were subjected to large-scale destruction. Such large capital centers as Kiev, Ryazan, Vladimir were plundered and burned not counting other large for those times Old Russian cities as well as small cities and nearest rural neighborhood. The fact of devastation of cities is well confirmed by the archeological evidences many of which, for example, *Desiatinnaya* church in Kiev, became already typical examples. A considerable part of the surviving townsmen was taken prisoner. Many of the prisoners were the highly skilled specialists in different professions. This could not but tell on the technology quality which is well traced in living essentials and, partly, pottery. The ceramic vessels belonging to the times after the campaign of Batu against the North-East Russia were quite often made of poorly mixed paste and differed by the low-quality baking. One can often establish the considerable distortions of the existing proportions which suggest clearly a loss of the prevalent skills and techniques of the pottery. The similar articles were made by amateurs or journeymen being saved by a miracle in the course of the invasion (Kadiyeva 2003).

However, it would be incorrect to attribute all consequences of the Russia crisis in the XIII century to only Mongols. In addition to the internal political crisis manifesting in the inability of the princes to unit and repulse the aggressors, one can say about the wide complex of changes of different directions caused by different objective and quite accidental circumstances

(Fennel 1983). After the campaigns of Batu, some towns were relatively quickly reconstructed (Serensk, Pereyaslavl-Ryazansky etc.). As to other towns, the process of their reconstruction has required the longer periods. Possibly, the capital towns – Kiev, Ryazan and Vladimir have to a greatest extent suffered. The decay of some towns was not directly related to the Batu invasion. So, a loss of the leading positions by the greatest urban center of the pre-Mongolian time on the territory of the North Russia – Beloozero – was caused by the crisis of the hunting economy in the region due to a reduction of furs harvesting. Rostov managed to avoid the full massacre in 1238, however, it was repeatedly subjected to raids of Tatars and also competitive Russian principalities in the later times which caused afterwards the collapse of the town. The study of the dynamics of villages in the North-East Russia shows that the fall of the existing system of settling and formation of a new one was caused by different palaeoecological and socio-economical factors (Makarov 2003).

In addition, the archeological evidences of the sites of fire, violent deaths and destructions should not always be related to the Batu campaigns. In Kiev, some destructions could be caused by the earthquake in 1230 and later massacres of 1416 and 1482 (Ivakin 2003). It is well to bear in mind that the losses of Mongols were also large (which, in no way, finds excuses for their conquests). As a rule, the attackers suffer the greater losses than defenders. Based on some assumptions, Mongols have lost about 25000 killed and slightly less wounded only in the course of the first Russian campaign (Khrustalyev 2004: 151). Possibly, that is the reason why Batu forced to postpone the campaign to the southern Russia and Europe by several years.

On the whole, one cannot but recognize that the initial conquests have made with the peculiar cruelty which should arouse fear and petrify a possible resistance. However, the destructions were of not total nature in time and in space (Biran 2004: 353). As soon as the Mongols have once and for all recognized that a taxation provides more revenue than a robbery (in the time of Möngke), they have cardinally changed all internal policy (Allsen 1987).

After the Mongolian conquests, the geopolitical alignment of forces in the Old World has fundamentally changed. In the eastern part of the Islam World, the center has shifted from Bagdad to Tebriz, in the Central Asia – from Balasaghun to Almaliq, in the Eastern Europe – from Kiev to Sarai and then to Moscow and in China – from Kaifeng to Beijing. The central positions of Moscow and Beijing remain until now. Mongols have united the whole China into the united state and their administrative division remains until now. Moreover, they have laid the foundation for the establishment of the Chinese state system within the modern limits including Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria. Now, the Chinese historiography emphasizes emphatically the multiethnic symbol of the Yuan society as the most significant contribution to the national organization of CPR (Biran 2004: 354–355).

Mongols have played an essential part in the Russian history. Thanks to their mediation, from China to Russia, manners of face downwards before the ruler – delivery of a petition and bastinadoing of tax-dodgers were transferred (Dewey 1988: 268). Mongols have laid the foundation of the further rise of the Moscow rule which has later on played a part of the successor of the Golden Horde and founder of the future Russia about which the supporters of eurasianism wrote in their works (Vernadsky 1953). The postal service established by Mongols has afterwards remained in China, Iran and Russia. The Mongolian military institutions have found their continuation in the Ming and Qing times. The Russian princes have used the principles of the military organization, strategy and tactics of Mongols right up to advent of the fire-arms (Halperin 1983: 250; 1985: 91).

The Mongolian conquests have contributed to the beginning of the large-scale migration processes, new cultural contacts, origin of new styles and fashion, forming of cosmopolitism. The Europeans have entered into marriages with Tatars of the Golden Horde, called their children by names which originated from names of nomads: Alaone (from Hulagu), Kassano (from Gazan), Abaga (from Abaka) and others (Göckenjan 2002: 96–97). The influence of the Mongolian world is traced even in the clothes. By the XIV century, so called Tatar clothes has become into fashion in Europe. In 1331, before the chivalrous tournament, the procession of the England riders has driven through the London streets, 16 of which were dressed in clothes and masks of the Tatar style. 250 garters of Tatar fabric (dark-blue color) with golden embroidery were made for the knights of the Order of garter (Allsen 1997: 1). From the Near East, the noodles came to China and Italia where became one of the basic courses (Buell 1999). The Europeans became acquaintance with the technology of alcohol production not to mention about such fundamental for the West discoveries as compass, gunpowder and book-printing. The elements of the Chinese painting and decorative art were a part of the Central Asiatic art in the same way as the Central Asiatic brocade fell into the far East (Allsen 2002: 17).

As Thomas Allsen writes, it would be incorrect to consider the movement of goods and technologies in the Mongolian times as the one-way road. The Chinese technicians and engineers have accompanied the Mongolian armies intruding into the Islam countries. The large groups of population from the Chin Empire territory were resettled to Merv and Tebriz to be occupied with handicraft and agriculture. By the order of Hülegü, the buddhistic temples on the territories of Khorsan, Armenia and Azerbaijan were constructed. The archeologists have studied the residuals of one such temple not far from Merv. The structure combines the local and Far-Eastern building traditions. In the towns, there were Chinese blocks. The similar adoptions were numerous in the Mongolian Empire. It provided the opportunities for expansion of new relations, formation of new fashion and styles. However, it should be

remembered that Mongols have not pursued the objective to establish the network of global information communications. They were afflicted with an idea to conquer the world and, therefore, many results of their contacts with other cultures and civilizations proved to be unpremeditated. The transits of the high technologies were, to a greater extent, a consequence of the political will of the Mongolian Empire rulers rather than a result of the internal development of economy and trade. As a result, the extensive and permanent networks of cultural and technological contacts between the craftsmen, engineers, painters and other representatives of the intellectual labour of different people and states. All of this provided the basis for the productive technological and cultural exchange, contributed to materialization of new opportunities and unique discoveries which should turn over the world in several centuries (Allsen 2002: 14–15, 27–28).

Mongols have also contributed to distribution and penetration of different religions. True, in the end, the Islam proved to be in the advantageous position: sooner or later, Ilkhans in Iran, Chaghadaids in the Central Asia, Jochids in Cumans steppe have Islamized. Probably, it was caused be the certain predisposition of nomads to just Islam – religion of warriors and traders (Fletcher 1986). One more consequence of the large-scale cultural exchange was a visual extension of the Eurasia horizons and cartography development (Allsen 2001: 103–114). To some extent, it pushed Europeans to the search of new seaways to India and resulted subsequently in the Great geographical discoveries.

Mongols have made the significant contribution to the developing of the science of language. The empire has been multinational and Mongols have used different languages to rule over the territories conquered. Mongols have established special schools for training of interpreters and they have stimulated the process of preparation of multi-dictionaries which began to issue in the XIII-XIV centuries in different countries related to trade along the Great Silk Way from China to Europe (Biran 2004: 352 note 44). We do not already tell about numerous adoptions of Mongolian words in different languages and language interactions stimulated by Mongols. Only in the Russian language, through the contact with nomads, such words as *argamak* (horse), *bazaar*, *den'gi* (money), *kazna* (treasury), *tamozhnya* (customs), *tabun* (herd), *t'ma* (ten thousand), *yamshchik* (coachman), etc.

From dawn till dusk

The expansion of Mongolian empire could not be endless. According to the structural-functional cycles model of Goldstone-Turchin-Nefedov, the prosperity of any empire is based on a maximization of the external surplus product in the mother country. At that, the domestic exploitation is insignificant

which results in rise of the population well-being and prosperity of the mother country. As the external sources earnings decrease, the government had to transfer the cost burden into its own society. In this case, the bureaucracy and army have also become accustomed to the luxurious mode of life and rise in the exploitation of masses results inevitably in the economic crisis, famine, political disorders and revolts (Goldstone 1991; Turchin 2003; Turchin, Nefedov 2008). It should be noted that this model can be applied to the Power of Chinghis Khan and his immediate successors only in part because the Empire was divided even before the depletion of potentialities of its maximum growth. However, to one or another extent, this model proved to be realized in the nomadic empires of the successors.

Other important reason was an expansion of the Mongolian empire territory beyond the optimal limit. It is known that as any empire expands it crosses the threshold of its information efficiency. Sooner or later, the information from the center to periphery and back moves so long that the center has no time to react on the external disturbances. After that, the control is lost and the empire integrity is threatened. Even in the Ugedei times, in order to drive through all possessions of Chinggisids from the west to the east, more than month would need. When the khagan died, the integrity of empire turned out to be threatened. The long period of regency began and the power turned out to be in hands of one of the immediate relatives. The regency has lasted until the assembly has elected new ruler of the steppe empire. The Mongolian Power has been so great that many long moths and years have elapsed before it has been possible to muster a quorum of relatives which would be legitimate to take similar decisions. Different forces have proposed their candidatures but, often, the position of a regent has given them the particular priorities. However, the Mongolian power has been so vast that the rulers of regional apanages have not always shown interest in the enthronement in Karakorum.

However, the main reason contributing structurally to the crisis and collapse of the nomadic empire was a tanistrial (in Russian *lestvitsa*) system of the power inheritance under which each of representatives of the ruling lineage from senior wives had the right, by turn in age, to raising of the administrative status including the right to throne. Action of this system could be presented as a logical model by which, owing to traditional for the nomadic aristocracy, the reproduction of the elite has been made in the geometric progression. Let us that a certain ruler of the steppe society had, at the least, five sons from senior wives. At such rates of reproduction, he should have 25 grandsons and 125 great-grandsons! At that, if each of children has received as inheritance about 20% of the total resource of politia then only 0.8% has fallen at each of grandchildren.

It is clear that it is ideal model: someone has died in the childhood and anybody has been killed in the military campaigns. Not all of the descendants

had the right to inherit a status equal to the position of their father (as a rule, the senior son from the senior wife or his half-brothers could be successors). But in case of need, the attempts to make exception for other sons, for example, for children from young beloved wives were noted. However, in addition of children from the senior wife, there were other sons, wives, daughters and sons-in-law as well as brothers, nephews, uncles etc. each of which should be, owing to their origin, provided with a certain quantity of people and livestock. The possibilities to provide all of them with a sufficient quantity of subordinates and livestock were sharply restricted by the ecological limits. As a rule, already in the second generation, a strong competition has arisen between the elite representatives and the nomadic empires have not survived more than three-four generations. The civil war has begun which has ended by either collapse or new integration after annihilation of all competitors. As this feature of the steppe politia functioning was first noted by Ibn-Khaldoun (true, he wrote about a loss of *asabiya*) it is not unreasonable to call it a law of Ibn-Khaldoun.

Now, let us consider the concrete facts of the Mongolian history. It is known that Chinghis Khan had about 500 wives and concubines (Rashid ad-Din 1952b: 68). Jauty, son of Belguitai, had 100 sons for which was jokingly called "commander of a thousand solders" (Rashid ad-Din 1952b: 57, 59). Rubruck in Chapter Two informs that Batu had 26 wives (see Rockhill 1990). Khubilai had 22 sons from 4 wives and some more 25 sons from concubines. Each wife had 300 maidservants and up to 10 thousand of servants, castrates and other retainers (Marco Polo 2001: 108–109).

Our model is a unpretentious logical problem as compared with a real life *uruq* of the Mongolian elite. Even in the Juvaini times, the population of so called *uruq* of Chighiss-Khan reached about 20 thousand of people (Juvaini 1997: 594). In the assembly of 1311, were 1400 Chinggisids having the khan titles. After proscription of Mongols from China, as Boris Vladimirtsov write: "It came to that there was nothing to give in principality. The number of Chinggisids became so much that flow-outs and aimaks in principality and in possession failed for all. By the end of the XVII century, in different places of the Mongolian world, noyans owning small estates appear and, then, the younger members of the feudal families do not receive in principality real *albatu* and they should content themselves with only home servants and ordinary nomadic property, livestock, first of all. Owning to this fact, a considerable number of Chinggisids proves to be in the same position in which the representatives of the highest class albatu, i.e. *tabunags*, *saids* etc. were" (1934: 175).

The Empire of Chinghis Khan has not passed through the full Ibn-Khaldun cycle as its dimensions were so great that the resources were not sufficient for all descendants of the empire founder. After the death of khagan Möngke, the power has well broken into separate pieces owing to the impossibility to control

so vast territory. However, the states of Chinggisids have not escaped this law and, sooner or later, all of them have been a failure. At that, the Mongols in Chins were driven out after one cycle while, in the steppes of the East Europe and Iran, the dynasties have survived two cycles. It seems that only Osmans were able to find the other solution of this problem. They have introduced such principle of inheritance that a circle of natural pretenders has narrowed, due to competition, to one candidate. A silk lace or other less humane variants of withdrawal of a candidature were a fate of the others. This increased the temporal cycles of the Osman empire to 200-300 years (Turchin, Hall 2003: 54).

All of the listed reasons were factors which should have resulted and, ultimately, have resulted in the collapse of the Chinghis Khan Empire and empires of his successors. However, an expansion of pandemic diseases has become an immediate circumstance practically destroying the global world-system of the XIII-XIV centuries. The Mongolian conquests have resulted in the establishment of the large-scale network of the human communications. Couriers, warriors, traders, diplomats have moved from one end of the network to the other, connected China and Karakorum, Central Asia and Iraq, trading stations of the Black sea region and Catholic Europe between them. He believes that, from the epidemiological standpoint, it had one fatal consequence. In 1252, Mongols have come into collision with plague the source of which has been, probably, in the Himalayas. Through Burma, a bacillus has fallen into the South China but, initially, it has been possible to isolate the infection source. However, a century later the infection source has activated and disease has become to headily extend (McNeil 1976: 134, 140, 143; Abu-Lughod 1989: 342).

There were two ways of the disease propagation (McNeil 1976: 145–157). The first variant of infection transfer was related to small steppe rodents being carriers of contagious diseases. They have spread the bubonic plague within the arid zone. It happened, possibly, in 1331. 15 years later, the disease reached the territories of Cumans steppe and Black Sea region. The second way of the disease propagation was the sea. From the South China, a plague has come to the Near East between 1331 and 1356. In the course of Kafa siege in 1347, Tatars, using the missile guns, have thrown the bodies of their warriors dieing of plague. It has caused an eruption of disease in the town. From Kafa, plague has propagated to Venice, Genoa, Constantinople and other seaports of the Mediterranian.

The Nikonian chronicle (PSRL 10: 222) reports that, in 1349, the plague was fixed in Polotsk. In the same year, the disease has covered the territories of Poland and Austria and, in the next year, Hungary. To Pskov, the plague has come in June, 1351, and as early as August, it has reached Novgorod. The chronicle states all signs of the pneumonic plague propagating by the

respiratory-air way: "a man spits blood and dies in two days, and deads were everywhere" (PSRL 10: 223). Obviously, the epidemic has lasted to the end of the winter-beginning of the spring of next year. In 1364, the plague has returned. From the Volga lower reach, it has propagated to Nizhny Novgorod, Ryazan, Tver, Vladimir, Beloozero. This time, in addition to the pneumonic plague, the bubonic plague has spread in Russia. The course of this disease is no so galloping and patient has some chances for recovery (Buzhilova 2005: 287–290).

Quite often, the propagation of the bubonic plague has been caused by the natural cataclysms (droughts etc.) resulting in the reduction of food reserves for the carriers of diseases – mousse and rats. In search of sources of food, they have concentrated in the places where people lived and this has caused the eruptions among people. The first order consequences of this catastrophe were horrific, at that, the towns of the core connected by trade have lost a third to a half a population during several years. According to computations of historians of demography, the population in Europe has reduced by a quarter while in China by nearly a third (Bentley 1996). The second order consequences of the mass reduction of population, were, probably, of the greater importance. As a result of the restoration processes in Europe, the local centers of power have moved to the north (from Italia to such former peripheral zones as England). In the Middle East, the plague has resulted in the crisis period which could not be mitigated even after the population reestablishment (Abu-Lughod 1990).

Conslusion

In summary, it should be noted that it is timely to reformulate the thought becoming axiomatic according to which the nomads were only passive users of the settled world achievements. In reality, all of this was much more complex. Mongols not only have contributed to the activation of contacts and exchanges between different civilizations but also performed, depending on their needs and interests, active selection of necessary technological and cultural components of the settled-urban societies. However, these processes have taken place no inside steppe culture but infringed and included in the wide cultural exchange the whole countries and continents. "The empire of Great Mongols functioned as the cultural clearing-house for Eurasia on the eve of Europe's maritime expansion, which, in its time, created a truly global network of exchange" (Allsen 2002: 28). This has been called "the basic information circuit" (Adshead 1993: 70).

Mongols have exerted great influence on the cultural and political development of the Old World. They have contributed to the medieval globalization of the XIII century – first globalization in the mankind history. However, this globalization has, finally, become a reason of the collapse of the

medieval world-system of the XIII-XIV centuries. In our time, when the communication facilities allow us to contact with the other hemisphere in a matter of seconds and distance between the continents is measured in the hours of way, this question has acquired the specific urgency. It will suffice to conceive what catastrophic consequences in the modern world can be caused by the expansion of AIDS, atypical pneumonia, Avian influenza H5N1 and other epidemics. For this reason, adverting to that distant epoch when the hoofs of horses of Mongolian warriors have dirtied the open space of the Eurasia, we should always remember the main lesson which the mankind should learn from the history of the Mongolian epoch – how is our human world delicate and how easily can be it destroyed by our own hands.

Part Four

ANTHROPOLOGY OF TRANSITION

13

TRANSFORMATION OF PEASANT PASTORALISM AMONG THE AGINSKY BURYATS, END OF XX – BEGINNING OF XXI CENTURIES

The transformation of mobile pastoralism in post-socialist countries became a subject of steadfast studying only in last ten years. The important researches devoted to studies of transition of a pastoral economy and society during this period in territory of Internal Asia (Mongolia, Tibet and Internal Mongolia of Chinac, Tuva, Buryatiya) have been executed. The given results are published (for example: Humphrey and Sneath 1996; 1999). Problems of study of transition processes in Aginsky steppe Buryats in last 15 years were not still a subject of special studying. This paper deals with an analysis of the present-day state of the pastoral branch in the economy of the Aginsky Buryats. The data sources are field studies of 2000-2007 (projects RSS/OSI # 1266/1999, RFBR # 02-06-80359, 06-06-234a, RFH # 04-01-1832e, # 05-01-18001e), archival materials, current statistical data, some information contained in the periodical press. It is meaningful to compare our results to conclusions of these authors, and also with processes, toward in other areas of the Russian Federation with the pastoral way an economy.

The Aginsky Buryat National District is situated in the South-Eastern Trans-Baikal region. It area is 19.6 thousand km^2. The territory is largely covered with pastures. On the north, the district is fringed with mountains. On the southern side, the historical river of Mongols Onon constitutes a boundary. The name of the District originates from the Buryat word *aga* meaning a great plain. In winter, snow is actually absent, therefore, the livestock can pasture the year round out of doors. It is not accidental that the pastoral nomads have resided here since antiquity. The District's population continues to be occupied with a breeding of animals. The farming has a secondary character.

By analysis of archives sources (Kradin 2000) and published statistical data of 19 – early 20 Centuries (Kulomzin 1898; Soldatov 1911), I managed to find out that a typical Buryat pastoral farm had a stock including 4–8 horses (13–15%), 10–16 head of cattle (25–30%) and 20–40 sheep (about 60%). Total number of rich cattle farmers was no large. Only 9.3% of farms had more than 10 horses; 1.8% of farms – more than 100 head and 0.3% of farms more than 300 horses. A share of farms possessing a greater number of other animals was also in significant. So, only 4% of farms had more than 300 sheep and 2% – more that 500 sheep. Only in 1/31 % of farms, here were more than 100 head of

cattle and about 0.01% possessed more than 300 head. All this gives a ground to assume that not more than 2% of household can be assigned to rich ones. At the same time, the majority of the pastoralists had that number of animals which allowed them to make both ends meet, around 20.7% of farms were forced to search additional sources of subsistence, of them 2.9% households had any single kind of animal while 5% of Buryat farms had no cattle at all (in interesting that late in XIX century, the number of cattle less house holds was not more than 0.5%).

Beginning on the last quarter of XIX century, the impact of the Russian economy on Buryat nomadic economy begin to increase. One can trace a growth in settled life, introduction than cattle-breeding, market orientation of economy, decrease in sickness rate (preventive measures against early incurable deceases) and mortality, spreading of literacy etc. The slow but progressive growth in total number of settled "non-Russian" (*inorodtsy*) in the *volost* (district) is observed. If in 1850, their number was around 80 then in 1911 more than 650. Along with an agriculture, some mechanization of the agricultural work come to the East Trans-Baikal region early in XX century. However, the majority of the agricultural implements was related to procurement of forage for animals for the winter rather than agriculture. As opposed to Mongols who were not practically engaged in procurement of forage for the winter. Buryats practiced a procurement of forage already before appearance of the first Russian pioneers in Trans-Baikal region. However, an intensification of haymaking was related to the cultural influence of the Russian migrants and to adoption of more improved haymaking technology. Towards the end of XIX century already 70% of Aginsky Buryat's farms become to engaged in haymaking.

At the Soviet period, the strong changes took place which were caused by joining of the Buryat nomadism in the Soviet economy system.

Among the Buryats, the sedenterization and agriculture were actively cultivated. One can identify several stages of the forces modernization of Buryats *collectivization* of nomads in 1920s-1930s. Ploughing up of pastures in 1950s (*tselina*) and introduction of agriculture methods unsuitable under extreme natural conditions of Trans-Baikal region, new wave of liquidation of pastoral collective farms and privatization of animals in 1990s caused still greater crisis in agro-economical sector. By the time of the USSR collapse, in the Aginsky National District about 28/5% of land was used for agricultural purposed.

At the Soviet period (1917-1991), the specific fine-wool sheep species for stalled keeping This was a serious achievement in the agricultural science. New sheep was more delicate, could not like under the open sky in winter but provided more wool and meat. The Soviet power perceived the nomadic pastoralism as a backward form of economy and planned to do a transition of Buryats to the settled life and engagement in agriculture. For this reason,

among Buryats, a policy of agriculture stimulation, development of stalled forms of cattle-breeding directed to the commercial arming has been pursued. Many old traditions of cattle-breeding were rejected as wrong (for example, in place of coarse-haired Buryat sheep, the fine-wool sheep were breeded; this led to a necessity of the stalled keeping of sheep, procurement of hay and, as a result, trampling down near settlements increased and anthropogenic effect on pastures enhanced).

The growth in demand for mean required to increase the population of sheep. Total number of sheep in 1970-1980s approached 900000 head. Also, the traditional pastoral stock structure of the Eurasian nomads was transformed (I reconstructed it for Buryats, see above). Total number horses, goats and camels reduced seriously. The head of live-stock decreased about two times. The number of sheep in the stock structure increased (from 60% on the 19-20 centuries boundary to 85–90% in 1990s). All this raised a load on grass and trampling down of pastures. The fine-fleeced sheep of the local breed has been called "golden" among people and the great part of this metaphor was true. The wages of a good herder was at that time not lower and, possibly, higher than that of the university's professor. Among the Communists Party leaders of the District, the forcible idea has emerged to carry the number of sheep to one million.

The sheep have broken the upper soil layer by hoofs, eaten and trampled down grass faster than other domestic animals. Early in the 1990s, the District was on the verge of the ecological crisis. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and new economic policy have impeded this process. But the receipt of subsidies and lax credits from the center has been stopped. The State did not almost support the surviving state stock-raising businesses and individual farmers. The vast difference between the prices for meat and wool and prices for electric energy, gasoline, artificial fodders has emerged. All of this has resulted in a crisis of the sheep-producing branch. The sheep-breeding became unprofitable. The main reason was an enormous difference between prices for meat and wool and prices for electrical energy, gasoline, artificial forge for animals. The state did not practically assist to the state cattle-breeding farms and individual farmers. If a prime coast of 100 kg of mutton after liberalization of prices in 1992 was 1785 rubles, it managed to sell it for 1130 rubles. Many collective farms were closed down, infrastructure proved to be ruinous and many farmers lost everything. The wool production has reduced nearly two and a half times while mutton production nearly six times. It became not advantageous to keep animals. There was a mass slaughter of animals. The total number of sheep has decreased to 220 thousand (in 1998). All this suggests the complex processes occurring in the present agrarian economy of the Aginsky National District.

Table 13.1. Cattle head (as of January 1 of the mentioned year)

Years	Cattle	Sheep	Horses
1991	98400	771500	13100
1996	70600	268800	13800
2001	69800	168000	10200
2005	84500	222700	11600

From the beginning of privatization the *kolkhoz* (collective-farm) system began to collapse. The common grounds and cattle began to divide into parts, collective farmers began to be allocated in individual owners – farmers and personal households. From all collective farms of district has kept the former form of the organization only kolkhoz Kunkur (see detail Kradin 2004: 103–105). However now the population of district has returned to old kolkhoz system. The name of these organizations varies, that is connected to the taxation. However essence is former. People survive together.

At present, the crisis situation in the District's agriculture relaxed. A load of animals on the pastures reduced. Grasses began to restore their productivity. As one of informants spoke in the year before last: "Now, nature began to breathe". In some places, pastures are so many and animals are so little that the pastures live for long in the winter stands and even do not store up the hay. The standing grass lasts the whole cold period right up to appearance of a new grass. Now the ordinary summer camp is a poor wooden shed with the earthen floor. Within the shed, there are beds, table and chairs. Without fail, there are a small stove and gas oven for preparation of food during warm periods. In the street, there are opened enclosures for sheep and cows. A distance from the summer nomad camp to the winter one is usually 10–20 km. When removing from one camp to the other, practically the whole property is taken away. Sometimes, the basic property is left in the winter camps but then a watchman of old men lives there in summer.

The winter camp is warmer than the summer one. One can live in the house. The enclosures are protected against winds and warmed with a ground or dry manure. Here, there are often subsidiary buildings, bath-house. When in 1970s, the electricity was available, the life became more comfortable. TV-sets, different electric mechanisms, refrigerators appeared. Now many pastoralists have cars. If for the traditional Buryats the horse was the main prestigious goods, now it is an "iron horse". Usually there are popular car of Soviet heads – *Volga,* and also the Russian (*GAZ*) or Japanese jeeps.

The cattle breeding allows a personal farm the meat. Buryats consume it more than, for example, Russians. Buryats are pastoralists traditionally, and Russian have typically agricultural feed model. Also the pastoral economy provides people with money. Realization of meat in the market enables to receive free money in conditions of chronic nonpayment wage plans in an

agriculture of district (many calculations are conducted by barter). This finance direct on purchase of necessary products (salt, sugar, groats, noodles), purchase of clothes, textbooks for schoolboys, payment for training for students.

A decay of the pastoralism and lower living conditions have led to a sharp reduction in the number of herders and professional specialists in the cattle breeding. The birth rate has decreased and migration of young people to cities of Chita and Ulan-Ude has begun. Many experienced herders have retired. As a consequence, a number of significant traditional and new knowledge in the cattle-breeding were lost. In the conversations with the young herders, I was given the impression that many of them have no a clear idea of gustatory qualities of grass, are not able to use the techniques of cattle pasture which were applied by their parents.

Unfortunately, many people have not appreciated the danger of the demographic changes being in the District. The considerable number of administrators of different levels with whom I has conversed believes that this is, in many respects, a forced problem. However, there are such persons who understand all gravity of the present situation. One of the chairmen of kolkhozs said me openly in summer of 2003: "It should be said that no educational work with the village youth is carried out. The old people can nothing pass on. The knowledge is passed only to the children of herders. The herders know that their major task is to drive calves away a herd but they have no idea what grass should be used for pasturage. There is an intense migration to district centers. The young people find a work and leave for".

Table 13.2. Cattle stock structure (as of January 1 of mentioned year)

Enterprises/years	1991	1996	2001	2005
Agricultural enterprises				
Cattle	52.1%	20.2%	14.0%	14.5%
Sheep and Goat	90.3%	77.4%	72.0%	75.7%
Personal subsidiary plots				
Cattle	47.9%	74.0%	80.7%	80.5%
Sheep and Goat	9.7%	18.2%	23.9%	20.5%
Farms				
Cattle	-	5.8%	5.3%	5.0%
Sheep and Goat	-	4.4%	4.1%	3.8%

For the sake of justice, it should be noted that a loss of habits of the traditional nature management has not started immediately after 1991. It was related to the formation of the kolkhoz system in the 1930s. Conducting a collectivization, the government and Party have considered it as a wide complex of actions directed not only to a growth in the economic efficiency of the branch but also to a building-up of a worker of a new type. Toward this end,

the settlements have been established, boarding schools have constructed, mechanization of the agricultural labor has been started. However, the reform intended proved to be double-edged weapon. The labor of herder is a highly skilled one requiring a long practical training. Most often, the habits of the traditional management have been passed from parents to children in the course of the socialization. After the children became to send to boarding schools, they proved to be alienated for a long time from parents remaining with the herds on pastures. This has disturbed the education system formed through the ages. With each new generation, there has been a loss of habits and knowledge.

For the last decade, the flock structure has sharply changed by the economy categories. If, for a Soviet period, it was not permitted to keep more than 10 head of cattle in a household then, after removing of this unfair restriction, the number of small cattle in the private sector has amounted to a nearly one fifth of this category of animals. The number of the cattle in the structure of agricultural enterprises has sharply decreased (from 52% to 14%) while the number of cows in the farms has increased from 47.9% to 81%. To a great extent, this was caused by the considerable naturalization of the economy and a survival of the District's population at the expense of private resources (dairy produce and mutton during warm season, meat and milk products (cattle) during the cold seasons, selling of meat to get the spare cash at the end of summer-at the beginning of autumn).

Table 13.3. Productivity of pastoralism

	1997	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Milk yield on one cow (kg)	626	476	513	399	340	435
Wools clip on one sheep, kg	2,6	2,4	2,7	3,1	3,2	3,2
Increase of calf	3318	2257	2245	2918	3313	3252
Increase of lamb	62330	38240	43283	54767	63862	61838
Loss of cattle	963	718	519	225	154	625
Loss of sheep's and goat's	25191	21067	10397	5395	5230	6839
Loss of cattle in % of turnover of herd	6	6	4	2	1	5
Loss of flock in % of turnover of herd	10	12	6	3	2	3

Today, the evident progress in the branch development is not observed. Many administrators consider the maintenance of the current level of livestock and arrangement of conditions for some growth in the number of animals as their main objective. Many kolkhozs have ceased to sell the milk because it is not recompensed (only one of 27 inspected farms supplied the milk to market).

In the last few years, the District's Administration provides subsidies for the dairy and meat produce and interest-free loans for purchase of fertilizers, seed and fuel. On the whole, some positive dynamics in the livestock was outlined. In many respects, it is a result of the weighted, balanced policy of the today's administration.

In recent years, the price for wool has also increased which has resulted in some intensification of its supplies. The District's Administration provides also the subsidies for wool harvesting. The wool is sold to different places – factories in Ulan Ude, Omsk and other cities. Kolkhozs, as a rule, do not sell their products independently. The general control of the wool realization is exercised by the District's Administration.

Table 13.4. Wool production (in tons)

	1990	1995	2000	2004
Agricultural enterprises	2398	690	345	528
Personal subsidiary plots	307	371	145	160
Farms	-	48	19	20
Total	2705	1109	509	668

The paternalist policy with the respect to kolkhozs is discovered in all respects – from realization of products and re-distribution of subsidies (25-38 million rubles from 2002 to 2004) to expectations of people themselves that the state in the person of the District's Administration Governor, President of Russia Federation and Government takes, without fail, care of them in their hour of need. This is well seen, for example, from the results of questioning of heads of the District's kolkhozs carried out in summer, 2003. More than 70% of respondents have noted that the state has no a competent policy with respect to the agriculture (and that is, undoubtedly, absolutely right). However, many of the heads poorly represent the realities of the modern market economy and are not practically acquainted with the modern marketing. When I attempted to clear up from them, for example, market prices for the stock-raising products, it turned out that many of them have a vague idea of this. So, by data of different questioners, differences in price for a sheep varied from 800 to 1500 rubles while those for one kilogram of mutton from 38 to 65 rubles. In reply to the question: "What month is the most expensive mutton on?", April, May, June, July and even November and January were named. And the answer to the question: "What month is the most cheap mutton on?", included all of months from August to March.

The easiest conclusion is in that the survival of the stock-raising branch depends on both the balanced state policy and activity of the inhabitants themselves. However, to create the verily market stock-raising branch on the District territory, it is necessary not only to destroy a still traditional, paternalist

mentality of residential population (in the XX century, the state paternalism of the Soviet power was imposed on it) but also to introduce consistently private property for the land. The experience of the transformation of the stock-raising communities of Asia and Africa and their adaptation to the market economy of industrial states in the last centuries (as the privatization process in our country) shows that the consequences can be not only unexpected but also disastrous. The social sciences are not always able to predict the real scenarios of development. In this situation, the special mission is given to the anthropology – its main task is to bring an idea of incorrigibility of any drastic economic and political solutions home to the public consciousness.

14

THE TRANSITION OF TUVINIAN PASTORALISM IN CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The aim of this paper is an analysis of the contemporary state of the pastoral sector in the South Siberia in comparison with transformation processes being among other nomads in the Central and Inner Asia. In 1998-2008, the field studies were carried out in the Baikal area (Ust-Orda District, Western Buryats), Buryatia, Trans-Baikal region (Aginsky District, Eastern Buryats), Khakassia, Tuva. The scenarios of events in these regions were similar. On the one hand, the socialist method of the pastoralism modernization has resulted in the economy intensification, nurture of new strains of cattle, increase in deliveries of meat, wool and milk. The sedenterization has been realized and living conditions of pastoralists were improved. New houses, schools and stores were built and the electricity was installed in the seasonal stations. On the other hand, the population sedenterization and growth of animal number have resulted in the pasturable digression while the ploughing-up of steppe has contributed to erosion. Towards the end of the Soviet epoch, majority of pastures have suffered an overgrazing. However, after the USSR collapse, the economical crisis rather than ecological one took place. Privatization, rise in prices for energy resources, reduction in area under crops have resulted in degradation of merino sheep breeding.

In this paper I present the results of field studies in Republic if Tuva in 2002 and 2008. This study was supported by grants of Russian Foundation of basic Research # 06-06-80234a, № 08-06-10006k. In 2002 we had only pilot studies. In 2008, the households (farms, *stoyanka* – Rus.) in the forest-steppe (Western Tuva) and steppe (Southern Tuva) zones were examined. In 2008, investigations were conducted in three *kozuns* (local districts) of Tuva Republic: Erzinsky, Ulug-Khemsky and Dzun-Khemchiksky.

Some camps in two typical for the Tuva pastoral ecological areas of Tuva were surveyed. The public inquiry, interviewing of farmers, kolkhoz members, experts of different ranks (representatives of authorities, heads of local administrations, chairmen of kolkhozes, livestock experts etc.) were made. The observations of stock-breeders' life were performed, interviewing of private owners, head of local authorities, experts was conducted. The work in the archival institutions and libraries was carried out.

Pastoral economy

The base of the Tuva's economy is pastoralism. For a period after 1991, a considerable naturalization of the agriculture and restoration of the traditional pastoralism took place. The number of livestock and horses has reduced more than two times. By 1991, 1.226 thousand sheep and goats were counted in Tuva. By 2002, the total number has decreased nearly two times, to 614 thousand head. At present, the situation has stabilized at the level of about 750 thousand animals. The total number of cattle has also reduced two times (from 205 thousand head to 106 thousand head). The number of horses has decreased from 40 thousand to 26 thousand head. The situation in the camel- and deer-raising is even worse. The total number of camels has fallen from 1.5 thousand to 159 head. The number of deer has decreased from 8 thousand to 1.7 thousand head. However, the critical point was observed in 2002. On the whole, not great growth in the number of animals was observed in the last few years. However, pedigree stock-breeding is not carried out and quality of the existing breed is worsened.

The composition of herd has changed by categories of economy. If about 55% of total number of cattle in the Soviet time were in possession of agricultural enterprises, then, now, about 75% of animals are in private ownership of population while a share of enterprises decreased to a quarter. The same situation is observed in the sheep breeding. In 1991, about 80% of sheep and goats have belonged to enterprises. By now, only 46% of the small cattle remained in possession of the state. A share of private households has increased from 20% to 52.5%. A share of farms is insignificant. At the beginning of the farming motion (in the mid-1990s), they owned 7–10% of sheep and goats. Now, this figure is not more than 1%. The same situation is observed with respect to horse breeding. In 1991, the enterprises owned 78% of horses whereas population only 22%. At present, enterprises have 33% of horses. Population owns 2/3 of horses. A share of farmers is only 0.6%.

The changes are caused by different factors. On the one hand, a lack of support on the state side and high prices for energy and low prices for agricultural products have resulted in ruin of many agricultural enterprises. Now, the agricultural enterprises have practically no money for purchase of farming machines and building materials. They buy only fuel, electric energy, mixed fodder and coal. On the other hand, the personal initiative and interest in preservation and increase of the property have contributed to increase in the number of cattle among population. However, products obtained in the private households are basically intended for their own consumption.

For a period after 1991, an essential naturalizing of the agriculture and return to the traditional cattle breeding have occurred. The majority of kolkhozes were divided into separate farms. Formerly, there were many pump wells. Now, the most of them are destroyed. For this reason, the amplitude of

movements and seasonal migrations has reduced. Many cattle farmers were forced to reject the seasonal migrations due to a lack of the artificial water sources. The nomads try to stay close by water. This results in an increase of loading on pastures located near the water sources. They remain on the same spot during several years which results in increase of load on the resources despite the fact that total numbers of animals has decreased. Within the near-border areas, the rhythms of seasonal migrations were disturbed due to fear of the cattle-lifting. This has caused an additional increase in load on pastures. The raids for the purpose of cattle-lifting have carried out as in the Middle Ages.

Cattle-hijacking in Contemporary Tuva

The existence of ancient and medieval nomads was apprehensive and perilous. The apprehensions and dangers could take the steppe inhabitants anywhere. One of such dangers was *baranta* (Turk.) – a bold foray of members of different tribes for the purpose of rustle of domestic animals. In order to illustrate this, it is sufficient to take, for example, the heroic biography of Genghis Khan *Secret History of the Mongols*. There, a multitude of information of existence of similar customs among Mongols and their neighbors is presented.

So, in § 90-93 of this chronicle (Rachewiltz 2004), a touching story of Temujin's acquaintance with his future closest associate Bo'orču who helped him to strip the horse-stealers of his horses is reported. In other section – § 128 – it is told about the breach of Genghis Khan with Jamuqa. As a reason for a conflict, a murder of Jamuqa brother – Tačar – served after he has stolen the herd of horses from one of the Genghis Khan camps. One can adduce the infinite number of such examples.

It would seem, how all of the foregoing is related to our times. However, the post-Soviet period is distinguished by the surprising property – regeneration of most diverse phenomena and forms being of the archaic nature. I had already to lay emphasis on similar components in the political culture of the post-Soviet societies (Kradin 2010). A burst of activity in formation of the neo-shamanistic, occulted and analogous institutions of various kinds is even visible with the naked eye. For the stock-raising society, a restoration of the system of *saun* relations (herd to farms out) should be noted (Kradin 2004). The mass cattle-lifting stated in Tuva during recent period is one more phenomenon of this kind.

It is important to note that the theft of cattle during the pre-Soviet period was widely occurring among Tuvinians and one of hobbies of youths and lower-income nomads. One of informants emphasized in his story in this respect: "The theft of cattle in Tuva was always observed, even with the advent

of Buddhism. Many Tuvinians are at a time both shamanists and Buddhist but they did not keep the commandments. Tuvinians have kept an idea of knockover which was as late as the Middle Ages. Tuvinians have stolen the cattle from the Russian Cossacks, Kazakhs and Mongols". In the Soviet times, this phenomenon became to be considered as a crime and was reduced to a minimum. After collapse of the USSR, it again bloomed opulently on the Tuva territory. It is natural that it is far from the classical *baranta* – institution of forming the military habits and rise in status for young people and poor men – in form and, particularly, in content. The contemporary pastoralists are ordinary offenders stealing or slaughtering the cattle with the view of its quick realization on the food market and receiving of profit. But that is just the point. The thefts of domestic animals became the essential truth of the life of the contemporary Tuvinian society.

It exists in the Republic at interstate, federal (with respect to other subjects of Russia Federation) and local levels. At the international level, the serious contradictions caused by the intermutual thefts of stock on the border territories arose between Tuvinian and Mongolian after 1991. I has often listened the stories of informants from both Mongolian and Russian territories in which the responsibility was usually shifted on the adverse party. One way or another, it created a considerable tension in the near-border relations. The events of fire weapon employment and murders were known. Sometimes, it is difficult to separate a horse-stealing from contraband cattle drive across the border. But in both first and second cases, it results in the countermeasure on the part of the federal structures. Not infrequently, the conflicts between the local slashers and frontier guards were accompanied by fire-fights. As far as is known from mass-media, this problem was even discussed at the level of governments of both countries.

A danger of loss of the domestic animals resulted in that the nomads became to leave the hazard areas. If a change in routes of migrating moving in Mongolia had no practical impact on the range condition then, for comparatively inconsiderable in size Tuva, it resulted in the load increase upon the winter and spring pastures.

The Tuvinian cattle-stealers carry off the stock from not only Mongols but also Old Believers, Altaians and Khakassians. In November, 2002, a crime happened when, at the time of the attack, one Altaian herdsman was killed while the other one was badly wounded. It resulted in the creation in the near-border areas of the Republic of Altai of voluntary people's patrols of local residents which, along with law-enforcement agencies went to war against the Tuvinian cattle-stealers. The statistics suggests that the detection of similar crimes is very little: about 20% in cases of the great cattle and only 18% in cases of sheep and goats.

Finally, not only representatives of other nationalities and ethnic groups but also ordinary Tuvinians are targets of crimes. Of a verity, the criminality knows no any bounds. One of the informants resident at the Piy-Khemsky *kozhun* informed, in 2002, that if, at the beginning of the privatization process, he possessed a quite large herd – about 150 sheep, 40–50 goats, three cows and stallion with female horse, then, in ten years, only 5 sheep, 15 goats and one milk cow remained in his household. It appears to him that the main reason of the ills of his life is *baranta*. The informant believes that this practice has gained major distribution in Tuva from the mid-1990s. The same time is called by other asked the pastoralists.

The same informant describes a nature of typical migrations in the Piy-Khemsky *kozhun* as follows. Movement from the summer ranges to the winter ones was made at the end of October, after snowfall. At the end of March, the grassy clearings appear on the slopes where the animals graze off while a full movement to the spring pastures occurs in the first half of April. In spring, the weather is windy because the snow dissolves and, due to temperature difference, the strong winds blow. At the time, much livestock perishes. Here, in the Piy-Khemsky kozhun, there is a great quantity of snow in winter while its quantity is small in the central and southern Tuva. Here, a snow depth reaches about 50 cm. In winter, the animals are driven into the shed – *ulyg kozha* while, in summer, into the enclosure. In winter, the animals are turned out at dawn and returned after dark. In summer, around six o'clock the cattle goes to graze up to 9–11 o'clock and stands near the river and drinks up to three o'clock and then again it keeps grazing up to 8–9 o'clock.

On the question "in what way and when the cattle is stolen" the same person told: "The cattle may be stolen at night from the yard and also in the afternoon. The grass near the river is high and there the thieves are on the watch for cattle and drive it down the river [in order to double back]. Now, there is a gun for fight against the thieves. It is no good to search the livestock; we filed without result the police reports. Police and thieves all hold together. The thieves go shares with police".

As the typical reasons of arising of this phenomenon, many informants point out economic collapse, weakness of state and police, instability of life of the general public. "Many people have no wages. All this makes people to steal", – one of the most commonly encountered point of view sounds something like this. However, the local residents suggest not infrequently the traditional nature of this phenomenon in Tuva: "We say from times immemorial the very person who has driven the cattle is the hero". These words were pronounced in 2002 and, thenceforth, situation became more stable.

Everyday and seasonal living

The daily pace of life (we are dealing with summer) is as follows. As soon as the sun rises, the milking operation begins. The calves are allowed to approach the cows in order to appease them. After that, the calves are pulled away from cows and tied nearby. A cow is usually stripped incompletely and a part of milk is left for calves. The Tuvinians believe that this contributes to the best development of the young stock. One cow provides about 7-8 litres of milk. In the evening, the cows are at first driven and milked and, afterwards, the sheep are driven. Time of a herd driving is regulated by the sun set-rise and is intuitively determined by the stockbreeder. In the heart of summer (July), the owner brings the sheep around six o'clock. By eight o'clock, he, leisurely, goads them to the camp. At a later time (within 10-15 minutes), the cows return home. The housewife goes to milk. At first, the calves are unpened one by one. They are permitted to have a suck at an udder, then the calves are tied near their mother and the housewife starts to milk. Concurrently with the milking operation, the chief father is engaged in milk distilling (at that time, there are not children at camp). The colostral milk is poured into the barrel for milk arrack. Nobody milks goats.

The cattle are yarded in the following order: first cows and then calves. Then the goatlings are separated from the adult goats and yarded to the shelter. Hereafter, the adult goats and sheep are yarded. All the procedure of the cattle milking and driving takes around an hour and a half.

A typical site includes yurt, farmyard as well as, possibly, some additional household outbuildings – sheds, cookhouses or cookplace (*povarka* – Rus.) etc. The Tuvinian *yurts* are home-made. In the Republic, there are several enterprises which carry on such business. The frame costs 30.000 rubles (1.000 USD) while the overall price with account of felt and furniture (two bedsteads and chests) reaches 80.000 rubles (in contrast, yurt in Mongolia costs as much as twice and, maybe, even more is cheeped).

As a rule, the children live in summer at camps and trained to work from their childhood, gain skills in traditional way of life – horseriding, grazing of livestock, milking operation and processing of dairy products, livestock management etc. The functional differentiation by sex and age is traced. The boys tend sheep and great cattle while the girls juice and help to process food and to clean house. The children are often sent for water for home needs. As far as I understood, the grown-ups leave not infrequently the children alone, at that, the eldest children undertake the execution of parent functions. Making of arrack is not considered to be forbidden. In my presence, the boys engaged in distillation of *khot'pook*. They received about a glass from one canister. For 4 hours of work, they succeeded in obtaining 2 plastic one-liter bottles. The grown-ups do it with a fine art.

The important problem is one of provision of the household with water. In the Soviet times, there were many wells. It is true, that, in opinion of some informants, the number of wells was insufficient. Mainly, the wells were located at those sites where the great cattle was ranched. If the wells were absent the water was delivered to sites by water carts for a full year at the rate of 6-7 l per sheep and 20-30 liter per a cow or horse. By now, all pumps and pipes were sold for scrap. The stockbreeders try usually to take stand close to the water. This reduces the number of yearly movements (migrations) and results in increase in load on pastures situated nearly the water sources. For personal consumption, water is usually carried by horses from a river or spring. Typical norm is a pair of trips a day 20–30 l each.

The other important problem is provision of households with firewood. In the western, forest-steppe Tuva, people go sticking not infrequently around the sites but it is preferable to carry wood "from taiga", i.e. from behind hills covered with coniferous species. Now, there is a great deal of fire-damaged forests due to continuous summer fires but, for transportation, the vehicle is needed. One can also burn *kizyak* (pressed dung) in stove. At the permanent winter sites, a thick layer of *kizyak* is formed in position of farmyard. *Kizyak* is dried and used subsequently as a fuel.

A preparation of arrack occupies a highly important place in the everyday rhythm. Because a household is small (in all, three milk cows), its owners prepare the arrack (Tuv *araka*, weak milk vodka) every 2-3 days. This process is as follows. The bowl is put on the oven. Into it, the sourdough from skim milk (*khot'pook*) is poured. It is stored at standard 36-litre milk can in the yurt. From above, the cylindrical container without bottom and upper cover is put. The functions of the upper cover are performed by the second bowl. For sealing, the joint between the container and bowl is circumferentially tied up by special rag. The bowl performs functions of cooler. Into it, different waste with water (generally, clear water worth its weight in gold!) are poured.

Inside the container, a trough crossing it in the middle is mounted. In the container, there is a hole through which the product flows from the trough in the special pipe. The pipe is inserted in a tea-kettle and tea-kettle is covered with a poly bag for convenience. The system is extraordinarily simple. The device itself is called *shurun*. Unfortunately, the alcohol abuse flourishes in the present-day Tuvinian village. Many men lose themselves into drinking. By the way, this is characteristic of many rural regions of today's Russia.

At present, Tuvinians, as opposed to Butyats, have almost completely changed over to the aboriginal breed which may be out in the open almost the year round. Of Tuva, the almost complete breakdown of the institutions of the collective husbandry is also characteristic. In the main, only some individuals are engaged in cattle breeding.

The seasonal cycle is as follows. The traditional Tuvinian pastoralism has supposed four seasonal migrations. The same model was used in the Soviet times. The winter camps were situated in the warmer places protected against the winds. A movement to the spring pastures has occurred in May. In June, the sheep were sheared (now, a shearing is carried out in May over fears of tick-borne encephalitis). Upon that, the herd was shifted to the summer pastures. The summer camps were located in the submontane belt ("in taiga") where the weather was a cooler weather. In August, hay was made. Early in September, the cattle were moved to the autumn camp where the herd and people lived until the snowfall (end of October) and, only after that, the winter quarters were occupied. At present, many herders use only winter and summer pastures. This is related to destruction of the system of pump wells in consequence of which a considerable part of lands was removed from service. The cattle head decreased and herders do not be afraid to trample down the grass. However, for the reason that the load on the same sections is 2–3 times greater, the pasture degradation is observed. The other factor being of fundamental importance until recent years is a risk to lose the cattle as a result of raids from the Mongolia territory. For this reason, manypastoralists have migrated inward Tuva.

Case study of one camp

For better visualization of the life of the contemporary Tuvinian pastoralists, it makes sense to make a detailed description of one of the households. The household under consideration is located in the *sumon* of Erzin (southern Tuva) alvost alongside of the Mongolian frontier. The area of *sumon* (*sumon* – local part of *kozhun*) is 4405 ha. In the *sumon*, 3,282 people (1,528 men and 1,734 women) were legally registered. Total livestock number is 17,051 including 13,482 sheep and goats, 2,788 great cattle, 785 horses and 86 pigs. There is a market in Erzin and many Mongols engage in trade there but there are no Chinese.

The household under consideration is situated at 13 km to the north-west of Erzin, on the left bank of Tys-Khem River (northern shore of the Bas-Khol Lake). The camp includes yurt and farmyard. It seems the yurt was made in accordance with classical canons; however, there is a spirit of the times. The door faces the south, lake. When facing the entrance, one can see on the right hand a broom, slop-bucket and two dressers (one in a traditional style). On the west and east, there are two bedsteads while, on the northern side, 4 chests with traditional ornament.

The owner of camp born in 1950 has a family consisting of 8 people. He has six children – three sons and three daughters. The eldest son is 37 while younger daughter is 19. All of children are adult. In addition, two granddaughters who help in domesticities live now at the camp.

The owner possesses UAZ-469 and truck GAZ. Until 1992, he was trucker while his wife was counter-jumper. After 1992, he became sheepherder. The owner is foremost worker. He grazes more than 100 horses, 80 cows, 1,500 sheep and goats (300 of them belong to sovkhoz). At present, the horses are at the summer pasture ("in taiga"), most cows (15 milk-cows and their calves as well as bull-calves) are at the same place while only 4 milk-cows and calves are at camp. In this year, there is little grass "in taiga", therefore, the animals should be separated. One of sons being on holiday lives now "in taiga". He lives in a tent, milks cows little – only for himself, and the milk is mainly consumed by calves. The straight distance is about 30 km. However, because the herd should be driven round about, the distance reaches approximately 60 km. This is all the day of passage for cows and horses. Passage of sheep takes two days. During rainy season, there is much grass. There is also a small creek from which one can take water for household needs.

Where the summer nomad camp of this year is situated, many other camps are located. The relations between shepherds are neighbourly, the strange is at first glance detected. If the animals are lost, all of shepherds help to find them. In 2008, the conditions for nomadism were favorable. The owner says that when the herd will be joined, he will make the cooking butter and sour cream for the winter. The spring pastures are not far located. The winter camp is at 3 km to the south of the summer one. The people live at winter camps usually from November to April. The winter is cold and lasts 4-5 months. There is the salt-water lake near the winter camp and it was too cold there. The frosts may be such that the thermometer goes off scale. From April to the end of June, the cattle graze off in the spring pastures. As the reference point, a snow melting serves. Because the snow disappears it is necessary to move the sheep to pastures provided with water resources. In the spring pastures, the animals graze off till the end of sheepshearing.

Earlier, the shearing sets were used while, now, the herders have to shear sheep by hand. A shearing of one sheep takes 7-8 minutes. One native sheep or Angora goat provides 2-3 kg of product. The wool is sold to dealers at the price of 4-5 rubles/kg or realized in Kyzyl at the price of 8 rubles/kg (if motor car or unexpected turn is available). Now, prices for the wool are very knock-down. The principal character of the Nikita Mikhalkov film *Urga* would be astonished getting to know that one kilogram of wool costs cheaper than a contraceptive sheath (!!). Goats are also sheared. There is little the Tuvinian goats, the Angora breed prevails mainly. Earlier, price of 1 kg of mohair-producing breed wool reached 50-60 rubles.

The summer pastures are used in July-August while the winter ones from September through November. They are located close to the winter quarters. It is necessary to do repair. The river should be also nearby in order to water animals. But they drink not so much. If animals drink little then they couch for

a long time and calmly. In means that much fat will be for winter. The animals go to the river to drink when they want. "In winter, we do not water cows and pay no attention to herd of horses". The animals lick a snow. Snow is deep and the winds are strong. When much snow falls tractors disturb the snow. The snow is removed by the special wedge and animals may get on to grass. In winter, there is no need to drive the sheep far away from the camp for them not to thin away.

The hay is made by the herders in August. This operation is executed by every herder. About 10 trucks of hay are needed in the case of hard and snowy winter. "If you will keep the sheep well in hand, then the yeanlings will be healthy".

The informant believes that the local traditional breed is most appropriate for the local conditions. It may live in the open air and out at feed. The sheep graze themselves, they are easy-care and are not in need of other food. The sheep and goats themselves know way home. The sheep at this camp are unpent and stay overnight near the yurt. The owner believes that they become fatter (they may graze until it got dark). Only goats are enfolded. The lambing occurs in March. In order to lamb in appropriate time it is necessary to allow rams to meet with female sheep in October. At other time, an apron should be tied (but it may break) or the rams should be isolated. It is more correctly to have a separate flock for handling of rams from December through October.

Around half of a month after fall of yeanlings, a moving to the spring pastures begins. At the time, the yeanlings may already have a few hay and fresh grass. A month later, there is little milk (because dried grass is insufficient) and yeanlings should graze. At the late July, the yeanlings should be kept separated from the mother for her not to thin away. At the time, the yeanlings may eat out the same food as the adult animals.

The castration of yeanlings is carried out at the age of one month. At the same time, their ears are cropped. Every year, the owner uses different marks in order to distinguish his own animals by age. The sheep are kept for 5-6 years while gelt rams 6-7 years. The public-owned animals are given back to kolkhozes while those possessed by the owner are sold or slaughtered for meat. It is best to do this in October while the animals are fat. Until December, the payments for animals are made and the stock is cleaned from culled animals.

The foals are generally born from February to May. In winter, they are born in the open air. "If a foal stands up at once and suckles then it will be sound. However, it will long lie, then is may freeze over". Although a foaling of horses is not someway regulated but cases that they bear young ones in other months are very rare.

A castration of horses is carried out at the age of two years. In the Soviet times, the horses were marked by the brand NP – "Novy put" ("New Pathway"). This was a name of kolkhoz. This brand is used up to date. At

present, the number of sovkhozes is very small. In the district under study, this sovkhoz is single.

For inspection of the herd of horses, the owner gets up at five o'clock while the cows are inspected in the evening. When the cows feed calves then they come certainly home. But, if there are not calves, the cows may remain at the pasture. In this case, it is needed to drive them home. The sheep are put to grass when the day is dawning. In winter, their tracks are immediately visible. During a warm season when a hot weather prevails, it is needed to drive the sheep to water. The sheep should be rounded up for them not to go away.

In the periods when there is a real hazard, people overnight alongside of the horse herd and return home at 4–5 o'clock. Earlier, it was especially dangerous when many animals were stolen. The cattle-lifters have mainly been naughty at night. Mongols have also fallen on and stolen horses and cows. Even though the tracks in the snow demonstrate that the animals were stolen, the frontier guards could do nothing.

A distance from the summer camp to the frontier is only 30-40 km. Mongols pass commonly a frontier not far. The herd shifts quickly, therefore the herds of horses are stolen. One phrase of the informant outlines properly all the difficulties of Tuvinian cattle breeder: "A shepherd spends all his life in open air in spite of hot weather or cold one. There is no undisturbed sleep. If dog barks it is needed to jump out of bed and check animals".

Discussion and conclusions

Due to fundamental transformation of the stock-raising business in Tuva, the majority of kolkhozes were divided into separate households. By the mid-1990s, the infrastructure (power lines, pump wells, farmyards and camps) ceased to function in many districts. Many pastoralists have to abandon the seasonal migrations due to lack of artificial water sources. They remain on the spot for several years which results in an increase in pressure on resources despite the fact that the total number of animals has decreased. Within the near-border areas, the rhythms of seasonal migrations were disturbed due to a hazard of cattle-lifting. This has resulted in additional growth in load on the pastures. The raids with the view of cattle-lifting were carried out as in the Middle Ages. Only at the present time, a situation has partially stabilized.

A comparison with data of these examinations shows that the events in the Aginsky District, Buryatia and Khakassia have developed under the identical scenario (Humphrey, Sneath 1996; Kradin 2004; 2008). By the end of the Soviet era, the majority of pastures have suffered from overgrazing. Privatization, increase in prices for energy resources, reduction in plantings gave rise to a breakdown of fine-wool merino sheep breeding. In the Aginsky District, the

sheep population has dropped 3.5 times. The sheep stock in Buryatia has decreased five times and reached less than 500 thousand head in the early 21th century. In the Ust-Ordynsky District, the sheep number has decreased from 280 thousand to 19 thousand. The sheep total in Khakassia has reduced nearly nine times and reached more than 150 thousand head in 1999. The economy in Tuva has least suffered. This was caused by the fact that the processes of collectivization there have started much later.

The economy in Tuva has suffered least of all. This was caused by the fact that the collectivization processes have there started much later. In Tuva, the total number of animals has decreased two times and considerable economy naturalization has occurred. The majority of kolkhozes have divided into individual farms. By the mid-1990s, the infrastructure (electricity, pump wells, corrals and sites) in many areas ceased to function. Many pastoralists were forced to refuse the seasonal moving-on due to absence of artificial water sources. They stay put several years and this results in the growth of pressure on resources despite the fact that the total number of animals has decreased. In the frontier areas, the rhythms of seasonal migrations were disturbed owing to the fear of cattle stealing. This has resulted in additional pressure on pastures. The real raids aiming at cattle stealing as in the Middle Ages were observed. The situation has partly stabilized only at present.

Now, the crisis situation has slowed down. The press of animals on pastures has reduced. The grasses started to restore their productivity. In some places, area of pasture land is so large and the number of animals is so small that cattlemen live always only in winter camps and do not hay. The dry grass is sufficient for the whole cold period, up to advent of young grass. However, the evident progress is not observed. The natural form of economy is characteristic of both kolkhoz cattlemen and farmers. Many kolkhozes stopped to sell dairy products because such sales are not repaid. In the last few years, the state provides the subsidies for dairy and meat products.

The situation is also analogous in other post-Soviet states – Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, Azerbaijan etc. (Finke 2005; Khazanov, Shapiro 2005). The changes in Mongolia were not so catastrophic (Bruun 2006; Humphrey, Sneath 1999; Janzen, Enkhtuvshin 2008 etc.). In the first half of 1990s, the country has also been in decline as a result of destruction of collective farms (*kolkhozes*), privatization of livestock and transition to market economy. The crisis was accompanied by inflation and price rises. The number of the great cattle has reduced by 27%, horses by 3%, sheep by 20%, camels by 47% while the goat population has increased by 47%. However, the situation has stabilized after first five crisis years. The number of individual farms of nomads has increased and total number of the livestock has grown for 10 post-Socialist years by 17% and reached 33 million head. The population of great cattle has increased from

initial value by 34% while that of horses and goats by 40% and 220% respectively.

This was caused by the transition of animals to private ownership nomadization of population and return to traditional methods of pasturage of domestic animals. This was made possible due to the fact that, in Mongolia, in contrast to Buryatia (as many other regions of Siberia and Central Asia focused in the Soviet times on breeding of new fine wool species of sheep), the native breeds of animals adapted to pasturage in the open air and being unneedful of winter stalling were not destroyed. As a result of these changes, the production of meat and milk yield in Mongolia increased by 16% and 47% respectively as compared with those early in 1990s. Many nomads draw significant income from sale of goats' wool. As a whole, this resulted in raising of living standards of the cattle breeders. According to the statistical data, the number families having TV-sets, wind-driven installations for electric energy generation, automobiles and motorcycles has increased 1.7, 2.2, 3.6 and 1.3 times respectively.

The pastoralism in the Inner Mongolia (China) has in another way transformed (Humphrey, Sneath 1996; Williams 2002). Here, the government-controlled, purposeful policy of sedenterization of nomads has been implemented which was accompanied by the large-scale mechanization, transfer of cattle to trans-stable keeping. As a result, the total number of livestock has increased from 10 million to 74 million head. This may be estimated as a giant jump in economy. However, considerable part of pastures in the Inner Mongolia is, at the present time, on the brink of serious degradation (more than one-third of pastures in the first half of 1990s. I think that the serious ecological problems will arise in this region before the Chinese government in the next decade.

As a whole, one can identify three different variants of the pastoralism transformation during the post-Socialist period for the societies under consideration. The first two variants are extensive. Both of them were caused by the crisis of the socialist system. Of them, the considerable naturalizing of economy, return to traditional principles of the cattle-breeding management without significant government intervention are characteristic. At that, the Mongolian model proved to be more viable and, maybe, the Russian specialists should take into account the experience of the nearest south neighbor. The third variant is of a pronounced "intensive" nature. It was realized under conditions of the economic upturn in China and accompanied by the qualitative transformation of the natural pastoralism into the industrial branch of the animal husbandry. However, the prospects of this way give rise to serious doubts because the intense pasture degradation is now observed on this territory.

15

BETWEEN KHANS AND PRESIDENTS. ANTHROPOLOGY OF POLITICS IN POST-SOVIET CENTRAL ASIA

Introduction

The political anthropology is traditionally considered to mean a part of anthropological science that studies institutions of power and control in the archaic and preindustrial societies as well as modernization processes of traditional and post-traditional political structures (Balandier 1967; Claessen and Skalnik 1981; Lewellen 1992; Abelels and Jeudy 1997; Gledhill 2000; Kradin 2001; Kurtz 2001; Skalnik 2004; Bocharov 2007 etc.). As independent discipline, it has formed in the framework of the British structural functionalism in early 1940s. After WWII, David Easton has attempted to formalize the political anthropology as the interdisciplinary line between the political science and anthropology (1959). However, political scientists were slightly interested in prehistory and anthropologists' interpretations contained much exotic. As a result, the politanthropology has remained within the framework of the science about human and culture.

Now, there are several different scientific schools: American neoevolutionism, British and American structural functionalism, French structuralism. In the USSR the political anthropology was officially considered as the bourgeois science and servant of imperial colonialism. Really, many researchers were occupied with political anthropology. First of all, these are orientalists who studied the state origin and wrote about the Asiatic mode of production. In addition, there were researchers of Africa and Third World, Russian ethnologists and prehistorians, some archaeologists. Lev Kubbel' contributed much to the formation of political anthropology in the USSR. In 1988 he published the first book about this subject in Russian. In this paper the subject of this discipline, political culture of primitive, early state and colonial societies are in detail analyzed and much attention is given to investigation of ideological mechanisms of power. As within the framework of Marxism it was considered that a politics is institution of the state, class society, the ethnographic discipline specializing in studying of pre-state structures could not have a word "political" as a generic feature. As a result, the *potestary ethnography* (from Latin *potestas* – power) was obtained. Beginning from

perestroika, a term *political anthropology* has gradually come into common use of the Russian scholars. This discipline has become the subject of teaching in some universities. The academic politanthropology also exists in post-Soviet Russia.

One can speak about two main tendencies of the development of this discipline in Russia. Major interests of the representatives of the first line concentrate around sociobiology of power (Butovskaya 2000; Dol'nik 1994), typology of early forms of leadership (Artemova 2000, 2003), multilinear evolution of complex societies and state origin (Vasil'ev 1993; Berezkin 1995, 2000; Popov 1995; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000; Kradin *et al.* 2000; Korotayev 2003; Grinin *et al.* 2004; Bondarenko 2006, 2007; Kradin and Skrynnikova 2006; Korotayev *et al.* 2006; Grinin 2007; Grinin, Beliaev, and Korotayev 2008 *etc.*). The second tendency includes a study of transformation of traditional and post-traditional power into the modern political institutions. By the use of ethnographic (qualitative) methods, a politanthropologist can efficiently investigate the power and control mechanisms in modern societies. The book by Viktor Bocharov (1992) where the author, on the basis of the secondary sources, showed the modernization processes in Africa became one of the first works in this field. At present this field is related to the study of the post-traditional power, tribalism, patrimonialism, clan relations, ethnocultural factors of authoritarianism, ethnic conflicts in different regions of Russia and the other countries of the CIS (Bocharov 1995, 2007; Afanas'ev 1997; Tishkov 1997, 2000, 2004; Kradin 2001; Kadyrov 2004; Bannikov 2009; Lamazaa 2010 etc.).

In this publication I will touch upon contemporary political systems of the post-Soviet states of the Central Asia and will show that some social phenomena and institutions can be interpreted as a legacy of the traditional institutions of power. I argue that combining aspects of traditional societies with the direct and uncritical adoption of Western liberal values can produce surprising results that are the opposite of what was intended. The multiparty system can be expressed in the formation of party structures on a clan – tribal or confessional basis, and also may result in large scale interethnic or religious conflicts. The system of reciprocity and gift economy can bring to bribes and corruptions. The separation of powers in democratic societies can result in chaos and disorder (because the separation of powers is, in essence, not characteristic of traditional societies).

Theoretical Foundation

The political anthropology has accumulated a great experience of the problem solving in the traditional and colonial societies of Asia, Africa, America, and the Pacific. This experience shows that the traditional and

bureaucratic (by Max Weber) patterns of domination are difficult to be compatible in practice. Democracy is the voluntary integration of independent individuals. In the post-traditional societies a man is a part of a single whole (tribe, clan, friendly association), hence, all of his activity is mediated by this single whole. Such features identified by Weber as rationality, depersonalization, competence are not characteristic of them (in the more general context, of all non western societies). In the course of time the anthropologists have understood that the support of the westernized youth, formal abolition of the traditional power institutions (it is characteristic of the states of socialist orientation) and an appointment of petty officers from residential population getting the European education did not mostly give a desired result. The former chiefs have reserved for themselves a high status while the appointees from the nonprivileged groups and, especially, from the strangers had, as a rule, no prestige (Cheng Tun-Yen and Womack 1996).

A pressure of the rational bureaucratism of colonizers resulted in a deformation and even, in some places, in a destruction of the traditional model of domination, its desacralization and establishment of the temporal *per se* system of power. In many former traditional societies (especially in Africa) the original dual political culture is established in which traditional forms of power are present in parallel with the official administration bodies. The particular interdependency is traced between the position of an individual in the party-state machinery and his status in the man's union or secret society. At that the advancement up in the hierarchy in one system is, as a rule, accompanied by the raising of a status in the another one; quite often the leaders of the traditional system of hierarchy not presented directly in the official political power have a profound impact on making the most important political decisions. Moreover as the parallel structures exert often a greater effect on their supporters than state, they influence directly on a character, forms and rate of the democratic evolution. Therefore, the perspectives of the stable democratization in Africa depend on whether the African governments will come to an agreement with these authoritative social forces about the mutually acceptable and able bodied mechanism of the separation of powers and responsibility and fair distribution of material resources to the benefit of all (Owusu 1997: 147–148).

In a society with a strong clan and tribal relations, a scale of this phenomenon becomes really large. It is related to the fact that a bearer of power in a traditional society acts always not by himself but as a representative, leader of the particular group. He is apprehended as its centre, concentration of the sacred force and should share with it his power functions and privileges. Therefore, it is not surprising that, in the countries of the Third World and new independent states, the ruling elite is making efforts to displace every one who

is not related to the members of these groupings by blood, family, and other ties from the responsible posts.

Finally a non coincidence of their administrative-territorial division and boundaries with territories of residence of traditional tribal structures is characteristic of the colonial and postcolonial societies often causes acute ethno-national and intergovernmental disputes (Balandier 1967: 188–189, 194). As recently colonial societies preserve their traditional tribal structure, party structures are often formed on the clan or tribal or confessional basis or as a tool of the personal influence of one or another leader. In this situation, there are often no political and ideological differences between the programs of different parties. Under such conditions, the elections to the representative bodies of power are based on tribal or confessional principles rather than on political programs. On the whole, all this produces instability of the ruling coalitions, they are often changed, there is an acute interfractional struggle and there is no political stability in the society. Any Asiatic state of the CIS can serve as an example of the anthropological analysis, where parties and movements arisen in the years of *perestroika* and after the USSR collapse have been established on the ethnic basis.

Clans Politics in Central Asia

At present, one can trace the influence of the local clan and clan tribal groups both in every now independent Central Asiatic state of the CIS and in the multinational republics of Russia. This phenomenon in the Soviet anthropological thought was designated in different terms: *mestnichestvo*, *ulusizm* or *kumovstvo* (tribalism or tribal nationalism) and considered as a remnant of the clan tribal or patrimonial feudal order. The Soviet party functionaries faced it seriously after the establishment of the Soviet power on the whole territory of the country. After the political repressions of local clan's elites in the 1930s, this problem was temporarily forgotten although it persisted up to the present and the anthropologists' studies of the Soviet political system demonstrate its presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the years of the publications on this subject appeared again in the mass media. It turns out that the question of the *ulusizm* as applied to the power problem remains to be as urgent as it was about seventy years ago (Masanov 1996; Amrekulov 2000; Dzhunushaliev and Ploskikh 2000; Kradin 2001; Collins 2004, 2006; Geiss 2004; Edgar 2004; Kadyrov 2004; Schatz 2004, 2005; Efegil 2006; Gullette 2006; Dzusupbekov 2009; Lamazaa 2010 etc.).

The protectionism with respect to the relatives is a particular aspect of the so-called personal relations in the pre-industrial, traditional society. In the industrial society, each person is presented as a detached individual while the relations between people take the form of the commodity-money ties. In the

pre-industrial social systems each person appears as an element of any stable collective (community, clan, military-hierarchical organization *etc.*) and relations between people are personal rather than physical. It is the personal coercion and power as applied to the relations of inequality and domination.

The practice of personal relations is founded on the important theoretical grounds. According to Max Weber, in the traditional society,

> "the place of firm business competence is occupied by the competition of initially given by the master at a free discretion, then becoming long term and, finally, stereotyped commissions and powers. They produce the competition for due chances for the payment of made efforts of both special messengers and masters themselves: owing to such interests, the business competences and, thereby, existence of departments are often constructed. All of special messengers having the long term competence are, first of all, the court functionaries of the master; the competence *not* related to the court (extrapatrimonial) is given to them on the basis of a quite superficial business similarity of the activity field in their court service or on the basis of, mainly, quite arbitrary choice of the master" (Weber 1922: 131–132).

Hence, all activity in the similar political structures is based on personal relations, personal devotion (one should remember the developments of the fall of 1998 – summer of 1999 with the permanent reshuffle of the government of the Russian Federation!).

This phenomenon has an extensive character in a society with the strong clan and tribal ties. This is related to the fact that a power bearer in a traditional society acts not by himself but as the representative and leader of a certain group. He is perceived as its centre, focal point of the sacred force and should share with it his imperious functions and privileges. It is not accidental that not a particular ruler but the whole of his lineage or clan has been considered as a holder of the "Mandate of Heaven" for the ruling of one or another territory as it was in the empire of Chingghis Khan and his heirs (it is especially true with respect to Central Asiatic states). Therefore, it is not surprising that in the countries of the Third World and new independent states, the ruling elite is making efforts to remove all those who are not connected with members of these groupings by blood, family and other ties from the responsible posts.

The authoritative closeness of the manpower policy of the party governmental nomenclature is favorable to such a removal. So, for example, a holding of the post of the First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic by Geidar Aliyev resulted in the gradual removal of Akhundov's proteges and penetration to the republic's governing bodies of his countrymen from Nakhichevan. After Aliyev's movement to Moscow with a promotion, during the reign of Bagirov, a new rotation of cadres in Azerbaijan began. Similarly, the improvement of the party

governmental nomenclature was performed, for example, in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic during the reign of Rashidov.

Sometimes the information of the clan character of the government bodies in the republics of Central Asia and the Transcaucasia infiltrated to the press bodies. In 1973 in Georgia a change of the nomenclature elite occurred. In the official party newspaper *(Zarya Vostoka*, February 28, 1973) information of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia taken place on that occasion was published the following:

> "The favoritism, regionalism, zemlyachestvo (friendly association of persons coming from the same area), place-hunting prosper owing to kindred ties and corruption... wives and members of the family begin to substitute their husbands of high standing in the post and the state problems begin to be solved in the narrow kindred, family and friendly circles."

The officials were commissioned basing on patronage, pulling strings, kindred ties, and on the principle of personal devotion rather than on their professional and moral qualities. Sometimes the unworthy persons were appointed to the top posts by recommendations of come-and-go people. The words "master said so", "master wishes so" sounded more often. In a number of cases, contrivers, bribe takers, blackmailers were able to take the governing posts by means of deceit. Among the leading employees a quite adverse opinion about undesirability to air dirty linen in public was cultivated. The facts of bribe-taking and thefts were kept secret. It is not difficult to understand what kept back in reality the official jargon of the standard newspaper formulations of those days adjusted by advisers and censors.

At present, in every nowadays independent state of the Central Asia region the influence of local clan and clan or tribal groups remains in a local tradition.

Kazakhstan Example

The questions of the Kazakhstan's political structure are more studied. In the ethnic self-consciousness of Kazakhs, four levels are identified: 1) ethnic-national, 2) *zhuz* (tribal or chiefdom confederation), 3) clan-tribal, 4) territorial independently of the ethnic belonging. Local (clan) structure is based on the *zhuz* genealogy (Great, Middle and Small Horde). The great *zhuz* traditionally roamed near the Semirechye (Seven Rivers of Central Asia). Middle zhuz occupied the East Kazakhstan territory. Small *zhuz* was located in the West Kazakhstan. However, the privileged clans – descendants of Chingghis Khan *tope* and descendants of saints *tozha* – were genealogically above any of *zhuzes* (Naumova 1991; Khazanov 1995; Masanov 1996; Smagambetova 1998).

The northern Kazakhs, as a rule, know the name of their zhuz and tribal group of the lower taxonomic level. In the south this information is of more essential significance because an individual's status and financial position depends on this (especially, under conditions of socialist deficit). The elder generation tries even to be consistent with exogamy. The clan division could be traced in funeral ceremonial rites as when carrying out the burial, the family of the deceased should give presents to the patriarchs of all clan groups residing in the settlement in question (Naumova 1991).

A well known Kazakhstan anthropologist and the leader of political opposition Nurbulat Masanov in detail considered the history of the struggle between the clan groupings of Kazakhstan in the 21st century (1996). It was the first publication about post-Soviet clan systems in anthropology. In Soviet times, in spite of the cruel Stalin's repressions, the representatives of the Middle zhuz predominated over a long period of time in the Kazakh intellectual elite: in art, science (many academicians and even the Presidents of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic) and, partly, in the party-state machinery. Since the 1960s the leading positions were caught by the Elder zhuz. Its first famous promoted worker was the main Kazakh poet Dzhambul. Kunayev holding this post from 1962 to 1986 came from the Elder zhuz. Making use of personal contacts and patronage of Leonid Brezhnev, Kunayev gradually appointed his fellow-tribesmen and relatives to many key posts. His cadet became the President of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. It was during his reign that Nursultan Nazarbayev started his career. In the years of Kunayev's reign, Kazakhs on the whole were recruited in the party-state machinery of all levels. By 1989 they made up 51 % of the administrative personnel but only 3 % qualified and 11.3 % unqualified workers in the Republic. But by 1994 the disproportion reached even greater quantities. A share of Kazakhs in the President's administration and ministry reached 74 %. The disproportion between Kazakhs and Russians in favor of the formers was present even in the local administrations of the northern areas where a share of Russians is traditionally higher. This tendency continues to grow. Only the elections to the Supreme Soviet reflect approximately a real ratio of the number between the nations and ethnic groups (Galiev et al. 1994: 43–44, 47–51; Khazanov 1995: 159–160).

The *younger* zhuz traditionally played the secondary part. Thereby, it differed in the higher corporative solidarity. During the reign of Yuri Andropov, he possibly considered the promoted workers as the competitors to Brezhnev's party elite and appointed them to a number of the key posts. However, Andropov's quick death and restoration of Breznhnev's system were a drag on this process.

In the years of *perestroika* the rivalry between *zhuzes* recommenced. Having found himself under difficult circumstances M. S. Gorbachev decided

to send to Kazakhstan a man from the outside – Kolbin who was at that time the First Secretary of the Ulyanovsky regional committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, this resulted in spontaneous disorders in December, 1986. Since Kolbin, in Masanov's opinion, mainly considered his armchair as a jumping off place for the following career in the metropolis, the coming of Kunayev's protege N. Nazarbayev was a matter of technique (Masanov 1996).

In 1989 Nazarbayev's time came. Having come to power, he pensioned off all his former and potential competitors, approved a monopoly of power of the Elder *zhuz* and, after the Soviet Union collapse, consolidated even more his clan positions appointing to different state posts his nearest relatives. This phenomenon reached such a scale that a new term – *chemolganization* of power structures (the village of Chemolgan is Nazarbayev's homeland) appeared in the press. It was not also accidental that just Akmola and Karaganda, to which Nazarbayev's childhood and youth were related, trusted him to a greater extent than other regions of Kazakhstan.

Nevertheless, an invisible for outside observers clan struggle continues to this very day. The expert inquiry carried out by the Institute of Kazakhstan development showed that 29 % respondents believe that the *zhuz* and clan belonging plays a significant part in the distribution of privileges, posts and offices (Smagambetova 1998: 23). Once the members of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences (as noted above, this niche was traditionally occupied by the representatives of the Middle *zhuz*) rejected the Nazarbayev's protege Dzholdasbekov and elected the candidate of their clan economist Sagadiyev, the destiny of the Academy was predetermined. The Academy was reorganized into the Ministry where all of the highest posts were distributed from the top.

Just the confrontation of *zhuzes* and backstairs, in Masanov's opinion (1996), or, rather, a dread of joining up into the opposition of the Middle and Younger *zhuzes* predetermined the abolition of the presidential election, prolongation of Nazarbayev's authorities as well as a transfer of the metropolis to Akmola. As the ethnic peace in Kazakhstan is very delicate and exists mainly due to relative equilibrium between two major ethnic groups, a transfer of the metropolis to the north, according to the plan of the ruling elite, should contribute to the growth of migration from the south and increase in a share of Kazakh population within the northern regions and, in that way, consolidation of the national state system. On the other hand, a movement of all key power mechanisms to then territory of the traditional residence of the Middle *zhuz* should additionally weaken the opposition to the today's president's power.

But such a situation exists not only in the nowadays independent countries of the CIS. In the above mentioned Kalmykia, about 85 % of townsmen and more than 90% of rural population identify themselves with one or another tribal group. The struggle for pow-er is carried between three major tribal

groupings: Torgut and Derbent ones (the origins of the confrontation of which are rooted to the double ternary wing system) as well as Buzavsk group which is more young and consists of the descendants of the Don Kalmyks. The similar processes are traced, for example, in Tuva as well as in many multinational subjects of the Russian Federation.

Gift and Bribe Economy

Many mechanisms and standards of the political behavior peculiar to the traditional societies also continue to function today. The descriptions of the bribery, corruption, protectionism are widely known in the postcolonial and post-traditional societies. It is not unreason able to give one of the demonstrative examples fixed by the Russian anthropologists in the Mountain Kirghizia in the mid 1920s.

> "The whole way of life makes easier and, to a certain extent, provokes the bribery. One should start with the fact that the 'presents' are given to all who come to the nomads' camp or winter camp... An honorary visitor (it should be noted that a chief is always an honorary visitor) was given victuals of all kinds, horses for movement, foodstuffs for the journey and all of this is free of charge, in view of hospitality. To take money from a visitor is considered to be an exaction; being on the move within the mountain country, a "chief" pays nothing: he eats, drinks and takes foodstuffs in the living form (sheep) for the journey free of charge... There are many heads in the Mountain Kirghizia. Not only militiaman is a head. The heads are a secretary of the Komsomol cell and secretary of the Party cell, any instructor, investigator and judge, forest ranger etc. All of them should be given "soish", it is necessary to entertain and give present to all of them. Finally, the very "soish" has transformed into the special kind of tax which is in random way paid by population in view of different fortuities" (Kushner 1929: 102–103).

Construing this brilliant sketch from the life of mountain Kirghizs, it is necessary to understand that the phenomena described are characterized by somewhat different matter as compared with the modern ones. So called bribe goes back to the institutions of the redistribution and exchange of gifts in preindustrial communities. It is not only and not so much as the "reward for the fulfillment of particular actions in the interests of a briber", in the modern juridical interpretation, but also as a certain obligatory (resulting from the custom, tradition), symbolic communicative act of behavior. Without it, the following establishment and maintenance of relationships between the parties seems to be impossible. The cases are known when the functionaries of local level in the Third World countries refused to take gifts from petitioners, did not give preference to relatives in the redistribution of statuses, resources or any other services in an attempt to conform to the liberal standards of the Western

civilization. This has provoked a condemnation of not only their congeners but also other persons as it violated the ordinary norms.

It is known from the ethnographic descriptions that there were customs to give presents to chiefs and elders for intermediary functions in the settling of conflicts in many traditional societies of Africa, Asia and Oceania. The superpower in new independent states of Africa quite often attempted to abolish this practice with the assumption that the functionaries should work for people and should not have the self profit as their object. However, the ordinary members of communities insisted on reservation of the former customs (to the extent of the appeal to the superior bodies) motivating this by that the success of the peacemaking action directly depended on the taking of a gift by the intermediary. In such a situation the Tanzanian political leaders made, for example, a peculiar compromise. They permitted to give to intermediaries the symbolic presents: office supplies, national flags etc.

These archaic principles of the prestigious economy became a fertile field for a bloom of bribe-taking in Central Asia and Transcaucasia republics in Soviet times. Here, so-called *baksheesh* flourished on a grand scale. According to the data cited in the closed report of G. Aliyev at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Azerbaijan Communist Party in 1970, the cost of post of a district public prosecutor in this union republic was 30 thousand rubles (cf. the price of the best car was 9000 rubles at that period). In order to hold the post of the chief of the district department of militia, it was necessary to pay slightly more – 50 thousand rubles. In comparison, it should be indicated that an official monthly salary of a public prosecutor amounted 150–180 rubles while that of the chief was 200–250 rubles. The prices of the Party armchairs were much more expensive. The position of the first secretary of district committee cost 200 thousand rubles while that of the second secretary "only" 100 thousand rubles. The profitable post of the head of the institute of higher education could be also bought for 200 thousand rubles while the post of the minister of trade cost by 50 thousand rubles more (Voslensky 1991: 280–284).

Azerbaijan was no exception to the rule. In Georgia the minister posts cost from 100 to 300 thousand rubles. However, a competition here was more intense and, according to Voslensky, changed into a "peculiar auction" (Ibid.: 284–285).

All the above said is, in full measure, applicable to both the past (Orlova 1999) and the present state of Russia (may be, at a large scale) where bribe-taking and corruption of functionaries have reached huge scales which is confirmed by intuitive feelings as well as sociological inquiries of people being confronted with such phenomena in their activity. According to some assessments, about 70 % of Russian functionaries accept bribes (Glinkina 2000).

The presents-bribes in the traditional and present-day societies are closely related to mass holidays. The most scaled of ritual holidays are mediated by different important events in the human or community life (wedding, funeral etc.). The higher the man status and his material prosperity are, the more splendid an associated festival should be. In the communities with strong traditional way of life this phenomenon takes especially grandiose character. Poor men make efforts to save their faces and to show that their position is not worse than that of the others. The rich men try to obscure with the pomp the people of equal status rather than their neighbors. It enhances their prestige further in opinion of their relatives and countrymen. Some years ago several functionaries of higher rank in Uzbekistan lost their posts for "demonstrated immodesty and vainglory, pomposity and squandering when celebrating a wedding" (*Pravda Vostoka*, October 22, 1998). In a week another presidential decree was published in the same newspaper in which the anxiety was expressed in connection with the intensifying of gift exchange rituals.

> "Currently in many locations of our country, when carrying out weddings, family festivities, funeral rituals, arrangements devoted to memory of the diseased, such vestiges of the past as vainglory, pomposity, excessive extravagance, neglect of people's traditions, dandyism, neglect of needs of people living around are allowed" (Ibid.).

Unlikely, the situation presented differs markedly from the state of affairs in other Central Asia republics of the CIS and in the multinational republics of Russia. I observe time and again the similar customs among the Buryats. One can also consider that these phenomena are widely present in many post-traditional states of Asia and Africa.

Non-Separation / Sacralization of Power

Thus a distortion of the primordial aim of modernization is also demonstrated by the results of the direct introduction of the western liberal-democratic institutions to the traditional societies. The multiparty system, parliamentarism, separation of different power branches etc. – all of this causes, quite often, the inverse results, very undesirable from the viewpoint of the democratization task. An experience of the politico-anthropological studies reveals that the party structures in the post-traditional societies are, quite often, formed on the clan-tribal or confessional basis or as a tool of the personal influence of one or another leader. Under such conditions the elections to the representative power bodies are, as a rule, based on the tribal or religious principles rather than on the political programs. As a result, many people are induced to participate in tribal, interethnic and interconfessional conflicts,

which results in the instability of the ruling coalitions and in the absence of political stability. All this causes the crises and political revolution. The developments in Chechnya in the last ten years also can serve as an illustration of this.

In the present state of affairs, the power sees, quite often, that the only way to keep stability lies in the establishment of the authoritarian – one-party, military – regimes. It is not accidental that practically all states appearing on the territory of the Asiatic part of the CIS are characterized by the autocratic nature of power. It is true that another feature of the traditional power must be kept in mind. The separation of powers is an institution that gone through a long evolution and, one might say, endured by Europe in the course of many rebellions and revolutions. In principle, the similar phenomenon is not characteristic of the archaic and traditional societies. The ruler of traditional society is the only bearer of the sacral status and all other independent branches of power are automatically taken as the undesired competitors not only by the ruler himself but also by most people. Therefore, in the post-traditional societies a political leader of a charismatic type invested with nearly plenary powers is, quite often, the governing body of both country and party.

The tendency to the sacralization of the state ruler appears. The most striking example is the cult of personality of the Turkmenistan President Niyazov (he died on December 21, 2006). His birthday (February 19) was declared as the national holiday. During the first month of a year more than a hundred of different objects including the former Krasnovodsky Bay (Caspian Sea), the Academy of the agricultural sciences, ships, many streets, kolkhozes and sovkhozes and, what is very symbolic, former Lenin avenue and Leninsky administrative district in Ashkhabad were renamed after his name. The portraits and busts of Turkmenbashi stood out in all official and public places. One needed to turn over the pages of republic's newspapers to make sure that they were crammed with slogans: "Turkmenbashi is our strength", "Turkmenbashi is our wisdom", "Turkmenbashi is our hope".

There were composed legends about Turkmenbashi. According to one of them he, similar to the archaic chiefs, was able, at the time of the official meeting with the President of the USA which was held outdoors, to disperse black clouds and to prevent rain. Moreover, the text of the daily morning appeal of announcers of the Turkmenian state television and radio broadcasting stations to the people is impressive (now all codes of Turkmenbashi cult of personality are cancelled – N. K.):

> "Allah, bless our chief. Keep his life for a long period of time and give support in all his undertakings... Turkmenistan is my fatherland and if I do damage to my homeland, let my hands dry out, if I talk anything bad about my President, let my tongue fail me and if I am false to my fatherland, let my being stop."

The semantics of this appeal is evident and does not require expanded comments. If in the rational state, the use of sanctions is based on the legal violence, then, in the traditional community the power has a sacred character; an infringement of the established norms causes the disequilibrium between the people world and world of supernatural forces, intervention of gods and wicked spirits in people's affairs.

From the above reasoning, it is clear why most countries of the CIS followed the analogous path of political transformation. The events in them developed according to the scenario of the same type: dissolution of the legislative bodies, enactment of the constitutions extending the powers of the President, gentle terror with respect to the opposition and independent mass media communication.

Let us illustrate the above said using several examples. In 1993 in Kazakhstan a certain confrontation between the legislative and executive powers came into existence. However, in contrast to Russia, where the analogous confrontation took the form of armed conflict, here the main threads of the political game were always in the President's hands. In spite of unwillingness of the Supreme Soviet to self-destruct, the enterprising group involving the "approved" deputies was established and began to agitate for the self-dismissal within the parliament. In December the parliament ceased to exist. Under the new constitution of Kazakhstan of 1995, the legislative and judicial authorities were under the executive one (the President appointed judges, the Constitution Court was liquidated etc.), in 1995 the referendum in Kazakhstan prolonged Nazarbayev's presidential authorities to the end of the 20th century (this phenomenon received the name *bashism* after Turkmenbashi Niyazov being the first who began the campaign concerning the prolongation of authorities of leaders of the Central Asiatic states of the CIS to the end of the 20th century).

The most unitary form of the state structure was in Turkmenistan in the period of the Turkmenbashi's rule. In 1992 a six-year moratorium on the multi-party system was proclaimed. President Niyazov was the supreme official in the state being out of control of the legislative power. All the levers of the executive power were concentrated in his hands, he appointed and dismissed the Prosecutor-General, Chairmen of the Supreme and Superior Economical Courts. The President was entitled to dissolve the People's Assembly (the country's parliament) if the latter gave a vote of non-confidence to the government appointed by the President. Nominally, the country was the republic with the presidential form of government. But its head had actually unlimited authorities. The regime of Turkmenbashi fantastically combined the features of both savage and patriarchal rule and it resembled more and more the rule of the traditional oriental monarch using, nevertheless, some modern techniques of power. The party structure was absolutely undeveloped, the press

was semi-official and frankly mercenary. Any criticism of the power was excluded, opposition was crushed and expelled (Kadyrov 2004).

The Russian variant differs from the Central Asian states of the CIS only in a single respect. There were no clans, but a personal patrimonial political system. If the usurpation of the power in the above-listed countries was amicably achieved, President Yeltsin needed tanks and armored troop-carriers in October 1993. However, on the whole, the mechanism of transformational processes was practically the same. The monstrous swelling of the state machinery, adoption of the Constitution in 1993 in which the President was granted the right to control the judicial authority and dismiss the legislative bodies and introduction of the institution of the Governor-Generals were also characteristic of Russia. After Boris Yeltsin's resignation, some balance between the democratic ideals of the first President of Russia and his inconsequent policy based on the former experience of the Party leader was broken. Putin followed other principles of the rule. The tendency to the power hierarchy and abolition of appointment by election of the heads of different levels became even stronger. In fact, the local government – one of the bases of any democracy – disappeared. The changes which consolidated legislatively the right of the power to intervene in affairs of individual regions and to dissolve local parliaments were introduced into the Constitution. Similarly, the transformation of Russia occurs also at the local level. The main components of these processes are the all-embracing role of the patrimonial power and the lack of development of personality and civil society. All the above testifies against that on the most part of the former Soviet Union the rational system of power was formed.

Conclusion

All the above said suggests that the developed democratic political system in the independent Central Asia states of the former USSR as well as in the most part of this territory was not created, its key components such as the emancipation of the individualized political individual, the stable multiparty system, the independent mass media etc. were not developed. The authorities, as a rule, are very suspicious in respect of independent mass media, prefer to act in the atmosphere of closeness. They use different methods to put pressure upon the press, attempt to achieve the state monopoly of the tele- and broadcasting and even to control the Internet.

There is a large quantity of small parties and associations established for solving any situation or problem. The overwhelming majority of already existing parties (may be, except for communist ones) were established as a tool of the personal influence of one or another leader, while in the multinational regions, the parties and movements are established on the ethnic sign. Quite

often it is the only difference between parties (even names and programs can be very similar). In the politics and power structures, the patron-age-client relations predominate.

Most political forces are unwilling to observe the democratic rules of play accepted in the West. The elected presidents (not only they but also heads of all ranks) as well as subordinate functionaries try to get out of any restrictions of their personal power, dispose hard of the legal opposition. However, the latter coming to the power acts in the same way. Too much in the political culture of the CIS countries belongs to the past and is related to the traditional system of power and rule.

From this point of view, it is clear why the majority of the CIS countries have not become democratic after a period of twenty years traversing, in the process, similar path of political transformation accompanied by dissolution of legislative authorities, adoption of new constitutions expanding the president's authorities, velvet terror in relation to opposition and independent mass-media. In the political life the informal, clan, patron-client or personal relations predominate. All this suggests that the political anthropology is not only of academic importance but also can be useful in studying modern regimes.

16

POST-SOVIET POWER IN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

Anthropological theories of state formation have developed generally separate theories from those in the field of political science, although anthropologists acquainted with the works of the modern political scientists can discover many common features in the mechanisms of the establishment of historical and modern political institutions. When the widely known works of Robert Michels (1968) concerning the social-democratic parties of West Europe in the 20th century are considered, it is suggested that social practices have varied little since the first chiefdoms of Sumer and Egypt.

Michels shows that any political party or trade union organization faces various challenges in the course of its activities (e.g., the organization of political campaigns and elections, publishing activity, contract negotiations). These activities take a lot of time, and sometimes demand special training. If the organization has a large membership, then additional efforts are necessary to coordinate these activities. Little by little, managerial machinery is created to provide vital services to the organization, such as collecting dues and interacting with other organizations.

Functionaries concentrate in their hands the organizational infrastructure, organs of the press, and financial assets. If an opposition emerges within the organization, then all of these instruments can be used against the revisionists. Over the course of time, as the financial position and status of leaders attain stability, their psychology undergoes a similar change. They may aspire now to maintain their own stability rather than fulfilling the programmatic aims of their party/organization. Therein, Michels says, lies "the iron law of oligarchy" (1968: 50–51, 61). But let us replace some variables in Michels' picture. For example, envision a group of neighboring villages instead of the trade union or party cell, gifts and tribute instead of dues, and a chief instead of a party organizer. One then obtains a typical picture of how the chiefdom developed into the early state. Yet for all of this, we are still focused on a key issue: why this form of state formation (i.e., oligarchic) is not new to post-Soviet Russia and other states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

To what degree do the mechanisms for establishing power structures differ between historical (or ancient) and modern societies? Political anthropology helps us to understand that modern politics is rooted in the past, and particular forms of social order can be traced to ancient human communities. Political

anthropology is also of great importance in understanding political processes in modern societies that are moving toward a democratic system of national government.

In the present chapter, I focus on providing a historical perspective on the character of institutions of power and political processes in post-Soviet Russian society, focusing on how they are in many respects *traditional* or *patrimonial* (to use Max Weber's terminology [1922: 130–140]). I argue that combining aspects of traditional societies with the direct and uncritical adoption of Western liberal values can produce surprising results that are the opposite of what was intended. The multiparty system can be expressed in the formation of party structures on a clan-tribal or confessional basis, and also may result in large-scale interethnic or religious conflicts. The separation of powers in democratic societies can result in chaos and disorder (because the separation of powers is, in essence, not characteristic of traditional societies), and then the establishment of a military junta, and other developments that further undermine representative rule.

Today's situation in the former Soviet republics clearly demonstrates the limits of the classical models of social and political science developed with exclusive reliance on Western materials. For many years, volunteers from Western Europe and the United States have heartily preached to Russian businesspeople, economists, and lawyers about the correct way to form a market economy. However, instead of privatization and a civilized market, Russia has experienced the appropriation of resources by people in high positions. Instead of a "normal" market, I term the current situation a pseudo-market mafia economic infrastructure. The *State Duma* (parliament), the government, and the president have issued one normative document after another, but economic and political actors ignore these pronouncements because, in Russia, there is little respect for laws (or the rule of law) as does exist in other European countries. In Russia, a directive or an order, such as the so-called telephone law–indeed, anything else–has always been the deciding factor, rather than the constitution and laws. Telephone law is a special form of politics in Russia. Consultations by telephone between political leaders, as well as telephoned directives, are more important than the written law. (It will suffice to note the manner in which the Russian government executes the budget adopted by the *State Duma*.)

Bureaucratic Change and Indigenous Social Practice

In compiling the extensive experience of problem solving in the traditional and colonial societies of Asia, Africa, the Americas, and the Pacific, political anthropologists have shown that the traditional and bureaucratic patterns of domination (in the Weberian sense) are difficult to render compatible in practice. Democracy is the voluntary integration of independent individuals. In post-traditional societies, an individual is a part of a single whole (tribe, clan, fraternal association); hence, all of his or her activity is mediated by this single whole. In such societies (in the more general context of all non-Western societies), features identified by Weber such as rationality, depersonalization, and competence are not characteristic (Cheng Tun-yen, Womack 1996).

Over the course of time, anthropologists have come to understand that the formal abolition of traditional power institutions (a practice characteristic of states with a socialist orientation), and appointment of petty officers from that segment of the resident population that had received a European education did not, for the most part, produce the desired result–in other words, making someone be the responsible party. The former chiefs reserved a high status for themselves, while appointees from the nonprivileged groups, especially outside groups, had, as a rule, no prestige.

Pressure exerted by the rational bureaucratism introduced by colonizers has resulted in the deformation and, even in some places, the destruction of the traditional model of power, its desacralization, and the establishment of a temporary system of power. In many formerly traditional societies (especially in Africa), a dual political culture is established in which traditional forms of power are present in parallel with the official administrative bodies. The particular interdependency is traced between the position of an individual in the party-state machinery and his status in the men's union or secret society. Advancement up the hierarchy in one system is, as a rule, accompanied by a rise in status in the other; quite often, leaders of the traditional system of hierarchy not directly present in the official structure of political power do have a profound impact on the most important political decisions. Moreover, as the parallel structures often exert a greater effect on their supporters than the state does in traditional societies, these structures directly influence the character, forms, and pace of the evolution of democracy. Therefore, the prospects for stable democratization in Africa depend on whether the African governments will come to an agreement with these authoritative social forces on a mutually acceptable and efficacious mechanism for the separation of powers and responsibility and the fair distribution of material resources to the benefit of all (Owusu 1997: 147–148).

In the society with strong clan and tribal relations, the scale of this phenomenon becomes very large. It is related to the fact that the bearer of power in the traditional society always acts not by himself but as a representative or the leader of the particular group. He is understood to be at the group's center, the concentration of the sacred force, and should share with the group his power functions and privileges. Therefore, it is not surprising that in countries of the Third World and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, the ruling elite is making efforts to displace from positions of responsibility all those who are not connected to the members of these groups by blood, family, or other ties.

The Ethnoterritorial Role in State Formation

In colonial and postcolonial societies, the absence of a coincidence between the administrative-territorial divisions and boundaries and those of the territories of residence of traditional tribal structures is a characteristic that often causes acute ethnonational and intergovernmental disputes. In recently independent former colonies that preserve their traditional tribal structure, party structures are often formed on a clan-tribal or confessional basis or as a tool of the personal influence of one or another leader. In this situation, there are often no political and ideological differences between the programs of different parties. Under such conditions, elections to the representative bodies of power are based on tribal affiliation or principles rather than on political programs. On the whole, all of this produces instability in the ruling coalitions: they are often changed, there is acute factional struggle, and there is no political stability in the society (Balandier 1967: 188–189, 194).

In much of the former Soviet Union, especially in the national republics (the newly independent states as well as a number of subject jurisdictions of the Russian Federation), the role of the clan and tribal remnants has been prominent and can be useful in forecasting political processes (Kradin 2001). The situation in Russia since 2000 has remained practically unchanged. It is period of political conservatism and new turn bureaucratization. Nearly all of the hypotheses I advanced in my 2000 article have been realized, with the exception of the latest developments in Kyrgyzstan and recent declarations by the leaders of Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan about future presidential elections in their states.

As an example of the anthropological analysis, any Asian state of the CIS can serve where parties and movements that arose in the years of perestroika and after the Soviet collapse were established on an ethnic basis. Summarizing an investigation of post-Soviet nationalism, Anatoly M. Khazanov (1995: 60–89) has concluded that the scheme of international relations within the post-Soviet space did not change, and national *nomenklatura* in most of the newly independent states replaced the Russian *nomenklatura*. At that, the ethnic Russians, having no ties with the *nomenklatura,* became the minority group, with all the dubious amenities of this ethnosocial status.

Unfortunately, sociological inquiries often cannot adequately reflect the existing situation. Direct formulation of the question "Do you prefer that the leader be your relative?" or "If you were a leader, would you gather all your relatives near yourself ?" results, as a rule, in unambiguously negative answers (Smagambetova 1998). Under certain conditions, people are often likely to assess themselves in an unduly positive way. However, different indirect data indicate the presence of certain manifestations of ethnic discrimination.

Kazakhs, for example, are inclined much less than other nationalities to note the presence in their country of interethnic conflict, violations of human

rights, bureaucratic abuses, and discrimination in the case of nominations to executive positions. In addition, they believe more often that the titular nationality should have certain advantages over other ethnic groups in Kazakhstan (in matters such as education and privatization). What is especially symptomatic is that more than a third of Kazakhs think that these preferences should be taken into account in elections to positions of authority (Arenov, Kalmykov 1998).

It is evident that all of this has been caused by the presence of the powerful traditional stratum in the mentality (including the political culture) of Kazakhs. Practically all non-Kazakh respondents note among the characteristic features of the Kazakh ethnicity "hospitality," "traditionalism," and "respect for relatives." The best example of Kazakh "traditionalism" is the custom of mutual aid within the clan or tribe, and, as a particular variant of this, protectionism with respect to relatives.

The fact of the ethnic inequality of rights is more truly reflected in the number of representatives of one or other nationality in the different authorities. Consider again the example of Kazakhstan. During 1990–1993, the ethnic composition of the supreme legislative body of the country approximately corresponded to that of the republic population. The coefficient of the ethnic representation* of the titular population was 1.2. It was 0.9 for Russians. At the same time, a share of the Russian population in the executive bodies was much less. At the local level, the coefficient for Russians decreased by 1993–1994 from 1.0 to 0.7, while for Kazakhs it increased from 1.2 to 1.3. The proportion of Kazakhs in the government bureaucracy was also much greater: the coefficient for Russians was 0.6, while that for Kazakhs was 1.5. The situation became even more aggravated over the course of the 15-year period (Galiev et al. 1994: 43–44, 47–51, 53–55).

A similar state of affairs is characteristic not only of the recently independent states but also of multiethnic subject jurisdictions of the Russian Federation. So, for example, in Sakha (Yakutiya), the coefficient of representation was 1.8 for Yakuts and 0.6 for Russians (Khazanov 1995: 177–179). In Tatarstan, the designation *nation* (i.e., as applied to Tatars) prevails in both the administrative machinery and the parliament. (The coefficients are 1.6 and 1.5, respectively [Farukshin 1994: 69]) In Bashkortostan, the coefficient of representation for legislative power is equal to 1.9 to 2.5 for Bashkirs, 0.5 to 1.0 for Tatars, and 0.5 for Russians; the coefficients for executive power are 2.7 to

* The coefficient is calculated as follows: percentage of ethnic group members in a given institution (e.g., national parliament) divided by percentage of ethnic group in total population (e.g., national population). If the coefficient is equal to 1, the ethnic group in question is proportionately represented. If the coefficient is more than 1, the ethnic group is over-represented, and when the coefficient is less than 1, the group is under-represented.

3.0 (Bashkirs), 0.5 to 0.7 (Tatars), and 0.4 to 0.5 (Russians) (Gallyamov 1999: 166–167). One could give many similar examples.

However, this opposition has not only an international basis (i.e., titular nationality against Russians), but also an intraethnic basis. At present, one can trace the influence of the local clan and clan-tribal groups in each of the now independent Central Asian states of the CIS, as well as in the multinational republics of Russia. This phenomenon in Soviet anthropological thought has been described by different terms, *mestnichestvo*, *ulusizm*, and *kumovstvo* (tribalism or tribal nationalism), and is considered a remnant of the clan-tribal or patriarchal-feudal order. For example, the Soviet party functionaries regarded it as serious even after the establishment of Soviet power over the entire territory of the country. One head of the Communist Party organization in the Kalmyk District even wrote, in 1926:

> "The *ulusizm* makes itself evident in the fact that every Soviet Communist Party member defending his *ulus* with respect to all party and Soviet questions reaches such a point that he forgets any party discipline proclaiming a principle: without regard to if my country is right or not, but it is my country and I am obliged to defend it. It is a most serious disease, hindering the work not only of the local party organizations but also of the governing body itself." (Glukhov 1928: 180)

At the same time, many people in Kazakhstan assumed that the intraparty struggle in the center had developed between the clans of Lenin and Trotsky.

After the political repressions of the 1930s, *ulusizm* was temporarily forgotten, although it has persisted to the present, with anthropologists' studies of the Soviet political system demonstrating its presence in Central Asia and the Caucasus. In the years of perestroika, publications on this subject again appeared in the mass media. It turns out that the question of *ulusizm* as applied to the power problem remains as urgent as it was about 70 years ago.

However, in real situations, all is much more complex. In the broadest sense, the phenomenon is a playing out of the protectionist impulse of members of government to bring aboard next of kin, distant relatives, and compatriots, with this practice being accompanied by the dismissal from key posts of people not related to the hierarch. It would be foolish to claim that such practices had been eliminated in industrial societies. Rather, this is a widely distributed evolutionary phenomenon with deep biological roots: opposition between one's group and a foreign group, and real preference for contact with relatives. Protectionism with respect to relatives is a particular aspect of so-called personal relations in the preindustrial, traditional society. In the industrial society, each person is present as a detached individual, while relations between people take the form of commodity-money ties. In preindustrial social systems, each person appears as an element of any stable collective (e.g., community, clan, military-hierarchical organization), and relations between people are

personal rather than physical. The situation is one of personal coercion and power as applied to relations of inequality and domination (Mauss 1925; Polaniy 1968; Sahlins 1972; Godelier 1996).

The practice of personal relations is founded on important theoretical grounds. According to Max Weber, in the traditional society,

> "the place of firm business competence is occupied by the competition of initially given by the master at a free discretion, then becoming long-term and, finally, stereotyped commissions and powers. They produce the competition for due chances for the payment of made efforts of both special messengers and masters themselves: owing to such interests, the business competences and, thereby, existence of departments are often constructed. All of special messengers having the long-term competence are, first of all, the court functionaries of the master; the competence *not* related to the court (extrapatrimonial) is given to them on the basis of a quite superficial business similarity of the activity field in their court service or on the basis of, mainly, quite arbitrary choice of the master." (Weber 1922: 131–132)

Hence, all activity in similar political structures is based on personal relations, even personal devotion. (In this regard, one should keep in mind the developments of autumn 1998 to summer 1999, a period of seemingly endless reshuffling of the Russian Federation government.)

The phenomenon of government based on personal relations is pervasive in societies with strong clan and tribal ties. This is related to the fact that the power bearer in traditional society acts not by himself but as the representative and leader of a particular group. He is perceived as its center, the focal point of the sacred force, and should share with it his imperial functions and privileges. It is not accidental that it is not the particular ruler but the whole of his lineage or clan that is considered to possess the "mandate of heaven" for the rule of one territory or another, as it was in the empire of Genghis Khan and his heirs. (This is especially true with respect to the Central Asian states.) Therefore, it is not surprising that in the countries of the Third World and the recently independent states of the former Soviet space, the ruling elite is making efforts to remove from responsible posts all who are not connected with members of these groupings by blood, family, and other ties.

The official insularity of the staffing policy of the party-governmental *nomenklatura* is conducive to such removals. So, for example, accession to the post of first secretary of the Communist Party of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic by Heydar Aliyev resulted in the gradual removal of the proteges of his predecessor, Veli Akhundov, and penetration of the republic's governing bodies by Aliyev's compatriots from the enclave of Nakhichevan. After Aliyev moved to Moscow to take a promotion to a national-level position, a new rotation of cadres began in Azerbaijan with the arrival of a new party secretary,

Kyamron Bagirov. A similar process occurred in the party-governmental *nomenklatura* in the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic during the reign of Sharaf Rashidov. On occasion, information on the clan character of government bodies in the Central Asian and Transcaucasian republics has infiltrated to news media bodies. For instance, in Georgia in 1973, a change in the *nomenklatura* elite became public knowledge when the official party newspaper, *Zarya Vostoka* (in an article published February 28, 1973), made it apparent, at least by inference, that a plenum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Georgia had taken place:

> "Favoritism, regionalism, *zemlyachestvo* [friendly association of persons from the same area], and position hunting prosper owing to kindred ties and corruption.... Wives and members of the family begin to substitute for their husbands of high standing in positions, and state problems begin to be solved in the narrow kindred, family, and friendship circles.
>
> Officials were commissioned on the basis of patronage, string pulling, kindred ties–by a principle of personal devotion rather than on their professional and moral qualities...
>
> Sometimes, unworthy persons were appointed to the top posts by recommendations of chance persons. These words were often heard: 'Master said so,' 'Master wishes so.'"

Among the leading employees, a strong opinion on the undesirability of airing dirty linen in public was cultivated. The facts of bribe taking and theft were kept secret. Indeed, thanks to media censorship, the actual extent of corruption is underestimated.

At present, in each of the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, the influence of local clan and clan-tribal groups remains a tradition. In Uzbekistan, such groups concentrate on the basis of geography (in the cities of Toshkent, Buxoro, and Samarqand). In terms of numbers, the metropolitan clan predominates. Taking an administrative post is only possible if one belongs to one or another clan. The access of minority groups (especially Russians) to the prestigious institutes of higher education has been closed.

In Kyrgyzstan, there are several levels of the traditional elite structure that were not destroyed as a result of the technological and cultural modernization carried out during the Soviet period. Modernization "only weakened but did not liquidate the established –in the course of centuries– hierarchy of subordination and co-subordination of tribes and clans, their struggle for influence and power." (Vasil'ev 1998: 296). At the highest level of the hierarchy, the elite is subdivided into two adversarial groupings of natives of the southern and northern regions of Kyrgyzstan, with general domination by the northern natives. The origins of this confrontation are rooted in the two-wing system of the traditional genealogical organization of nomads. The dual division of the

political elite is complicated by the presence of a number of authoritative clan groups. Among the northerners, these include, for example, the clans of Tugu (from the region around the lake Issyk-Kul), Salto (from the Chuiskaya Valley), and, especially, Sary-Bagy (found in the Chuiskaya Valley and the Narinskaya Region), which claims among its sons the man who was president of Kyrgyzstan during its transition to independence, Askar Akayev.

Beyond that point, there is a tendency for the activation of the representatives of the former aristocratic clans (*manapsky*) driven from the power and control mechanisms during the period of Soviet power (Kushner 1924). They take an active part in the struggle for influence at the local level, attempt to move their proteges into positions of control or other key posts in different branches of the power machinery, and make efforts to remove the "non–well-born" party-governmental *nomenklatura* who climbed the ladder during the years of Soviet power (Vasil'ev 1998: 296–297).

In Tajikistan, clan divisions can be traced in several ways, first of all, along a line from the "northern" Leninabad District, the most urbanized in the country, to the agricultural "south." The Leninabad group (the Khudzhandsky clan) traditionally has been one of the most authoritative formations. In Soviet times, its representatives held key party-governmental posts in the republic. This tradition remains in post-Soviet times. Rakhman Nabiyev, who was president of Tajikistan when it became an independent state, came from the Khudzhandsky clan.

The Kulyab clan represents the interests of the residents of the agricultural regions of the south. After coming to power in 1992, a member of this clan, Imomali Rahmonov, effected the gradual removal of representatives of Leninabad from key posts in state security bodies, law enforcement agencies, ideological institutions, and other organs of the government.

Geographically and politically, the Gissar community is located between Leninabad and Kulyab. This Gamar group's interests are concentrated in trade and consumer cooperatives. The Islamic party of revival and extremist groups of soldiers (*vakhabits*) comes from this group. The particular place is occupied by Pamirs' people (Badakhshan grouping), who speak East Iranian languages and are Shiites-Ismaelites, unlike most Tajiks who are Sunnis. Some refer to this community as a small Tajik "Sicily" (consider the theoretical basis of specificity of the political system of mountain people) (Vasil'ev 1998: 217–219, 242–243).

Questions concerning Kazakhstan's political structure are more frequently studied. In the ethnic consciousness of Kazakhs, four levels are identified: (1) ethnic-national, (2) *zhuz* (tribal or chiefdom confederation), (3) clan-tribal, and (4) territorial, which is independent of ethnic identity. Local (clan) structure is based on the *zhuz* genealogy (Great, Middle, and Small Horde). The Great Horde *zhuz* traditionally has roamed the Semirechye (Seven Rivers) area of

what is now southeastern Kazakhstan. The Middle Horde *zhuz* has occupied eastern Kazakhstan. The Small Horde *zhuz* has located in western Kazakhstan. However, the privileged clans–the descendants of Genghis Khan (the Tope) and the descendants of saints (the Tozha)–were ranked genealogically above any of the other *zhuzes* (Naunova 1991; Khazanov 1995: 165; Masanov 1995: 55–64; 1996: 47–50; Smagambetova 1998: 20–22 etc.).

The northern Kazakhs, as a rule, know the name of their *zhuz* and their tribal group of the lower taxonomic level. In the south, this information is of more essential significance because on this, the status and financial position of an individual depend. (This was especially true under the conditions of the shortage economy under socialism.) The elder generation at a marriage carries out the exogamy principle. Clan divisions can be traced in funeral rites. For example, when burying the deceased, the bereaved family is expected to give presents to the patriarchs of all clan groups residing in the settlement (Naumova 1991).

The well-known Kazakhstan anthropologist and opposition political leader Nurbulat Masanov has considered in detail the history of the struggle among the clan groupings of Kazakhstan in the 20th century (Masanov 1996). In Soviet times, in spite of the cruel Stalinist repression, the representatives of the Middle Horde *zhuz* dominated the Kazakh intellectual elite for a long time: in the arts, in the sciences (its members included many academicians and even presidents of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic), and, to a lesser extent, in the party-state machinery. Since the 1960s, the leading positions have been taken by the Elder *zhuz* or Great Horde. Its first member promoted to a prominent administrative position was the leading Kazakh poet Dzhambul. (Dzhambul has only one name given his status as a traditional nomad.) Dinmukhamed Kunayev, who held the post of first secretary of the Communist Party of Kazakhstan from 1962 to 1986, was from the Elder *zhuz*. Making use of personal contacts and the patronage of Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev, Kunayev gradually appointed his fellow tribesmen and relatives to many key posts, including his younger brother, who became the president of the Academy of Sciences of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. During Kunayev's long tenure as first secretary, future president Nursultan Nazarbayev started his own political career. In the years of Kunayev's reign, Kazakhs were recruited into the party-state machinery at all levels. By 1989, they made up 51 percent of the administrative personnel, even though they accounted for only 3 percent of the qualified workers and 11.3 percent of the unqualified workers in the republic. By 1994, the disproportion had become even more extreme, with the share of Kazakhs in the president's administration and ministry reaching 74 percent. The disparity between Kazakhs and Russians in favor of the former is present even in the local administrations of the northern areas, where the proportion of Russians is traditionally higher. This

tendency continues to intensify. Only the elections to the Supreme Soviet approximately reflect the actual demographic proportions of nations and ethnic groups (Galiev et all 1994: 43–44, 47–51; Khazanov 1995: 159–160).

The Younger *zhuz* (Small Horde or clan) traditionally has played a secondary role. This *zhuz*'s status as the lowest-ranking horde in Kazakhstan has had the effect of unifying its members. During the administration of Yuri Andropov, the Soviet leader possibly considered the promoted workers as competitors with Brezhnev's party elite, and appointed them to a number of the key posts. However, the death of Andropov after only a brief period in office and the restoration of Brezhnev's system hindered this process.

In the years of perestroika, the rivalry among the *zhuzes* recommenced. In response, Mikhail Gorbachev decided to send to Kazakhstan a man from the outside–Gennadi Kolbin being at that time the first secretary of the Ulyanovsk Region Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. However, this appointment prompted spontaneous disorders in December 1986. Because Kolbin, in the opinion of Nurbulat Masanov, mainly considered his armchair a jumping-off place for a career in the metropolis, the coming of Dinmukhamed Kunayev's protege Nazarbayev was simply a matter of technique (Masanov 1996).

By 1989, Nazarbayev's time had arrived. Coming to power, he pensioned off all of his former and potential competitors, approved a power monopoly for the Elder *zhuz*, and, after the Soviet collapse, further consolidated the position of his clan, appointing his nearest relations to various state posts. This phenomenon grew to the point that a new term–*chemolganization* of power structures (the village of Chemolgan is Nazarbayev's hometown)–appeared in the news media. It is not also accidental that the regions of Akmola and Karaganda, to which Nazarbayev has ties dating to his childhood, trust him more than other parts of Kazakhstan (Mal'kova 1998: 12).

Nevertheless, a clan struggle invisible to outside observers continues to this very day. An expert inquiry done by the Institute of Kazakhstan Development showed that 29 percent of respondents believed that *zhuz* and clan affiliation played a significant part in the distribution of privileges, posts, and offices (Smagambetova 1998: 23). Once the members of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences (as noted above, such positions traditionally were occupied by representatives of the Middle Horde) rejected Nazarbayev's protégé Azamat Dzholdasbekov and elected the candidate of their clan, the economist Kenjegali Sagadiyev, the destiny of the academy was predetermined: it was absorbed into the ministry (first the Ministry of Education and then the Ministry of Education and Science), where all of the highest posts were distributed from the top.

The confrontation between the *zhuzes* and the backstairs, in Masanov's opinion (1996), or, rather, a dread of joining in the opposition of the Middle and Younger *zhuzes*, predetermined the cancellation of the presidential election

and prolongation of the Nazarbayev regime to 2000, as well as the transfer of the national capital to Akmola. Because "the ethnic peace in Kazakhstan is very fragile and exists mainly because of the quantitative parity of the two major ethnic groups," (Khazanov 1995: 168) the transfer of the national capital to the north, according to the plan of the ruling elite, was expected to contribute to migration from the south and an increase in the share of the Kazakh population in the northern regions, and, in that way, further the consolidation of the national state system. On the other hand, a movement of all key power mechanisms to the territory of the traditional residence of the Middle Horde would have the effect of further weakening opposition to the incumbent president's power.

But situations of this type exist not only in the newly independent countries of the CIS. In Russia's Kalmykia Region, about 85 percent of townspeople and more than 90 percent of the rural population identify with one or another tribal group. The struggle for power is carried out between three major tribal groupings: the Torgut, the Derbent, and a clan with more recent origins, the Buzavsk, which consists of descendants of Kalmyks from the Don River region. Similar processes can be seen in the Russian republic of Tuva, for instance, as well as in many multinational subject jurisdictions of the Russian Federation.

Ethnographic and anthropological studies have shown that the situation in Chechnya, in contrast to that of the genealogically hierarchical structures of yesterday's nomads of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, has always been of the egalitarian and decentralized type–perhaps as a result of many years of conflict. But then, mountain societies have always been distinguished by their thirst for nonhierarchical models of political organization (Korotayev 1995a).

The Chechens have no noble class or other privileged hereditary group. They are divided along clan, territorial, and, to a certain extent, confessional lines. The Chechen *teips* (clans) survived the Soviet period and now acquire more and more influence in the political life of the society. Devotion to one's clan remains the highest value in the Chechen mentality; feuds can last for generations. The Chechens are divided into three basic territorial groups: those who reside in the Terek River valley (they experienced a greater Russian influence than the two other groups); those who live in the foothills; and the true mountaineers (economically the poorest and, at the same time, the most traditional part of the Chechen ethnos). During the Soviet period, political power in Chechnya was held by people from the lowlands. During the rule of Dzhokhar Dudayev, the rebel leader killed by the Russians in 1996, the mountaineers were his very loyal supporters. Although all Chechens are considered Sunni Muslims, they are more accurately the followers of two different Sufi orders or congregations, Nakshbandiya and Kadyriya, which contend for influence in Chechen society. Even in the past, the Chechens were

unable to unite and elect a national leader because they did not wish to give priority to one clan or territorial group over the others. Their only national leader was Sheikh Mansur, who lived in the 18th century and was the first leader of the Chechens in their war with the Russian Empire (Khazanov 1995: 215–216; Reno 2002; Tishkov 2004).

A distortion of the basic aim of modernization is also demonstrated by the results of the direct introduction of Western liberal-democratic institutions into traditional societies. Movements to create components of modern political culture such as multiparty systems, parliamentary rule, and the separation of powers often have inverse results, very undesirable from the viewpoint of the democratization task. Political-anthropological studies reveal that party structures in post-traditional societies are quite often formed on a clan-tribal or confessional basis or as tools to advance the personal influence of one leader or another. Under such conditions, election to representative bodies is, as a rule, based on tribal or religious principles rather than on political programs. As a result, many people are induced to participate in tribal, interethnic, and interconfessional conflicts, a development that results in the instability of the ruling coalitions and the absence of political stability in general. All of this causes crises and political revolution. Events in Chechnya itself since the mid-1990s illustrate this. In the present state of affairs, those in power see quite often that the only way to maintain stability lies in the establishment of authoritarian, single-party military regimes. It is not accidental that practically all the states in the Asian part of the CIS are characterized by autocracy.

One more feature of traditional power must be kept in mind. The separation of powers is an institution going through a long evolution of the kind, one might say, that was endured by Europe over the course of many rebellions and revolutions. By definition, this phenomenon is not characteristic of archaic and traditional societies. The ruler in a traditional society is the only bearer of the sacral status, and all other independent branches of the power are automatically perceived as undesired competitors not only by the ruler himself but also by most people. Therefore, in the post-traditional societies a political leader of the charismatic type invested with nearly plenary powers is, quite often, the governing body of both country and party. It is thus clear why most countries of the CIS followed a similar process of political transformation: dissolution of the legislative body, enactment of a constitution extending the powers of the president, and "gentle" terror with respect to the opposition and independent mass media communication.

This process can be illustrated by several examples. In 1993, in Kazakhstan, a confrontation developed between the legislative and executive powers. However, in contrast to Russia, where a similar confrontation took the form of armed conflict, in Kazakhstan the main threads of the political game were always in the president's hands. In spite of the unwillingness of the

Supreme Soviet to self-destruct, an enterprising group involving the "approved" deputies was established that began to agitate for self-dismissal within the parliament. In December 1993, the parliament ceased to exist. Under the constitution of 1995, the legislative and judicial authorities were put under the executive authority (e.g., the president could now appoint judges; the constitutional court was liquidated). A referendum in 1995 prolonged the authority of President Nazarbayev to the end of the 20th century. (He continued to serve in that office in 2009.) This phenomenon received the name *bashism*, after Saparmurad Niyazov, ruler of Turkmenistan until his death in 2006 and popularly known as Turkmenbashi, who was the first leader of a Central Asian member of the CIS to begin a campaign to prolong his authority to the end of the 20th century.

In Uzbekistan, the Muslim Islam Karimov holds the posts of president of the country and head of the cabinet of ministers. The Supreme Soviet of Uzbekistan is controlled by the president. In the autumn of 1991, some of the deputies in opposition voiced criticism of the president. In response, an amendment to the law on deputy status was introduced into the Supreme Soviet, and was accepted in the summer of 1992. According to the introduced clarifications, any deputy, according to the decision of the superior legislative body of the country, could be unseated for "conduct discrediting the title of the people's deputy, making anticonstitutional actions directed toward the derogation of the state system, and destabilization of the sociopolitical situation, as well as appeal to such actions." (Vasil'ev 1998: 95). It does not require much imagination to grasp how avidly the executive branch of government would take advantage of the ambiguities in this amendment.

The constitution, as Sergei Panarin judiciously observes (2000: 103–104), is mainly oriented to demonstrating the democratic structure of the young state to world opinion. It does not explain the mechanisms of presidential elections, the organization and activity of the cabinet of ministers, or registration of the public unions and movements (see Articles 56, 90, and 98). As has been noted, in 1995 the president's term in office was extended to 2000. (Like his counterpart in Kazakhstan, President Karimov also remained in office in 2009.) In the style of Soviet times, a large-scale campaign to exalt the Karimov cult was launched in the country. There is internal and external censorship in the mass media. The parties existing in the country are, per se, pro-presidential. Opposition, whether secular or religious, runs the risk of persecution.

The most unitary form of the state structure occurs in Turkmenistan. In 1992, a six-year moratorium on the multiparty system was proclaimed there, which effectively put President Niyazov beyond the control of the legislative power. All of the levers of the executive power became concentrated in his hands. He held the power to appoint and dismiss the prosecutor general and the chairmen of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court (a body that

rules on disputes between private enterprises and state agencies), as well as the freedom to dissolve the People's Assembly (the national parliament) if it gave a vote of no confidence to the government he had appointed. In 2000, when Niyazov's power was at its peak, Panarin wrote:

> Nominally, the country is a republic with a presidential form of government. But its head has truly unlimited authority. The Turkmenbashi regime combines fantastically the features of both primitive and patriarchal rule, and it increasingly resembles the State, rule of the traditional Oriental monarch, using, nevertheless, some modern techniques of power. So, on the one hand, there is comprehensive police control over the population, while on the other, populist gestures of all kinds in ... its social defense are made. The party structure is not developed absolutely; the press is semiofficial and frankly mercenary. Any criticism of the power is ignored; opposition is crushed and expelled; the few remaining *pravozashitniki* are subject to systematic intimidation and periodic court actions (2000: 105).

Possibly the least authoritarian system of government in Central Asia is in Tajikistan. Even so, under the constitution of 1994 the president possesses a very wide range of prerogatives, although his power is in a way limited by the Supreme Assembly, which is entitled to approve all members of the cabinet of ministers and has many more important control functions. However, this "democratism" is most likely related to the struggle between different influential clans in the country and a lack of sufficient force to crush the opposition (Vasil'ev 1998: 245).

Toward an Explanation

Socialism can be considered a highly specific, anticapitalist variant of secondary modernization (Fursov 1995). However, this modernization was carried out under extremely specific conditions. It came to an end with the establishment in the Soviet Union, and then in other countries of the socialist world, of a very specific system of power in which rational (party and bureaucracy, other institutions), personal (predominance of the individual power over the law), and charismatic (cults of the chief, father of the nation) components were present.

The Russian variant differs only in one respect. While the usurpation of power in the Central Asian republics was generally achieved peacefully, President Boris Yeltsin needed tanks and armored troop carriers in October 1993. However, on the whole, the mechanism of transformational processes is practically the same. As in the other newly independent states, the state machinery swelled considerably under a constitution adopted in 1993, the president was granted the right to control the judicial authority and dismiss the legislative bodies; the institution of the office of governor-general was also

characteristic. After the resignation of Yeltsin in 1999, whatever balance remained between the democratic ideals of the first president of Russia and his policies based on his former experience as party leader was broken. Yeltsin's successor, Vladimir Putin, followed other principles of rule. The tendency toward a power hierarchy and the abolition of the appointment by election of chief executives at different jurisdictional levels became even stronger. In fact, the institution of local government–one of the bases of any democracy–disappeared. The changes that consolidated legislatively the right to intervene in the affairs of individual regions and to dissolve local parliaments were introduced in the 1993 constitution. The transformation of Russia also occurred at the local level. The main components of these processes were the all-embracing role of the patrimonial power and a lack of development of the individual and civil society. All of these developments testify that, in the largest single component of the former Soviet Union (i.e., the Russian Federation), a rational bureaucratic system of power was *not* formed.

In the course of the collapse of socialist society, traditional ties on the ethnonational periphery escaped from the envelope of rational-bureaucratic relations. However, in post-Soviet Russia itself, a stable model of the personal system of power has been formed on account of the traditional neglect of legal institutions.

Patron–client ties occupy one of the most significant places in the aggregate of similar relations (Kradin 2001; Kadyrov 2004; Fisun 2006). As Mikhail Afanasyev has clearly demonstrated in a number of works (1997), such ties never completely disappear in the course of modernization and can occur not only in post-traditional societies but also in developed modern and even postmodern ones. (The mafia is the most striking example.) Patron–client relations are based on the necessity for cooperation between persons of different status under conditions of economic, social, or political instability. Persons with low status can be provided with resources and sources of subsistence, and can serve in a defensive role on the side of their patron. In this way, they fulfill particular obligations or compensate patronage by material gifts or other payments. These relations are convenient for both sides, and what is more important, they satisfy the requirements of people in regard to confidence and a sense of affiliation in the developed, industrialized society. To the societies in which traditional values are, as before, of a sufficient importance, similar circumstances are essential.

These relations are of a personal and informal nature; are based on an inequality of status, wealth, and access to resources between the patron and his clients; represent a combination of exploitation and compulsion, with voluntary gifts and services; and have externally the form of ties of mutual obligation, cooperation, and mutual interest (Afanasyev 1997).

The character of power in post-traditional states is not too different from that in systems of traditional rule. In many respects, the influence of the political leader in post-traditional societies remains in the form of patrimonial features. This influence is based to a greater extent on patronage relationships than on rational legitimism and law. In the special literature, it has been noted time and again that the *personal* character of power in post-traditional and even developed industrial societies forms the basis of the political institutions, and relations between the patron and his clients determine political life at all levels, from the presidential palace to the crudest village (Gellner, Waterburu 1977; Eisenstadt, Roniger 1984 etc.).

To a large extent, these conditions are caused by the traditionally important role of the state in the economic sector and, therefore, by the great role of the power-property. For this reason, administrative posts are sources of personal off-budget income (e.g., the issuance of licenses, payments for lobbying of one's interests, bribes) rather than means for the growth of status within the bureaucratic hierarchy.

In the post-traditional Asian societies, patron–client relations play a significant stabilizing role. In Montesquieu's time, it was already common practice to characterize Asian societies, in contrast to those of Europe, as purely despotic. Such a point of view has certain grounds. In fact, many of the ancient, medieval, and modern societies of Asia could be classified as regimes with an authoritarian-traditional system of rule. (The same could be said of such societies in Africa and the Americas.) However, the despotism of the superpower in the East is strongly exaggerated. The striving for uncontrolled rule is strongly suppressed there, on the one hand, by the existence on the lower level of communal, tribal, professional, and other organizations alleviating, to a certain extent, the press of power on the individual. On the other hand, in traditional cultures (including Asian ones), the paternalistic perception of the state by subjects is characteristic. For this reason, the masses never strive to change the existing regime but only demand that the heads observe justice. Finally, in Asia there have been various categories of persons (chiefs, landowners, patrons, rich peasants, headmen, etc.) and groups and associations (bureaucratic machinery, castes, clans, etc.) that have pretended to a certain percentage of power and to guarantees of their own status and property, and thereby have had the capability to be both conductors of the purposes of the supreme power and brakes on the process of change. A scholar of Indian society has noted that the impossibility of realizing evolutionary institutional reforms in India pushed a desperate Indira Gandhi to strict, unpopular measures: The hereditary caste groups, each of which occupied ritually the higher or lower position with respect to the others (all of them have been guided in their interrelations by standards of asymmetric rights and

obligations), have formed the blocks of social organization in hundreds of thousands of Indian villages (Migdal 1988: 32).

In modern Russia, client relations–although they have a certain occurrence (in particular, in business and politics, but to a greater extent in the criminal sphere, and especially widely among the nationalities of Central Asia and the Caucasus)–do not have as much of a role as in posttraditional Asia. Personal relations are developed to a greater degree. In the administrative and managerial system of the Russian Federation, they are most conspicuous in the personal character of presidential power. The president is a supraparty figure not related to any political grouping. Under the constitution he is entitled, without consultation with anybody, to dissolve the legislative bodies and to shift the chairmen of government and key ministers. This power was clearly demonstrated in the last years of Boris Yeltsin's rule, when, guided only by personal predilections, he changed prime ministers several times in the course of a year. The government is the nonpolitical body occupied only with economic and social problems. The heads of the Ministry of Defense, Federal Security Service, Ministry of Internal Affairs, Federal Agency for Government Communications and Information, Federal Frontier Service, and so on, answer directly to the president. All of the most key decisions are elaborated in the administration of the president, a body comparable, by its functions and status, with the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Soviet days. Each subject jurisdiction of the Russian Federation has the careful attention of the eyes and ears of the president–his inspectors at the local levels. In addition to them, there are the regional representatives–so-called governors-general with their numerous mechanisms that, according to plans of the creators of this bureaucratic body, should further strengthen the vertical line of executive power. In the time of Putin, the levers of total power have been still more extended.

However, the personal character of the power of the Russian president is only the tip of the iceberg. Similar relations penetrate deeply throughout the power pyramid in Russia. One of the most competent specialists in this matter had the chance to interview, over a long period of time, functionaries of different hierarchical levels. He writes that "the most important component of today's administrative process in Russia is the clientage ties (relations of personal devotion and patronage), which (1) penetrate practically the whole machinery, (2) have a determining effect on the functionary's career, (3) determine the ways conflicts are settled, and (4) are perceived by most employees as normal, natural conditions of the machinery activity." (Afanasyev 1997: 233).

Afanasyev's sociological inquiry, conducted among more than a hundred functionaries of the federal and regional power structures in 1995 in the Russian Academy of Public Service, shows that the representatives of the

administrative elite themselves acknowledged a wide expansion of personal contacts in their environment (see Table 16.1).

Table 16.1 Nature of Personal Contacts among Federal and Regional Government Functionaries

Extent of ties	Family-kindred ties	*Zemlyachestvo* ties (i.e. ties based on place of origin	Ties among mess mates	The based on personal relationships
Not extended	30%	15%	5%	5%
Occasional	55%	60%	0%	35%
Very extensive	15%	25%	5%	60%

Source: Afanasyev 1995: 71; 1997: 227, Fig. 1

Table 16.1 demonstrates how embedded within personal relations the modern Russian administrative elite has become. Only about a third of respondents noted that family-kindred relations did not extend among the functionaries. The share of the other forms of personal relations is much greater. At the same time, personal devotion and patronage are most dominant. Only 5 percent of respondents said they believed that similar relations did not extend to administrative environment. Finally, there is one more interesting point. According to the respondents' opinions, the extent of the occurrence of family-kindred relations and *zemlyachestvo* in Russia was less than that of personal relationships. This assumes the important structural differences between the power system established in Russia and those of the other countries of the CIS (primarily the Central Asian states).

According to data from the same study, the main factors in the functionary's career in Russia are personal relationships and patronage. (This opinion is shared, to one extent or another, by 95 percent of respondents.) Examination of the biographies of some politicians shows that if the present-day Russian functionary does not follow the personal model of conduct and attempts to adapt his (or her) activity to the framework of management of the rational type, then his (or her) tenure most likely will be short. Such a factor as the influence of family-kindred and *zemlyachestvo* relations is also present, but its role is one order of magnitude less, though it is comparable to not-unimportant criteria of the functionary at any level, such as assiduity. A certain role in one's career is played by support of some economic structure, ethno-national affiliation, or ideological conviction. It is indicative that, in the opinion of the respondents, education and office qualifications did not influence the career of the Russian functionary of the end of the 20th century (Afanasyev 1997: 168–169, 176, 227–229).

In post-Soviet times, the number of functionaries of all levels and denominations has sharply increased. The number of generals in today's Russian army is several orders of magnitude more than in the Soviet army during the World War II. According to calculations by Mikhail Voslensky (1991: 150–153), the nomenklatura in the Soviet Union accounted for about 3 million people (taking the members of families into account). The number of functionaries and their nearest relations comprised about 1 million people (0.5 percent of the population). By the turn of the 21st century, according to specialists' estimates, the number of Russian functionaries had increased several times. Their maximum number, including their families, was esState, timated at 7.2 (i.e., 1.8 X 4) million people. This is about 5 percent of the Russian Federation population. New measures related to the strengthening of the vertical line of power in the country resulted in one more qualitative jump in the number of functionaries. All of this has taken place against the background of the prolonged economic and political crisis, a reduction in the country's area of about a fourth, and a decrease in the population by about half (Kradin 2001: 180).

In Russia, most of the real levers of power are controlled by the same people who represented the Soviet elite. Only the deputy corps and business elite have been rotated; among these groups, a little less than half of the people are not tied by the past to the Communist Party *nomenklatura*. In the government and other higher echelons of power, only about 25 percent of persons do not have ties to the party *nomenklatura* of the past. In the regional elites, the share of such individuals is even less: 17 percent. Analysis of the age composition of the Soviet and Russian elites in the last several decades allows one to characterize the changes in the composition of the administrative elite as a "revolution of deputies," with the key posts found in the hands of the younger generation of persons from the Soviet *nomenklatura* (Afanasyev 1997: 245–247). Each Russian functionary of the top managerial level costs the treasury an average of approximately $30,000 a year. According to estimates by various analysts, about a third of the national budget is spent on maintenance of the bureaucracy.

All of this suggests that a developed democratic political system in Russia, as well as in most of the territory of the former Soviet Union, has not been created. Key components, such as the emancipation of the political individual, a stable multiparty system, and independent mass media have not been developed. The authorities, as a rule, continue to be very suspicious of independent mass media, and prefer to act in a closed environment. They use different methods to put pressure on the news media, and attempt to achieve a state monopoly on television and radio broadcasting and even to control the Internet.

Numerous small parties and associations have been established to address any number of specific problems. The overwhelming majority of already-existing parties (except perhaps for communist ones) were established as tools of the personal influence of one leader or another, while in the multinational regions, the parties and movements are established on an ethnic basis. Quite often, these are the only differences between parties (even names and programs can be very similar). In politics and power structures, patron–client relations predominate.

Most political forces do not want to observe the democratic rules of play accepted in the West. The elected presidents (like chief executives at all levels in the former Soviet Union), as well as subordinate functionaries, try to get out of any restriction on their personal power and dispose of the legal opposition. However, the latter, on coming to power, acts the same way. Too much in the political culture of the CIS countries belongs to the past and is related to the traditional system of power and rule.

Will the Russians be able to overcome the burden of traditional state domination (*etatism*) and create a stable democratic society? When I first proposed this question to my colleagues in 1999, it seemed to me that my perspective was more or less optimistic. After President Yeltsin's resignation, the silencing of opposition and the acquiescence of the masses in subsequent years, my predictions became much more pessimistic. However, the Ukrainian and Kyrgyz lessons show that all our theoretical conceptions can be erroneous. In this case, I offer paradoxical ideas: naturally, as a researcher I would like my conclusions to be confirmed by future developments. But as a Russian citizen, I would like them to be proven erroneous. In this case, the answers to my questions can be given only in the course of time.

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